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*Interpreting the Constructed Realities Of the 1991 Gulf War:
A Comparative Textual Analysis Of Two Arab and
Two North American Newspapers*

Mayda Topoushian

A Thesis

in

The Department

of

Communication Studies

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

March 2002

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ABSTRACT

*Interpreting the Constructed Realities of the 1991 Gulf War:
A Comparative Textual Analysis of Two Arab and Two North American Newspapers*

Mayda Topoushian,
Concordia University, 2002

This study examines and compares the realities of the Gulf War as constructed in two Arab, and two North American newspapers. The textual analysis of the *New York Times* (NYT), the *Globe and Mail* (G&M), *Ad Dustour*, and *Al Ahram* revealed the frames that were used in interpreting the complex and remote occurrences of the Gulf War. The convergences and divergences that were revealed through the discourse analysis were examined on two levels: the micro- and the macro-level analysis. At the micro-level, the discussion dealt with the layout, functions of headlines and leads, stylistics, sources, language characteristics of the headlines, editorials, opinion columns, and letters to the editors, all in relation to the newspapers' distinctive roles in articulating their local historical, cultural, and political interests and foreign policy in the coverage of the Gulf War. The contextual analysis, on the other hand, explored the ways in which these newspapers negotiated the constraints of war journalism, media management, transnational news flow, propaganda efforts, and image perceptions.

For The Memory Of My Mother

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Chapter 1

Introduction To The Study

- ***Introduction***

This dissertation examines how four newspapers, located in different national settings, covered the Gulf War. It argues that the realities they constructed were deeply rooted in their unique historical, political, economic and cultural settings, and in turn, were shaped by their respective, and often diverse, cultural values, norms and traditions. In order to grasp the dynamics of the transnational news coverage of the Gulf War, and to offer a culturally germane interpretation, this study employs a comprehensive, multidisciplinary and comparative perspective.

Ostensibly, the focus here is to examine and compare the Gulf War narratives as constructed in two Arab, and two North American newspapers. The Egyptian, *Al Ahram* (The Pyramids), was chosen due to Egypt's participation in the Gulf War. The Jordanian, *Ad Dustour* (The Constitution), was selected to draw attention to Jordan's peculiar position and opposition to the Gulf War. A Canadian newspaper the *Globe and Mail*, served as a comparative Western counterpart to the American, *New York Times*, which represented the United States, a major participant in the war effort. The study explores the challenges to war journalism, and conducts qualitative content analysis to investigate various national images of the Gulf War, and the interdependence of these images across transnational boundaries. In fact, the study employs various theoretical tools, and focuses on the textual patterns, and examines linguistic features or arrangements of facts, arguments and frames in the reporting of the Gulf War. Overall, the study also delves

into the causes and effects of this coverage in terms of the interplay of media, society and politics.

- ***Problem Statement***

The historical, political, and cultural consequences of the Gulf War are still unfolding even a decade later. Media research on war journalism is presented with unique opportunities to benefit from the passage of time, and to grasp the new realities created as a result of the Gulf War. First, in the collective history of the West, the Gulf War is a distant memory of triumph and victory. To the Arab world the Gulf War sinks in deep memory as yet another episode of broken promises and unfulfilled expectations simmering and waiting for the right moment to explode. Secondly, despite the myriad of research and post-Gulf War forecasting of increased tension between the two civilizations (East and West, occident and orient, Christian and Muslim), no one could have ever predicted the magnitude of this apprehension that led to the events of September 11th, 2001.

Worse yet, any reasonable call to challenge the euphoric need of the United States to strike back at an invisible enemy is drowned out. Reason dictates that we dig into the roots of this malaise, of which terrorism is only a symptom, and to ask elementary questions of what it is in the United States' foreign policies that instigates such radicalism and such heinous acts of terrorism. What is it in the name of Islam that drives these men to suicide missions of this magnitude? Until we start looking into the roots of this predicament, and ask appropriate questions, no amount of bombing and killing will be enough to eradicate terrorism, and make the United States safe again. It is an arrogant

blunder to overlook a rudimentary idea that violence breeds violence, and despair sows the seeds for thousands of “Bin Ladens” to spring out of their wretched realities and to threaten the myth of an invincible status quo.

Communication research can help one comprehend the underlying meanings, and clear up the distorted images, and fuzzy perceptions of unfamiliar “others” in distant societies. The transnational media system has the power to eradicate rivalries and to cultivate harmonious coexistence among diverse people. Instead, the media created a global audience to entertain, to sell consumer products, and ways of life. An unbridgeable gap is indeed widening between the silent majority of moderates in both worlds who are being polarized, and forced to align themselves between one *or* the other. The universe is much more infinite, profound, and forgiving should we utilize the same marketing strategies to promote shared commonalities, and celebrate our differences in order to avoid further human suffering and to achieve meaningful human existence. This may be a goal too ambitious to attain, or perhaps, too naïve, and compassionate for the power game of Real Politik to contemplate.

On the other hand, media research on the Middle East¹ has been characterized by generalized, fragmented and functional surveys of media systems in different countries, with scant critical scrutiny, or little probing into, the genuine workings of a culture that makes each of their media systems unique. The majority of the studies undertaken have been behaviorist in orientation, assessing mass media according to a Western determinist paradigm, which has measured media primarily in terms of quantifiable newspapers,

¹A European colonial geographical labeling that referred to the regions between the Far East and the Near East, from Afghanistan to Egypt, including Arabia, Cyprus, and Asiatic Turkey. This entire region, excluding the Balkans was considered peripheral with respect to the dominant center of power in Europe.

radios, magazines, TV sets etc.² In contrast, critical analyses of media economy, ownership, regulations, power, and elite relationships, were conducted in the tradition of dependency, or development paradigms, and were successful in exploring the relevant historical, colonial context of the Middle East.³

But a genuine breakthrough in critical-media studies, and image analysis on the Middle East did not occur until well after Samuel Huntington's (1996) thesis of the "Clash of Civilizations," which generated an intense scholarly response (Abdelnasser, 2000; Agha, 2000; Hafez, 2000; Karim, 2000b; Mowlana, 2000; Tehranian, 2000) to his discourse about an imminent collision between the oriental and occidental worldviews, forecasting alarming and self-fulfilling new religious and cultural conflicts in a new world order where the menace of militant Islam would replace the cold-war narrative reviving North/South, East/West dichotomies. In this regard, the strikingly coherent response of Karim Karim to Huntington's thesis strives to expose the often susceptible, and selective perceptions, and historical prejudice about the Middle East, and Muslims as "violent," and "irrational barbarians" determined to "obliterate the civilized North" (Karim, 2000b:12). Moreover, the comprehensive collection edited by Kai Hafez not only expands our critical understanding of the global media images of Middle Eastern

²For detailed country surveys see: Y. R. Kamalipour & H. Mowlana Eds., 1994. *Mass Media in the Middle East: A Comprehensive Handbook*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. See, also, Boyd, D. A. 1982. *Broadcasting in the Arab World*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

³ L. Zaghlami, "Algeria", 1994, pp. 13-25. A. Hamod & E. K. Paesigian, "Bahrain", 1994, pp. 26-44. J. E. Keshishoglou, "Cyprus", 1994, pp. 45-59. S. Dabbous, "Egypt", 1994, pp. 60-73. A. Malek & M. M. Rad, "Iran", 1994, pp. 74-95. K. S. Hurrat & L. L. Leidig, "Iraq", 1994, pp. 96-108. S. Lehman-Wilzig & A. Schejter, "Israel", 1994, pp. 109-125. M. I. Ayish, M. N. El-Sarayah & Z.D. Rifai, "Jordan", pp. 126-143. Fayad E. Kazan, "Kuwait", 1994, pp. 143-159. M.M. Hammoud & W.A. Afifi, "Lebanon", pp. 160-172. K. Mezran, "Libya", 1994, pp. 173-185. H. S. Noor Al-Deen, "Oman", 1994, pp. 186-197. M. Haque, "Pakistan", 1994, pp. 198-212. O.A. Najjar, "Palestine", 1994, pp. 213-228. M.M. Arafa, "Qatar", 1994, pp. 229-243. K. R. Rampal, 1994, "Saudi Arabia", 1994, pp. 244-261. A. Singhal & V. Krishna, "Syria", 1994, pp. 261-272. A. Hidri, "Tunisia", 1994, pp. 273-280. H. Unsal, "Turkey", 1994, pp. 281-292. A. S. Babbili & S. Hussain, "United Arab Emirates", 1994, pp. 293-308.

and Muslim societies, but also elaborates on the perceptions of the West in the Arab Middle East, which for the longest time, the West has been portrayed in terms of “immoral materialists,” and “crusading neo-imperialists” (Hafez, 2000:xi).

Although image analysis is imperative in enhancing our understanding about how the West views the Arab and Muslim World, and how the Arab world perceives the West, it is not quite sufficient for revealing various determinants of the interplay between media, politics and society. Therefore, media research on the Middle East calls for a multidisciplinary approach to thoroughly identify the relationships between: a) transnational news reporting and foreign policy; b) transnational news reporting and the construction of reality; and c) transnational news reporting and the taken-for-granted cultural repertoire of symbols and meanings (Hall, 1975) that newspapers use in their construction of the Gulf War.

As Edward Said notes: “No one lives in direct contact either with truth or with reality” (1981:43). What we come to know as individuals about our existence is an accumulation of past and present interpretations of our reality. This second-hand world that we live in depends on stereotyped meanings and experiences of ready-made interpretation centers established by the cultural apparatus in a society. Thus, the fallout of these crude generalizations in media research on the Arab world resulted in methodological reductionism, a “commonsensical” perspective that treated the area as one big homogenous unit and failed to disentangle the intricate social, historical, economic and cultural characteristics of a genuinely diverse region. The immense disparities among Arab states make any one-dimensional media research of events in the Arab world quite challenging, especially during an acute crisis such as the Gulf War.

Despite the fact that Arab countries are bound together by religion, history, and language, their political, economic, and cultural circumstances vary, in some cases, dramatically. For instance, the political, economic, and social differences between Kuwait and Yemen or Sudan and Jordan are vast. Still, there are periods when either a real crisis or perceived threats from “outsiders” such as the West or Israel may have provided the basis for cohesiveness, albeit temporarily for the most part. The Gulf crisis did not unite the Arab world despite the fact that most Arab countries, except for Jordan, Sudan, Libya, and Yemen, joined the coalition that liberated Kuwait (Boyd, 1994).

- ***The Gulf War: From Desert Shield To Desert Storm***

On Wednesday, January 16, 1991, the United Nations’ Coalition forces led by the United States launched “Operation Desert Storm” to drive out the Iraqi occupying forces from Kuwait, and to prevent a possible attack on Saudi Arabia. Not only was Operation Desert Storm among the largest military attacks since World War II, it also began like no other in history, live and on prime-time television, just before 7 pm EST. George Gerbner argued that the “technology based immediacy” of the Gulf War was similar to its comparison by Frederick Williams, a media-technology scholar, to “the first moon landing in 1969” (Gerbner, 1992:243).

The aim of “Operation Desert Storm,” according to the president of the United States, was to free Kuwait and to fully enforce the UN resolutions on Iraq. A clean and swift surgical strike was needed to punish aggression and to get rid of Hussein in order to secure oil, jobs, peace and democracy. However, according to the UN inspection team, this military measure turned into a human and ecological disaster of “cataclysmic

proportions” that achieved few of its purported aims. By the forty-third (and last) day of “Operation Desert Storm,” 88,500 tons of bombs had been dropped on Iraq and Kuwait (Smith, 1992:194). A British defense expert calculated that in the first month “the tonnage of high explosive bombs already released has exceeded the combined allied air offensive of World War II.” (Gerbner, 1992:252). The Pentagon estimated that 200,000 lives were claimed in direct casualties alone, according to a secret report revealed by former navy secretary John Lehman. The war “changed almost nothing,” concluded *Newsweek* on June 28, 1991. “Most of the same faces and the same tired policies remain.... Internally, the regime's capacity for repression seems undiminished” (Gerbner, 1992:258).

Ironically, this same Iraqi regime had once been in a strategic relationship with the United States (during the Iran-Iraq war), and had been perceived as a secular bulwark against the spread of radical Muslim fundamentalist revolution. The United States presented Iraq with military equipment and intelligence, agricultural credits, and “dual-use” technology that could be used for building highly destructive weapon systems. With the sudden end of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988, Iraq continued to buy massive amounts of arms from the West, and Iraqi president Saddam Hussein persisted in building up his military machine with Western help. Despite the fact that Iraq brutally suppressed the Kurds (who lived in northern Iraq) and that his human-rights record was atrocious, Hussein continued to receive aid and favored treatment from the Bush administration. The State Department talked of the importance of the U.S. relationship with Iraq, and U.S. senators visited Iraq for Saddam Hussein's birthday in 1990, and even advised him on how to improve his negative image by adopting a better public-relations policy

(Keller, 1993:12).

- **The Media Coverage Of The Gulf War**

As in all wars, the Gulf War challenged war journalism in Western democracies with the task of balancing between the right to inform, and the military need for secrecy. The trick, however, was to avoid entrapment in propaganda warfare under the guise of patriotism and safeguarding the troops.

There are two levels of arguments in any discussion of transnational war journalism, firstly: the national level, and secondly: the transnational or global level. On the national stage, issues such as the interdependence of media and politics, censorship, the need to inform the public, the military need for secrecy, and consensus formation are of central importance. However, on the transnational scene, topics of ideology, dominance, and propaganda become paramount, and entwined in discussions about the global media structure, the transnational flow of news, the domestication of transnational news, and the interdependence of transnational news and foreign policy.

A) War Journalism On The National Level

The Gulf War was a global event that represented a focal point in the history of global journalism. Advanced technological capabilities gave the Gulf War immediate, and instantaneous media coverage of events unfolding in real time, and in front of a global audience. In a way, the media coverage of the Gulf War presented a virtual global village, and brought a sense of closeness to faraway battlefields right into the comfort zones of peoples' living rooms around the globe. National angels, nevertheless, were still

needed to interpret the Gulf War narratives within the context of informing a domestic audience about their national policies and perspectives (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001).

A significant portion of the Gulf War media coverage literature has grappled with aspects of media independence during international conflicts. Research on war coverage (Knightly, 1974; Luostarinen, 1994, Luostarinen & Ottosen, 2001; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001; Schiller, 1992) repeatedly attests to the fact that media in war times are easily manipulated, and drawn into conflict, and can often end up as instruments for propaganda.

One of the primary questions that this dissertation has set out to explore is whether war journalism can resist the one-dimensional and propagandist nature of war reporting in Western democracies, and if there is any real chance for independent and critical war journalism. Obviously the answer is in the forthcoming textual analysis of the next chapters. However, to guide us in seeking this answer, Nohrstedt & Ottosen (2001: 269) cautioned against slipping into a common entrapment of blaming the lack of alternative views in war reporting on the media's sole interest in preserving the status quo. There are other constraints on war journalism besides the ideological mobilization perspective to preserve the status quo, which is in reference to news accounts presented in dominant frames, and ideological meanings in a society (Parenti, 1986; Hall 1982). This study however, does not subscribe to the view that Western mass media promote particular views on given issues, it attributes this predisposition to the hegemonic nature of dominant narratives that transpire in the common field of meanings shared in a society, and in the norms and traditions which are commonly embedded in institutional practices, and in professional journalistic guidelines (Karim, 1993, 2000a, 2000b).

- **The Gulf War Media Management**

The literature on journalism during the Gulf War has dealt with media-management strategies such as censorship, access and propaganda. (Auerbach, 1992; Branigan, 1992; Coll, 1992; DeParle, 1992; Gellman 1992; Henderson, 1992; La Marche, 1992; Lubow, 1992; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001; Schanberg, 1992; Wicker, 1992; Williams, 1992; Zorthian, 1992). However, this study contends that by limiting access to Saudi Arabia, access to pools, and access to witnessing actual combat to a handful of U.S. and British journalists, the U.S. army was able to achieve near total control over the media coverage of the Gulf War. Through censorship of reports, footage and film, the U.S. army not only banned independent journalism, but also used the media to rally the audiences to support the goals of the government. Through limiting access to the battlefield and establishing the pool system, the military denied reporters access to other sources, and when journalists were able to comment outside the guidelines of the pool system, or engage in critical reporting, they were harassed, punished or even expelled by the military personnel. Pitting journalists against one other was another strategy used by the military. Robert Fisk, the Middle East correspondent for the British *Independent* was involved in the following incident as told by Philip Taylor:

Robert Fisk... encountered a news pool attached to the 1st US Marine Division and was told by one American network reporter: "You asshole: You'll prevent us from working. You're not allowed here. Get out. Go back to Dahrn" (Taylor, 1992:142).

The interdependence of media and politics during wartime is most obvious in their reciprocal influences, and the dependency of sources. The persuasive methods of the pool system in the Gulf War were implemented by feeding the pool and the media

through frequent press conferences. Reporters in the pool system had a constant and abundant American military supply of interviews, background information, and film footage, a campaign that established the primary position of the military in “the history of war visualization” (Luostarinen & Ottosen, 2001:41). During these press conferences the U.S. military leaders fed the media the U.S. version of events, and eliminated the chance for any critical questions. Mary Mander (1991) claimed that these conferences were planned and rehearsed down to very minute details. She wrote in the *Christian Science Monitor*:

At televised press conferences, the military had direct access to the people.
- And at the same time was able to undermine the credibility of journalistic interpretations. It was a stunning reversal of roles from Vietnam, where the press called military credibility into question (Luostarinen & Ottosen, 2001:41).

It is believed that at times, the military purposefully misinformed the media to mislead the Iraqi army. John Whiting (1991) stated in the *Naval Institute Proceedings* that the military leaked a possible Marine landing site and when the actual attack began, the Iraqi army had its back to the incoming attack (Luostarinen & Ottosen, 2001:42).

- **Counter Strategies To Media Management**

The literature about the persuasive nature of the U.S. military information policy in the Gulf War is abundant. The controlled news flow during the Gulf War had many journalists commit themselves to never play into the hands of the military again. However, Philip Knightly contends that the military is much better organized, and resolved to control the news flow during wartime than reporters' hectic schedules and

commercial, political and institutional pressures on critical journalism. Dan Rather (1994) described the situation best in *The Quill*:

Kiss ass, move with the mass,
And for heaven
And the ratings' sake
Don't make anybody mad...
Make nice, not news (Luostarinen & Ottosen, 2001:44).

There were few ways that journalists could escape the military news-management of the Gulf War. Some made the military media-management of the Gulf the topic of their reports. For example, *The Times* and *The Guardian* of Britain devoted 9% of their total first week of Gulf War reporting to media issues (Luostarinen, 1994).

Additionally, many news organizations chose to balance the uncritical militaristic, and spontaneous war coverage by publishing more critical and analytical stories and interviews. Ironically the factual coverage and hard-action news were the least trustworthy, and the truly independent reporting was to be found in background stories and opinion columns (Denton, 1993). Using media as a tool of warfare shocked the media. In this regard, an article in the 25 February 1991 issue of *Newsweek*, commented on the military control of information: "the journalists of democratic societies work independently in theory, ... in practice they are treated as a part of the army's weaponry during wars" (Luostarinen & Ottosen, 2001:46).

B) War Journalism On The Transnational Media Level

Research in international communication is mainly concerned with the global media structure, transnational flow of news, ideology, dominance and propaganda. There have been numerous studies of the media coverage of the Gulf War: Tracy Weber's 1996

literature survey of the Gulf War media coverage accounted for 39 books, 89 articles, 22 book reviews, and 11 theses and dissertations (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001:12). But few of these studies have analyzed the transnational Gulf War narratives in conjunction with the processes of recontextualization that occurred during the transfer of these dominant discourses from their transnational to the cross-national settings, thus allowing national or local media systems to construct multiple Gulf War realities.

Therefore, following in the steps of Nohrstedt & Ottosen (2001), this study departs from the theoretical premises of ideology and dominance, and acknowledges the power and hegemonic nature of the transnational media system that consists of U.S. based and owned giant conglomerates (Bagdikian, 1997). These global media giants have immense power to disseminate transnational news in accord with the hegemonic interests of the United States, despite the presence of other media conglomerates such as Sony, Philips and Seagram's; a dominant U.S. media narrative emerges in place of true independent journalism.

In spite of the overwhelming and unrestricted global Gulf War media supply, and the dominant media narrative favoring U.S. control and leadership, this study contends that the effect of transnational news content is not linear, and will not have a direct, and similar influence on global public opinion (Jensen, 1986; Liebes & Katz, 1993; Radway, 1984). It is quite likely that "recontextualization" (Fairclough, 1995b: 41) and "domestication" (Cohen et al., 1996: 152-153) processes of transnational news will occur while being decoded, and transferred from a transnational to a national or local context. In effect, John Thompson (1995) argued that the appropriation of such symbolic material would always depend on local cultural, political, and historical conditions. In other

words, the same media content distributed worldwide will not be interpreted in the same way everywhere. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to explore the ways in which the national journalistic discourses of these four newspapers handled a globally disseminated supply of information of a major international conflict such as the Gulf War.

Hence, this study holds the view that: a) in the Gulf War the U.S. authorities controlled the news coverage by advanced media management strategies, and provided the global media with a U.S. framework for coverage. b) the globalization effect of media in terms of news values and immediacy and the fact that the U.S. dominated on the international level gave the actions of U.S. leaders and authorities top priorities in the news agenda all over the world. c) this led to a U.S. dominant Gulf War narrative in the transnational news flow. d) despite the enormous global Gulf War news diffusion, local appropriation was still possible, and reception (on the newspapers level) was characterized by cultural, linguistic and ideological preconditions, which differed from one nation-state to another.

Accordingly, this study contends that the Gulf War was not interpreted the same way in the newspapers studied here, and argues that transnational media content, and the national decodings of the newspapers studied here have in fact functioned as filters, and gatekeepers sifting through the myriad of Gulf War information, appropriating and utilizing the products that fit their national perspectives best (Breed, 1955, Epstein, 1973; Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973; Tuchman 1978; White, 1950).

- **Transnational News Coverage & Foreign Policy**

Scholars have explained transnational news coverage in terms of development and dependency approaches (Mowlana, 1973, 1986, 1994). However, the production and distribution of news stories consists of several interrelated elements. Media aspects of the Gulf War have been explored extensively from the American side (Alexandre, 2001; Fromm, 1992; Gart, 1992; Garbo, 2001; Hughes, 1992; Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen, 2001; Nohrstedt, 2001; Rodman, 1992; Tanzer, 1992) and to a certain extent from the Canadian side (Greenwood, 1991; Karim, 2000a; Mosco, 1996; Smith, 1991; White, 1991; Winter, 1991, 1992). But how was this war covered in Egypt and Jordan? Is there a relationship between transnational news coverage and foreign policy?

The interdependence between foreign policy and mass media is known for having the ability to influence politics and public opinion. The two pillars of foreign policy are interests and perceptions and the media play a major role in manipulating and safeguarding a country's foreign interests (resources, or strategic locations), and constructing a perception, in the form of a mental model of the "other" (i.e. foreign peoples' traditions, religions, cultures), which is very different from the familiar ("our") way of life.

In exploring the connection between foreign policy and media reporting on the Middle East, Jochen Hippler poses the question of whether the political system "manages" the media, or whether foreign policy is primarily driven by newspapers and television in this "era of information?" He also, evaluates the relationship between foreign policy-elites and the general public's perceptions of the Middle East (Hippler, 2000:68).

Hippler asserts that in times of conflict, media coverage can be pivotal to the success of military operations and in achieving national strategic goals, as was the case in Vietnam, a war that many believed was lost on the “home front.” In an acute crisis, media war-reporting exercises power by influencing decision-making and altering policy implementation. A case in point is the Vietnam War, where pictures of dying U.S. soldiers and those of the My Lai massacre victims helped cultivate public opposition to the war. Another example is the U.S. administration’s embarrassment over media reporting of the American troops’ self-inflicting damage during the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983. The U.S. involvement in Somalia was also compromised by the TV footage of killed U.S. soldiers whose bodies were shown dragged by Somalis through the streets of Mogadishu.

In essence, the role of media in times of conflict is considered to have a dual nature of either promoting peace and defusing tension or intensifying the conflict and deepening the crises. This generalization is commonly held under the assumption that international relations are not solely driven by national interests but also are based on image politics that can influence political decision-making and foreign policy (Hafez, 2000: 36; Tehranian 1984: 44f.). Having said that, the transnational media during the Gulf War were also used as vehicles for leaders to conduct diplomacy and manipulate the public (for examples, see Alter et. al 1991; Heiberg 1991; and O’Heffernan 1991). Media diplomacy in the Gulf War was quite intense and full of public displays of acrimony between President Bush and President Hussein. Their public exchanges of personal attacks, threats, and ultimata were all scheduled for prime-time viewing. In essence, the Gulf War is a classic example of war reportage that intensified the conflict

by failing to promote peace and to defuse tension. Some believe that the mainstream media-portrayal of the conflict limited the debate between either sanctions or war, thereby restricting the calls of alternative media for more peaceful solutions into the background (Tiveiten, 2001).

- **Propaganda - Image & Perceptions**

This study contends that while the Gulf War provides an ideal context for a classical propaganda perspective, the term propaganda is used here with extreme caution to avoid slipping into the pejorative sense of propaganda (injection theory, mass society and passive receivers) referred to in brainwashing and psychological warfare of dictatorial communication systems. Therefore the term propaganda will be used in this study in its most modern sense, as a sort of delicate public-relations strategy used for persuasion, and cognitive manipulation of public opinion. Better yet, this study subscribes to Nohrstedt & Ottosen's opinion that "any modern war is also a propaganda war or a conflict fought on the symbolic level" (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001:20). On the other hand, this study argues that the propaganda perspective is not sufficient for the objectives set for this endeavor; nonetheless, it is used as a theoretical background to guide the ensuing textual analysis. In fact, the most pertinent propaganda model to this undertaking is the one developed by Luostarinen (1986b; 1994), in which he considers the narratives of war propaganda as a story-telling process with three distinct features: a) mythical references, rich descriptions and metaphors, b) motivational logic, and c) rich polarized references depicting the conflict in good vs. evil terms (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001:21-22).

Hence, this study asserts that all parties involved in the Gulf War were engaged in some sort of propaganda warfare, and the media functioned as propaganda channels of the nation state. Mobilization efforts were primarily focused on creating consensus for the armed forces, and military objectives transcended peace-time journalistic ideals, and the citizen's right to know. The media were more susceptible to censorship or were even engaged in self-censorship, thus were more inclined to shy away from reporting the suffering of the enemy while depicting their righteous struggle in familiar age-old perceptions and stereotypes about each other (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001:250).

So, in order to provide a comprehensive analysis, it is also significant to examine the historical, political, and cultural context of Western/Arab/Muslim relations (Hafez, 2000; Hentsch, 1992; Hippler, 2000; Ismael, 1986; Karim, 2000a, 2000b; Said, 1978;) and the distorted image of Arabs and Muslims in Western media (Abdelnasser, 2000; Adams, 1981; Agha, 2000; Ghareeb, 1983; Karim, 2000a, 2000b; Said, 1981; Shaheen, 1984; Tehranian, 2000; Wiegand, 2000). Also, in tune with current theories of newswork (Tuchman, 1978; Hall et. al., 1978; Schlesinger, 1978; Epstein, 1973; Ericson et.al, 1978) it is quite important to consider the role of media in the reproduction of dominant meanings in society.

- **Purpose & Significance**

This study examines and explicates the processes through which the Gulf War was constructed in print journalism. It treats the coverage of the Gulf War as an interpretation reflecting powerful interests in the society. Along with this constructed picture is a set of feelings that Said called the over-all context. By context he meant the

picture's setting in reality, "the values implicit in it, and not least, the kind of attitude it promotes in the beholder" (Said, 1981:43-44).

Certainly, the cornerstone of the study is the assumption that a single event will be interpreted in different ways by the news media in different countries. Why? Because communication and culture are inseparable, and when the elements of culture differ, the elements of communication differ too. Based on the interpretive communication paradigm, I assert that people from various countries send and receive different messages via different channels. The way they communicate is a reflection of their own cultures.

The purpose of this dissertation is primarily to expand on the work in international communication, and interpretive media research on the hegemonic nature and the bias of Western media in covering events in Third World countries. The bias in international news coverage within the United States has been studied extensively (see for example, Ahern, 1894, Chang, 1988; Galtung & Rugd, 1965; Gans, 1979; Graber, 1989; Hopple, 1982; Lent 1977, Mazharul Haque, 1983, Mcnelly & Izcarey, 1986; Peterson, 1981; Seberney-Mohammadi & Grant, 1985; Stevenson & Cole, 1984; van Dijk, 1984, 1988). These studies reveal the bias of often-negative media coverage of foreign issues that have a strong Western orientation, but they are limited to the American context, and do not probe into the structures and dynamics of this bias (Huang & McAdams, 2000:58). Thus, this study attempts to go beyond the explanation of transnational news bias, and to place it in a broader theoretical framework of hegemony, by probing how each selected newspaper from the United States, Canada, Egypt and Jordan covered the Gulf War. By comparing the news coverage of the Gulf War, this study will attempt to show how this war was defined, and the context in which it was

interpreted and treated by the sampled newspapers of these four countries.

If one is to provide a glimpse of how transnational news reporting is dominated by Western news agencies, it is essential to verify the sources of news as indicators to the contextual relation of the news report to their sources (Nohrstedt, 2001: 184). In this regard, the term “source” will be used in this study in reference to the institutional, and professional suppliers of material to media – news agencies, correspondents, and other media (but not spokespersons, or political actors).

Ultimately, this study contributes to research on the theory of transnational news flow, domestication of transnational news, and foreign reporting, and presents an integrated theoretical framework to analyze the interplay of transnational news coverage, politics and society. By employing a multi-level analysis of the Gulf War narrative, the study attempts to uncover the processes of trans-cultural communication in terms of a) transnational news coverage and public agendas, b) transnational media content’s interaction with domestic environments, c) interaction between “domestic” and “foreign” media issues, and d) media effects on international conflicts.

Furthermore, this work provides insights into the interplay of language, politics, history and culture as they are all embedded in the textual processes of the Arab and English newspapers, and in the ways these languages were used by the media to interpret and construct very different realities of the Gulf War, hence reflecting the interests as well as the uniqueness of each society. Therefore, the significance of the study is in the probing of the way in which the Arab press has depicted the realities of the Gulf War. Since the writer is familiar with Arab language, culture, history and geography, it makes it worthwhile to venture into examining the Arab press accounts that touched the lives of

millions of Arabs, and to juxtapose them with the accounts of the American elite daily *The New York Times*, and the Canadian *Globe and Mail* in terms of what coverage each represented to their respective cultures, politics.

Another contribution of this cross-national endeavor is to the tradition of press theory in comparative media studies, and in its attempt to connect economic, cultural, and political differences between countries to corresponding differences in national approaches to journalism (Martin and Chaudhary 1983; Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1956). Thus, the analysis enriches our understanding of the nature and function of transnational communication systems in the Arab World as manifested in their journalistic practices, which differ from those in the West. The detailed textual analysis of the *New York Times* in chapter two, the *Globe & Mail* in chapter three, *Ad Dustour* in chapter four, and *Al Ahram* in chapter five offer a juxtaposition of the interweaving nature of media philosophies, and their respective structures, and roles in a society.

In this chapter though, an explanation of key concepts such as quality journalism, and variations in philosophical and journalistic standards of all four newspapers is warranted. First, *The New York Times* (1,097,180 copies daily)⁴ and *The Globe and Mail* (375,003 copies daily)⁵ are considered “elite” and “journals of record,” a Western term that refers to their high standards of journalistic practice, and dedication to serve the information needs of their societies with utmost thoroughness, balance and integrity. A typical elite newspaper is usually recognized as an opinion leader with wide readership (see Table 1.1 below), as a national and international agenda-setter of public opinion, and as influential in national and world policy. Quality journalism can also be found in both

⁴Audit Bureau of Circulations FAS-FAX, Sept. 30, 1999; sworn statements; company records.

⁵Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC), 2000.

authoritarian and libertarian societies. In both models, the elite paper is usually devoted to the press philosophy of its society and usually it takes its task quite seriously (Merrill, 1983).

Table 1.1 Profile Comparisons of The Four Newspapers

| | <i>THE NEW YORK TIMES</i> | <i>THE GLOBE AND MAIL</i> | <i>AD DUSTOUR</i> | <i>AL AHAM</i> |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Founded In | 1851 | 1845 | 1967 | 1876 |
| Readership | - | 1,219,500 (m)+ | - | - |
| Circulation | 1,097,180 (m) * | 375,003 (m)+ | 90,000 (m) | 900,000 (m) * |
| Company | The New York Times Co. | Thomson Corp. | Jordan Press & Publishing Co. | Al Ahram Co. |
| Readership Profile | - | Household income of \$100,000+ | - | - |
| National Ranking | 3 rd | 1 st | - | 3 rd * |
| International Ranking | 42 nd * | - | - | 53 rd * |

Sources: +Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC), 2000
NADbank, 2001

*Editor and Publisher's Yearbook, 1998.

<http://www.naa.org>

<http://www.addustour.com>

<http://www.alahram.com>

Secondly, both *The New York Times* and *The Globe And Mail* operate within pluralist social parameters (albeit slightly different) of journalistic philosophies declared and guaranteed within their respective nation's constitutions, and under the provisions of free speech. Conversely, the Arab press has always been highly political, and is labeled as a loyalist, mobilization or diverse press. The Jordanian *Ad Dustour* fits the loyalist press, while the Egyptian *Al Ahram* belongs to the mobilization press and both operate

within the social responsibility/authoritarian theory that will be discussed soon. Suffice it here to say that the Egyptian *Al Ahram* established in 1876, with its wide readership (900,000 copies daily)⁶, and circulation outside the nation's borders, is considered authoritative and would probably fit the "journal of record" maxim more than its Jordanian counterpart *Ad Dustour* that was founded in 1967 (90,000 copies daily).⁷

Then again, I would caution against slipping back into measuring Arab newspapers according to Western principles and values, a simplistic generalization that has plagued most media research on Arab countries. However, in order to clarify why *Al Ahram* might fit loosely into this Western standardization pertaining to the information, wide readership, and influential tasks assigned to the label "elite journalism," one must explain how it is rooted in Egypt's leading literary, political, ideological and social role in the Arab world (a topic dealt with in chapter five).

On the other hand, variations in structure, practice and role of the communication systems in this study also need to be addressed. The print media in the United States and Canada are rooted in the Libertarian Theory of the press, which dates back to seventeenth-century England, and was characterized by John Milton and John Locke who insisted on doing away with government control of the press as well as articulating individual liberties and the right to pursue truth ... etc. In this model the press is considered the Fourth Estate (albeit theoretically), and its role in society is to uncover and present the truth, inform the public, and keep abreast of government activities.

The print media in Egypt and Jordan (albeit privately owned in the former and semi-private in the latter) depending on one's perspective, range somewhere in the

⁶ *Editor and Publisher's Yearbook*, 1998.

⁷ *Ad Dustour* website, based on 1995 circulation figures.

middle between the authoritarian and the social responsibility theories. Unlike the libertarian theory, the social-responsibility theory of the press is a mid-twentieth century hybrid concept (from authoritarian, libertarian, and communist) that was modified by the Hutchins Commission in 1947. The concept mainly calls for government regulations to restrict the excessive freedom of the press, and demands its obligation and responsibility to support government policies and advance national leadership. The role of the media in the social-responsibility system is to cultivate public support, serve society, and promote national political interests as articulated by the leader and government (Merrill, 1983:26).

Without delving deep into the philosophical or epistemological aspects of what constitutes the social responsibility of the press, arguments can be easily made about a socially responsible press in different political systems. Consequently, even the most authoritarian media systems are justified as being responsible in the eyes of their beholding states or regimes. After all, where do you draw the line between what Egypt thinks is a responsible press, and the most appropriate governing system that meets the needs of the Egyptian society? Similarly, who is to say that a loyalist press in Jordan is authoritarian rather than responsible without risking being riddled by an ethnocentric, reductive and irrefutable American perspective?

A case in point is the Canadian communication system. Nothing is more compatible with or comparable to the American philosophy of the freedom of the press than is its Canadian counterpart. Yet when Canada takes measures to preserve its cultural identity and to regulate its media system in order to facilitate and advance its national unity and cultural sovereignty, Americans call it infringement on the freedom of expression, individual liberties and so on. To put a logical twist to this argument, any

media system is deemed socially conscientious if it preserves the norms, codes and traditions of a certain society. In other words, any press or media system that does not uphold its country's political philosophy would then be considered negligent. By the same token, one country's irresponsible press system is another nation's responsible one. For instance, during the Vietnam War the American military and political establishment accused the American press of reckless coverage (referred to as the Vietnam Syndrome), and blamed its unpatriotic treatment of the war as one of the main reasons for losing the Vietnam War. Since then, the American mainstream media have felt a certain responsibility to support U.S. troops in combat (in Grenada, Panama and the Gulf War) under the banner of "my country right or wrong." Therefore, any media system can be justified under the rubric of social responsibility, a system that believes in a supportive, or cooperative press, which has moral obligations particularly in times of crisis to help its government in its efforts to foster national stability, security and unity. Most developing states were plagued by colonialism and are still recovering from their underdeveloped sense of identity and juvenile statehood.

The dominant Western global media system is believed to be encroaching more than ever on the national sovereignty and cultural identity of the Third World. These states are in a battle for their existence especially in the current global structure, as characterized by the unsurpassed technological superiority of the United States and the West. The critique of the American, and thereby Western dominance of the global media system, the concerns over the imbalance of the global flow of information (North vs. South), the dominant role of Western news agencies in disseminating negative distorting news, and stereotyping images of developing countries were all concerns that sparked the

great debates of the New World Information Order in the 1970's, culminating in the MacBride Report of 1980. Some twenty or thirty years later, the arguments are even more intense today given the incredible innovations in communication technologies that put the developing states in dire need for a responsible press if they are at all to stand a chance to achieve nationhood (Mowlana, 2000). Quite frankly, many in the so-called Third World do not believe that they can afford the luxury of a Western-style free press, given their desire to advance their national development, social, and political harmony. Now, more than ever, there is a need for a critical global perspective that keeps track of the dangers inherent in the enormous one-way flow of international information from the global media machine. This means that media scholars should be aware of its monopolistic power to dominate, interpret world events and redefine history.

Lastly, the originality of this work is in its effort to uncover the contrasting stylistics of Arabic, and English in news reporting, as well as the patterns of thought and discourse in Arabic language. Arabic language and discourse is a thrilling, but highly controversial subject. Experts dispute whether the Arabic language shapes content over ideas, and ideas over facts in such a way that cripples its capacity for logical argumentation (Patai, 1983). The arrogant charges that the Arabic language is fundamentally, and structurally not suitable for reasoned discussion is certainly absurd, but defending it goes beyond the realm of this study. However, the use of slogans of nationalist, and Islamic clichés in the discourses of *Ad Dustour* and *Al Ahram*, and their ability to drown out reasoned discussion needs, nevertheless, to be addressed.

A final comment is warranted to account for the variations between the Arabic, and English languages pertaining to the current undertaking:

1. Arabic writing proceeds from right to left, and has no upper and lower case characters to discriminate, for instance, between pronouns, or to accord prominence.
2. My translations of all Arabic headlines and leads are based on assumptions drawn from both the universalistic and the relativist theories of language. The very nature of translation presupposes the existence of certain universal parameters, which render all languages translatable. It should be acknowledged that due to certain idiosyncratic elements in each language, a perfect translation is ultimately impossible (Obeidat, 1994:20).
3. A major variation (in quantitative terms variable) that needs to be dealt with is the language issue. I do not in any way claim to be a linguist or an expert on linguistics, nor are the observations I make about the stylistic, discursive and rhetorical distinctions between Arabic and English of specialized academic merit. The focus of the study will always be on the communication and journalistic practices of these newspapers, although as we all know it is a hair-splitting task to try and separate the interconnectedness of language and culture from its communicative aspects. This is certainly not my objective, and I'm not even sure that anyone would want to venture there. Therefore, any linguistic judgment in this study is merely made to appreciate the workings of language and culture intertwined into the journalistic frames and accounts of the newspapers that are being examined.
4. In terms of the charges that the Arabic language is full of verbs and adjectival phrases usually used to imply power and coercion (Rubinstein, 1987), the textual

analysis has examined the esthetic qualities, and stylistic, lexical and syntactic levels, of rich grammar, and levels of abstractions in Arabic language to verify these charges. In comparison to precise English news writing, Arabic news writing is often thought to rely too heavily on stylistic characters of exaggeration, to appeal to pride and shame, and to use expressions of readiness to take action, forthrightness, steadfastness, invocation of religion, vagueness of thought and sarcasm (Shinar, 1987:56).

5. The cultural ethos such as the prevailing belief of Arab fascination with words rather than action was also examined while interpreting the Arabic discourse of the Gulf War in both *Ad Dustour* and *Al Ahram*. Special attention was given to the inferred indication of experts to the intrinsic value of words in Arab cultures and its deep-rootedness in historical, cultural, religious, and political meanings.⁸
6. Finally, Oddgeir Tveiten contends that many non-native newspaper readers fail to understand the role of the opinion page as an institution in the English-speaking media world (Tveiten, 2001:228). The function of opinion columns and editorial comments are aspects of news reporting that are still vague in cross-national settings, and it needs to be noted that their function in Arab newspapers is totally different from their English counterparts in this study. In other words, the range of alternative views, and critical debates of issues are significant features of the

⁸ See also Barbara Kock, "Presentation as Proof: the Language of Arabic Rhetoric", *Anthropological Linguistic*, 25 (1), 1982. E. Shouby, "The influence of the Arabic Language on the Psychology of the Arabs," *Middle East Journal* 5, no. 3 (Summer 1951), 284; H., Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World*, (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1966) referred to in Dov Shinar's, "Palestinian Media: Content, Style, and Language," *Palestinian Voices*, 1987.

op-ed pages of both *The Globe and Mail* and *The New York Times*, but not so in *Al Ahram* and *Ad Dustour*. The ensuing analysis will reveal the conceptual and functional deviation of both editorial and opinion columns, since the latter is embedded in the factual news reports, and the former is in total compliance with the front-page coverage of the Gulf War.

After a swift linguistic journey, we have arrived at a philosophical juncture of language, thought, communication and culture, but before going astray, let's return to our topic.

- **Research Questions & Method**

The comparative-interpretive nature of this study offers an alternative way for content analysis to study the often scattered and unsynthesized research on Arab media. The problematic of previous media research on the Arab world has been plagued by crude generalizations and simplistic characterizations based on comparisons with the Western media models.

- Researchers have characterized mass media in the Arab world in general and print in particular as developmental, compatible, and typical of developing countries' revolutionary media in the world. Others have contended that the manipulation of language in the Arab world leads to militant style mobilization, and that advocacy often permeates most messages, which results in political factionalisms of a "mobilization press" full of aggressive, combative, hyperbole, reactionary and repetitive style (Shinar, 1987:56).

- Central to our discussion is the assumption that “what the media produce is neither spontaneous, nor completely free: news does not just happen, pictures and ideas do not merely spring from reality into our eyes and minds, truth is not directly available; we do not have unrestrained variety at our disposal” (Said, 1981:44). Specifically, during an acute crisis that puts a nation’s security and interests in jeopardy, certain media, regardless of their philosophical orientation, rally behind their governments, and even function as propaganda mouthpieces.
- Having said that, it is not the purpose of this study to suggest that the Western states are repressive, propaganda-ruled political entities. Nor do I wish to say that they express one general view; of course, they do not. But, as Said explicates: “despite the extraordinary variety there is a qualitative and a quantitative tendency to favor certain views and certain representations of reality over others.” Since our knowledge of the world cannot be direct or natural, and is made for us “as the result of human will, history, social circumstances, institutions, and conventions of one’s profession. Such aims of the press as objectivity, factuality, realistic coverage, and accuracy are highly relative terms; they express intentions, perhaps, and not realizable goals” (Said, 1981:45).
- In contrast, Egypt is considered to have a mobilization press, and Jordan a loyalist one (Merrill, 1985:106). Their developmental role in general is to support the ruling regime and its policies. Western journalistic standards of objectivity, impartiality, and distinction between facts and views, news and editorial material have completely different connotations. In a development journalism model, all national resources including the mass media are utilized above all for liberation, and nation-building

efforts. However, attributing such characteristics as “the shortage of Western style high-level professionals” (Shinar, 1987), to Arab journalistic practices of omission, distortion, contradiction, and half-truth is common practice.

- Finally, and in all fairness to *The New York Times*, and *The Globe and Mail*, we must account for the censorship and media-management practices of the Gulf War. The Pentagon and the Bush Administration came close to achieving their goal of forcing journalists – and the public- to rely solely on information supplied by the military news personnel, or gathered in pool interviews in the field. Doing away with independent reporting has been the Pentagon’s goal ever since the Vietnam War. The system strategies of media control worked brilliantly from the military perspective, but it subverted the coverage of the Gulf War, and gave it a dismal, canned quality.

In short, let me reiterate a common denominator that will serve as the axis of the entire study. Media are not neutral, common-sensed, or rational mediators of social events, but essentially help to reproduce pre-formulated ideologies. So, what were the social, cultural, political, economic and religious realities constructed by the Arab press? In other words, what does the international coverage of the Gulf War tell us about the media and to what extent do they play a hegemonic role by producing dominant ideologies and perspectives? What myths did the media use in depicting the realities of the Gulf War? And what was the interplay of media in different cultures?

- **Discourse Analysis**

Discourse analysis is a relatively new approach that allows one to examine text and talk in language use from all possible perspectives. In this study, however, our main

interest is in a special type of discourse – media messages and their linguistic, semiotic, cultural and ideological aspects. Since this dissertation is primarily concerned with analyzing and comparing the Gulf-War news coverage, which is a type of public discourse, discourse analysis was deemed most appropriate to conduct a structural and contextual analysis. A limited but systematic quantitative analysis has been conducted with the aim of studying, and comparing the quantity, the degree, the source, and, to a certain extent, the attitude of editorial and opinion columns pertaining to the Gulf War reportage in these four newspapers.

Therefore, to conduct a pertinent and meticulous discourse analysis, it is crucial that we also develop a certain understanding for the intricacies of each culture in which the media system operates. This warrants employing a sophisticated method that goes beyond the simple bias detection associated with conventional content analysis. Structural and contextual news analysis is deemed suitable to meet the challenges posed by two different languages, four diverse political and cultural settings, with very unique and complicated historical backgrounds.

Essentially, the structural analysis was utilized to reveal the overall global meaning of news discourse and its semantic macrostructure of topics and themes as expressed in the headlines and leads of these four newspapers. Special attention was given to the textual properties of news on different levels:

- Linguistic or grammatical structures e.g. words, clauses, sentences and their respective phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic descriptions of style, neologisms as well as sentence complexities.

- **Cognitive roles:** While macrostructures have functions of generalization, deletion and construction, which in turn, have a direct correlation on the overall coherence of a news text, most importantly, macrostructures have cognitive roles. Consider for a moment all the events that were taking place in the battlefields of the Gulf War. Neither reporters nor readers had direct access to the facts out there. The comprehension of the world and knowledge of events were interpreted through frames and scripts known to language users. These frames and scripts were the mental models of the reporter and the reader alike through which they understood the mere happenings of the war. Conversely, the subjectivity of these frames or scripts differed from one person's interpretation to another (and from one newspaper or from one country to another), and definitely fluctuated through the use of different languages, especially in the case of English and Arabic (van Dijk, 1988:32-33).
- **Syntactic structures** that express the underlying ideological positions, for instance by using passive constructions and or deleting agents from typical subject positions.
- **Lexical choices** in which hidden opinions or ideologies may surface along with the local semantic or world knowledge as in the thematic macrostructure forms or models, frames and scripts etc:

The unit analysis was considered as the overall global meaning of news discourse or its semantic macrostructure of topics and themes as expressed in the headlines and leads of these four newspapers. The contextual analysis on the other hand was mainly concerned with the cognitive social factors such as conditions, constraints of textual structures and their tacit economic, cultural and historical embedding in the news discourse.

Primarily, classical linguistics and semiotics noted the variation between the form (significants) and the meaning (signifier) of signs. Yet, current discourse analysis-, which is a relatively new interdisciplinary field of inquiry – acknowledges the difference between text and talk and their intricate complexities that warrant: 1. Separate though interrelated accounts of phonetic, graphical, phonological, morphological, syntactic, micro- and macro-semantic, stylistic, superstructural, rhetorical, pragmatic, conversational, interactional, and other structures and strategies. 2. Each of these levels has its distinctive structures that can be interpreted or function at other levels, both within and outside the traditional boundaries of the sentence, as well as in the broader context of discourse use and communication (van Dijk, 1991:110).

This intricate, open definition of discourse analysis is by no means limited to the systematic study of textual or conversational structures. The interdisciplinary nature, and illustrative structure of discourse analysis allows for the study of the relationships between text and context. Put simply, the goal of discourse analysis is to specifically explain how the social, historical, political, and cultural contexts of language use and communication influence the contents, meanings, structures, or strategies of text and dialogue, and how conversely, discourse itself is a central part of the meaning formation, and adds to the structure of these contexts. It is especially relevant to our press analysis that:

We show how 'social or political structures' are also manifest in the meanings or organization of news reports, and how such news reports may in turn contribute to the formation or change of social cognition of the readers or the reproduction or legitimization of power of elite's...(van Dijk, 1991:44).

Van Dijk identified a range of news discourse categories as obligatory such as headlines, leads and main events, and considered backgrounds, verbal reactions, and comments as optional news categories. While van Dijk referred to language variations across cultures, he established that the headline category “except in languages such as Japanese or Arabic,” remain the same (van Dijk, 1988:53-56).

To conduct the analysis, statements appearing in the headline and lead paragraphs were examined in detail. This analytic approach is warranted by studies of the structures of the discourse of print journalism. Specifically, van Dijk (1983, 1986, 1988) explains that the headline and lead perform a summary function in news discourse by presenting the most important topics and themes, which are elaborated, in the body of the text. The headline and lead also perform the strategic function of conveying the intended semantic macro structures of the text. The headline constructs the macro proposition, i.e., the semantic summary, of the entire report and, thus, presents the most important and relevant information in the news report. The lead repeats the highest macro proposition of the headline and presents a fuller expression of the thematic structure of the report. Finally, the remaining body of the text elaborates the information presented in the headline and lead (van Dijk, 1988).

While some categories of news superstructure are mandatory and universal (i.e. the summary and main events) others are optional (comments). Since we are dealing with two different media systems (Arab and Western), and two diverse languages, this study is challenged by the mere fact of finding a common unit of analysis, one that is shared by all four newspapers. To avoid comparing apples with oranges, the most general unit analysis in both the Arab and English newspapers were to be found in the

headlines and leads of their front pages. But we still needed to account for the high status of the op-ed pages of the English newspapers, which are not shared by their Arab counterparts. To solve this dilemma, we opted for analyzing the front-page headlines and leads, and then contrasting them with the editorial comments and opinion columns whenever possible, in order to account for any conformities or divergences between factual hard news front-page coverage, and opinion and commentary in the op-ed pages.

Across the various micro- and macro- levels of form and meaning, discourse analysis also discerns diverse dimensions of analysis: one dimension is that of style: “the trace in the text of the personal opinions of speakers as well as the social context of language use” (van Dijk, 1991:209). Style has to do with the choice and variations of the words used by journalists when writing about specific events, and with the sentence patterns that organize these words. Rhetoric, as used here, refers to the special verbal strategies, such as alliterations, metaphors or hyperbole that are used to catch the reader’s attention with a primarily persuasive aim.

As style expresses the attitudes and social context of the reporter or about the type of communication event (news report, editorial, etc.), rhetorical structures are mainly prepared for the reader to enhance the efficiency of the text by calling special attention to specific expressions and meanings. In reporting about the Gulf War - which is the case here - style and rhetoric play a significant role. Since the subject matter is riddled with judgments and opinions and often prejudice, sometimes-delicate topics and complex attitudes must be subtly and persuasively formulated in order both to inform and persuade the readers. A cross-national comparison of style and rhetoric, in addition to other levels of analysis, show us “how” news workers write specific events.

While the above levels of analysis are related to the global meanings and forms, the style and rhetoric features of the local or micro-levels of news discourse were also analyzed.

- **Contextual Analysis**

Hafez (2000) asserts that for the analysis of the textual structures of the media it is particularly critical to combine social psychology with more recently elaborate theoretical approaches like framing analysis (Entman 1993), or discourse analysis (van Dijk 1988).

Therefore, accompanying the structural analysis, relationships with the cultural, historical, and political contexts will be verified in terms of a) Micro-level theory of international conflict and war coverage, as well as socio-psychological analysis of “stereotypes” or “images” and news value systems, b) Meso- level theory of institutional orientations of the mass media and various elements of news and information flow, and finally, c) Macro- level theory to analyze the subtle interaction processes and the interplay of media, politics and society (Hafez 2000). In other words, I will analyze how the specific textual structures (i.e. headlines), different categories of news reporting and argumentation, or a specific style or rhetorical device draw on or reinforce “established” views on war, good/evil in general, Arab, Muslim, Western cultures, and Arab war in particular in order to frame the Gulf War as a case of “good” against “evil.” To this end, I will critically examine the following distinct, yet often interrelated, topics and matters such as: the historical portrayal of Arabs/Muslims in the West, images and perceptions of the West in the Arab world, current cultural and anti-Arab prejudices and stereotyping of Arabs in the media, etc.

In short, this multidisciplinary analysis of the dominant discourse of the press will deal with different levels, dimensions, and contexts of the news coverage of the Gulf War.

- **The Sample**

As news claims to provide objective, factual accounts of events, people, and places as they exist and unfold in the world (Hall, 1982; Schudson, 1978), newspaper texts provide a logical data source for this study. Also, because a primary task of news organizations is to "...Transform mere happenings into public discussible events" (Tuchman, 1978:3), newspaper texts are particularly relevant to my interest in constructing the realities of the Gulf War. Evidently, the Arab newspapers were simply selected because they operated at an arms-length from their respective governments (considering the major differences in journalistic practices, regulations and philosophies in terms of freedom of expression, freedom of the press etc., in the Arab world and the West). These two Arab countries, Jordan and Egypt, were selected namely because the first opposed the war and the latter supported it. The United States as we all know played the "major" role in the Gulf War, whereas Canada supported the United States and was represented in the coalition.

Also, this study challenges the *New York Times'* claims of objectivity and impartiality (detached from American interests). The problem is that, given their rootedness in their own cultures and political interests, these papers are simply going to reveal a different sort of bias. In order to call into question the authoritative claims of *The New York Times* it is best to compare it with *The Globe and Mail*, another Western

newspaper that also claims to be a “journal of record,” but within a different national context.

Basically a select nine front-page issues of these four newspapers over a time period between January 15, 1991 till April 1991, have yielded a sample of 157 headlines and leads, 26 editorials, 27 opinion columns (only the *NYT* and the *G&M*), and 27 letters to the editor (only the *NYT* and the *G&M*).

Nine issues of these newspapers have been selected to cover the dates of the following significant events: January 15 and 16, 1991 (the expiration of the United Nations deadline for Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait); January 16, 1991 (the coalition’s first air attacks on Baghdad); January 23, 1991, (the White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater’s criticizing CNN for Peter Arnett’s report on the bombing of the Iraqi baby-milk factory); January 29, 1991 (CNN airs Peter Arnett’s interview with Saddam Hussein); January 30, 1991 (eleven Marines were killed in the ground fighting near the Saudi border town of Khafji); February 13, 1991 (U.S. Stealth fighter-bombers kill Iraqi civilians in what Iraq claims was a civilian shelter; U.S. claims the structure was a military command bunker); February 25, 1991 (debris from an Iraqi Scud Missile hits barracks in Saudi Arabia, killing U.S. soldiers); February 28, 1991 (marks the end of ground war; and Iraq agrees to meet with the U.S. to discuss cease-fire terms); and finally, April 29, 1991 (Fialka, 1991:67-70).⁹

A challenging inconsistency has occurred in finding all the above events covered by all four newspapers simultaneously. The North American newspapers were one day

⁹Fialka reported that fifteen Washington D.C., bureau chiefs sent a letter to Defense Secretary Cheney requesting a meeting to talk about military-media relations. Bureau chiefs stated that they were not in favor of repeating the Desert Storm-style pool system in the future.

behind in the reporting of events occurring in Iraq, due to printing deadlines and time zone differences (seven hours) between North America on the one hand, and Jordan, and Egypt on the other, the newspapers' dates did not coincide with the events stated above.

Chapter 2

Analysis Of The New York Times' Coverage Of The Gulf War

- **Introduction**

This chapter examines the *New York Times'* (*NYT*) news coverage of the Gulf War. It looks at the intricate relationship between U.S. foreign policy, war coverage, and military censorship on one hand, and the *NYT*'s highly regarded mandate as a "journal of record," with an excellent international reputation on the other. To fully appreciate the determinants of transnational news coverage in U.S. print media in general, and the journalistic practices of the *NYT* in particular, this analysis tackles a) the uneasy relationship that exists between the press and the military during wartime, and explores the long tradition of governmental news management in times of military conflict, b) the cultural determinants that shape the coverage of the conflict within a broader framework of dominant images of Arabs and the symbolic power of a whole cultural and political theater that legitimizes the official government's version of the conflict, c) the professional, and institutional role of the *NYT* in the political, economic and cultural milieu of the United States, and finally, d) the dynamics of the Gulf War coverage of America's leading elite newspaper, the *NYT*, in terms of hegemonic frames, news objectivity, etc.

Therefore, a brief geopolitical review is critical to provide the much-needed context for the ensuing textual analysis of the *NYT* front-page headlines, leads, editorials, and opinion columns.

- **U.S. Geopolitics - An Overview**

The crux of U.S. foreign policy is founded on its diverse, yet interrelated political, economic, and cultural strategic interests in the Middle East in general, and the Gulf region in particular. A comprehensive study of the dynamics of U.S. foreign policy is beyond the realm of this study. Suffice it here to say that an overview of U.S. domestic and global state of affairs will help us to contextualize the leading U.S. role in the Gulf War.

On the domestic scene, President George H. Bush was faced in 1990 with a \$300-billion federal deficit and an economic recession that made it challenging for him to deliver on his electoral promise of a domestic renewal program, a state of affairs that was eating into his popularity ratings (Gunder Frank, 1992: 5-6).

On the international scene, with *glasnost* and *perestroika*, the cold war was fading into history, and a new world order was emerging. Consequently, the U.S. military-industrial complex was feeling the heat of confronting a grim future, and the prospect of enormous government budget cuts in military expenditure. Thus, the U.S. administration had to refurbish its policies, and reinvent old patterns to secure its complex alliance with the conservative U.S. military industry in order to validate a huge military expenditure. Therefore, the U.S. administration had to redefine its military role as pertinent to affirming the U.S. role in the new emerging international arrangements.

Over the past fifty years, the history of U.S. foreign policy indicates a pattern of resorting to war as a means to loosen the tight grip of a severe economic recession. Many U.S. wars were instigated following subsequent U.S. economic recession cycles. Cases in point were the 1950 Korean war, the 1953-1954 U.S. recession that led to initiating a

military coup in Guatemala, Eisenhower's 1958 deployment of U.S. troops in Lebanon, the 1968 Vietnamese Tet Offensive, and the 1969-1970 recession which escalated the war in Indo-China, including Cambodia (Frank, 1992: 5-6). The Soviet-American arms race, and the massive military build-up also followed the 1979 recession. Critics believe that the recession of the early 1980s may have played a role in President Reagan's decision to send U.S. Marines to Beirut, Lebanon in 1983. This recession is also blamed for the massive U.S. military build-up leading to the scandalous Contra policies in Nicaragua and the invasion of Grenada. President Bush is also believed to have tried to ease the late 1980s recession by invading Panama and perhaps trapping Saddam into occupying Kuwait and instigating the Gulf War (Gunder Frank, 1992: 5-6).

By 1990, the recession had soon spread to the rest of the world (except for Japan and Germany), and the fluctuations in oil prices and their respective correlation to market commodities and inflation rates were making it even harder to recover from stagnation in world markets where oil prices were ranging between \$17 or \$18 a barrel prior to the invasion of Kuwait, and jumped to \$30 a barrel in April 1991 (Mowlana, 1992: 38).

It is no surprise that the strategic position of the Gulf region sitting on the world's largest oil reserves makes it of pivotal interest to the United States and the West. Having said that, it is paramount at least from the American perspective to have political and military access to the oil fields in case of real or perceived threat, as was the case in the portrayal of the Gulf War.

In addition to oil, capital flow to American investment firms from rich Gulf States such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, puts them directly in an alliance with the United States. With enormous wealth at their

disposal, these countries not only provide the U.S. and Europe with mammoth amounts of investment capital, but their demands for technology development, military equipment, and luxurious commodities create major lucrative markets for U.S. industry. For example, prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, it was estimated that Kuwait held an investment portfolio of \$ 100 billion in the U.S. and Europe, of which \$80 billion were in government holdings and the rest invested by rich Kuwaitis. Half of the above figures were investments in U.S. corporations including all those on the Fortune 500 list (Mowlana, 1992: 42).

The same was true for government agencies from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates that had colossal investments of hundreds of billions of dollars. In addition, private investors from these three states alone had holdings in the United States amounting to \$150 billion. The government-fund agencies of Saudi Arabia, such as the Saudi Central Bank; the Kuwait Investment Authority; and the governments of Qatar, Oman and Bahrain all held an estimated \$200 billion in investments abroad (Ibrahim, 1991: D3).

Saudi Arabia was (and still is) extremely crucial to U.S. interests in terms of its military, and strategic sectors, as well as its close relationship with the United States in military and intelligence matters (Mowlana, 1992: 42).¹ In view of this, it is no revelation to appreciate the importance of the entire Gulf region to the economic well-being of the United States in particular and the West in general, or the expediency of U.S. military response to protect the geopolitical arrangements of the Gulf sheikdoms.

¹Saudi Arabia ranked sixth on U.S. most important overseas markets, with the balance of trade in favor of the United States.

Evidently, the U.S. was determined to safeguard its superpower status amid the shifting powers of global relations. The world power relations of East-West polarity by then were history, and the centuries-old North–South schism took center stage again. The United States had to create an ideal world, a context that would allow it to tap into the riches of the Gulf states, and to create a crisis where the U.S. can justifiably utilize its military might, restore its ailing economy, assert its world hegemony, and boost the leadership and popularity of a failing republican presidency.

- ***The New York Times* & U.S. Foreign Policy**

The *NYT* is a highly credible journal, a U.S. political agenda-setter, and a forum for international discussions and exchange of opinions. Its unique role in American culture and politics is noted in Edward Said's remarks that the *NYT* is:

“An extraordinary strong institution functioning as a power almost coeval with the nation itself. *The Times* can speak authoritatively about a subject and also make that subject pertinent to the nation; it does so deliberately and, it seems, successfully” (1983: 83).

Research has established that competition between print and TV images of the Gulf War have made for an overemphasis on bizarre behavior and on psychological profiles of Saddam Hussein (Nohrstedt, 2001). But other pressures played important roles as well. As Said affirms, print journalists are aware that television-network correspondents can produce literally eye-catching stories every night; and makes them (print journalists) think too in terms of “what will draw consumers, which in the end has little to do with actual coverage, accuracy, or real significance.” No-one has studied the effect of this on “deciding what’s news,” but Said believes that a general awareness of it

drove United States reporters to think restrictively and reductively in “us” versus “them” dichotomies. Yet this liberalization of group feeling made the reporters’ incapacities and inaccuracies more rather less apparent (Said, 1983:103).

In this regard, and in order to guide the analysis, it would be useful to pose questions such as: how did the *NYT* relate to the domestic and foreign players of the conflict? In other words, was it upholding its own independent position instead of adapting to the Western position? Our interest here is to examine how the *NYT*, one of the most credible and respectable newspapers in the United States, performed during this period of acute crisis. Was the coverage sensational/confrontational, or truly informational? Why does it matter? Did the global discourse of the “Islamic Peril” (Karim, 2000a) affect the way in which the *NYT* constructed its Gulf War narratives of religious scripts as a war between Christianity and Islam? (Agha, 2000; Karim, 2000a, 2000b; Hafez, 2000; Malek, 2000, Tehranian, 2000).

- ***The New York Times***

The *NYT* not only is the newspaper of record for the Fortune 500, but it is also a member in good standing of that elite group of corporate giants (www.fair.org).

Table 2.1 *The New York Times* Profile

| READERSHIP FIGURES | FOUNDED IN | CIRCULATION FIGURES | COMPANY | READERSHIP PROFILE | NATIONAL RANKING | INTL. RANKING |
|-----------------------|---------------|------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| - | 1851 | 1,097,180 (m) | The New York Times Co. | Opinion Leaders | 3 rd | 42 nd |

Sources: Audit Bureau of Circulation, Editor & Publisher, 1999

Founded in 1851, the *NYT* is considered the crown jewel of a highly profitable media conglomerate, the New York Times Co. Besides the newspaper of record; the

company publishes 26 daily and nine non-daily newspapers, mainly in the south-east and California. The company is also in possession of five TV stations, two radio stations, and a number of consumer magazines (e.g., *Family Circle*, *Golf Digest*, and *Tennis*).

- **Analysis Of *The New York Times*' Coverage Of The Gulf War**

The texts of the *NYT* were chosen to provide the material of this analysis, in view of extensive scholarly studies in international coverage of U.S. print media that consider the *New York Times* a "prestige newspaper" (Chang, Shoemaker, & Brendlinger, 1987; Dorman & Farhang, 1987; El Zein & Cooper, 1992; Malek, 1997; Nohrstedt, 2001; Riffe, 1996). The *NYT* is considered "the best or near-best paper in the United States" (Merrill, 1980:220). The *NYT* has attracted much research attention in international news coverage due to its quality, and its wide scope of readership and power as an agenda setter for American media and politics. Semmel (1976), for instance, found that the *NYT* printed almost 25 percent more international stories than the *Los Angeles Times*, 40 percent more than the *Miami Herald*, and twice as many stories as the *Chicago Tribune*. The *NYT* also had more space for international news coverage: about 44 percent was front-page news stories (Haque, 1983).

The front page of the *NYT* presents five to seven stories that are usually continued in the inside pages. Usually, different character type, and placement is used in the front pages of the *NYT* to allocate varied degrees of significance to the news. The lead story for instance, is always found on the top right-hand side. Banner headlines are unusual; but when used, the news is given foreground to call attention to its importance. In 1980, Merrill found the editorial stance of the *NYT* to be rather independent, although it has

editorially supported eight democrats and four republicans for president (Acosta-Alzuru & Roushanzamid, 2000:100).

January 15, 1991 marked the United Nations deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait or face the consequences. Newspapers of the world heralded the news and the *NYT* was no exception. The wording of the *NYT* front-page headlines defined the Iraqi defiance and provided a framework for the ensuing conflict's coverage.

| |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>The New York Times</i>, Tuesday, January 15, 1991. |
|--|

- **US AND IRAQ PREPARE FOR WAR**
- **AS TONIGHT'S DEADLINE NEARS;**
- **DIPLOMACY REMAINS FRUITLESS**

• Troop Moves Show Hussein Wants To Fight, Many US Officials Say²

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

WASHINGTON, Jan14 – Iraqi forces have tightened their defensive positions in Kuwait and stepped up aircraft training in recent days as Baghdad and Washington gear up for war, American Intelligence reports say.³

This headline sets the stage, introduces the actors (the U.S. and Iraq) in an Us: Other ratio (Lester-Massman, 1991), in which the “other,” the “different” is Iraq. The reader is led to sense the gravity of the forthcoming battle. The headline announces the failure of diplomacy by labeling it “fruitless,” and pounds the war drums. The information presented in the headline sounds like the countdown to the showdown between the U.S. and Iraq. By omitting evidential aspects of source, mode, and degree of reliability, this information is constructed as an unqualified statement about the conflict. Like the village crier, the *NYT* announces the imminent advent of warfare and all the catastrophic consequences that accompany it.

²*The New York Times*, 01/15/A1/C 3/headline, lead 1.

³The citation provides the following information about the excerpt: paper, date, article, and location within the article.

The headline evokes “the relevant knowledge in memory the reader needs to understand the news report” (van Dijk, 1993:50-51). It not only summarizes the most essential information in the report by expressing its “main topic,” namely, that Iraq is the one who wants to fight and is getting ready, but most notably it (the headline) *defines and interprets* the situation in what the reporter believes to be the most pertinent and relevant information in the news report. Notice how the headline mentions that the U.S. is gearing up for war very casually, yet emphasizes Iraq’s defiance and desire to fight.

This headline, in van Dijk’s (1991) terms, *is an ideological definition of the situation* that can influence the interpretation and mental model the readers build of that event. Evidently, the lead paragraph further expands the headline by presenting the source and mode of the information from “U.S. Officials” and “American Intelligence reports.” In other words, the “war preparation” definition derives from a category of speakers representing the position of the Bush Administration. However, rather than constructing the military preparation as an interested position, the use of the category term “U.S. Officials” constructs this definition as a statement that is particularly resistant to criticism. This resistance derives from “U.S. Officials” and “American Intelligence reports,” providing a powerful combination of “strong inferential criteria” and “weak incumbency criteria” (Potter and Halliday, 1990). Specifically, the category term allows for positive attributes to be ascribed to the individual speakers within this category while fending off the charge that the individual speaker is not a member of the category “U.S. Officials.”

The “community leader” term is used in Potter’s and Halliday’s analysis of statements about crowd violence to demonstrate how such category terms function as

rhetorical devices for constructing a descriptive account of events and, further, for warranting those accounts as the version of "what actually happened." In terms of inferential criteria, the use of general category terms (as opposed to specifically named individuals) such as "community leader" or, in this case, "U.S. official" and "American Intelligence" invokes the attribution of certain characteristics to the individual members within the category. These characteristics construct the speakers as knowledgeable and credible sources of the information they present. In the present context, the attribute "access to the official information" is ascribed to the "U.S. officials."⁴ In terms of incumbency criteria, the use of a general category, rather than an individual's name, protects this information from being categorized as an individual, interested position. Furthermore, the information is protected from the challenge that a particular spokesperson is not a member of the category "official spokesperson" and, thus, does not bear the attribute "access to official information."⁵

⁴Other attributes could be ascribed to this category, as different dispositions toward this group of speakers. For example, "U.S. Official" may invoke the ascription "mouthpiece for the government", especially later, and upon analyzing the Egyptian and Jordanian newspapers. However, within the context of these categories being used in the lead paragraphs of the *New York Times* to present a "report" of "events", it is likely that these terms were used in order to invoke a positive, uncritical ascription such that the information would be read as an "objective" account of the events.

⁵Zelizer (1989:373) provides a similar analysis as she argues that by referencing primarily anonymous collective bodies, reporters present information to audiences that set a stage for facilitating unilateral, and uncritical decoding of news. For instance, she argues that when presented with news items beginning with the category term "proponents of abortion", audiences are not likely to consider which specific proponents nor the arbitrary collective proponents implied by the term. Menz (1989) draws on Murray Edelman's notion of "reference to mythical groups" as a strategy used by news organizations to legitimize their views while also protecting the news report from criticism.

- **IRAQI PARLIAMENT VOTES TO DEFY US**

Unanimously Backs Hussein in 'Showdown' on Kuwait

By PATRICK E. TYLER

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Jan. 14- In an extraordinary war rally two days before the United Nations deadline, Iraq's Parliament voted unanimously today to follow President Saddam Hussein into combat with the United States and its allies in a "showdown" over this country's Aug. 2 invasion of Kuwait.⁶

This headline datelined in Baghdad, leads the reader to believe that a democratic process is in effect. The Iraqi parliament rallies behind its leader, and after painstaking deliberation and serious thought, it decides to support its leader's decision to go to war against the United States. An implicit sarcasm is embedded in this connotation of a free, and autonomous parliament in Iraq, and is used here to mock Iraq's attempt to depict an image of a rational, and democratic society, akin to the U.S. Congress, which incidentally had convened earlier to approve a resolution authorizing President Bush to use force, if Iraq did not comply with the United Nations deadline. A "unanimous" vote is used here to imply a defiant, yet undisputed, and united Iraq, standing by its President Saddam Hussein. A united Iraqi parliament portrays power and determination; and chooses to defy the "U.S.," and not the international community represented by the United Nations. Only at the end of the report in "Continued From Page A1" does the reporter mention "Mr. Hussein's authoritarian rule."⁷ The "showdown" narrative of the *NYT* reinforces the definition of the conflict in which the norm, the legitimate, the way things should be is the American way, and the deviant, the illegitimate, and the exception is the Iraqi way.

The report continues on page A13 and quotes the Speaker of Iraqi Parliament Saadi Mehdi Saleh as saying: "This is a historic showdown between the forces of good, justice, and truth led by Iraq, against the forces led by the United States and this history

⁶*The New York Times*, 01/15/A1/C5/headline, lead 2.

⁷*The New York Times*, 01/15/A13/C5.

of tyranny, oppression and arrogance.””⁸ It is obvious that a reversed Us: Other is being established, in which the “other” the “evil” is the United States. As explained before, the creation of this ratio implies the definition of a norm and a deviation from it, and in a very subtle way, the *NYT* uses this direct quote from the Iraqi statement on page A 13, to reinforce the equation, and reaffirm to its readers that Iraq is the one that views the United States in an “us” vs. “them,” the “good guys” vs. the “bad guys,” and “good” vs. “evil.” Thus, depending on the reader’s frame of reference, the battle between the forces of “good” and “evil” is being pursued on both sides; the U.S. and Iraq.

- **EARLY ATTACK SEEN**

Baghdad Envoy Leaves- 6th American Carrier Arrives in Region

By R.W. APPLE Jr.

WASHINGTON, Jan. 14 – The United States girded for war, perhaps as early as this week, as hopes for a peaceful settlement of the Persian Gulf crisis faded rapidly today.⁹

In accordance with the above-cited anticipation for war, this headline presents the counter preparation of the “showdown,” and signals the likelihood of a U.S. “early attack.” The lead mainly explicates the war preparation mentioned in the headline, and reinforces the postulate of the “faded peaceful settlement” in order to avoid looking overly eager to fight, while maintaining a willingness to take action. The words of a senior U.S. Administration official that “Only a miracle could prevent war,” were quoted in the 3rd paragraph to emphasize the certainty of war and the failure of diplomacy. Notice the simple and taken-for-granted cause-and-effect frame of “Baghdad Envoy Leaves” to highlight the failure of political settlement, and the intense military maneuver of the “6th American Carrier Arrives in Region.”

⁸*The New York Times*, 01/15/A13/C4.

⁹*The New York Times*, 01/15/A1/C6/headline, lead 3.

- **On the Verge of War, G.I.'s Are Anxious**

By PHILIP SHENON

DHAHRAN, Saudi Arabia, Jan. 14 - Only hours before a deadline that could thrust them into war with Iraq, American troops say they are at least thankful that the long, often nerve-racking wait in the lonely northern deserts of Saudi Arabia may be over.¹⁰

This headline and lead draw attention to the enigma of "will we fight." The climax is intensified by using terms such as "on the verge" and "anxious." Despite the grim fact of anticipating war, the reporter manages to find at least one positive aspect to the beginning of war, which is ending the uncertainty, and the waiting period for U.S. troops, positioned in the Saudi deserts. Despite their readiness for combat, the troops had to dreadfully wait for the end of political and diplomatic maneuvers. But the wait is almost over, and they are "thankful" for the approaching resolution to the long awaited and the much-anticipated war.

To underscore the anxiety of waiting, the second paragraph undermines the whole ideology of battle, combat and war into a mere "thing" by quoting a U.S. Sergeant saying: "People just want this thing finished." The report contrasts the brutality of the wait with the human interest of describing the sergeant's "wife Brenda, who is eight months pregnant with their first child and is living with her mother on Long Island," while her husband is stationed in the Gulf!

These were the four front-page Gulf conflict reports of the *NYT*, on Tuesday, January 15, 1991. However, to fully appreciate the *NYT*'s position, and to verify the presence of any narrative linkage between front and back pages, it is crucial to juxtapose the editorials and opinion columns with the *NYT* same-day front-page news coverage.

¹⁰*The New York Times*, 01/15/A1/C3/headline. lead 4. This headline appeared on the bottom of the front page with lower case characters.

Many in the United States believe that President Bush trapped the whole country into complying with his war policies by rushing into an early and massive deployment of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, to solicit the approval of Congress to sanction his war efforts, support the U.S. troops, avoid any appearance of abandonment (as in Vietnam), and demoralize U.S. soldiers. In this regard, Chomsky (1992) confirmed that the role of mainstream U.S. media in the foreign policy prior, during, and in the aftermath of the Gulf War was that of conformism and subordination. He argued that the Gulf War might have been prevented had the U.S. mainstream media observed minimum journalistic standards, and made relevant facts publicly available in a forum of open debates and discussions.

Furthermore, Chomsky asserted that the media not only joined forces with the Bush administration, but that any venue of diplomatic negotiations was “suppressed by the *New York Times*, as it quietly conceded.” The only serious, rational discussions about the war, Chomsky affirmed, were in the alternative press. Investigative reporter Robert Perry argued, “the U.S. media approached unanimity in their unequivocal support and rush to war by failing to ask serious questions: was a peaceful diplomatic resolution to the conflict possible? Had sanctions worked?” (Chomsky, 1992:56-57).

While conforming to the imminence of the Gulf War on its front-page news, the *NYT*'s editorial on January 15, 1991, “The Stakes in the Gulf,”¹¹ also acknowledges the diversity of American public opinion. Yet, in its unique authoritative manner, the *NYT* refers to the opposition as a minority of Americans: “pacifists who oppose ever

¹¹*The New York Times*, 01/15/A18/C1/Op-Ed 1.

using force,” and the majority who are “impatiently eager to punish, and incapacitate, Saddam Hussein.”

In justifying the waging of war, and the morality of aiding Kuwait, the editorial disputes claims that the Gulf crises is “only” about the oil as “simpleminded,” and denounces critics de-emphasizing the invasion of Kuwait by: “arguing that Saddam Hussein’s rape of Kuwait is somehow less offensive because the emirate was not a democracy.”¹² On the economic level, the editorial blurs the North-South-West (Karim, 2000a)¹³ rift, and stresses the stability of oil prices as vital to poor and rich nations alike: “to India and Brazil as well as Japan and Europe.”

In legitimizing the war option, the *NYT*’s editorial reviews the morality of Saddam Hussein and portrays him as: “Iraq’s aggressive agenda could make a single unscrupulous tyrant the master of the world’s main energy tap.” With reference to Saddam’s callousness and cruelty, the article offers historical context to the Iraqi invasion: “Saddam Hussein has amply advertised his ruthlessness. He waged unprovoked war against Iran, gassed his own people and connived and bribed to develop nuclear and chemical weapons.”

In regards to upholding the United Nations’ Charter and international law, the editorial refutes any counter arguments about the Israeli occupation of Palestine, Golan Heights, the West Bank etc., as: “citing past failures to uphold world law cannot possibly justify the forcible extinction of an entire nation.” With respect to the historical context

¹²*The New York Times*, 01/15/A18/C1/Op-Ed 1.

¹³Karim Karim (2000a) uses the terms North-South-West in his *Islamic Peril*, p. 7. as “merely analytical tools for the study”, and he explicates the North-South dichotomy as a geopolitical, economic, and cultural entity comprised of the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel. Following in the steps of Karim (2000a), the “West” in this study also refers to the North with the exclusion of Eastern Europe, and is used here too to denote to a historical and cultural power center with a dominant relationship to the rest of the world.

of the long standing American support for ruthless Saddam Hussein, the editorial simply described it as: “a matter for reasonable argument whether misguided U.S. policy contributed to Saddam Hussein’s rise, and to the excessive Western reliance on imported oil.” Concerning the opposing arguments that the American government did not give diplomacy a chance, the editorial states: “People can differ as well on whether Mr. Bush erred in his November decision to double the U.S. force in Saudi Arabia, transforming Desert Shield to Desert Sword.”

One certainty that remains beyond any reasonable doubt is that of blaming the “other.” For the *NYT* it is simple: “What cannot be disputed is that blame for this crisis lies in Baghdad rather than Washington, and that the keys to avoiding a conflagration are in Saddam Hussein’s pocket.” To add universal endorsement to the American decision, and on the morality and justness of the cause, the editorial concludes: “Principles, and vital interests, have compelled the United States, and many other countries, to send forces to the gulf. These are realities that unite the majority of Americans with those all over the world who are counting the minutes today.”¹⁴

• ***The New York Times*, Wednesday, January 16, 1991.**

• **US WEIGHS TIMING OF ATTACK AGAINST IRAQ
AS DEADLINE PASSES AND DIPLOMACY FAILS**

The Gulf conflict became the most important story in the *NYT*. A big banner headline indicates the importance given to the story. Under the (above) two-deck headline/banner, occupying six front-page columns, the *NYT* front page presents four

¹⁴*The New York Times*. 01/15/A18/C2/Op-Ed 1.

different Gulf stories/issues to its readers. In this headline, the U.S. is the subject of the statement, the one that performs the action, “[w]eighs” the appropriate time to attack Iraq. The headline voices the U.S.’s own interpretation/justification of the actions to be taken. The message is clear: Iraq is the aggressor that defied the January 15 deadline, sabotaging all diplomatic efforts for peaceful resolution to the conflict; as the antagonist, Iraq must now face the consequences.

- **Personal Steps in March of History**

By ALESSANDRA STANLEY

When the day of reckoning finally arrived, it brought uncertainty. Many sought a kind of do-it-yourself catharsis. Church bells rang, protesters marched, and people donated blood for soldiers. Yesterday, millions of Americans who had uneasily awaited the Jan. 15 deadline overwhelmed by a sense of helplessness felt compelled to do something.¹⁵

Under the banner headline, there is a picture of “thousands of people across America praying for peace.” In a smaller font, this headline and lead focus on the day of reckoning and the start of the much-anticipated air battle. It describes what Americans are doing amid the “March of History.”¹⁶ Church bells are ringing, protesters are marching, and people are donating blood for soldiers. The report describes Americans as united; the reader is led to believe that there is a consensus among Americans regarding this conflict. The alternative antiwar protestors were only mentioned on page A15 in the fifth column of the “Continued From Page A1” section.

In contrast, and just below this report, was another headline “Gamble for Hussein: Power or Oblivion,” (by a different reporter) describing the scene in Baghdad as “tens of thousands of Iraqis took to the streets to show that they are prepared to march off the cliff

¹⁵*The New York Times*, 01/16/A1/C3/headline, lead 1.

¹⁶*The New York Times*, 01/16/A1/C3/headline, lead 1.

with their leader in defiance of the same ill-defined Western arrogance of which the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini so often complained.”¹⁷

It doesn't take much to detect the disparity between the portrayal of the civilized “us” where rational people confront their fears by praying, protesting and donating blood while the “other” people are bewildered irrational *masses*, marching the streets of Baghdad, and getting ready to self-destruct with total obedience to their leader. Even worse, the author invokes yet another distasteful figure in American collective memory, that of Khomeini, and fails to remind his readers that not long ago the Iraqi people waged a painful, decade-long war against Iran's Khomeini during which Saddam was a favorite of the American administration. That very war against Iran drained Iraqi resources and drove the country into bankruptcy.

To put the story in perspective, the reporter questions the rationale of Mr. Hussein's actions, and after exhausting all reasonable venues she concludes: “Mr. Hussein may have been provoked, as many Arab leaders concede, but the path of violence and retribution he chose against the small emirate that faithfully fueled and financed his military engine during eight years of war with Iran have indelibly marked him as a dangerous and unreliable neighbor for the custodians' of the world's oil wealth in the Persian Gulf.”

¹⁷*The New York Times*, 01/16/A1/C3/headline, lead 3.

- **'POINT OF DECISION'**

- **France Ends Its Attempt to Mediate- No sign of Kuwait Pullout**

By MAUREEN DOWD

WASHINGTON, Wednesday, Jan. 16 – The Deadline for Saddam Hussein to withdraw his forces from Kuwait passed at midnight Tuesday with the Iraqi Army still in place and the Bush Administration poised at the “point of decision” to unleash an American attack.¹⁸

This story is second in importance to the reports about the certainty of war. The kicker line, “Point of Decision,” precedes the three-deck headline that presents the failure of the French initiative, and “No Sign of Kuwait Pullout.” This report, datelined in Washington, puts the decisiveness of the war in the hands of the United States. Attention here is centered on the “Bush Administration” as the authority expected to sanction the war. France is placed in a secondary position with respect to the United States. Only in the sixth paragraph does the reporter succinctly describe the last-minute French initiative, which was destined to failure due to Iraqi insolence. By placing it in the sixth paragraph, the *NYT* leads its readers to also consider the *story* as being of lesser importance.

The *NYT* clearly downplays the French initiative by announcing its coming to an end in the headline. The lead then proceeds to introduce the next logical step by telling the American public opinion that after the failure of all diplomatic efforts (including that of the French), the time has come to take disciplinary actions and to start the much-anticipated war.

The following two headlines and leads were placed under each other with a photograph of Mr. Hussein, and Mr. Bush respectively.

¹⁸*The New York Times*, 01/16/A1/C3/headline, lead 2.

- **Gamble for Hussein: Power or Oblivion**

By PATRICK E. TYLER

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Jan. 15 –President Saddam Hussein goes to the brink of war with the United States and its allies today because many analysts say they believe the Iraqi leader is trying to get – up until the last possible instant – the thing he most desires: recognition from the West and a protected role as the region’s pre-eminent power.

The colossal will power, stubbornness, ego or megalomania of the 54-year-old Arab leader, whatever the psychoanalysts of history eventually call it, has been one of the most remarkable phenomena of the Persian Gulf crisis that has carried this country of 17 million to the precipice of destructive national combat.¹⁹

And

- **Stake for Bush: Presidency and Politics**

By R.W. APPLE Jr.

WASHINGTON, Wednesday, Jan. 16 – The decision President Bush is confronting could change the face of domestic politics, the map of the Middle East, the realities of big-power relationships and the world economy for years or decades to come.²⁰

Two side-by-side news analyses²¹ juxtapose the two men and their political agendas. The first report is datelined in Baghdad, and demonstrates Saddam Hussein’s position on the brink of war. The second report is datelined in Washington and evaluates the stakes of President Bush’s decision to go to war.

Firstly, the report on Saddam Hussein opens with a character assessment of the “54-year-old” Saddam, who is believed to have: “colossal willpower, stubbornness, ego or megalomania,” and is an Arab leader who misled his country and trapped his people in a “destructive national combat.”²² In explaining Mr. Hussein’s motives, the lead attributes the information to (unidentified) “analysts” who believe that “... the thing he (Hussein) most desires: [is] recognition from the West and a protected role as the region’s pre-eminent power.” This report uses rhetorical and stylistic features comprised of

¹⁹*The New York Times*, 01/16/A1/C3/headline, lead 3.

²⁰*The New York Times*, 01/16/A1/C4/headline, lead 4.

²¹See Appendix “A” for complete headlines and leads.

²²*The New York Times*, 01/16/A1/C3/headline, lead3.

lexical registers (importing registers of madness, irrationality, etc.) and rhetorical devices (metaphor, hyperbole such as megalomania, etc.) to characterize Saddam in strongly negative terms.

In contrast, the very rational President Bush bears the burden of a decision that “could change domestic politics, the map of the Middle East, the realities of big-power relationships and the world economy for years or decades to come.” A comparable narrative is sketched linking the Gulf War and World War II, invoking a *mental model* to help readers appreciate the enormous gravity of the situation. Furthermore, the analogy continues by providing WWII as a historical context to evoke the knowledge repertoires of the American people, in order to help them define and put the current events into *perspective*.²³

In sum, this section has shown that headlines are not arbitrary parts of news reports. By their position and semantic role they not only express the major topic of the report, as the reporters see it, but also define and interpret the situation. Therefore, the headlines and leads of the *NYT* on January 15, and 16, 1991, respectively, offered a superficial definition of the conflict between Iraq (as agent) and Kuwait (as object). This justification/legitimization of the United States’ action in the Gulf characterizes most of the *NYT* coverage throughout the conflict. The American newspaper defined the conflict as the rightful recovery of Kuwait, and the war was presented as the only way to regain the “normal” condition of Kuwait by enforcing the United Nations resolutions.

The justification of the Gulf War was depicted in the *NYT* as a case of obstructing international law and order, in which the forceful occupation of other countries cannot be

²³Emphasis added.

permitted and must warrant severe punishment. However, in the words of Chomsky (1992), “No one argues that a proper response to aggression is the quick resort to violence; no one has proposed the bombing of Jakarta, Damascus, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Cape Town, or Washington, to pick a few recent examples of aggression that match or in several cases vastly exceeds Saddam Hussein’s crimes in his invasion of Kuwait”(p. 59).

Evidently, no meaningful contextual, historical or background stories were offered to help readers put the events into perspective. For example, there was no mention whatsoever of the self-serving U.S. interests to go to war with Iraq such as: (1) the domestic economic recession, (2) the restriction to military spending due to the end of the cold war (3) the price of oil, (4) the capital flow from the rich Gulf states, (5) the transition of power in the region in light of the post-Cold War U.S. role as the only superpower of the new world order, and so on. Contextual arguments about the reasons that instigated the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait were also absent. There was no historical, political, or economic perspective on the roots of the Gulf crisis, nor any indication of Iraq’s economic decline after a brutal decade-long war with Iran. For instance, there was no reference to the extreme wealth in Kuwait and the bankrupt economy of Iraq. The *NYT* totally neglected covering pertinent factors such as the historic dispute over the oil fields near the Kuwaiti-Iraqi borders and the deliberate Kuwaiti provocation by over-drilling to deflate oil prices. This Kuwaiti action caused Iraq to lose much-needed oil revenues. Moreover, there was no mentioning of the Kuwaiti refusal to allow land-locked Iraq a seaport access, to which Iraq had claimed a historical ownership.

Having said that, let us now turn our attention to the *NYT* op-ed page and look for any conformity to, compliance with, or divergence from, its front-page reportage.

On its op-ed page A23, the *NYT* had three Gulf conflict articles on Wednesday, January 16, 1991. The first is “Stop That Blank Check,”²⁴ datelined in Washington, by Charles Peters, the editor-in-chief of the *Washington Monthly*. Mr. Peters offers an insightful and relevant analysis for his antiwar piece and presents a discerning context to understand the conflict from various perspectives. For example, Peters explains that President Bush trapped the nation into accepting his war plans by his early and massive deployment of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. He also cites the U.S. administration’s covert approval through Ambassador April Glaspie, who signaled to Saddam that it was O.K. to move against Kuwait.

Finally, Peters argues that it was the Bush Administration that persuaded the UN to adopt the January 15 deadline. He concludes his piece by referring to a Saudi teacher saying: “The American soldiers are a new kind of foreign workers here. We have Pakistanis driving taxis and now we have Americans defending us.”²⁵ In contrast, Foreign Affairs correspondent, Leslie H. Gelb, appraises “Mr. Bush’s War Strategy,” notes his determination to avoid “the mistakes of Vietnam,” and explores the meaning of “What massive, quick decisive means?” As the piece concludes: “there should be no doubt that Saddam Hussein – first and last would bear the core moral responsibility for a war.”²⁶

Flora Lewis, senior columnist of the *NYT*, datelines the third article in Paris, “Mitterand’s Cynical Gaullist Posturing,” which mocks France’s solo persistence to find

²⁴*The New York Times*, 01/16/A23/C2/Op-Ed 1.

²⁵*Ibid.* Column 5.

²⁶*The New York Times*, 01/16/A23/C5/Op-Ed 2.

a peaceful resolution of the Gulf conflict, and explicates Mitterrand's independent actions as part of France's domestic politics:

Domestically, Mr. Mitterrand is affected by a new wave of anti-Americanism determination emanating from an unusual combination of the left, and not only the Communists, and part of the right. Both have decried the prospect of war and what they consider weakened submission to America's will. Some critics make President Bush and Saddam Hussein equivalent, and some argue that Mr. Bush is mainly to blame. France, they say, should show its "difference."²⁷

Lewis finally explicates France's competitive conduct on the international scene in terms of "power politics" and refers to France as "A middle power trying to be great."

In the next section, I will examine the various topics found in the news reports of the *NYT* to illustrate the extent of the headline framing of the Gulf War reinforced by the kind of topics included.

• ***The New York Times*, Wednesday, January 23, 1991.**

**IRAQ SETS OIL REFINERIES AFIRE
AS ALLIES STEP UP AIR ATTACKS;
MISSILE PIERCES TEL AVIV SHIELD**

On this date, the *NYT* front-page presents four different Gulf stories/issues to its readers under the above three-deck headline banner. The headline is accompanied by a three-column photo of a wounded Israeli woman being taken to an ambulance after an Iraqi missile attack on Tel Aviv. The headline reports three actions, and the choice of verbs is critical to the reporting of these actions. But the placement of this picture is most crucial in affording the Tel Aviv attack a foreground prominence and significance, especially to the average newspaper reader who relies on the front page for an

²⁷*The New York Times*. 01/16/A23/C2/Op-Ed 3.

understanding of what is happening. Therefore, readers of the *NYT* front page will immediately experience the appalling act of terror committed by Iraq. This headline conveys an antagonist image of an Iraq determined to spread death and terror to its neighbors, thus prompting the coalition forces to “step up” their air attacks to stop the Iraqi aggression.

- **3 DIE, 96 ARE HURT IN ISRAEL SUBURB**
 - **Damage is Heavy as Defenses Fail to Stop Iraqi Missile**
- By JOHN KIFNER

TEL AVIV, Wednesday, Jan. 23 – An Iraqi Scud missile evaded two American Patriot air-defense missiles and slammed into a Tel Aviv suburb on Tuesday night, leaving 3 people dead and 96 wounded, Israeli officials said today.²⁸

Once again the choice of verbs and the use of a photograph in this story is crucial to its understanding. We learn that “3 Die, 96 Hurt” in a neighborhood “Suburb,” and the photo jumps at you and captures the human suffering. There is a certain degree of verification and authentication to this report, which is placed to the left of the casualty reports from Baghdad (below). This headline and lead datelined in Tel Aviv are probably read immediately before the one from Baghdad.²⁹ Through the placement of this photo alongside the story and choice of verbs, the *NYT* assigns the authority to define the events to “Israeli officials,” who are the source of the information. Hence, the reader is prompted to assign more importance and increased credibility to the Tel-Aviv report than to that of Baghdad. The *NYT* seems to have allotted considerable significance to the Israeli victims of the Iraqi Scud-missile attack, more than the Iraqi civilian casualties

²⁸*The New York Times*, 01/23/A1/C3/headline, lead 1.

²⁹Stuart Hall discussed the connection between placement and prominence of a news report in his Introduction. In A. C. H. Smith (Ed.), *Paper Voices: The popular Press and Social Change*. 1935-1965 (pp. 11-24). London: Chatto & Windus, 1975.

caused by Allied bombing, although the Iraqi story was a two-column-report, and the Israeli was only one column.

• **Refugees From Baghdad Report Some Casualties Among Civilians**

By ALAN COWELL

RUWEISHID, Jordan, Jan. 22 – Refugees from the Persian Gulf War at this ramshackle town on the desert border between Jordan and Iraq said today that the allied bombing of Baghdad had caused some civilian casualties and had damaged civilian buildings.³⁰

In an attempt to achieve balance, the *NYT* hinted in the following report to “some”³¹ (note the estimate to downplay and minimize) Iraqi “civilian casualties” and “damaged buildings,” on a day when conflicting reports were circulating out of Baghdad about the destruction of the baby-milk factory bombed by U.S. planes. Many researchers (Karim, 2000a; Nohrstedt, 2001; Hackett, 1991) have noted this strategy of downplaying the victims of “terrorism” i.e. “us” and victims of “bombing raids” i.e. “them.”³²

The *NYT* is cautious in the treatment of this story. The headline is not stating a fact; it is merely reporting some eyewitness accounts mentioned in the lead, which is very carefully presented to downplay the information of damage as eyewitness speculations. The reader will understand that this is only the refugees’ version. Chomsky (1986) and Kellner (1992) criticized this undermining strategy of reporting the “other,” and accused the mainstream Western media of racism and of the constant downplaying of Arab suffering. But in fairness to the *NYT* reports, we cannot assume with any degree of certainty that there was not sufficient coverage of Iraqi suffering. However: there was some act of false balancing in terms of according equal, or more accurately, nearly equal

³⁰ *The New York Times*, 01/23/A1/C4/headline, lead 2.

³¹ Emphasis added.

³² Schlesinger wrote: “A particularly strong feature of news reporting, whether on television or in the press, is its concentration upon the ‘human angle,’ notably the tragic consequences of acts of terrorism.” (1983), p. 46.

space and position to the plight of the Iraqi people. But the manner of quoting suggests the media's assumption that the "other" people are not credible enough to be used as primary sources of information (van Dijk, 1987, 1989, 1993).

- **TWO IRAQI SHIPS HIT**

- **Coalition Forces Moving Toward Kuwait Front – 10,000 Sorties**

By PHILIP SHENON

DHAHRAN, Saudi Arabia, Jan. 22 – As the skies over Iraq cleared and allowed an intensification of the American-led air war, allied military officials said today that Iraq had set fire to two Kuwaiti oil refineries and to an oilfield near Kuwait's border with Saudi Arabia.³³

Although datelined in Dhahran, the source of this information is unspecified "allied military officials." The topic of this headline and lead is "environmental terrorism" committed by Iraq. Iraq is once again the perpetrator on the *NYT* front page. The passive form of reporting that "Two Iraqi Ships Hit," with no reference to allied forces is a strategy to minimize the fact that the Coalition forces were the ones who are bombing. The use of such a discursive strategy may lead a casual reader to diminish the damage caused by the Coalition forces' air attacks of shooting and damaging ships, and to emphasize Iraq's torching the Kuwaiti oilfields. The headline is arranged in such a way as to demonstrate a correlation between setting the oil refineries on fire, and justifying the intensified coalition's air attacks on one hand, and firing Scud missiles on Tel Aviv and the striking of two Iraqi ships on the other hand. These four conflicting, obscure, and vague topics all appear in one headline and lead. For instance, there is no elaboration to the significance of 10,000 sorties in terms of damage and casualties, or to the consequences of such air raids for the Iraqi people, or incidentally to the amount and tonnage of explosives dropped over Baghdad with the enormous effects of sinking the

³³The New York Times, 01/23/A1/C3/headline, lead 3.

entire city into the deep dark ages.

However, these same concerns are echoed in the same day's *NYT* editorial, which is skeptical of the military officials' conduct, and is demanding answers about the effectiveness of the air attacks:

Outside the frames that the Pentagon has selected, hundreds of thousands of pounds of bombs are falling all over Iraq and Kuwait. On whom and on what are they falling? What are the consequences of that action? These questions beg to be answered, and in detail.³⁴

• **Hueys and Scuds: Vietnam And Gulf Are Wars Apart**

By R. W. APPLE Jr.

DAHHRAN, Saudi Arabia, Jan. 22 – High technology is one thing- the biggest thing, perhaps – that sets this war apart from Vietnam. Technology in aerial combat between attack and defensive missiles, guiding Patriots to their deadly rendezvous with Scuds. Technology for pilots, enabling them to skim the ground, juke to avoid ack-ack and perform other jazzy maneuvers, all at night or in the clouds. Technology that guides cruise missiles so precisely that one fired from a battleship in the Persian Gulf clipped a communications tower in Baghdad neatly in two, according to witnesses in the Iraqi capital.³⁵

Another recurring topic is the comparison between the Vietnam and the Gulf Wars in terms of American military capability. The report datelined in Dhahran marvels at the American military superiority in the Gulf War, and contrasts it with the Vietnam War. The lead informs us about the “super sophisticated systems” that offer surgical accuracy of smart bombs, and allow for precision targeting of the Patriots. This account corresponds with what Said had referred to long before the Gulf War began. In *Orientalism* (1979), he referred to the clash of technological rationality and the moral superiority of the Western culture, with the polarization of Western civilization and what

³⁴*The New York Times*, 01/23/A18/C1/Ed-Op 1.

³⁵*The New York Times*, 01/23/A1/C4/headline, lead 4.

Said called upon as its 'Other'- represented by the endemic "barbarism of Arab culture- and the contrast between our enlightened modernity and their benighted dark ages."

Interestingly enough, the *NYT* editorial "Back Up the Bombing Boasts," discusses these same issues, and even challenges the U.S. military officials' unsupported claims of air superiority over Iraq, and cites the Scud-missile attack on Tel-Aviv as a testimony to the ineffectiveness and the failure of the precision of "smart" weapons in preventing the Scud attacks.

The Pentagon has nurtured disbelief by its relentless boasting about the historic dimensions of the air war without yet documenting its effectiveness. The allied air attack has been portrayed as the most intense in world history. Officials keep reporting the thousands of missions flown, the huge tonnage dropped and an amazing 80 percent success rate at releasing weapons onto targets.³⁶

Regarding the comparisons made between the Gulf and Vietnam Wars, the *NYT* editorial criticizes the unusual and severe Gulf War censorship and warns:

Local commanders have been arbitrary to the point of capriciousness. Timely publication of stories has been made nearly impossible. Reporters are forced to withhold information on the grounds that it might aid the Iraqis only to see it released later by the military.

This secrecy is driven by recollections of Vietnam. Many in the military still believe that the unfavorable news coverage made the war unpopular at home and ultimately lost it. This misrepresents history, Americans lost faith in that war because they gradually realized that the Government had misled them.³⁷

It is obvious that the *NYT* editorial line on this date is in sharp disagreement with its front-page reportage and critical of the U.S. government. This is especially important to our analysis, since it highlights how headlines determine the significance of a story.

³⁶*The New York Times*, 01/23/A18/C1/Ed-Op 1.

³⁷*Ibid.*

but at the same time do not necessarily work in concert with the rest of the newspaper, or according to the editorial position of the *NYT*.

• ***The New York Times*, Tuesday, January 29, 1991.**

- **80 OF IRAQ'S PLANES NOW IN IRAN;
HOSTS' INTENT CALLED A PUZZLE;
US SAYS FLOW OF OIL IS STEMMED**

On this date, nearly half of the *NYT* front-page was dedicated to the Gulf War. A large banner (four-columns) headline and a map indicate the progress made against the oil spill, the re-routing of Iraqi warplanes to bases in Iran, and give the two stories great import. Under the headline, two stories datelined in Washington and Dhahran respectively share equal significance.

- **Harboring of Iraqi Planes by Iran
Calls Its Neutrality Into Question**

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 – The flight of more than 80 Iraqi planes to Iran has raised urgent questions in the Bush Administration about Iran's intentions and avowed neutrality in the Persian Gulf War.³⁸

In this article, we find five different major topics: the main event is the departure of Iraqi planes to Iran, which is emphasized in the headline and lead, and forms the first topic. The second topic is about Iranian intentions and is in the first paragraph: "Iran has said it intends to keep the aircraft grounded until the war ends." Note for instance the ambiguity of the unnamed source, which begs the question: who in Iran said that? This is clearly a discursive strategy used here to imply vagueness and low credibility of the Iranian statement. The same paragraph points out the concerns of the U.S.

³⁸*The New York Times*, 01/29/A1/C4/headline, lead 1.

Administration about Iran's action, and finds it quite "puzzling" given the history of Iran and Iraq and the fact that "the two countries have fought a brutal war from 1980 to 1988."

Remarkably, the *NYT* rushes in this segment to provide (prominent position in first paragraph) historical contexts when it serves the American administration and how hastily these are ignored when they do not (such as the historical conflict between Iraq and Kuwait after the colonial British creation of Kuwait). The reporter continues to doubt the Iranian decision by citing the director of operation for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieut. Gen Thomas Kelly (highly credible source), saying that "so far Iran had kept its commitment to impound the planes, but he left open the possibility that Iran and Iraq may have struck a secret deal."³⁹

The third major topic is a mere speculation over Iraq's plan. "It could be a plan to save those aircraft for another time, to include during this conflict or after this conflict."⁴⁰ To balance it all and to offer yet another context to the main event, Mr. Gordon, the journalist, refers to Saddam Hussein's statement during an interview with CNN's Peter Arnett's that despite the history of conflict between the two nations, Iran was offering the Iraqi planes a safe haven as a gesture of Muslim solidarity. The third major topic is the speculation over Iraq's plan "to save the planes" as well as the verbal reaction of the United States to the defection. Notice the use of semantic strategies of "finding it puzzling," and the use of the evaluative word "puzzle" to imply the irrationality of Iranian behavior, which had been an old established practice since the coverage of the

³⁹ *The New York Times*. 01/29/A1/C5/paragraph 1.

⁴⁰ Quoted from Lieut. General Thomas Kelly's statement in *The New York Times*. 01/29/A1/C5/paragraph 2.

American Embassy hostage crisis of Tehran in 1978, and not so surprising to the collective American memory concerning Iran.

The fourth category is the reporter's own speculations and comments on the events. Based on the views of some American intelligence personnel, Mr. Gordon suggests an early Iranian approval (no substantiation of facts). In the comments category, the reporter assigns several paragraphs to American officials along with his own speculative analysis based on information from specified (e.g. Lieut. Gen Thomas Kelly), and often unspecified sources (unidentified intelligence officer, the Pentagon, another Administration official, some experts, and top British military officers etc.). He also uses irrelevant details such as the "intention of Iran to play both sides," and the fact that Iran is in a "win-win situation" to cast a negative image of the events. This could very well be an attempt to discredit and de-legitimize Saddam Hussein's claims that Iran's action was a "gesture of Muslim solidarity."

Another main topic of relevance is the historical context needed to understand the main events. In this regard, Mr. Gordon does not hesitate to substantiate his historical analysis by "symbolic access" to offer interpretations based on information from an intelligence official about the Iran-Iraq rapprochement.⁴¹ "In August, two weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Tehran and Baghdad concluded an agreement in which Mr. Hussein surrendered virtually all his territorial and political gains in the war with Iran."⁴²

Finally, a feature of topical organization is the verbal response/reaction category. Hence, first we find Kelly with direct quotes, and to balance that with the Iraqi side, Mr.

⁴¹Hackett (1991) distinguishes between "sources" and "actors." The former are considered credible, pertinent and legitimate quite contrary, the latter are used for appearing newsworthy rather than authoritative.

⁴²*The New York Times*, 01/29/A12/C1/paragraph 3.

Gordon uses Arnett's interview with Hussein (secondary source). As for the rest, he extensively quotes the American Administration, an unidentified intelligence official, the Pentagon, another Administration official, some experts, top British military officers etc. The sources/quotes utilized by the reporter and the choices that were made to emphasize certain opinions and de-emphasize others, are clearly ideological. For example, the American views of the event were dominant and legitimized by an authoritative and credible military source (General Kelly), while the statements of Iran and Iraq were minimized (in space) and even delegitimized by making them look suspicious. Even the personal values, and commonsensical beliefs of the reporter about the Muslim world were embedded in the narratives of the report that portrays Iran's gesture of Muslim solidarity as irrational and "puzzling."

- **DEFECTION DOUBTED**
Pentagon Says Aircraft
Will Be Shot Down if
They Try to Return

By R. W. APPLE Jr.

DAHRAN, Saudi Arabia, Jan. 28 – More than 80 Iraqi warplanes have been flown to Iran by their pilots in recent days, including more than 60 fighters and bombers, the United States reported today.⁴³

This is yet another *NYT* front-page report dealing with the same topic of the Iraqi planes' exodus to Iran. This report confirms and reiterates the previous one, and adds to it the "eco terrorism" frame. In its sixth paragraph, the report makes reference to CNN reporter Peter Arnett's interview with Saddam Hussein, and states the latter's assertions that Iraq was justified in using oil for self-defense, and that Mr. Hussein strongly hinted at the possibility of using chemical weapons if his back were to the wall. This is an

⁴³*The New York Times*, 01/29/A1/C6/headline. lead 2.

added indication of the portrayal of Saddam Hussein as an evil terrorist who has no qualms about using chemical weapons on civilians. Worse yet, it exposes Saddam's "sick" rationalization of torching and causing oil spills as one of his defense strategies. There was no mention about the U.S. air raids on Iraqi oil refineries, rigs, tankers, and other targets, resulting in widespread spills. Nor was there any mention of the destruction of the civilian water supply in major Iraqi cities like Baghdad, bombed water purification plants, and operational nuclear facilities, which all perfectly fit the definition of "eco-terrorism" committed by the U.S.-led coalition (Grossman, 1991:26).

At the end of the report, the *NYT* attempts to balance the story, but grants it less prominence and visibility in order to discredit it.⁴⁴ on page A11, in a "Continued from Page A1," refers to Baghdad Radio broadcasts: "asserted that an allied air attack on Sunday had created the oil spill."⁴⁵

In its editorial "War's Shared Price – and Costs," the *NYT* stresses the burden of war carried by the United States, and joins President Bush in welcoming the allied pledges of \$37 billion to help defray the mounting costs of the Gulf War. Although the editorial expresses relief about the sharing of the financial burden, it still requests a collective allocation of the political and security risks of the war, and warns the United States against the dangers of going solo.⁴⁶

Another editorial, "The F.B.I. Is Calling," commends the Bureau's superb record in curbing domestic terrorism, but warns against excessive and insensitive dealings with law-abiding Arab-American leaders, and calls for sensible guidelines for the interviews

⁴⁴ A discursive/ideological plan, van Dijk, 1991.

⁴⁵ *The New York Times*, 01/29/A11/C5/paragraph 11.

⁴⁶ *The New York Times*, 01/30/A20/C1/Op-Ed 1.

that are being conducted by the Bureau during these tense days to investigate hate crimes and terrorism.⁴⁷

It is evident that the editorial position of the *NYT* on this day has no narrative linkage to its front-page headlines, but is overall in favor of the U.S. Administration's conduct. Although the second editorial conforms to the principle of protecting Americans against domestic terrorism, it raises serious concerns about the intimidating manner the F.B.I. is using to interview Arab-Americans. As for the opinion segment, the *NYT* carries controversial articles representing alternative views, as well as arguments that question the government's conduct during the Gulf War. The first is Russell Baker's "Soft Soap Does The Trick," in which he expresses his resentment about the military briefers' maneuvers to escape media scrutiny. The second is Alan Brinkley's "Bush Surrenders at Home," which calls attention to president Bush's poor performance, and criticizes his Administration's scant domestic accomplishments, and the empty domestic agenda in his State of the Union Address. The third opinion piece "The Gulf Could Be Another Korea," by Jae Won Kim, warns against the perils of a prolonged Gulf War similar to the Korean War, and cautions Americans against the menace of exporting military force instead of democracy.

⁴⁷*The New York Times*, 01/30/A20/C1/Op-Ed 2.

• ***The New York Times*, Wednesday, January 30, 1991.**

• **IRAN PROMISES IRAQI PLANES
WON'T REJOIN THE FIGHTING;
BUSH SAYS US IS PREVAILING**

On this date, the *NYT* front page presents to its readers three different Gulf-War related issues all under the above three-column banner headline. Under this three-deck headline, the front page carries a photograph of a triumphant, but serious President Bush, delivering his State-of-the-Union Message. The first two decks reiterate and confirm the U.S. administration's earlier concerns about the status of the defected Iraqi planes. In the headline, Iran is the subject of the statement; the one that is doing the "promising" that the Iraqi planes will not fight. The credibility of Iran's reassurance can be taken either seriously or sarcastically depending on the way Iran is perceived in the reader's frame of reference. In contrast, the third deck is placed above President Bush's photo, where the President is the subject "**BUSH SAYS US IS PREVAILING.**" Attention here is focused on the authority of the President of the United States, and on his declaration that the "U.S. is prevailing." The headline projects the U.S. victory as a fact, and in an undisputable tone, unlike the open-ended nature of the Iranian statement/promise.

• **President, in State of Union Talk, Dwells on War and the Economy**

By MAUREEN DOWD

WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 – In a State of the Union Message to a nation burdened with war and recession, President Bush promised tonight that the "Indomitable" American character would overcome Saddam Hussein abroad and economic troubles at home.⁴⁸

This report datelined in Washington highlights the American moral righteousness, and fits its arguments in the "just war" frame. In his State of the Union address,

⁴⁸*The New York Times*, 01/30/A1/C4/headline, lead 1.

President Bush does not discuss the nation's current state of affairs that affects the lives of millions of Americans, such as the recession, the stagnant world markets, and other issues that would evidently expose the failure of his political agenda. Instead, he opts for a safe and popular motto, the American "Indomitable" character, which sits well with the electorate, and conceals public dissatisfaction with his futile governance. We know by now this "Indomitable" American military would overcome Saddam, but just how would it surmount the economic troubles at home he did not elaborate. And neither did the *NYT* ask! This is a genre of superficial and void repertoire that is used to a) limit public debate, and b) protect the status quo. In the second paragraph, and under the guise of quoting the President, "If we can selflessly confront the evil for the sake of good in a land so far away, then surely we can make this land all that it should be," the *NYT* presents its seemingly uninterested, and simplistic "us" vs. "them" analogy. The *NYT* precedes to sell to the American public the corporate conservative agenda by underscoring the President's quote: "If anyone tells you America's best days are behind her, they're looking the wrong way."⁴⁹

To the average reader, the reality presented by the *NYT* is a reality that conforms to the status quo, and is obscured by the popular ethos of democracy. For instance, no explanation is offered by the *NYT* as to what President Bush is implying by linking the Gulf War to "economic troubles at home," and to the years leading up to WWII by saying: "Together, we have resisted the trap of appeasement, cynicism and isolation that gives temptation to tyrants."

⁴⁹*The New York Times*. 01/30/A1/C4/headline. lead I.

However, Chomsky noted frequent instances in American history where the U.S. Administration resorted to war in order to solve global economic predicaments:⁵⁰

...The promotion of international trade; open access to markets, raw materials, cheap labor, and investment opportunities; and a set of trading and financial institutions that primarily benefited multinational corporations and the already developed countries. [To endorse] profitability and economic growth. Military assistance to cooperative regimes, global military power, and frequent interventions were used to reinforce this order and to support US hegemony within it... War, then, is the ultimate prop for the global capitalist system under US leadership, when power itself is insufficient to determine the course of events and relationships. In this case, the US intervention in the Middle East is about protecting access to oil, preserving jobs (Baker), and continuing the "American way of life" (Bush).⁵¹

- **BUSY DAY IN THE AIR**
Allies Fly 2,600 Missions and Pledge to Attack
Any returning Jets

By R. W. APPLE Jr.

DHAHRAN, Saudi Arabia Jan. 29 – On one of the heaviest days of the air war in the Persian Gulf, with allied pilots flying more than 2,600 missions, American officials said the number of Iraqi warplanes fleeing to Iran reached 90 today, up from 80-odd on Monday.⁵²

As the banner headline predicts a U.S. triumph, this large deck headline, datelined in Dhahran, assigns the authority to define the events to "American officials." The kicker presents the description of a busy day in terms of the number "**2,600 Missions**" of sorties and the day's events are construed as negative to the Iraqi side.

In addition to describing an extremely mission-intensive day, the headline and lead signify the American military superiority by contrasting it with the "90 fleeing Iraqi warplanes." A cognitive "mental model" is used here to remind the reader of a familiar

⁵⁰For similar analysis see Andre Gunder Frank's "A Third-World War: A Political Economy of the Persian Gulf War and the New World Order," in Mowlana et. al., 1992, pp. 5-6.

⁵¹Cited in James Winter, "Truth As The First Casualty: Mainstream Media Portrayal Of The Gulf War". Paper presented at a Concordia sponsored "Gulf War" Symposium, Montreal, 1992. p. 16.

⁵²*The New York Times*, 01/30/A1/C6/headline, lead 2.

“how was your day?” sort of dinner-table question, where a typical answer would be “a productive day full of 2,600 missions.” This proposition calls to mind an efficient and productive day similar to the ones that we have at the office, school, or home. The problematic is in the “commonsensical” portrayal of an intense day of killing, destroying and terrorizing an entire people, and reducing the connotation of destructive warfare into a mere “busy day full of 2,600 missions.” The report leaves out the human aspect altogether, such as basic questions about what exactly these missions are bombarding, what were the casualties, losses, etc. This persistent usage of the “dehumanizing Iraqis” frame distorts the *NYT* informational task and renders it as a mere desensitizing one.

• **War Refugees Flood Jordan, Telling of Raids and Extortion**

By ALAN COWELL

RUWEISHID, Jordan, Jan. 29 – Refugees fleeing Iraq and Kuwait streamed into Jordan today, telling of bridges and highways bombed in lands where food and hope are scarce and foreigners fear the perils of flight as much as they dread allied bombardment.⁵³

This headline and lead, datelined in Jordan, offer a unique glimpse of life on the other side. The reporter interviews fleeing refugees arriving at the Jordanian border from Kuwait. Interestingly, the witness accounts vary according to their nationalities. For instance, unidentified “travelers reported that the Iraqis did not permit 500 Egyptians to leave with the others today, apparently to punish them for the pro-American policies of their President, Hosni Mubarak.” Another Sudanese journalist also confirms the reports about the Iraqi mistreatment of Egyptian refugees stranded “in the cold desert.” Some refugees tell about destroyed highways, bridges, and scarcity of food supply and gas. A significant observation is offered by a Syrian merchant who encountered on his drive north 40 or 50 cars with coffins on the roof supposedly, “headed for the Shiite Muslim

⁵³*The New York Times*, 01/30/A1/C5/headline, lead 3.

sacred shrines at Kerbala and Najaf,” which is favored for burials by the families of fallen soldiers.⁵⁴ This covert suggestion validates rumors that Saddam Hussein is discriminately positioning Shiite Muslim soldiers in front lines, and is purposefully risking their lives.

In sum, positioning this report on the front-page of the *NYT* demonstrates some balance. But the integrity of the report is compromised by the way the author organizes the refugees’ unsubstantiated accounts in a way conforming to the “demonizing” frame of Saddam Hussein. First, he refers to the Iraqi violation of basic human dignity; in the way they mistreated the Egyptian refugees as a retribution for Egypt’s participation with the coalition against Iraq. Second, he points out the moral decay of Iraqi soldiers who were profiting from selling gas in Kuwait City at double the usual price. On the other hand, the report downplays the Palestinian refugee’s account that Iraqi soldiers were distributing meat and food for the remaining civilian population in Kuwait (although hard to believe), and every time a witness refers to bridges, highways or buildings destroyed by the Iraqis, the reporter immediately interjects the statement with a clause insinuating that the bombed locations might have been possible sites for Scud missile launchers.

Finally, on this day, there was only one Gulf War-related editorial in the *NYT*, “Don’t Bash the Messenger” defending CNN’s Peter Arnett, “the only correspondent for a U.S. news organization still in that city.” The editorial refutes criticisms made by the White House: “However limited and one-sided Mr. Arnett’s accounts from Iraq must

⁵⁴*The New York Times*, 01/30/A10/C5/paragraph 12.

necessarily be, the White House ignores the value in such independent reports of what its adversary wants the world to believe.”⁵⁵

As for the opinion section, there are three articles related to the Gulf War. The first, “The Military’s New Myths,” is by Gary Hart, a Democrat and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee from 1975 to 1987. In his article, Mr. Hart questions the superior war technology of the U.S. with respect to the inferior Iraqi war machine, and undermines the reliability of computer guided weapons “compared to the vast capacity of the human mind” and concludes that it is “too soon to worship high tech.”

The second is by Foreign Affairs correspondent Leslie H. Gelb, (“Gas, Germs and Nukes,”) in which President Bush’s choices of using chemical weapons are characterized as a “response to Iraq’s expected use of chemical and other terror weapons.” The article anticipates that the President will have to make “this awful decision once he moves to join the ground battle in mid-to-late February.” The moral dilemma that the author poses is if the President “should decline to retaliate with chemical and nuclear arms, he would affirm great moral and political principals –at the price of American lives. His restraint would be highly second guessable, noble, very costly and courageous.”

Lastly, Tom Wicker writes in “The Key to Unity” about the threats to American unity in support of the Gulf War, and warns against a lengthy ground war and extensive American casualties similar to the Korean and the Vietnam Wars.

⁵⁵*The New York Times*, 01/30/A22/C1/Op-Ed 1.

• ***The New York Times*, Wednesday, February 13, 1991.**

- **HEAVIEST SHELLING
BY THE ALLIES YET
RIPS SOUTH KUWAIT**
- **LAND, SEA AND AIR BATTLE**
- **Long Convoy Is Attacked Near Airfield held by Iraqis**
- **Missile Launchers Hit**

By R. W. APPLE Jr.

DHAHRAN, Saudi Arabia, Feb. 13 – Allied shells fired from land, sea and air rained down on a large concentration of Iraqi infantry, armor and artillery in southern Kuwait today in what military spokesmen called the largest combined operation of the Persian Gulf War.⁵⁶

On this date, the *NYT* front page presents three different reports about the Gulf War. The headline and lead datelined in Dhahran describe a heavy day of shelling and destroying “lucrative enemy targets.” The sources as usual are U.S. military generals and authorized official spokespersons. The fourth paragraph describes the destruction of government buildings, “including the Justice Ministry and the Local Government Ministry, headed by one of President Saddam Hussein’s cousins.” This strategic use of *irrelevant* detail such as “Saddam Hussein’s cousin” signifies the ideological implication of the *NYT*’s attempt to degrade and expose the feudal nature of the Iraqi regime.

In a last paragraph under a kicker line “**Iraq Acknowledges Attack**,” a reference is made to an Iraqi military communiqué stating that “a *hospital and maternity ward had been hit, but also acknowledged* [the Iraqi communiqué], *in an unusual step, that 130 military targets had been attacked in 24 hours.*” The report also makes a quick reference to the coalition’s denial of hitting the hospital and maternity ward, and hints at the controversy of how many casualties there were, by recapping President Bush’s claim that: *Mr. Hussein was exploiting them for propaganda by “cranking out myths and*

⁵⁶*The New York Times*, 02/13/A1/C6/headline, lead 1.

falsehoods.” It takes an average intelligent reader to discern facts from fiction in this report. First, it is “commonsensical” logic to assume that after a headline that reads: **HEAVIEST SHELLING BY THE ALLIES**, one must expect heavy casualties. After all, the huge amount of tonnage is not dropped in a vacuum; it is aiming at targets located in a heavily populated city.

It is noteworthy that at the very end of the above news report, there was a low-profile, unspecified, tiny kicker line with four tiny font lines lead that read:

- **Saudis Seek to Borrow Billions**

Because of the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia is seeking to borrow billions of dollars from international banks, a Western diplomat said.⁵⁷

This story calls to attention a journalistic cliché of “man bites dog.” Yet it is positioned (almost hidden) at the end corner of the previous report. It is unthinkable to even contemplate the idea of Saudi Arabia one of the world’s richest countries, encountering fiscal challenges. To elaborate on the event, the *NYT* runs the next report on page A15, written by Eric Schmit, and datelined in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

- **SAUDIS REPORTED TO LOOK FOR LOANS**

Despite Oil Profits, Nation Is Said to Seek Billions to Pay for the Gulf War⁵⁸

Mr. Schmit attributes his information to an anonymous Western diplomat and some unspecified Saudi businessmen. The report points to the fact that since the early 1970’s Saudi Arabia has not borrowed money, but is doing so due to the huge expenses (about \$ 48 billion in military and economic assistance to the United States and other allied nations since the Gulf crisis began in August) incurred as a result of the Gulf War.

⁵⁷*The New York Times*, 02/13/A1/C6/headline, lead 2.

⁵⁸*The New York Times*, 02/13/A15/C1.

Presently, the Saudis are in the market to ask for unspecified amount of loans. Mr. Schmit also refers to a letter sent to Congress by the Saudi Ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz. In his letter, the Prince fends off U.S. lawmakers' speculations regarding the seriousness of the shortage in Saudi finances.

No mention is made anywhere in this report of an alternative and quite rational and simple perspective on the Gulf conflict. Had a peaceful Arab resolution been permitted to prevail [i.e. in an ideal world], the rich Gulf states would have compensated bankrupt Iraq, and settled their quarrels by forgiving Iraq's \$ 40 billion loans (incurred during the Iran-Iraq war) by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and stopped Kuwait from deflating oil prices set by OPEC, an action that delivered the last blow to the alienated Iraqi regime.

It is quite probable that had the United States allowed for a peaceful, brotherly, and compassionate approach for an inter-Arab solution to the crisis, this massive cost of war in terms of loss of life, destruction, and rebuilding would have been spared. But since this option did not prevail we will never know.

The following is the third *NYT* front-page news report pertaining to the Gulf War, and is about the Iraqi-Soviet collateral peace initiative.

- **Hussein Meets With Soviet Envoy and Talks of Effort to End War**

By PATRICK E. TYLER.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12 – President Saddam Hussein of Iraq said tonight that he was willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union to end the Persian Gulf War, but he also said that Iraq was determined to keep fighting “until aggression and the aggressors are beaten back.”⁵⁹

This second front-page headline and lead datelined in Washington is placed right under a photo of the debris in a Tel Aviv neighborhood, where “a man was trapped in his wrecked home.” Two Iraqi missiles that were launched at Israel and were intercepted by Patriot missiles caused this extensive damage. By being placed under this photo, the positive Iraqi intentions are instantly undermined.

The positioning of this picture on top of this report induces the reader to immediately discredit the Iraqi intentions for peace. It is well established by now that the *NYT* has treated all peace initiatives rather superficially (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001; Tveiten, 2001), and is in accord with the U.S. administration’s own agenda, which was determined to block any negotiations that might lead to a ceasefire, and in turn, jeopardize the fulfillment of U.S. objectives in the Gulf War.⁶⁰ The *NYT*, on the other hand, could not possibly conceal the presence of a Soviet envoy in air-bombed Baghdad, who was negotiating the terms of an acceptable Iraqi withdrawal and a possible halt of the allied offensive. But in the lead, the *NYT* intercepts and contradicts the Iraqi intentions by a clause: “but he also said that Iraq was determined to keep fighting ‘until aggression and the aggressors are beaten back.’”

Oddly enough, there is no editorial comment in the *NYT* on this day, but there are two Gulf War related opinion columns. The first is Tom Wicker’s “Lincoln and the

⁵⁹*The New York Times*, 02/13/A1/C4/headline, lead 2.

⁶⁰As was portrayed in international media, and will be revealed further in the next chapters.

Gulf,” in which he tenders an insightful analogy of American democracy during wartime. Wicker suggests that dissent against the Gulf War needs to be tolerated and should not be viewed as unpatriotic. In the second article, “GulfSpeak,” Leslie H. Gelb offers an interesting cultural interpretation of the political accounts often used by prominent Gulf actors who say something and do the opposite. The article accounts for the interplay between language and politics of leaders such as King Hussein of Jordan, President Bush, Prime Minister Shamir, Saddam Hussein, and Mikhail Gorbachev.

• ***The New York Times*, Monday, February 25, 1991.**

• **ALLIES REPORT FAST ADVANCES IN IRAQ
AND KUWAIT, WITH LITTLE RESISTANCE;
THOUSANDS OF IRAQIS TAKEN PRISONER**

By February 25, 1991, the long anticipated ground battle is well underway, and the entire front page of the *NYT* is dedicated to report the progress on the battlefield. A six-column banner headline is accompanied by a five-column-photo of the en masse surrender of Iraqi prisoners marching past vehicles of the Second Marine Division.

• **The Battle for Kuwait**

By PATRICK E. TYLER

WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 – When the gun went off for the ground war, the allied war plan unfolded as a complex series of thrusts and feints, but with a very simple overall goal: race to the rear of the Iraqi Army and cut it off, then take it apart piece by piece.⁶¹

Under the banner headline there is a map highlighting “The Battle for Kuwait.” The map is accompanied by a news analysis indicating the importance given to the liberation of Kuwait.

⁶¹*The New York Times*, 02/25/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

This front-page news analysis by Mr. Tyler mystifies the journalistic legacy of the *NYT*. The analysis is full of palpable contradictions. First, the author warns against the challenges of the ground battle and the dangers of confronting the dreadful Iraqi Republican Guard. Second, he reiterates the threat of Iraq's chemical arsenal in detail, and contemplates the risks of an Iraqi mustard-gas assault. But in the seventh paragraph the author contradicts himself by saying: "The light resistance and hasty surrender of thousands of Iraqis during the opening hours of the invasion were not unexpected, since half of the troops on the front lines were believed to be poorly trained and poorly fed reservists."

What happened to the estimated 540,000 Iraqi troops, which allegedly were ranked as the world's "fourth largest army?" (Winter, 1992:10). How misleading were the warnings from parading TV think tanks, experts and retired generals, who were speculating about the perils inherent in Iraq's chemical and biological weapons. The media spent months of extensive reporting on the fearsome Iraqi war machine, which eventually turned out to be in the *G&M's* MacKenzie's words just a "hollow Iraqi threat."⁶²

• **'We Own This Piece,' G.I. Proclaims**

By JOHN KIFNER

IN IRAQ, Feb. 24 – More than 2,000 American air assault troops plunged at least 50 miles into Iraq at first light today in what officials described as the largest helicopter-borne operation in military history.⁶³

This headline is right under the photograph of the marching Iraqi prisoners of war. Unlike the previous one, this report does not discuss the "Battle for Kuwait;" rather, more

⁶²Colin MacKenzie, "Desertions, understaffed units eroded the threat of Iraqi army," *The Globe & Mail*, March 19, 1991, p. A1

⁶³*The New York Times*, 02/25/A1/C3/headline, lead 2.

accurately it depicts the *battle for Baghdad*.⁶⁴ It reports on the U.S. military maneuvers in the heartland of Iraq, mocking the UN Charter and resolutions, and embarrassing the handful of believers who were naively sold the idea of the Gulf War as a means to liberate Kuwait. It is rather a unique opportunity that renders Iraq a prime site for an applied laboratory, to test the latest innovations in military deployment techniques. In the words of U.S. officers the Gulf War is: “the first combat test of the Army’s new air-land battle doctrine that went like clockwork.”⁶⁵ It is a subsequent chapter of a successful completion of the first U.S. “techno marvels,” “super smart” missiles and aircraft aerial supremacy display (Winter, 1992).

Once the war is over, the U.S. military-industrial complex could marvel in its renewed secure future (that was threatened by the end of the cold war) and prepare for “tens of billions of dollars of new arms sales for the whole replenishment and extension of military arsenals in the Middle East” (Gunder Frank, 1992:20-21).

- **A 300-MILE FRONT**

- **Schwarzkopf Says US Casualties so Far Are ‘Extremely Light’**

By R. W. APPLE Jr.

DHAHRAN, Saudi Arabia, Monday, Feb. 25 – Allied troops drove deep into Iraqi-occupied Kuwait on Sunday, reaching the outskirts of Kuwait City before nightfall, according to senior officers. To the west, powerful armored columns and a huge fleet of helicopters stormed into Iraq, heading northeast towards Basra in an effort to isolate Iraq’s elite Republican Guards.⁶⁶

This headline expresses two macro-propositions, namely, the enormous “300-Mile Front,” and the unprecedented low U.S. casualties. These two propositions summarize the main information of the text and thereby signal that for the *NYT*, both

⁶⁴My emphasis.

⁶⁵*The New York Times*, 02/25/A13/C1/paragraph 1.

⁶⁶*The New York Times*, 02/25/A1/C6/headline/lead 3.

events are equally important. The lead and subsequent sentences provide further details of these topics. For example the “300-Mile Front” is used to indicate the enormous offensive required to liberate Kuwait City (a U.N. declared objective), and the awesome force needed to “isolate” the dreadful Iraqi “elite Republican Guards” (an unstated U.S. objective). The cognitive meaning of the text creates a *script* of “powerful armored columns and huge fleet of helicopters” (the good guys) storming the “Iraqi Republican Guards” (the bad guys). The script draws on culturally shared conventional knowledge of “good” vs. “evil,” and is used by the *NYT* to overshadow the political context of the U.S.’s covert intention described by Stanley Hoffmann as “rejecting any deal with Iraq, and the prospect of total victory in the fast-moving ground war that has fed America’s confidence in its capacity to write the rules of the new world order that President Bush cited during the mounting confrontation with Saddam Hussein.”⁶⁷

Also, the intricate cognitive representations and strategies used in the production and comprehension of this headline and lead imply the ideological position of the *NYT* in terms of realizing the interests and goals of the U.S. government. Hence, the second paragraph gradually reconstructs the unprecedented dimension of this battle by calling it in U.S. officers’ words: “the biggest American-led assault since World War II, and it touched off one of the largest battles in decades spread across a front of 300 miles wide and involving more than a million combatants and support troops.”⁶⁸ The quote is strategically used here to stress the overwhelming scope of the operation, and is contrasted with the remarkably low U.S. casualties. The relevance of this information

⁶⁷Stanley Hoffman, the chairman of the Center for European Studies at Harvard University, wrote a column: “Avoiding New World Disorder” in *The New York Times*, Op-Ed page on 02/25/A19/C3/-Op 3.

⁶⁸*The New York Times*, 02/25/A1/C6/paragraph 2.

conveyed by the *NYT* lies perhaps in its discrediting of the American dissidents' warning of a prolonged Gulf War and high American casualties.

Evidently, the local coherence of this report favors attention to those aspects of the situation that are important to the *NYT*, while leaving out information about the Iraqi casualties that had resulted from the U.S.-led systematic bombing. Shortly after the war, a few press reports based on U.S. military and CIA information estimated the Iraqi losses at 100,000 to 250,000 dead soldiers. When asked by David Frost about the Iraqi casualty numbers, General Norman Schwarzkopf's answer (in a televised interview) was: "50,000 or 100,000 or 150,000 or whatever of them to be killed" (Gunder Frank, 1992:11). A Saudi military commander also told CNN that 100,000 Iraqi troops were killed and 200,000 wounded. A French military intelligence source told the *Nouvelle Observateur* that 200,000 had been killed. Greenpeace meanwhile, expected the number of Iraqi casualties to exceed 150,000 dead, among which 100,000 to 120,000 were believed to be troops and 5,000 to 15,000 to be civilians (Gunder Frank, 1992: 12).

In sum, the accounts of this event consist of a pattern of discursive features that reflect the ideological position of the *NYT*. There is a complete absence of comment on the Iraqi casualties either in the editorial or in the opinion columns. However, in its editorial "War Damage, " the *NYT* warns against the rush to celebrate the first U.S. historic casualty-free victory, and forewarns Americans "Iraq's best troops have yet to be tested. Saddam Hussein is a resourceful foe and, as the torching of Kuwait shows, a vengeful one. He answered the allied air barrage by launching Scuds at Israel; it would be foolish to assume that he is incapable of some brutal retaliation."⁶⁹

⁶⁹*The New York Times*, 02/25/A18/C1/Ed-Op 1.

• **Hussein Orders ‘No Mercy’ for foe but Hints Iraq May Face ‘abyss’**

By ALAN COWELL

AMMAN, Jordan, Feb. 24 – In an emotional address laced with Koranic verse and invocations of Islam, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq today urged his soldiers facing the advance of allied forces into Kuwait to “fight them and show no mercy.”⁷⁰

Mr. Cowell datelined his report from Amman, Jordan, in continuity with the “demonizing Saddam” frame, and mystifying Islam, which exacerbates an already awful situation and portrays him as the ultimate evil, someone who does not stop at anything, even going so far as citing Koranic verses, and stirring Islamic feelings in his people to forge a false sense of steadfastness and a callous demand for retribution with no mercy.

As Said demonstrated in *Covering Islam*, this is another example of superficial treatment of Koranic verses, and their consequent negative connotation to Islam as some irrational menace that afflicts the minds of Muslims and renders them into crazy zealots, which has no equivalent in Western thought, nor is explicable in Western expressions or experiences.

This also conforms to what Karim (2000b: 180) has identified as the jihad model that Western journalists frequently use to construct a religious strife script whenever they report about conflicts in which Muslims are normatively identified as villains: “Dominant construction of conflicts between Christian and Muslim groups by the ostensible secular Northern mass media has generally involved the portrayal of the Christian as the victim and the Muslim as the victimizer.”

⁷⁰The New York Times, 02/25/A1/C2/headline, lead 4.

• ***The New York Times*, Thursday, February 28, 1991.**

• **BUSH HALTS OFFENSIVE COMBAT;
KUWAIT FREED, IRAQIS CRUSHED**

This date marks the end of the Gulf War, and the *NYT* dedicates its entire front page to commemorating this historic event with an enormous headline banner trumpeting the victory of the United States. Immediately under this headline there are two photographs credited to the Associated Press. On the left is a three-column picture of a jubilant crowd in Kuwait City waving Kuwaiti flags under skies darkened by smoke from burning oil wells. Nearby is a large photo of a triumphant and smiling Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf reinforcing Iraq's defeat. On the bottom of the front page is another AP photo of "legions of bedraggled Iraqi warriors on buses, trucks and flatbed trailers voicing cheers of relief at the end of their fighting days." On top of that picture is a map of Kuwait and Southern Iraq highlighting the liberated regions, and circling various allied force divisions that have fought Iraqi tanks in the desert west of Basra.

The analysis of this headline once again draws attention to the power of wording and placement in defining the news. The authority is assigned here to President Bush to declare the end of the Gulf War to the world. The headline strongly asserts that Kuwait is "freed," and the Iraqis are "crushed." The discursive choices of the verbs "freed" and "crushed" entail a cognitive framework that renders these accounts coherent to the average reader who relies on the front page of the *NYT* for understanding what is happening. The former entails dignity and honor; the latter demands humiliation and shame. Therefore, readers of the *NYT* front page will understand that the defeat of Saddam Hussein is a fact, and a good "done deal."

- **Freed Kuwaitis Tell of Iraqi abuse Including Some Cases of Torture**

By CHRIS HEDGES

KUWAIT CITY, Feb. 27 – On the third floor of a gutted mansion, a Kuwaiti Army major slowly pushed open a door with his foot to what was once a laundry room. It had been converted by the Iraqis, he said, into a torture chamber.⁷¹

This headline and lead datelined in Kuwait City carry the accounts of a Kuwaiti Army major telling about torture by Iraqi soldiers. The major is only identified in the third paragraph: “as an underground leader active during the Iraqi occupation.” Since there is no way of knowing whether this story is fabricated (like the false reports about Kuwaiti newborns being snatched out of incubators by Iraqi soldiers at the beginning of the conflict), there is no choice but to take it at face value. The markedly suspicious validity of these accounts did not prevent the *NYT* from presenting them in an authentic manner, in which the norm, the legitimate, the way things should be is the American, and in this case the Kuwaiti way, and the deviant, the illegitimate, and the exception is the Iraqi way. In a sense, the reader is led to believe that such atrocities are very likely to have happened given the ruthlessness and brutality of the Iraqi army. Karim (2000a: 188) noted this discursive strategy when he wrote:

A newspaper reader cannot be expected to refer to the details of previous reports to notice inconsistencies and contradictions; s/he merely retains an overall impression that conforms to the basic myths and cognitive models concerning the particular issue.

⁷¹The New York Times, 02/28/A1/C1/headline. lead 1.

- **IRAQ ELITE ROUTED,
US SOLDIERS SAY**

Officers Brace for Prisoners as Hussein's Force Retreats

By PHILIP SHENON

WITH US VII CORPS, in Iraq, Feb. 28 – American troops described a ferocious armored battle between the United States and troops of Iraq's Republican Guards that resulted, they said in interviews tonight, in devastating losses for the Iraqis and a torrent of thousands of battle-weary Iraqi prisoners of war.⁷²

Positioned beneath the picture of the jubilant Kuwaiti flag-waving picture, the *implication* of the *script* in this headline and lead builds a mental model, a social cognition in which the reader identifies the U.S. soldiers with the “good guys” that have just defeated, and “routed” the “Iraqi bad guys.” The description of a “ferocious” battle creates a biblical picture of the forces of “evil” being conquered by the “good” ones. This script desensitizes the average reader to the “devastating” Iraqi human loss and underplays the number of Iraqi casualties, while at the same time underscores the number of “thousands of battle-weary Iraqi prisoners,” (which the report subtly implies) are relieved to have been captured, perhaps even “rescued,” by coalition forces.

As the dust settles in the battlefield, the harsh reality stares us in the face as hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fade into oblivion. Yet, there were no editorials nor opinion columns in the *NYT* about the awesome and unprecedented minimal American casualties (less than 100), nor any reference to the wasting of an unknown number of Iraqi lives that may have tipped the scale in our favor, and to the fact that what may have saved our way of life from a perceived threat is the infinite devastation of another peoples' way of life. The analysis of the “unsaid” in this news report reveals the ideological position of the *NYT*, which is still in the euphoric stage of triumph, and the “morning after,” may never come upon us.

⁷²The New York Times, 02/28/A1/C3/headline, lead 2.

In spite of the unremitting contradictions between the inflated Iraqi military power and the staggering ground war reports of meeting minimum Iraqi resistance, the truth of the matter remains that the exaggerated Iraqi war capabilities were only a pretense for a premeditated and calculated operation that resulted in the total destruction of Iraq, and in the words of a U.N. commission of inquiry, the country was found in “near apocalyptic” ruins of catastrophe, with its “economy, society, and people bombed back into pre-industrial age”(Gunder Frank, 1992:12).

• **Allies Destroy Iraqis’ Main force; Kuwait Is Retaken After 7 Months**

By R. W. APPLE Jr.

DHAHRAN, Saudi Arabia, Thursday, Feb. 28 – Hours before President Bush announced the conditional suspension of offensive military operations in the Persian gulf, allied armored units, which had trapped Iraq’s vaunted Republican Guard, cut it to pieces in a furious tank battle that began Wednesday and raged until early this morning, American officials said.⁷³

This headline and lead is underneath the smiling photograph of Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Like the rest of the *NYT* front-page headlines, this one too is recapping the same remarkable coalition victory and Iraqi defeat. The two propositions expressed in the headline “**Allies Destroy Iraqis’ Main force; Kuwait Is Retaken After 7 Months**” are both temporally (‘after’) and (indirectly) causally related (Iraqi forces were destroyed to free Kuwait) to justify the act of “destroying” the Iraqis. Notice also how the syntactic structure of the lead, the stylistic choices of “trapping,” and “cutting” the enemy “into pieces,” and the “furious” and “raging” tank battle, reveal the ideological position of the *NYT*’s frames of dehumanizing the Iraqis and “trapping” them like animals, and “cutting them into pieces.” Moreover, the *NYT*’s choice to use the “American officials” source,

⁷³The New York Times, 02/28/A1/C4/headline, lead 3.

and not allow the Iraqis to speak is what van Dijk (1991) has termed the ideological manipulation of news.

- **MILITARY AIMS MET**

- **Firing Ending After 100 Hours of Ground War, President Declares**

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL

WASHINGTON, Thursday, Feb. 28 – Declaring that “Kuwait is liberated” and Iraq’s army defeated, President Bush ordered allied forces on Wednesday night to suspend offensive military operations against President Saddam Hussein’s isolated and battered army.⁷⁴

This headline and lead are located to the right of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s smiling picture. In addition to reiterating the events of the day, the headline reinforces the importance of fulfilling the military objective prior to ending the “100 Hours of Ground War.” But neither the headline nor the lead offers any indication as to whose military objective is being referred to (the United States, the UN, or that of the allied forces?). The assignment of relevance or importance is given to the President of the United States, who through the hegemonic narrative of the lead is granted the ultimate power and authority to declare: a) the end of the Gulf War, b) the liberation of Kuwait, c) the Iraqi defeat, and d) the suspension of military offensive. Even though the Gulf War was presumably sanctioned by the UN, and executed by “coalition forces,” for the average reader, these facts are minimized in favor of portraying the dominant and consistent patterns of discursive features that imply or signal the ideological position of the *NYT*. Evidently, the relevance structure of this report favors attention to those aspects of the situation that are important for the *NYT* such as asserting the superpower status of the United States in the so called “New World Order.”

⁷⁴*The New York Times*, 02/28/A1/C6/headline, lead 4.

There is no Gulf-War related editorial comment on this day in the *NYT*. The only editorial reference is a tribute to the “precious few” fallen Americans who would “first touch U.S. soil” at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. However, two opposing commentaries about the U.S. military did appear on the *NYT* Op-page. First, William Safire sarcastically criticizes the Gulf War media management of the U.S. military in the “The Gulfie Awards:”

Hence, loathed Melancholy! After winning the “mother of all bugouts,” a nation of mesmerized gulf potatoes must brace itself to its happy new duty: a tick-tocks (who were hero-advisers on the fateful night, and who advocated blinking); a torrent of declassified military retrospectives (print journalists will tell you what really happened on the battlefield); and a deluge of what-nexters (so you think this is a time for celebration, eh?).⁷⁵

Second, and atop a giant “Robocop” caricature, a headline reads “America’s New Combat Culture.” In this opinion column, Anthony H. Cordesman (“a military analyst for ABC News, who teaches national security studies at Georgetown”) calls for the restoration of the military budget and praises the virtues of the American military:

Iraq lost the war because of Saddam Hussein’s military incompetence and the shock of the allies’ excellence. Iraq was doomed because its backward looking forces clashed with America’s new military culture and competence. The bad news is that if the military budget is cut in accordance with present plans, that competence will suffer and our ability to resist aggression will be hurt.⁷⁶

⁷⁵*The New York Times*, 02/28/A25/C1/-Op 1.

⁷⁶*The New York Times*, 02/28/A25/C2/-Op 2.

- ***The New York Times*, Monday, April 29, 1991.**

- **U.N. READY TO TAKE US REFUGEE ROLE**
- **Iraq Meeting Is Step Toward Transfer of Responsibility**

By JOHN KIFNER

ZAKHO, Iraq, April 28 – United Nations officials met with top American military officers at the growing Kurdish refugee camp here today in the first step toward taking over responsibility from American troops.⁷⁷

Nearly two months later, the Gulf War became a distant memory, and faded away from the front pages of the *NYT*, except for this one-column headline and lead that introduce the transfer of the American Kurdish relief efforts over to the UN. The gist of the report is mainly about the logistics of the much-anticipated American withdrawal: “Delighted, I’m delighted,” said Lieut. Gen John Shalikashvili, in the second paragraph, expressing American enthusiasm to pull out, “as he shook hands with Stefan Demistura, representative of Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan, the chief United Nations refugee official in the region.”

Eventually the report continues on page A8, where an entire page is dedicated to the long history of the Kurdish strife. Two photos and a map capture the plight of the Kurdish people, and put a human face to their anguish. The report identifies their aspirations of one day becoming an autonomous nation, as well as their fears of U.S. abandonment and Iraqi retribution. A feature article tells the story of their horrific past when in 1988, Saddam Hussein’s army torched the Kurdish people with poison gas, and eradicated their villages.

No editorial however, commented on this subject in the *NYT*. But a finger was pointed to the American betrayal in the opinion column: “Gains and Losses in the Gulf.”

⁷⁷*The New York Times*, 04/29/A1/C5/headline, lead 1.

by *NYT* columnist, Anthony Lewis. In his perceptive analysis of the American successes and failures in the Gulf War, Lewis writes: “Then there is the cost to Iraq’s Kurds and Shiites, encouraged to revolt against Saddam Hussein and then slaughtered by his troops as Mr. Bush averted his gaze.”

- **Quantitative Findings**

The role of the media in Middle Eastern conflicts has been thoroughly analyzed in numerous studies about the Arab-Israeli conflict (Adams, 1981; Chafets 1985; Lewan, 1970; Musallam, 1976; Wolfsfeld, 1997), and the Gulf War (Benett & Peletz, 1994; Karim 2000a; Morrison, 1992; Mowlana, Gerbner & Schiller (Eds.) 1992; Nohrstedt & Ottosen (Eds.) 2001). Approaches focusing on the “flow of information” expose the communication channels through which the media gain their information, such as foreign correspondents, or news agencies (Boyd-Barrett 1997). Also, the media’s interest in selling foreign news of crises, conflicts and wars can reinforce a sensationalist tendency, as well as exhausting and intensive transnational news coverage, and the Gulf War coverage did merit both.

In this respect, the analysis of the nine *NYT* sampled front-pages yielded twenty-eight Gulf-War related news reports, an average of 3.11 reports per issue, twelve photographs, and three maps (see Table 2.1 below). The amount of coverage that the *NYT* dedicated to the Gulf War is definitely extensive. Seven out of the nine issues had prominent Gulf War banner headlines underscoring the significance of that day’s events. In terms of the source of coverage, the *NYT* remarkably had no agency news items (only photos), but all twenty-eight reports were *NYT* correspondents’ bylines. The *NYT* had

eight Gulf War-related editorials and twenty-one opinion columns.

TABLE 2.2 *The New York Times*' Front-Page Coverage Of The Gulf War

| DATE | # OF FRONT- PAGE NEWS REPORTS | # OF ILLUSTRATIONS | # OF HEADLINE BANNERS | # OF EDITORIALS | # OF OPINION COLUMNS | # OF LETTERS TO THE EDITOR | BYLINE/ AGENCY TOTAL #0 |
|--------------|---|-----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 15- Jan. | 4 | 1 Photo + | 1 | 1 | - | - | NYT |
| 16- Jan. | 4 | 3 Photos | 1 | - | 3 | - | NYT |
| 23- Jan. | 4 | 1 Photo + | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | NYT |
| 29- Jan. | 2 | 1 Map | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | NYT |
| 30- Jan. | 3 | 1 Photo | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | NYT |
| 13- Feb. | 2 | 1 Photo * | - | 1 | 2 | 1 | NYT |
| 25- Feb. | 4 | 2 Photos* & 1 Map | 1 | 1 | 3 | - | NYT |
| 28- Feb. | 4 | 2 Photos * & 1 Map | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | NYT |
| 29- April | 1 | 1 Photo | - | - | 2 | - | NYT |
| Total | 28 | 15 | 7 | 8 | 21 | 6 | 100% |

* Photos by AP (Associated Press)

+ Photos by Reuters

Firstly, this study argues that in spite of the *NYT*'s outstanding, and total dependence on its own vast correspondents' resources, its front-pages were not able to overcome the challenges of war reporting and present an accurate, balanced and independent Gulf War reportage. A plausible answer to the serious slant of the *NYT* front-page towards the American administration is granted in the inherent bias of U.S. official views that heavily influenced the Gulf War news flow.

Secondly, this analysis challenges earlier research findings about the "cheerleading role" of the *NYT*, and argues that despite the constraints of war reporting in terms of military secrecy, censorship, restrictions on journalist's freedom, access to

independent, and alternative reporting news sources, the *NYT* coverage can be considered relatively balanced if taken in its entirety, i.e. editorial, opinion columns and letters to the editor.

TABLE 2.3 *The New York Times*' Attitude Towards U.S. Participation In The Gulf War

| DATE | ATTITUDE OF EDITORIALS TOTAL # 8 | | | ATTITUDE OF OPINION COLUMNS TOTAL # 21 | | | ATTITUDE OF LETTERS TO THE EDITOR TOTAL # 6 | | |
|--------|-------------------------------------|----------|---------|---|----------|---------|--|----------|---------|
| | Supportive | Critical | Neutral | Supportive | Critical | Neutral | Supportive | Critical | Neutral |
| Jan.15 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Jan.16 | | | | 2 | 1 | - | | | |
| Jan.23 | - | 1 | - | - | 2 | 1 | - | 1 | - |
| Jan.29 | 1 | 1 | - | - | 3 | - | - | - | 1 |
| Jan.30 | - | 1 | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | 3 | - |
| Feb.13 | - | 1 | - | - | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | - |
| Feb.25 | 1 | 1 | - | - | 3 | - | - | - | - |
| Feb.28 | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| Apr.29 | - | - | - | - | 2 | - | - | - | - |
| Total | 3 | 5 | - | 4 | 14 | 3 | - | 5 | 1 |
| % | 37.5 % | 62.5 % | - | 19 % | 66.7 % | 14.3 % | - | 83.3 % | 16.7 % |

Table 2.2 shows five of the eight sampled editorials, or 62.5% to be critical, and only three, or 37.5% supportive of U.S. government. In the opinion columns category, fourteen out of twenty-one opinion columns, or 66.7 % were found to be critical, three or 14.3 % were neutral, and four, or 19% were supportive. In the letters to the editor, five or 83.3% were critical, and one or 16.7 % neutral.

Essentially, this tells us that in spite of the *NYT*'s challenges of meeting the expectations of its national and elite readership in times of war, and its own institutional constraints, the *NYT* was able to maintain a reasonably independent, and balanced reporting despite its favored "use of force" display on its front-pages. This balance was

mainly achieved in the opinion columns featuring dissenting ideas, and arguing against the use of force.

On the other hand, the *NYT* front-page textual analysis reveals a narrative linkage that advanced the use of force, and consistently downplayed various peace talks and initiatives. As we have seen, only one *NYT* issue had front-page coverage of a peace proposal. One plausible explanation of the extremely light front-page coverage of various peace initiatives (especially the Soviet peace talks) is believed to be due to the *NYT*'s total support of the U.S. government's position (on this particular issue), which blocked all diplomatic efforts for peace initiatives. In essence, the *NYT*'s conformity resulted in failing to afford the peace talks their deserved (from journalistic standards) foreground treatment, in a front-page position. This suggests that the *NYT* may have assisted in creating a consensus to support the use-of-force option in order to oust Iraq from Kuwait. This study also confirms Tveiten's (2001:232) findings that critical opinion in the *NYT* was in fact restricted to the views sections, and only made occasional appearances in the news sections. He asserts that the *NYT* did hesitate to underscore the Soviet peace initiative, and could have found more forceful argumentation to support the peace negotiations if it had wanted to. Interestingly, Tveiten questions the *NYT*'s motive in passing over the peace negotiations as superficially as it did. He also confirmed "there was beyond any doubt a concerted media campaign to bring about retaliation against Iraq" (Tveiten, (2001:239).

- **Conclusion**

The front-page stories of the *NYT* revealed a narrative linkage that is carried not only over the pages of the same day, but also over the course of days. Thus, to comprehend the overall Gulf War coverage of the *NYT*, one ought to read and understand various Gulf War-related stories with respect to each other. Another front-page strategy of the *NYT* was to display a number of Gulf War-related stories on its front page, and summarize their critical conditions from what is referred to as a birds-eye perspective, and “not give first-person voice to criticisms offered outside a very tight, inner circle of the Establishment” (Tveiten, 2001: 227).

The analysis of the *NYT* coverage also unveiled the ways in which a local territorial dispute between Iraq and Kuwait was constructed as a world peace-threatening situation, demanding a U.S.-led international task force of a “Third World War” magnitude. The analysis partially confirms previous international news research indicating that during an acute crisis, threatening U.S. strategic interests, the press usually supports its government and loosens its journalistic mandate of political analysis, which in this case, would have required presenting the Gulf War within the context of the complex histories of the Gulf region. Only on occasions (in editorials and opinion columns) though, did the *NYT* situate its portrayal of the conflict within the context of American foreign policy, i.e. considering the entire Gulf region as extremely vital to U.S. interests and therefore, requiring protection and forming strategic alliance with the oil-producing Sheikdoms.

The *NYT*'s support of the U.S. Administration was evident in its views of human death counts and sufferings as well. The toll of Iraqi death was not a core issue in the

thematic orientation of the sampled *NYT* issues, and its war devastation coverage was more instrumentalist and detached - simply something observed in passing (Tveiten, 2001: 227). This analysis also unveiled the *NYT*'s occasional slant towards legitimization, and consensus despite its independence of direct political control (Gitlin, 1980; Gramsci, 1971; McQuail, 1987; Shoemaker, 1987; Tveiten, 2001). At the onset of the Gulf War, the *NYT*'s extensive coverage at times took a frank pro-government stance; in fact, one *NYT*'s editorial bluntly defended the U.S. government in "The Stakes in the Gulf":

Why for example, do some hawks insist, against the evidence, that war can be conducted by painless "surgical" strikes? Why do some doves insist on denouncing the response but not the brutal crime that prompts it?⁷⁸

But, alternative discourses were not entirely absent from the *NYT*. In fact, 66.7% of the opinion columns were critical, and 62.5% critical editorial comments, not to mention the 83.3% critical letters to the editor. These findings attest to the true diverse opinions, and critical views presented in the op-ed segments of the *NYT*. Essentially, there were a number of extremely critical pieces of how the military managed and restricted the media. Additional concerns were also raised such as Tom Wicker's perceptive "The War On the Tube," which discerned:

No experts have been brought on to discuss the costs of Desert Storm-estimated at \$ 2.5 billion a month when it was still desert Shield – or the question of whether the same money, or some part of it, might not have been better used to meet U.S. domestic needs, from education to infrastructure, not to mention the deficit or the savings and loan scandal.⁷⁹

⁷⁸*The New York Times*, 01/15/A18/C1/-Ed 1.

⁷⁹*The New York Times*, 01/23/A19/C6/-Op 3.

Though, in all fairness to the *NYT*, this analysis accounts for the detrimental role of military censorship that transpired during the Gulf War. Censorship was implemented not only to eliminate the risks of disclosing classified military information to the enemy, but also the potential of creating a negative picture of U.S. soldiers in combat. For example, stealth pilots returning from their first combat missions could not be described in the media as being “giddy:” they had to be “proud”(Mead, 1991). The real purpose of the censorship was to manage public opinion in a most sophisticated way,⁸⁰ and to influence the mediated image of war back at home. A case in point was the censor’s deletion of reports that crewmembers aboard the aircraft carrier *Kennedy* were watching porno videos before taking off in their fighter jets. But there was no objection for instance, to U.S. pilots saying when discovering Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait, “It was like turning on the kitchen light late at night and the cockroaches started scurrying... We finally got them out where we could find them and kill them” (Ottosen, 1992:141). There was no doubt that journalists’ access was greatly restricted by the military and coercive measures. The Saudis, in this regard, were offering a handful of visas to favored journalists from the coalition countries only, and if these journalists failed to abide by Saudi rules, they were immediately stripped of their work credentials. This happened to Chris Hedges of the *New York Times*, whose interviews with Saudi shopkeepers, fifty miles away from the Kuwaiti border were tape-recorded by censor officials. Later, however, he was allowed to do interviews only in the presence of a Saudi intelligence officer (Luostarinen, 1992:128-135).

⁸⁰Michael Getler (1991), *The Washington Post*’s foreign editor, has concluded that the Gulf War was a case of “the most thorough and sophisticated” control of reporters in the present day, the totality of which clearly surpassed that of WWII, Korea, or Vietnam.

In essence, it is safe to conclude that the critical balance that was lacking from the *NYT* front page Gulf War reportage was compensated for in the range of views and opinions voiced in the commentary and op-ed pages of the *NYT*. Critical opinion in the *NYT* was strictly relegated to the views sections, and made occasional dashes to the news sections.

Chapter 3

Analysis Of The Globe And Mail's Coverage Of The Gulf War

- **Introduction**

This chapter explores how the *Globe and Mail* (*G&M*) constructed the narratives of the Gulf War. Chapter two examined the *NYT* coverage of the war from an American vantage point. But how was it covered in Canada? Were the Canadians' knowledge and perceptions of the Gulf War heavily dependent on American media accounts of the event? Was there a relationship between Canadian foreign policy and international news coverage? This chapter addresses the relationship between: a) the Canadian press and Canadian foreign policy; b) the *G&M* elite status and its influence on Canadian elites' decision-making process; and c) The *G&M* coverage of the Gulf War and the degree of its conformity to U.S. media.

The literature on Canadian media treatment of the Gulf War and the degree of conformity to, or convergence with, U.S. media is highly dependent on the method of analysis. For instance, Hibbard and Keenleyside (1991) reveal an interesting instance of Canadian resistance to the pull of the American media, and suggest that the Canadian public was somewhat divided on the wisdom of military action against Saddam Hussein and largely opposed to direct Canadian involvement in any such initiative. However, the non-quantitative literature pertaining to Canadian media treatment of the Gulf War, such as Greenwood (1991), Karim (2000), Smith (1991), White (1991), and Winter (1991, 1992) asserted a cheerleading role for Canadian media similar to their American counterparts. Others, who conducted systematic and empirical analysis of the press such

as Hibbard & Keenleyside (1991), Kirton (1991), Miljan (1991, 1992) come to a different conclusion.

Hibbard & Keenleyside found that up until the outbreak of the Gulf War, polls in the United States and Canada showed comparable levels of support for the U.S. decision to take military action against Iraq (73% in Canada to 79% in the United States). Nevertheless, Canadians remained strongly opposed to direct Canadian participation in the conflict with 62% rejecting the idea and only 36% in favor. Accordingly, the support level of the American public for U.S. involvement in the war against Iraq was 43-percentage points higher than the Canadian support level for direct military involvement, and the U.S. opposition level (at 15%) 47 points lower.

Finally, the study attributed the divergence of public opinion towards the Gulf War between Canada and the United States to the significant discrepancies between the Canadian and American media coverage of the war. It will remain to be seen in this study, however, if this discrepancy of Gulf War treatment between the *G&M* and the *NYT* can be confirmed.

To offer a perceptive analysis, it is paramount to distinguish early on between the compatibility of the Canadian and American communication systems on the one hand, and their diverse political, cultural, economic and social environments on the other. It is within this distinction that one should comprehend the role of the *G&M* in Canadian society and politics vis-à-vis the *NYT*'s authoritative and political stature. Also, relevant here is the research done on Canadian press coverage of international news, and the Canadian press coverage of the Middle East. The focus of this chapter is to study the

seemingly more independent Gulf War coverage in the *G&M*, which could be a reflection of a distinctly different press and public attitudes towards the Gulf War.

The disparity in the political culture between Canada and the United States is attributed to the seemingly less enthusiastic Canadian public opinion regarding their countrymen's involvement in combat. This is primarily due to Canada's less militaristic history, its affinity for compromise and its peacekeeping orientation. It is particularly important to examine the press coverage during a period where CNN had emerged as the absolute power in instantaneous coverage of the first televised war in history, which had media critics protesting the mesmerizing effects of its shallow, fragmented and decontextualized reportage.

It is the purpose of this chapter, among other things, to explore the *G&M*'s significant contribution to shaping societal perceptions towards the Gulf War by "covering a much wider array of topics than was available on television"(Rowse, 1991: 27).

- **Canada - U.S. Bilateral Relations: A Historic Overview**

There are diverse historic viewpoints regarding Canadian-U.S. bilateral affairs that involve economic, political, military, and mostly cultural factors. A comprehensive analysis of U.S. - Canada relations, however, is beyond the scope of this endeavor.

In order to best describe the relations of these two countries and for the purpose of this study I will be referring to Canada-U.S. relations from two standpoints. A brief discussion of the Canadian official perspective will be followed by the contrasting "dependency" view. The official line of the Canadian-American coexistence is summed

up in the remarks of Mr. Michael Kerigan, the Canadian ambassador to the United States. Mr. Kergin in his presentation of his letter of credence to the American President pointed out the significance of the partnership with the United States as “Canada’s closest ally, largest trading partner and greatest friend. No country is more important to Canada and its citizens” (Kerigan, 2000).

The two neighbors share vast borders, and a complex interdependent partnership that is based on their mutual commitment to “democracy, federalism, a love of freedom, and a shared respect for the rule of law, human rights, tolerance, diversity, and the free flow of ideas” (Kerigan, 2000). The façade of this equal partnership, nonetheless, conceals major differences in their historic paths to nationhood. These diverse philosophical approaches between the United States and Canada are crystallized in their respective constitutions. The U.S. Constitution speaks of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, while the Canadian Constitution speaks of peace, order and good government (Kerigan, 2000).

The consequence of their special historic experiences results in occasional quarrels over how issues of common concern should be resolved. The most notable irritant to U.S. efforts is Canada’s determination to preserve its cultural identity by making policies to limit gigantic American cultural overflow to Canadian markets with minimum collateral damage to this alliance with the U.S.¹ No discussion about Canadian-American relations can be complete without referring to the intense debate about Canadian cultural identity and its vulnerability, in light of increased integration with the American economic, political and cultural system. One cannot escape this intense

¹ A topic that deserves a study on its own, and is beyond the realm of this one, but is to be kept in mind in light of the ensuing arguments.

scrutiny or make an argument without referring to at least two perspectives to a state-of-the-art research review of cultural development in an open Canadian-American economy (Lorimer & Duxbury, 1990: 3-4).

Firstly, in its talks with the United States leading to the Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Accord, Canada maintained a solid position on domestic cultural policy and on culture. In domestic cultural policy, and on several occasions, the federal government insisted on its objective to sustain and further develop its (national) cultural sovereignty. Yet, how effective can the Canadian government be in restricting the American spillover in order to preserve its cultural identity? How can this discussion about the information-flow imbalance between Canada and the United States benefit from the two-decades-old debates of the New World Information Order (MacBride, 1980), considering the constant infringement of American media and cultural products on various societies?

Secondly, in the free-trade talks, Canada insisted on keeping culture, and specifically cultural industries, off the bargaining table--not that it has been entirely striving on that front. On the basis of this background, one might suppose that "cultural development" would mean national cultural development consisting of (a) a distinctive communication system that promotes the prosperity, diversity and plurality of the various linguistic, racial, ethnic and regional people of Canada, (b) a Canadian media system that sets the premises of our intricate and constantly changing identities in order to harness the dynamic and the shifting nature of the Canadian culture (Lorimer & Duxbury, 1990:3-4).

- **Canada - U.S. Foreign Policy (Official View)**

From a perspective of diplomatic history, Canadians and Americans have faced common threats and fostered democracy and peace around the world. They fought side-by-side in both World Wars and the Korean War. Both countries cooperated closely together through NATO to end the Cold War. As partners in NORAD, they guaranteed the defense of North American airspace. During the past decade they joined efforts to bring “peace and stability by contributing troops to places as diverse as Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia and, most recently, Kosovo and East Timor.” Both countries strive to ensure global stability and encourage open markets, rules-based trading systems, and more democratic governments and societies through multilateral force, such as the United Nations, the G7/8 and the World Trade Organization (Canadian Foreign Affairs & International Trade, 2001).

It well may be that the official view of Canada during the Gulf War was in total support of American policy and objective in the Gulf. At a closer look, however, Hibbard & Keenleyside (1995) argued that this American-Canadian collaboration of foreign policy was not as great as one might think given the propinquity of these two countries. For instance, on the eve of the Gulf War, only 3,700 Canadians participated in the coalition force of over 500,000, and no ground forces were assigned to Operation Desert Storm, arguably the acid test of full and unconditional Canadian support for this U.S.-led policy. Admittedly, the main drawback of a more extensive level of Canadian military participation was firstly, the limited offensive ability of Canada’s armed forces, and secondly, the lack of Canadian public support for the Gulf War that some believe might have tempered the government’s enthusiasm for involvement in a military solution.

How does all this pertain to our current assessment of Canadian media's contribution to our foreign policy in general, and to the *G&M* in particular? Are there any similarities between the stature of the *G&M* in Canadian society and politics and that of the *NYT*? We know that research has established the influence of American mainstream on American foreign policy and that the press not only plays a significant role in interpreting world events for people, both mass and elite (Bennett, 1988; Galtung & Holmboe Ruge, 1965; Gitlin, 1980; Parenti, 1986; Smith, 1980; Stevenson & Shaw, 1984; Thompson, 1987), but also serves as an information conduit connecting the government and the governed in the policy-formation process (Bennett, 1990; Cohen, 1963; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Weaver, 1984). Conversely, Soderlund & Lee (1999) suggested that research regarding the impact of Canadian media on the formulation and execution of Canadian foreign policy is lacking the much-needed scholarly attention.

American and Canadian (albeit limited in the latter) researchers have pointed out that public interest in foreign policy is fairly low and is still a field that depends a great deal on elite input with minimum restraints from a perceptive public (Almond, 1950; Caspary, 1970; Kegley & Wittkopf, 1991; Stairs, 1977-78). Other studies, however, have recommended that over a period of time a strong association between public opinion and policy may be most likely (Funkhouser, 1973; Mazur, 1980; Page & Shapiro, 1983). Consider for instance Etheredge's (1985) significant reference to the *NYT*'s authoritative claims and influence on American decision-making:

Two American institutions -- the press and universities -- do have the power, the role, and the independence to effect long-term change.

The [New York] Times creates the upper boundary of political system sophistication, and principal news media are the daily guardians of truth, memory and standards for what will be accepted as accurate knowledge and serious discussion of foreign policy issues (p. 199).²

Judged against the *NYT*'s acclaimed world authority, the *G&M* also has a considerable influence on Canadian politics and public opinion. In this respect, several Canadian studies have in fact concluded that the Canadian press has significant impact on foreign policy decision-making. Munton (1983), in his study of public attitudes toward arms control, contended "evidence strongly suggests that the media can have a considerable effect not only on what issues the public thinks about, in the sense of a foreign policy agenda, but also on its attitudes toward these issues" (1983: 209).³

Dewitt & Kirton (1982) also confirmed the influence of the Canadian press on Canadian elite decision-makers' reaction to Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982:

The direction and intensity of [press] coverage influenced the basic assumptions that members of Parliament had about Israel and as a result Canada's traditional Middle East policy came close to being overturned. Members came to see Israel in a negative light and an attempt was made in the Liberal party caucus to press for a policy that would be more sympathetic to the P.L.O. (As reported in Taras & Taras, 1987, p. 552).⁴

In sum, there is sufficient literature to suggest an increased influence of both the press and public opinion on foreign policymaking in Canada. But, whether the *G&M*'s coverage of the Gulf War had any impact on public opinion or foreign policymaking will remain to be seen.

²Referred to in Walter C. Soderlund & Martha F. Lee, "International Reporting in Canadian Newspapers: Results of a Survey of Daily Newspaper Editors." *Canadian Journal of Communication*, 24 (2), 1999.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

- **Canada – U.S. Economic Relations**

To truly comprehend the *raison d'être* of Canadian-U.S. bilateral affairs, one must account for the significance of their intertwined economic relations. Trade flows between Canada and the United States are quite significant, as they have always been. Today, over one billion U.S. dollars in trade crosses their borders each day. Thirty-eight U.S. states have Canada as their largest customer, and cross-border foreign direct investment stands at well over two hundred billion dollars. As such, the benefits of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement to the two countries are abundantly clear. What that implies in political terms is even more synchronized Canadian-U.S. foreign policies in international affairs (Kerigan, 2000).

In short, the political economy of U.S.-Canada relations is that of mutual prosperity. The Canadian economy is closely tied to the American one. Any slowdown or recession in the latter is reflected enormously in the former. Such partnership, though, requires that Canada follow in the footsteps of the United States' comprehensive foreign policy in the Middle East in general, and the Persian Gulf in particular. And this was precisely the case in 1990-1991, during the Persian Gulf crisis and the subsequent Gulf War.

The acute recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s had serious economic and political repercussions in Canada. Hence, it is hard to imagine any official Canadian opposition to U.S. policies and interests in the Persian Gulf, particularly not from the Tory government at the time, nor the Liberals later on, given the economic challenges

that were encountered. Some even believed that the Gulf War would relieve the economic recession and help jumpstart the recovery of stagnant world markets.⁵

Therefore, the policies of friendship, cooperation and compromise between the United States and Canada were in total agreement and collaboration regarding their official policies and objectives in the Persian Gulf crisis and the subsequent war. At least that was the façade put on for diplomatic consumption, since there were some serious divergences, and even conflict between U.S. and Canadian objectives towards the end of the ground battle, but they were delicately articulated.⁶

So, what does the above represent in terms of our interest in the comparative argument of Canada's open economy, and what are the implications of this openness for Canada's communication system? It is no surprise that the reality of an open market may produce a greater access to potential markets and producers, but it also presents Canadians with the most fundamental challenge of their independence and nationhood in the face of growing American presence in all sectors of Canadian life.

In brief, Canada's open economy cannot be divorced from the particularity of its involvement with the U.S., and indeed, with Mexico through FTA, NAFTA and WTO. It is no secret that Canada does not have substantial bargaining power with the U.S., and critics of these bilateral agreements have constantly referred to the increased coercion of the American interpretations of GATT as the main source of challenge facing Canadians (see Crooks, 1989; Lorimer & Duxbury, 1992).

⁵ Which in retrospect proved minimal to Canada, upon granting the multi-billion dollars rebuilding Kuwaiti contracts to American corporations.

⁶ I will refer to that later in the analysis of *The Globe & Mail*.

Finally, with reference to the implications of the hegemonic power and political philosophy of the United States in relation to Canada, Lorimer & Duxbury (1990:3-4) articulate it best by saying:

Canada's position starts with culture, acknowledges the industrial nature of cultural production in our modern information economy, and ends with cultural goals, which may be achieved in part by industrial means. The U.S. position starts with markets, speaks in the language of free trade, property rights in copyright, free speech, free flows of information, consumer rights, and entertainment products, and ends with markets. Their practice is dramatically different. Private foundations support cultural activity, employment restrictions are endemic, the courts are often used to harass competitors, and certain laws may be invoked unilaterally when the politicians can be persuaded to act.

The need to understand the foundations and support of both positions is evident, given that there is bound to be movement over the years. On the U.S. side the foundations of their approach to cultural industries reach to the Constitution and the Supreme Court (Head & Sterling, 1990, p. 464). On the Canadian side the roots are more nebulous but equally basic. They are to be found in nation building, the public interest, and cultural sovereignty.

- **The Dependency View Of Canada – U.S. Relations**

Since the late 1940s and early 1950s, there has been a growing bipartisan intellectual trend in Canada to scrutinize the U.S. - Canadian relations within the dependency perspective. The dependency theory touches all aspects of Canadian – U.S. affairs: from politics, foreign policy, economy, and above all culture and society. Harold Innis in this respect is often considered responsible for influencing the reigning generation of Canadian nationalist, communication and cultural studies scholars and bureaucrats, through a combined legacy of “dependency” political economy and -

depending on one's point of view - the anti-populist, or nationalist, Massey cultural ethos.⁷

Few Canadians were better placed than Innis to intimately understand Canada's relationship to the United States. For instance, American popular culture, via radio, movies, and press, was immediately accessible to Canadian readers, and radio and film audiences. For Innis, unlike some of his contemporaries, the issue was not the lack of Canadian comic sketches on the radio, but the reduced ability of the United States to examine its empire in a critical fashion. Hence, on several occasions, and through his correspondence, Innis expressed his concern about the risks that Canadian identity and culture were encountering when he wrote in 1942:

I have a feeling that we are losing our anchorages in Canada since the entry of the United States in the war. Even the New York Times has become propagandist in its news, and without some sort of steadiness we can go off the deep end in short order⁸ (Beale, 1993).

I am afraid that I share to some extent the view that our foreign policy is determined by Mr. Truman's views about being elected for a second term. I am afraid that we are in for trouble since the United States has never faced in a big way the problems of imperialism before. Consequently they have fallen back on the military with results, which are to be expected⁹ (Beale, 1993).

The meetings [of the Canadian Historical Association] were at the Royal Military College, in Kingston. [Donald] got off a good pitch on our position of slavery under the United States... tremendous applause which

⁷ In 1949, a Royal Commission on National Development of the Arts, Letters and Sciences, was set to evaluate the cultural policies in Canada since 1928-29. The Massey-Levesque Commission, usually known in English Canada as the Massey Commission, reported in 1951. Although its key recommendations were not implemented until later in the decade, they contributed decisively to transforming Canadian society over the next forty years.

⁸ Harold Innis to G. S. Graham April 30, 1942.

⁹ Innis to Graham, May 1, 1947.

leads me to suspect there is a great deal of feeling against American imperialism, as it has developed in Canada...¹⁰ (Beale, 1993).

Almost fifty years later, questions regarding Innis' portrayal of Canadian–U.S. relations still persist, and increasing consensus about upholding an independent Canadian foreign policy, culture and media are still legitimate concerns against the threats of American dominance.

Since the Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media (the Davey Committee) in 1970 (Canada, Senate, 1970), and the 1981 Royal Commission on Newspapers (the Kent Commission), which disapproved of the nation's newspapers for lacking Canadian viewpoint in their reporting on foreign policy and international news, and according to Burton & Keenleyside (1990), scholars (Burton & Keenleyside, 1990; Karim, 2000, 2000a; O'Donnell, 1991; Scanlon, 1974; Soderlund & Lee, 1995) and foreign policy makers (Freifeld, 1976; Marchand, 1983), as well as additional government-sponsored studies (Canada, Royal Commission on Newspapers, 1981), have by and large criticized the way in which international events are reported in Canadian newspapers. Karim (2000b:14) also referred to the Canadian print media's heavy dependence on American sources, and articulated that "the coverage of foreign news in Canada is significantly influenced by the manners in which American journalists perceive it- this factor becomes crucial when considering regions of the world in which the U.S. government has strong foreign policy interests."

The limited literature on Canadian media coverage of the Middle East together with the more extensive literature on Canadian media coverage of international affairs is considered modest. Soderlund and Lee (1995) asserted that Canadian press coverage of

¹⁰ Innis to Graham 1950, date unknown.

international news was simply insufficient in quality and quantity due to a) shortage of Canadian correspondents abroad, b) inadequate knowledge of international politics among the newspapers' staff, c) Canadian newspapers' heavy reliance on news agencies and American news sources were among the factors behind the lack of the Canadian dimension in international news reporting. This resulted in the American bias in Canadian news coverage as echoed in the famous title of Scanlon's 1974 article "Canadians See the World Through U.S. Eyes."

Furthermore, and over the years, the qualitative research of the Canadian media coverage of the Middle East suggested a strong sympathy for Israel while often reflecting a blatant anti-Arab or Palestinian bias.¹¹ In contrast, the quantitative media analyses conducted in the 1980s, revealed a relatively more balanced coverage of the Middle East.¹² Still, Karim (2000a:15) asserts that Canadian newspapers closely followed the global narratives of Northern countries, mainly the USA, such as "during the hostage-takings of Westerners in Beirut in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when they paid more attention to American and British hostages than to Canadian ones held in Lebanon and elsewhere."

- ***The Globe and Mail***

The *G&M* is considered Canada's leading national newspaper with 1,219,500 daily readers (NADbank, 2001). The *Globe and Mail* is a leading Canadian news and

¹¹See Dewitt & Kirton, 1983, pp. 368, 383, 386, 390; Ismael, 1976, pp. 260, 264-265; Lyon, 1982, p. 4; Cohen, 1979, p. 34; Choquet, 1984, pp. 75-85; Noble, 1983, pp. 3-7; Sajoo, 1988, pp. 9-11

¹²See Keenleyside, Soderlund, & Burton, 1985; Kirton, Barei, & Smockum, 1985. Perhaps the most widely cited general treatise on this subject is Cohen, 1963. For a thoughtful Canadian perspective, see in particular, Stairs, 1976, 1977-78. A random check of the content of stories was undertaken and it established that there was a high level of congruence between the nature of stories as established that there was a high level of congruence between the nature of stories as portrayed by headlines and their actual substance.

information company that includes: the *G&M*, the globeandmail.com Web Center; magazines such as *The Report on Business Magazine* and Globe Television; and ROBTv, Canada's only all-business news network.

Table 3.1 *The Globe and Mail's Profile*

| READERSHIP FIGURES | FOUNDED IN | CIRCULATION FIGURES | COMPANY HOLDINGS | READERSHIP PROFILE | NATIONAL RANKING |
|--------------------|------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---|------------------|
| 1, 219, 500 (m) | 1845 | 375, 909 (m) * | The Thomson Corporation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Household income of \$100,000+ • Personal income of \$60,000+ • Senior management titles in Manager/ Professional occupations | 1 st |

Sources: Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC), 2000
NADbank, 2001

Founded in 1845, the *G&M* is presently part of the Thomson Corporation (TSE:TOC) a leading global e-information and Solutions Company in the business and professional marketplace with "1999 revenues of US\$5.8 billion. The Corporation's common shares are listed on the Toronto and London Stock Exchanges" (www.thomson.com).

- **Analysis Of *The Globe & Mail's* Coverage Of The Gulf War**

In line with the above review of literature it seems that special attention to the *G&M's* coverage of the Gulf War is called for in terms of a) the role of its wide readership and elite status in Canadian society, b) the role of its significant influence on

public opinion and politics, c) the degree of its conformity with or divergence from claims of previous research on Canadian press coverage of the Middle East, d) the contribution to a highly warranted scholarly research area, and, e) the extent of the *G&M*'s consistency or deviation from the *NYT* coverage of the Gulf War. Having established the main thesis for this chapter, a range of more specific questions may be devised for further analysis.

1. Will the analysis of the *G&M* coverage of the Gulf War reveal any different outcome than previous research both quantitative (by Hibbard & Keenleyside, 1991; Kirton, 1991; Miljan, 1991, 1992; Soderlund & Lee, 1995, 1986), and qualitative (by Greenwood, 1991; Hafez, 2000; Karim, 2000b; Maybee, 1980; Mowlana, 2000; Mosco, 1992; Said, 1981; Smith, 1991; Wasko, 1992; White, 1991; Winter, 1991, 1992) in terms of dealing with negative stereotyping of Arabs and Islam in the West by the media, academy or government?
2. What news sources did the *G&M* use in its coverage of the Gulf War? And how important was its dependence on American media? How did military censorship and pooling measures impinge on its Gulf War reportage?
3. Finally, was the *G&M* instrumental in delivering public support for war and helping to sustain societal consensus on the morality of Canadian participation in the Gulf War?

Attention will now turn to the *G&M* front-page headlines and leads, which will be analyzed and contrasted with those of the *NYT* whenever available. Those sections of the paper that provide contextual background and evaluative comment such as the editorial

page will be also examined to detect any slant or convergence within the *G&M* editorial comment on one hand, and its front page headlines and reportage on major developments during the Gulf War on the other. Finally, this portion of the press coverage that reflects the voice of Canadian public opinion, namely, the letters to the editor, will also be analyzed and contrasted with the former two sections to verify the degree of conformity or divergence from the *G&M*'s front-page coverage.

• ***The Globe & Mail*, Tuesday, January 15, 1991.**

• **France makes late bid for peace**

Proposal calls for Iraqi withdrawal in exchange for conference on Palestinian issue

By TIMOTHY APPLEBY

AP, AFP, REUTERS; NYT and Staff

Baghdad – France unveiled a last minute peace plan at the United Nations yesterday that calls for Iraq to immediately announce its pullout from Kuwait in exchange for promise of a future international conference on the Palestinian question.¹³

On this date, the *G&M*'s front page presents to its readers a six-column banner headline about the latest developments on the Gulf conflict, accompanied by a four-column Associated Press (AP) photo of a frustrated woman at Tel Aviv airport trying to buy a ticket to get out of Israel. In the banner headline, France is the subject of the statement, the one that performs the action, "making [a] late bid" for peace. The kicker headline explicates the terms of the peace mentioned in the banner headline and makes a causal association between an "Iraqi withdrawal" and a "conference on Palestinian issue." Then the photo of the frustrated woman in Israel subtly reinforces the causality of the two statements.

¹³*The Globe & Mail*. 01/15/A1/C 1/headline/ lead 1.

The lead paragraph explicates the main topic, specifies the agent (France), the roles, the time, the place (United Nations), and identifies Iraq as the “aggressor,” Kuwait as the “victim” and orders an “immediate” Iraqi withdrawal, while connecting the consequence of the action with a “promise” (an international conference on the Palestinian question).

In contrast, the *NYT*'s front page displays a banner headline in which the U.S. and Iraq are preparing for war, and diplomacy remains “fruitless.” The foreground treatment of the failure of all diplomatic efforts to solve the conflict sets the stage for the *NYT* to present the preparation of the forthcoming battle, as the only inevitable option. Thus, the ideological position of the *NYT* becomes even more evident when it gives the French peace initiative the background treatment on page A 12: **“France and 3 Arab States Issue an Appeal to Hussein,”**¹⁴ while it downplays any alternative peaceful resolution to the conflict, the *NYT* limits the range of debate, and builds the societal consensus needed to wage the Gulf War.¹⁵

The divergent headlines of the *NYT* and the *G&M* may be attributed to a number of factors. For instance, and in tandem with its government and the Canadian peace-loving conviction, the *G&M* appears hesitant that war can still be averted at the last moment. Conversely, the *NYT* (which also conforms to the position of its government) appears determined and confident at stressing the failure of diplomacy and announcing the imminence of war.

¹⁴*The New York Times*, 01/15/A12/C1.

¹⁵Strictly from a journalistic point of view, it is interesting that a news event sourced from the three major news agencies can merit a front-page coverage in the *G&M*, while the *NYT* only refers to it in tiny six-line characters on its front-page, and presents it in an ambiguous headline on page 12.

Evidently, the *G&M*'s foreground treatment of the "Palestinian connection to the Iraq-Kuwait conflict," situates the Gulf conflict within the comprehensive perspective of the Middle East, and offers the *G&M* readers a wide spectrum of debate and issues to contend with, contrary to the narrow and simplistic "us vs. them" depiction of the *NYT*.

Interestingly, the *G&M* editorial of this day "Israel's interest in lying low," also addresses the conflict within the Middle East perspective, and calls upon Israel to refrain from launching any pre-emptive strikes, or from retaliating in the event of an Iraqi missile attack on Israel. After carefully weighing Israel's interest in avoiding such involvement, the editorial concludes:

As one Israeli editorial stated yesterday, should Iraq attack, it will take "nerves of iron" to resist the inclination to retaliate and to avoid "play[ing] into Saddam Hussein's hands." Israel has shown before it has nerves of such strength.¹⁶

- **Canadian jets could escort U.S. bombers**

Considering air duties offensive role "splitting hairs." Base commander says

By MATHEW FISHER and ROSS HOWARD

Canadian fighter aircraft could change from enforcing sanctions to escorting U.S. B-52 bombers on missions over Kuwait and Iraq under the current orders given Canada's military in the Middle East.¹⁷

This headline is placed to the left of two side-by-side photographs reading: "U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in Ottawa yesterday. PM affirmed Canada's commitment to use of force in the gulf. Story A13." The adjoining placement of this story immediately signals a concurrent American-Canadian Gulf War policy.

¹⁶*The Globe & Mail*, 01/15/A14/C1/Ed-1.

¹⁷*The Globe & Mail*, 01/15/A1/C1/headline, lead 2.

The careful wording of this headline introduces the possibility of change in the Canadian military mission from “defensive” (protecting ships) to “offensive” (escorting U.S. bombers). What is in an adjective? In a sense, the use of a “defensive” or “offensive” adjective may signal the policy favored to resolve the territorial dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. Essentially, the “defensive” context may refer to a peaceful resolution to the conflict where Canadian jets’ mission would merely enforce UN sanctions, and escort ships in the Gulf waters. An “offensive” context on the other hand, may favor warfare and the potential of Canadian troops engaging in combat.

The kicker line introduces the “splitting hairs” quote by an unidentified Canadian Base commander who is only introduced in the second paragraph. The “splitting-of-hairs” analogy refers to the contentious “defensive,” or “offensive” role to be assumed by the Canadian military in the advent of the Gulf War. The lead paragraph explicates the main topic, which is the nature of the Canadian military presence and role in the Middle East. In the following paragraphs, the report offers additional details by interviewing various Canadian officials who all seem to emphasize the role of the United Nations in authorizing any “offensive” maneuvers that need to be taken.

Due to the delicate nature of the topic, the *G&M* headline and lead present the readiness of Canadian military to participate in the Gulf War in a slightly repentant tone. For instance, there is no use of confrontational semantics; the report simply offers the readers a clarification of change in mission, from “enforcing” UN sanctions to “escorting U.S. B-52,” all within the context of the United Nations, while subtly hinting at a coordinated Canadian-U.S. Military effort.

Apparently, Canadians were quite divided on the issue of Canadian military participation in the Gulf War. This diversity is echoed in the *G&M* opinion columns, Commentary, and in "Letters To the Editor." For instance, in the latter category, Antonio R. Gualteri from Ottawa, criticizes the "Canadian complicity," with the foreign policy of the United States, and condemns using the United Nations to construct a multilateral approach to legitimate the U.S. economic and hegemonic interests. Conversely, in "Why Saddam Hussein is unlikely to be dissuaded by economic sanctions,"¹⁸ Jeffrey Simpson of the *G&M* skillfully advocates the military solution to the Kuwaiti crisis by asserting that sanctions are useless against a ruthless dictator who does not care what price his people must pay. He supports his thesis by referring to the long, dreadful, and oppressive Iraqi regime, which is immune to the pressures of Iraqi public opinion, and refers to the bloody and brutal history of Saddam Hussein as among the major obstacles to a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Furthermore, a syndicated *Commentary* on A 15 by David Keppel criticizes the Bush Administration's outdated "cold war" mentality and warns against the consequences of rushing to war.¹⁹ Mr. Keppel then assesses this "cold war" American perspective, while exposing its ineffectiveness in the Middle East. By the same token, syndicated columnists Gary C. Hufbauer and Kimberly A. Elliott offer a further attestation that "sanctions will work within the next 12 months," in "Sanctions will work – and soon,"²⁰ and back up their arguments with remarkable statistical evidence of 115 similar cases since WWI.

¹⁸*The Globe & Mail*, 01/15/A14/C1/Op-1.

¹⁹*The Globe & Mail*, 01/15/A15/C1/Op-2.

²⁰*The Globe & Mail*, 01/15/A15/C2/Op-3.

In sum, and with war clouds hovering overhead, Canada still lacks political and popular consensus about its military role in the Gulf. The *G&M* clearly reflects this uncertainty and attempts to accommodate the diversity of opinions both in its coverage and commentary. However, it is too early to predict which way the *G&M* will slant, but it will certainly be revealed as the analysis advances.

• ***The Globe & Mail, Wednesday, January 16, 1991.***

• **UN chief makes final appeal**

Perez de Cuellar gives Hussein guarantee against attack if he withdraws immediately
By *REUTER, AP, CP, NYT* and Staff

United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar made a final personal appeal to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein last night, offering Baghdad a guarantee against attack, a review of economic sanctions and every effort to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict if it agreed immediately to leave Kuwait.²¹

The *G&M*'s front-page main headline is dedicated to the diplomatic efforts to avoid war. In the above large banner, the *G&M* imparts paramount significance to the UN's last-minute attempt to defuse the escalating crisis, and relates the advent of war to its readers in four different Gulf-related issues. Immediately beneath the headline, and in a center front-page position, is a four-column AP photo of "thousands of Iraqi demonstrators march[ing] along a street in Baghdad" and carrying "Yes for Peace" "No for War" banners in what the *G&M* referred to as the "Day of Challenge." In this headline, kicker and lead, the United Nations' Secretary General is the subject of the statement, the one who "appeals," to the Iraqi leader and "guarantee[s] against an attack." Attention here is centered on the United Nations and its power to deter war and attain peace. The choice of verbs is critical to the reporting of this event. Notice the *G&M*'s

²¹ *The Globe & Mail*, 01/16/A1/C1/headline, lead 1

docile tone in using the verb “appeal” that implies a plea, a request instead of a forceful verb such as “demand.” Equally is the *G&M*’s portrayal of the compliant attitude of the UN chief’s pledge to evade war, and his promise of reviewing economic sanctions and of sparing no effort to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. By giving the UN plea a front-page prominence, the *G&M* asserts its confidence in the UN’s aptitude (especially after the end of the cold war), in its power to negotiate, and its ability to implement its chartered peace-keeping mandate.²²

This story is particularly remarkable since it highlights how headlines determine the significance of a story. The *NYT* and the *G&M* had the information about the UN plea, which was also sourced by three different news agencies. The *G&M* underscores the event in a front-page headline to afford it a high degree of significance. In contrast, the *NYT* downplays the same event by reporting it on page A 13.

• **War morally justified, PM tells Commons**

Says nations have duty to stop Hussein

By HUGH WINSOR and ROSS HOWARD

OTTAWA – The international community is morally justified in going to war to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, and Canada should not sit on the sidelines, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney said yesterday.²³

This headline and lead is placed right under the photo of Iraqi demonstrators. In this headline and lead the subject is the Prime Minister who is doing the act of “justifying” the morality of war against “protagonist” Iraq and “urging” Canadians to join the collective actions of the “international community” and “go to war” and “not sit on the sidelines.” Notice the lexical stylistics at work in this headline where negative acts

²²Andre Gunder Frank, mentions that Secretary General Perez de Cuellar declared outright that this was a U.S., not a U.N. war, and that the Security Council was in the hands of the United States, Britain, and France (In *Triumph of the Image*, 1992, p. 17).

²³*The Globe & Mail*, 01/16/A1/C2/headline, lead 2

are associated with Saddam Hussein's Iraq and defined as "them-groups," while positive implications are associated with the "international community" acts of "going to war" and thus are considered as "we-groups" (van Dijk, 1988:71). The concept of "morality" here is also in tune with the Canadian peacekeeping and ethical tradition, where the PM must justify the war morally to the House of Commons and the Canadian people.

These few examples show how lexical and semantic implications may involve evaluations based on the shared knowledge, beliefs, norms, and values of readers and reporters alike, and are more likely to induce the *G&M* reader to assign more credibility and more truthfulness to the requests of their Prime Minister than to say a "morally decadent" Iraqi aggressor like Saddam Hussein. In cognitive terms, readers are more likely to be enthralled by the righteousness of a military intervention carried out under the authority of the UN Security Council, and therefore are more likely to wholeheartedly support a Canadian military role.

- **Hussein's biggest weapon could be American people**

Iraq may try to test "major vulnerability" of opponent

By LINDA HOSSIE

As he faces the overwhelming superiority of the Western forces in the Persian Gulf, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein has a secret weapon: the American people.²⁴

This headline, kicker line and lead are composed of several embedded clauses that express several evaluative propositions. First the headline has an embedded nominalization (threat), and acts as a *predictor* of Mr. Hussein's actions in the event of war. The kicker clause uses exaggeration of the "vulnerability of opponent," with no substantiation, or attribution to the source of this information. The lead is also full of

²⁴*The Globe & Mail*, 01/16/A1/C4/headline, lead 3

rhetorical reformulations to make the story more effective. The reporter makes comparisons between “Hussein’s secret weapon” and the “overwhelming superiority of the Western forces” and suggests metaphors that serve to victimize “the American people.” Eventually the entire report flows neatly into the familiar cognitive frame of “demonizing” Saddam Hussein, and the narrative of his “terrorist threat.”

• **As the gulf drama unfolds, little is filtered to Iraqi public**

By TIMOTHY APPLEBY

Baghdad

With the war clouds hovering overhead, it was a moment of calm. In a grubby restaurant, directly across the Tigris River from President Saddam Hussein’s splendid palace, Sabah outlined a circle on the tablecloth.

“For us, it is like this.” Sabah’s finger moved around and round, and he frowned. “You, you can leave, but us, we cannot leave. I have always wanted to visit Egypt, but ...” Sabah’s voice trailed off: it was time to end the conversation.²⁵

This headline datelined in Baghdad calls attention to the desperation of the Iraqi people and to the brutality of the Iraqi regime. The lead is entirely a descriptive narrative that employs metaphors and evaluative terms such as “hovering clouds,” “grubby restaurant,” and contrasts it with Saddam Hussein’s “splendid palace.” The reporter uses rhetorical devices such as direct quotes to enhance his own observations, and to refer to the immediacy and the truthfulness of his description. There is no way to verify the credibility of the interviewee’s accounts and it wouldn’t really matter anyway since in van Dijk’s (1988) terms: “it is not so much the real truth as is the illusion of truth that is at stake in the rhetoric of news” (p. 86). Hence, the reporter introduces them anyway to convey both human and dramatic dimensions of the news event.

²⁵*The Globe & Mail*, 01/16/A1/C2/headline, lead 4.

In line with its front-page headlines, the *G&M* editorial on January 16, 1991, "Sanctions aren't enough to force Iraq from Kuwait" supports its government's view that war is not only needed but also "must be fought." After listing all the facts that are working against the capacity of economic sanctions to reverse the "illegal occupation of a sovereign state," the editorial comforts its readers by reviewing the not-so-impressive Iraqi military record and foresees the "potential for a short campaign with limited casualties, at least on the UN side." The editorial concludes by holding Iraq responsible:

Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait to pay the bill he ran up during his misadventure in Iran. His cycle of tyranny must end. As Prime Minister Brian Mulroney told the House of Commons yesterday, "It is the moral duty of the international community to stop him now."²⁶

Moreover, Jeffrey Simpson, senior columnist of the *G&M*, also presents his pro-war piece in "Parliamentary debate on whether Canada should go to war,"²⁷ in which he reviews the Canadian parliamentary debates over the option of war or giving economic sanctions sufficient time to instigate an Iraqi withdrawal. Mr. Simpson then contends that similar discussions are also occurring between the governments of the U.S., France, Britain and their domestic opposition parties. Yet, the author carries his argument a step further, and spells out the Canadian Liberal and New Democratic parties' arguments that "Canada should remove itself from offensive action to safeguard its independence and reputation as a peacemaker." Then he criticizes this "dependency" allegation:

This argument about independence is always a curious one. Critics almost always claim that when Canada disagrees with the United States, the country is demonstrating its independence, and that when Canada agrees, the country has forgone its independence and caved in to Uncle Sam.

²⁶*The Globe & Mail*, 01/16/A14/C1/Ed-1.

²⁷*The Globe & Mail*, 01/16/A14/C1/Op-1.

In sum, it is clear that the *G&M*'s editorial and opinion position on this date is in total agreement with its government's policy and in support of a full-fledged Canadian military participation in the Gulf War.

• ***The Globe & Mail* on Wednesday, January 23, 1991.**

• **MISSILE STRIKES TEL AVIV**

Three dead, 70 injured after Iraqi Scud eludes Patriot defence system

By JOHN GRAY

And COLIN MacKENZIE

With AP, Reuter and Staff

An Iraqi Scud missile eluded a sophisticated U.S. anti-missile screen and slammed into a Tel Aviv residential neighborhood last night, injuring at least 70 people and causing widespread damage. At least three people died of apparent heart attacks.²⁸

On this date, the *G&M* front-page presents four different Gulf stories/issues to its readers under the above two-deck headline banner. The headline is accompanied by a four-column Reuters' photo (the same one used in the *NYT*) of a wounded Israeli woman in the aftermath of an Iraqi missile attack. Although the *G&M* headline appears in an unusual upper case, and larger font characters, it is the placement of the photo that affords significance and prominence to the story. The headline and picture together convey to the reader the despicable acts of horror committed by Iraq, while instilling in the reader's mind a justification for waging an urgent war to halt the menace of Saddam Hussein to prevent him from carrying any further deadly attacks to terrorize his neighbors.

The kicker clause asserts the factual nature of the event and suggests its truthfulness by implying exactness of precise numbers such as "Three dead, 70 injured."

²⁸*The Globe & Mail*, 01/23/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

This figure, however, does not exactly match the *NYT*'s "3 DIE, 96 ARE HURT" headline.²⁹ In fact, van Dijk (1981b) illustrates in his case studies of domestic and international news that even when using the same sources, figures may vary among news media. These numerical indications are mere rhetorical strategies, and are conveniently employed to convey precision and to suggest truthfulness.

In effect, the lead paragraph has a syntactic function (van Dijk, 1988) to explicate the headline and kicker in terms of: a) the agent/aggressor (Iraqi Scud missile), which "eluded" b) the subject "sophisticated" U.S. anti-missile screen, and slammed into c) location (Tel-Aviv residential neighborhood), when d) time (last night), and resulted in e) consequence (70 injured, and widespread damage). The last sentence in the lead verifies that the heart attack was the cause of death in the three reported fatalities.

Let us take this inquiry one step further and juxtapose the above *G&M* news report with the below from the *NYT*.

• **3 DIE, 96 ARE HURT IN ISRAEL SUBURB**

• **Damage Is Heavy as Defenses Fail to Stop Iraqi Missile**

By JOHN KIFNER

TEL AVIV, Wednesday, Jan. 23 – An Iraqi Scud missile evaded two American Patriot air-defense missiles and slammed into a Tel Aviv suburb on Tuesday night, leaving 3 people dead and 96 wounded, Israeli officials said today.³⁰

In addition to the earlier discussed discrepancy in numbers of injuries (70 *G&M* vs. 96 *NYT*), there is clearly some language variation between the *G&M* and the *NYT* that warrants some comment. Take for instance the adjective use of the *NYT* reference to "heavy" vs. the *G&M*'s "widespread" damage. This variation is not so much a question of semantics or the arbitrary use of adjectives, but rather according to van Dijk (1988), a

²⁹*The New York Times*, 01/23/A1/C3/headline, lead 1.

³⁰*Ibid.*

specific signal, in this case an “institutional embedding of discourse,” that may also expose “the attitudes and ideologies of the speaker” (p. 81). A rhetorical strategy of mitigation is also detected in the *NYT* upon comparing the cause of death statement: “apparent heart attacks,” which was mentioned in the *G&M*’s lead, while mitigated in the *NYT*.

- **Commons affirms Canada’s war role**

Liberals vote with government

By GEOFFREY YORK

OTTAWA – The House of Commons voted overwhelmingly last night to endorse the United Nations actions that led Canada and an allied coalition into war against Iraq.³¹

This headline and lead is within the context of the Canadian national democratic process. The headline assigns the authority of “affirming” Canada’s role in the war to the House of Commons. The kicker expresses solidarity with the “opposition” i.e. Liberals in voting “with the government” to go to war. Finally, the lead sentence explicates the headlines and signifies a strong unity in the Canadian decision to follow through with the United Nations’ sanctioned war against Iraq.

In total contrast to the above democratic process conveyed by the headline and lead is this Letter to the Editor “Let Parliament be the judge,” that read:

It is a striking anomaly that Canada’s House of Commons, that democratic gathering of the elected representatives of the Canadian people, has little or no say in the decision to send Canadian forces off to fight in a war.

³¹*The Globe & Mail*, 01/23/A1/C2/headline, lead 2.

- **UN envoy “joked” about murder plan**

Suggested KGB could “take out” Hussein

By MIRO CERNETIG

OTTAWA – Canada’s ambassador to the United Nations says remarks he made about the possibility of Soviet secret agents assassinating Iraqi President Saddam Hussein were taken out of context.³²

This is an interesting headline and lead that reads as a murder mystery novel. The novelty of the headline’s first proposition is the main topic, which is a “joke” about a “murder plan.” The term “joke” is probably used here to diminish the act’s political ramification. The kicker clause offers more details about this “murder plan,” such as the agent “KGB,” who will commit the act of “taking out” the subject “Hussein.” The lead identifies “Canada’s ambassador” as the source of this “murder plan,” only to interject his statement with a conciliatory clause clarifying that “the remarks were taken out of context.” But which context is that?

The next five paragraphs of the report refer to quotes and interviews with the ambassador to explain the circumstances of his comment. The explications that were offered along with this intricate headline fit perfectly into the “demonizing Hussein” narrative. The fact of the matter is that Saddam Hussein has been extensively portrayed as the world’s number-one villain, a criminal, or the new “Hitler,” which dictates that the civilized world do something about him. Therefore, the “take out Saddam” rumor is put within the context of moral justness, to allow for such public contemplation in the highest levels of international and UN representatives.

It is quite fascinating to disregard Saddam’s “once-upon-a-time” history, as the West’s hero, fighting against fundamentalist Islamic Iran, and safeguarding the vital interests of the rich Arab Gulf states. But that was then, and now he has another role of

³²*The Globe & Mail*, 01/23/A1/C4/headline, lead 3.

being “the enemy of mankind.” A historical parallel is in the way the United States disposes of many Latin American military junta and dictators, as in the ousting of Panama’s Manuel Noriega in 1989. In this regard, Chomsky describes the immoral depiction of Saddam and his transformation from a friend to a foe as “the same murderous gangster, just as he was before August 2, when he was an amiable friend and favored trading partner” (Chomsky, 1991a: 52).

- **War drama pre-empts nation’s business**

By GRAHAM FRASER

It was symbolic. During the first days of the war in the Persian Gulf, a television monitor was in the lobby of the House of Commons – tuned to CNN.³³

This headline assigns the “War drama” the agency, and the power to disrupt a “nation’s business” (legislations, litigation etc.) the subject. The lead in a sense testifies on behalf of the power of (American media) CNN, and implies albeit “symbolically” to the potential (of media) to *distract* or *inform* depending on one’s point of view the decision making process (a democratic practice) usually associated with the House of Commons.

In the end, the *G&M* editorial on this date: “Iraq’s military machine was built by experts,” offers an assessment of the Iraqi war machine. The editorial holds the global power struggle and the arms race in the Middle East responsible for creating a monstrous power in Iraqi. The editorial then blames the greediness of arms-exporting countries such as the former Soviet Union, France, Brazil, South Africa and yes, the United States for helping Saddam Hussein build his mighty military machine.

³³*The Globe & Mail*, 01/23/A1/C1/headline. lead 4.

• ***The Globe & Mail*, Tuesday, January 29, 1991.**

• **Up to 100 Iraqi planes now in Iran**

Flow of oil to gulf slick “down to a trickle,” U.S. officials say

By COLIN MacKENZIE

and PAUL KORING

With AP, Reuter and Staff

As U.S. officials announced that a weekend bombing strike had stopped the growth of a huge oil slick off the Kuwaiti coast, the number of Iraqi aircraft fleeing to Iran raised new concerns yesterday.³⁴

On this date, the *G&M* front-page presents two different Gulf issues to its readers under the above two-deck headline banner. The headline is accompanied with a four-column AP photo that reads: “Debris from bomb damage litters a street in downtown Baghdad in an undated photograph released by an Iraqi news agency.” In other words the *G&M* is telling its readers that there is no way to verify the authenticity of this picture, hence it is implying caution and untrustworthiness of the Iraqi news agency. But for the reader the bottom line is that there must be some damage caused by the intense coalition bombing, and some connection to the news item.

Basically, the local coherence of the news discourse in this headline and lead are not linked conditionally or functionally in relation to the topic and pertinent world knowledge of the news report. According to van Dijk’s (1988) principles of local discourse semantics, this news item is displaying a top-down, schema-driven release of information, and here is where the vagueness in connecting the “100 Iraqi planes’ departure to Iran,” and flow of the “oil slick” comes in.

Meanwhile, the use of numbers “100 Iraqi planes” is a rhetorical strategy to imply precision and exactness to the report, while the authority to define both events is assigned

³⁴*The Globe & Mail*, 01/29/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

to “U.S. officials.” The lead paragraph on the other hand, does not offer sufficient details to make either topic comprehensible. Only in the third paragraph is the plight of the Iraqi aircraft explicated from the American and British perspectives. No Iraqis, Kuwaitis, Iranians nor Saudis are commenting about events taking place in their respective countries.

Although the *G&M* article uses AP, Reuter, and Staff sources, it is almost identical to the story reported by the *NYT* correspondents, datelined in Washington, Dhahran, and Saudi Arabia, respectively. In this case, and since the news about these events do not allow for direct observation or for description by eyewitnesses, it does not make any difference whether the *G&M* story is sourced from news agencies, or the *NYT*’s story filed by its correspondents. If anything, it challenges the idea that the proximity of the description and the nearness of the reporter to the events is “a rhetorical guarantee for the truthfulness of the description and, hence, the plausibility of the news” (van Dijk, 1988, p. 86) because in this case it is not.

Both articles (*G&M* and *NYT*) do attest to what van Dijk (1988) refers to as the “social hierarchy” being reproduced in the “rhetorical hierarchy of credibility and reliability.” This means that reporters substantiate the factuality of their accounts by the use of quotations and sources. Yet, not all sources or quotations are equally credible. The higher the source on this social hierarchy the more credible the accounts are. Elite sources in general are considered not only more newsworthy, but also more reliable as observers and opinion formulators. Similarly, the elite status of a nation on this international hierarchy is valued on the same premises. This explains the intense presence of U.S. and British military sources, and the substantial direct and indirect quotes of

American experts, intelligence, Pentagon and high ranking military officials, in view of the total silence of the “other” (non-elite) Iranian, Iraqi, or (less-elite) Kuwaiti, and Saudi officials’ sources, opinions or accounts.

- **Summit talks postponed**
- **“Inappropriate” for Bush to leave Washington, U.S. says**

By COLIN MacKENZIE

WASHINGTON – The United States and the Soviet Union have postponed their summit scheduled for next month, saying the Persian Gulf War makes it “inappropriate” for President George Bush to leave Washington.³⁵

This headline and lead is placed immediately beneath the photo of debris in Baghdad to perhaps hint at some correlation between the two. Although the large font three-column headline assigns considerable significance to the event *per se* i.e. “postponement of Summit,” the incoherence and vagueness of its clauses do not allow for any connection between the two issues. For instance, there is no connection between a) the “postponement of [the] summit,” b) the identification of “which summit,” and c) the relevance of this postponement to the events of the Gulf War, which is only hinted at by the positioning and the proximity of the headline to the aforementioned photo.

At any rate, the news report does exhibit an indirect thematic realization structure (van Dijk, 1988), which basically means that the most important topics are put first and the details connecting these seemingly three disperse topics are offered indirectly, and in installments through the text.

This episodic character of news discourse, however, allows the topic’s prominence in the headline and lead. For each topic, the most important information is presented first, and the details pertaining to their relations are offered in parts throughout

³⁵The Globe & Mail, 01/29/A1/C2/headline, lead 2.

the report. For example, and strictly from a Realpolitik perspective, the news value of this event demands more significance to the survival of mankind (due to the threat of nuclear war) than any Gulf War event. But, in reality, a news event does not necessarily merit newsworthiness unless, as in this case is determined by the White House agenda. This conditional relation of cause/consequence is not spelled out in the report, but is left to the cognitive knowledge of the reader to realize it.

Still, the real reasons prompting the rescheduling of the summit are implicitly presented in a temporal before/after relation both in the *NYT*, and in the *G&M*. The former focuses mainly on the American disenchantment with the Soviet crackdown on the Baltic republics' independence movement, and with Russia's slow shift from a communist to a market economy. The *G&M* news report candidly refers to the Soviet dissatisfaction with the U.S.'s intense aerial bombardment of Iraq in its fourth front-page paragraph. It even goes further in mentioning that the United States had no reason to "believe that Soviet advisers are continuing to help Iraq fight its war against the international coalition"³⁶ In contrast, the *NYT* downplays these "real reasons" and only mentions them on its "Continued from page A1" section, paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 respectively, while totally neglecting any reference to the allegations of Soviet-Iraqi cooperation in the Gulf War. The choice of the *NYT* to mitigate these claims is an indication of a calculated move (which incidentally coincides with its government's view) to avoid alienating the visiting Soviet foreign minister to the point of publicly denouncing the U.S. role in the Gulf War.

³⁶*The Globe & Mail*, 01/29/A1/C4/paragraph 8.

On this date, the *G&M* did something unique. Instead of its traditional Op-Ed page, it turned the “Commentary” page into a public forum, and dedicated it to a sampling of “War Correspondence,” as well as publishing letters to *The Globe and Mail* (to show:)

[H]ow Canadians view their country’s part in the assault on Iraq, what they think of war and peace, arms dealers, the ‘new world order’ and the UN record in protecting defenceless states. A small sampling show only one point in common – concern.³⁷

Among the thirteen published letters, three are critical of Canada’s role in the Gulf War, one claims: “we see the UN objectives pushed aside and the real goals of the United States exposed – namely the destruction of Iraq (not to mention the testing of all that wonderful new military technology).” Three are questioning the morality of war: “Mr. Mulroney is willing to sacrifice Canadian lives in the name of protecting freedom, democracy and justice. Is Mr. Mulroney willing to send our forces to the Soviet Union, or communist China, to protect freedom and democracy in the Baltic states or Tibet?” Two are commending Israel’s restraint as “heroic,” two are expressing support for Canada’s role within the United Nations, and one is arguing that sanctions might have worked, while of the last two, one criticizes NDP Party Leader Audrey McLaughlin’s opposition to the Gulf War, and the other praises her.

³⁷*The Globe & Mail*, 01/29/A13/C1/Op-Ed.

• ***The Globe & Mail, Wednesday, January 30, 1991.***

• **U.S. offers Iraq ceasefire**

“Unequivocal commitment” to leave Kuwait could end war

By COLIN MacKENZIE

And PAUL KORING

With Associated Press and Reuter

The United States last night offered Iraq a ceasefire in the Persian Gulf War in return for “an unequivocal commitment” that it will pull out of Kuwait.³⁸

On this date, the *G&M* front page presents to its readers a four-column banner headline and a big Reuter photo of a man displaying 12,000 Saddam Hussein masks to sell for “Carnival in Rio de Janeiro!” Atop the photo is the (above) two-deck headline declaring a U. S. proposal for a ceasefire in return for “an unequivocal commitment” to leave Kuwait. It is not exactly clear what the relevance is of this juxtaposition with the headline of a serious news report, except for the appalling graphical effect of thousands of repugnant Saddam Hussein faces jumping out at you. Upon further assessment of the front-page in its entirety, it becomes obvious that the juxtaposition has: First, a “demonizing/dehumanizing Saddam” frame, which *incidentally* (emphasis added) coincides with a quote that is a part of the news text, but is placed immediately under the picture (for added drama), and reads: “If we see them in the air, we’ll take them on,” U.S. Brigadier-General Pat Stevens said in Riyadh yesterday.” “If they remain in the theatre of war as an enemy aircraft, we’re going to try to destroy them.”³⁹ Secondly, the appalling Saddam Hussein masks are probably used to cast a shadow of negativity, reservation, and distrust. Ostensibly, the seeming irrelevance of the photo to the actual news topic is intended in van Dijk’s (1988) terms to evoke the presupposed vast amounts

³⁸*The Globe & Mail*, 01/30/A1/C1/headline. lead 1.

³⁹*The Globe & Mail*, 01/30/A1/C2/headline. lead 1.

of general and particular political, and often-stereotypical knowledge the reader has about Saddam Hussein. In other words, it will remind the *G&M* reader of the irrationality of Saddam Hussein, and the odds of his likelihood to accept the proposed “U.S. ceasefire offer.”

Contrary to the dramatic picture, the very serious headline and lead assign to the U.S. the authority to “offer” Iraq a ceasefire, and to “demand” an “‘Unequivocal commitment’ to leave Kuwait.” The lead paragraph reiterates the headline in a conditional cause/effect manner i.e. a ceasefire will be offered only if Iraq leaves Kuwait.

The installment character of the report unfolds in the ensuing paragraphs where a thematic realization from macro to microstructures takes place. The second paragraph explains that the offer comes in a joint statement in Washington delivered by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet foreign minister Alexander Bessmertnykh.⁴⁰ The subsequent paragraphs indicate that the truce bid is a breakthrough for the United States’ policy of insisting on an Iraqi withdrawal before any halt to the punishing air raids, and in light of “the Soviet concern that Iraq was not being given a chance to end the war.” Moreover, the fifth paragraph affirms that this is the closest the United States came in linking the Gulf crisis with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Interestingly enough, these two “breakthrough” (as referred to by the *G&M*) factors in U.S. foreign policy underscored in the *G&M* front page headline banner, do not merit enough significance to be reported on this day in any *NYT* front-page news report. After a thorough search in the *NYT* pages and index, it is confirmed that this news item

⁴⁰Notice the title of James Baker ‘Secretary of State’ begins in upper cases, while the title of his counterpart ‘Soviet foreign minister’ in lower cases. I checked the style of the same news report in *NYT*, and found both titles in upper cases!

did not appear as an independent report or otherwise on the front pages of the *NYT*. However, it may well be, and it is a common practice in the *NYT* to incorporate different news reports under a general headline, and perhaps filter this information within the context of another Gulf War news item in one of the "Continued From Page A1" paragraphs, but certainly, not independently under its own headline.

Thus, a comment is warranted on the question of how two *G&M* correspondents can file a story of this magnitude, sourced from AP and Reuter, and yet the same story cannot be accounted for in any of the front-pages of the *NYT*.

This is a quite fascinating testimony to the power of headlines in determining the significance of a story. In a sense, it is safe to suggest that the *NYT* did in fact overlook or at least downplay this information to avoid appearing overbearing, and conflicting with the U.S. Gulf War policy. This U.S. policy, many believe, has been reluctant to consider any comprehensive Middle East peace process prior to achieving overwhelming U.S. victory in the Gulf War. Therefore, and according to Herman and Chomsky's (1988) "Propaganda Model," and to consumer advocate Ralph Nader's (1991) "dissenting ideology," the *NYT* indeed seems to be restricting the range of debate, and propagating the official U.S. Administration's version of events.

• **The *Globe & Mail*, Wednesday, February 13, 1991.**

• **Hussein hints at move to peace**

Meets Soviet envoy, Baghdad radio reports

By COLIN MacKENZIE

and MATHEW FISHER

With Reuter and Associated Press

Iraqi president Saddam Hussein is willing to co-operate with the Soviet Union in seeking an end to the war in the Persian Gulf, Baghdad radio said last night.⁴¹

On this date, the *G&M* dedicates one front-page headline to Iraqi peace intentions, and another to Israel's plans. The headline introduces the topic and assigns the authority to "hint" and "meet" meet with the Soviet envoy to Hussein. However, at the cognitive-semantic level, the *G&M* immediately undermines Hussein's authority by a conspicuous use of the verb "hints," to suggest uncertainty and distrust in his intent to seek peace.

The lead paragraph gives the full macrostructure of the main topic. It confirms the Agent (Iraqi President), Place, the political role of the (Soviet Union), and a further Goal set for the "cooperation" which is to (seek an end to the war) (Van Dijk, 1988). It is unclear, however, if the repetition of the source "Baghdad radio," mentioned in the headline and lead, and also in the opening of the second paragraph: "The state-run-radio said," is intended to undermine the reliability of the news report, or to grant it an added legitimacy.

In fact, van Dijk (1988) confirms the correlation between the hierarchy of sources and the degree of their credibility; he even refers to the newsworthiness of elite sources (news actors such as political leaders or states) and their status as credible observers and opinion formulators. Hence, it is within this context of rhetorical social hierarchy and reliability that the source "Baghdad radio," and the irrelevant detail of "state-run-radio,"

⁴¹ *The Globe & Mail*, 02/13/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

has been stressed repeatedly so that the *G&M* reader is led to treat the Iraqi source and intent with extreme skepticism. It is at this cognitive level that the ideological working of the headline and lead is exposed.

- **Israel seeks approval from U.S. to hit Scuds**

Shamir recalls bombing of Iraqi reactor

By JOHN GRAY

JERUSALEM – Israel has asked the United States to approve a special Israeli mission to wipe out missile launchers in western Iraq.⁴²

The graphical juxtaposition of this headline with the former one calls for some clarification. It is remarkable how the first front-top-page position, and the positive (cooperation for peace) topic of the bold, and large font Iraqi headline, which is in sharp contrast to the positioning (below), smaller font character, and negative connotation (hitting Scuds) of this Israeli headline, has absolutely no relevance to its semantic degree of credibility.

To understand the headline in which Israel “seeks approval from U.S. to hit Scuds” requires social cognition of shared knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, goals, plans, or ideologies, all of which are also in part shared by the reporter, who in turn is a member of the *G&M* institution. This worldly knowledge if you will, prompts the *G&M* readers to assign a higher degree of credibility to the Agent (Israel) and to view her request (to hit Scuds) more sympathetically than, for example, the former “Hussein’s hints at peace” news report.

The second-deck headline “Shamir recalls bombing of Iraqi reactor” (which is a topic by itself with no direct relevance to the theme of the first deck), is merely a presupposition (van Dijk, 1988), to remind the reader of a previous forgotten event, and

⁴²*The Globe & Mail*, 02/13/A1/C1/headline, lead 2.

to invoke a model about Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor, the goal of which Israel claims was "to deprive this evil man [Iraqi President Saddam Hussein] of the nuclear capacity. Now, the whole world remembers our action with gratitude."⁴³ Although much of the information about activating this past model remains implicit, it submits to Israel's right to take appropriate measures in order to defend her national security, and to "wipe out missile launchers in western Iraq."

In contrast, the *NYT* downplays this same Israeli intent to strike back, and reports it on page A14, squeezed in a totally different report under "Continued From Page A1" segment. In a less-than-four lines paragraph, and under a sub headline "Hints of Retaliation," the *NYT* confirms Shamir's plans to get even with Saddam, only to intercept it with a positive clause: "but said he did not want to alienate Arab nations in the allied coalition."⁴⁴ Interestingly enough, no reference is made in the *NYT* to Shamir's recollection of the 1981 bombing of the Iraqi-reactor, or to his asking for approval to strike back. This *deletion* and selective use of reference in the *NYT*, is not arbitrary. Indeed, it can be attributed to what van Dijk (1988) termed as one of many news-production strategies, routinely used to decide upon the relevance or irrelevance of details of vast information. In other words, this very process of "selecting the pertinent" is ideologically determined by the *NYT* journalist's particular beliefs, opinions and attitudes towards Israel, and in the journalist's assumption of the *NYT* readers' similar models and scripts.

⁴³*The Globe & Mail*, 02/13/A12/C2/paragraph 2.

⁴⁴*The New York Times*, 02/13/A14/C1/paragraph 4.

• ***The Globe & Mail*, Wednesday, February 25, 1991.**

• **Coalition meets little resistance**

Initial incursions into Kuwait and Iraqi desert called “dramatic success”

By MATHEW FISHER

With Associated Press and Reuter

RIYADH – U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf momentarily broke an official news blackout yesterday to report that coalition forces had achieved all of their first-day objectives within 12 hours of invading Kuwait and Iraq by land, sea and air in the largest offensive since the D-Day landings in Normandy in 1944.⁴⁵

This day marks the beginning of the end of the Gulf War, in what has been referred to as the “mother of all battles” (that lasted less than 100 hours), in reference to the largest since D-Day. The *G&M* displays the significance of this event in a grand six-column Reuter night-time photo (compared to the same *NYT* daytime AP photo) of endless lines of hundreds of captured Iraqi soldiers marching towards the Saudi border. Against this surrealist juxtaposition of defeat, the *G&M* introduces the above two-deck banner headline. Beneath the first paragraph of this report, and across two columns, the *G&M* uses the same *NYT* map⁴⁶ to indicate the progress made “within 12 hours of launching offensive into Kuwait and Iraq.”

The newsworthiness of the main topic of this headline “meet[ing] little resistance,” is partly determined by the significance of its consequence, which is the overwhelming “dramatic” success of the coalition. Hence, the causal coherence of the discourse affords the consequence category the highest-level topic expressed in the headline (van Dijk, 1988).

Ostensibly, the lead paragraph gives the full macrostructure of the main topic. It specifies the Agent (U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf), Time (yesterday), the Subject

⁴⁵*The Globe & Mail*, 02/25/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

⁴⁶*The Globe & Mail* used the *NYT* accredited photo adding the above stated subtitle, whereas the *NYT* used it with no comment.

(mission of invading Kuwait and Iraq), the means (by land, sea and air), exactness and efficiency in the coalition's Goal (achieving first day objectives within 12 hours).

Furthermore, the context of the detailed specification of the event is offered in the second paragraph in regards to the number of "about one million coalition and Iraqi troops... finally meeting on the battlefield yesterday," the exact time of the "attack that began at 4 a.m.," and the impressive magnitude of a front "that extended from the Persian Gulf almost to Jordan."

However, the semantic relevance of this headline and lead is not only in its meaning and reference, but also in its cognitive presupposition (van Dijk, 1988). In other words, the conditional relationship between the prepositions of "meet[ing] little resistance" which causes the fact of "dramatic success of battle" is assumed and remains implicit. This may include the stereotypical and consensual knowledge language users have, which may vary between reporter and reader; so, the local coherence is established only when the knowledge about war is presented in a socially shared script of a "battle," between "good 'we' vs. evil 'them,'" and a shared conceptual implication of "the good 'us' usually defeating the evil 'other.'"

- **HUMILIATION/Grind-it-in-your-face triumph is what U.S. wants in
Determined effort to ensure Hussein loses all credibility as pan-Arab figure.**
- **When victory is not enough**

By COLIN MacKENZIE

Washington

In the end, widely acknowledged victory was not enough for U.S. President George Bush. Overwhelming, undeniable, grind-it-in-your-face triumph is what the White House wants and is the goal it has set for the U.S. led ground attack that began at 8 p.m. EST on Saturday.⁴⁷

This opinion column is placed right to the left of the above-mentioned map. The first deck of the headline pervasively characterizes the U.S. intentions in a dominant aggressive way. The delicate implications and presuppositions of this headline lie in its subtle clausal relations. Consider the interesting connective use of “When,” which is used to signify the “concessive” relationship between the two propositions of the headline (van Dijk, 1988). For instance, the clause suggests that President Bush did not have a valid reason for being overbearing and domineering. After all, victory is “not enough to U.S. President George Bush,” the lead asserts, in an evaluative proposition, and suggestive metaphor, it has to be “Overwhelming, undeniable, grind-it-in-your-face triumph.”

In addition to the rhetorical stylistics used extensively throughout the report, as an opinion column, the author makes the story effective and persuasive by embedding opinions, attitudes and ideology such as American hegemony, and “Pan-Arab[ism].” Significantly, the author presupposes not only knowledge or beliefs but also norms and values that are shared by various social groups or cultures such as the hegemonic role of the U.S. Therefore, in order for the reader to achieve total understanding of the text, s/he

⁴⁷*The Globe & Mail*, 02/25/A1/C3/headline, lead 2.

must construct a model of the situation, and form specific opinions about the conduct of President Bush, and the American foreign policy.

It is safe though to suggest that these evaluative propositions (humiliation, defeat, credibility), and opinions hint at the increasing Canadian dissatisfaction with American Gulf War policy, which many believe has exceeded the UN directives, as is evident in the third paragraph:

“Iraq’s acceptance of its defeat, implicit in Baghdad’s agreement to leave Kuwait under terms negotiable with the Soviet Union, was not enough for a United States determined to ensure that Saddam Hussein loses credibility as a pan-Arab figure.”⁴⁸

In subsequent paragraphs, Mr. MacKenzie offers a historic context about how President Bush personalizes the war in his own mind. To project the degree of acrimony, the author compares the American President’s hatred for Hussein to that of former Panamanian president Manuel Noriega (notice the use of historical parallels and comparisons). To emphasize his point, Mr. MacKenzie uses a quote of a congressional aide about “the kind of florid rhetoric he uses –Saddam Hussein- and I think it’s more of a cultural trait than a personal one – drives Bush nuts.”⁴⁹

Finally, both at the macro-level, as suggested by the very headline, and at the micro-level we may gather from these descriptions that President George Bush, or the United States’ victory are not presented very positively.

⁴⁸*The Globe & Mail*, 02/25/A1/C4/paragraph 3.

⁴⁹*The Globe & Mail*, 02/25/A11/C2/paragraph 7.

- **Soviet criticize U.S. over timing**

“Military solution prevailed” against diplomacy, official says

By JEFF SALLOT

MOSCOW – The Soviet Union frostily complained yesterday that the U.S.-led coalition launched a land offensive in the Persian Gulf conflict without allowing sufficient time to seek a political solution.⁵⁰

This headline is connected thematically to the previous one, which incidentally, the *G&M* positioned beneath the previous one, and to the right of the “map” elaborating the swift advances of the coalition forces.

The headline empowers the Soviets (the agent) to criticize the U.S. (the subject), over (the act of) choosing military option instead of diplomacy. The same old argument about the military or diplomatic means of resolving the conflict resurfaces again.

The lead paragraph summarizes the topic in a quite disenchanted tone, and adds some details such as “frostily complained” about launching the land offensive prior to giving the political solution enough time to work. The most implicit insinuation of the lead is embedded in its emphasis on the unilateral role of the U.S. in the war, despite the reference to its “U.S.-led coalition.” The (former) Soviet Union irrefutably accuses the U.S. of prematurely launching the land offensive, in the same hasty manner that the United States embarked on the relentless air attacks on January 17. The gist of the report illustrates (in spite of the diplomatic squabbling) that the U.S. has been determined all along to use military action as a solution to the conflict, “even after Iraq agreed to withdraw its forces from Kuwait.” The second paragraph offers additional evidence by paraphrasing the Soviet Defence Minister that: “the United States was going beyond the United Nations mandate by bombing Iraqi cities.”

⁵⁰*The Globe & Mail*, 02/25/A1/C3/headline, lead 3.

This front-page news report is yet another attestation to the *G&M*'s regular devotion to peace initiatives and to its elite role as a forum of diverse perspectives and opinions. In contrast, this news event went once again unreported in the *NYT*. After literally probing every Gulf War-related issue in all *NYT* pages of that day, there it was, on page A16, which incidentally was devoted to world reactions from Britain, France, Germany, Israel, Kuwait, Jordan (a photo of angry demonstrators) and finally Egypt. There, in the bottom of the page under the headline:

• **Egypt**
Sighs Drown Out War Cries as Arab Marches Against Arab⁵¹
By CLYDE HABERMAN

First, the article describes the uneasy feelings of all Egyptians having to fight an Arab country, and then, for an added feel of the street if you will, the reporter conducts interviews with ordinary Egyptian merchants in the famous "Khan al Khalili Bazaar," which is referred to as a "buyer's market in these tourist-starved times." The interviewees are troubled by the fact that "Arabs are battling Arabs," yet, seemed resigned to "the Islamic principle to help the weak one who cannot help himself, even if it means having to fight against another Muslim country."

Only in the fifth paragraph, and within the context of recounting the Egyptian opposition, does the reporter acknowledge the presence of "many others, especially among the more educated and the monied, who object to the land assault and believe that diplomatic efforts like the Soviet formula for an Iraqi pullout from Kuwait, which has been accepted by Iraq, should have been given more time and energy.

⁵¹*The New York Times*, 02/25/A16/C1.

What this juxtaposition tells us is that unlike the *G&M*, the *NYT* downplays this event by a) integrating it in a different news report, and b) placing it on page A16 and under a totally irrelevant (unsuspecting) headline and lead. Chances are the casual *NYT* reader will not stumble upon this information that is probably deemed to raise doubts about the international support of the U.S. war conduct. Thus, this suggests that on this day, the *NYT* has indeed framed the ground war in one jingoistic U.S. image, depicted a perception of a renowned world support, precluded critical perspective, and distorted reality to conform to the official American view of total triumph and undeniable victory. For, to do otherwise would have exceeded what Chomsky called, "The Bounds of the Expressible," which illustrates the genius of "brainwashing under freedom."⁵²

It would be interesting to verify the *G&M*'s editorial position against the nuances of the preceding front-page analysis, which has detected a strong *G&M* tilt against the U.S. persistence on exceeding the UN-set objectives to free Kuwait. This slant, however, could not be verified to determine whether it was indeed the result of a genuine Canadian frustration with the American role, or if it was simply within the *G&M*'s diligent and systematic efforts favoring the peaceful resolution of the conflict over the military option.

⁵²Cited in James Winter, "Truth As The First Casualty: Mainstream Media Portrayal of The Gulf War", 1992, p. 13.

• ***The Globe & Mail, Thursday, February 28, 1991.***

• **U.S. declares victory;
offensive suspended**

““This war is now behind us,”” Bush announces after rout of Iraqi forces

By COLIN MacKENZIE

With CP, AP and Staff

WASHINGTON – The United States claimed victory in the Persian Gulf War last night, declaring a cessation of hostilities at midnight Eastern Standard Time as its forces completed a crushing ground offensive that took only 100 hours to overwhelm an Iraqi army reeling from six weeks of bombing.⁵³

On this date, the front page of the *G&M* is completely dedicated to declaring the United States’ victory, and to the official proclamation of the end of the Gulf War. The huge six-column, three-deck headline banner frames the thematic relevance of all three front-page articles and boasts a three-column AP photo of jubilant Kuwaiti soldiers waving their rifles in a victory celebration parade in Kuwait City.

The first two decks of the headline banner offers the U.S. (the agent) the authority to “declare victory” and the power to “suspend the offensive.” The third deck bestows upon U.S. President George Bush the command and credibility to assert that “[T]his war is now behind us.”

After three paragraphs into detailing the American “crushing” victory announcement, the reporter initiates the rhetoric of the “defiant” “other.” The fourth paragraph depicts how Radio Baghdad signs on as usual at 5:30 a.m. local time, which is incidentally, minutes after President Bush’s statement. The paragraph read as follows:

“This is Baghdad, the voice of dignity and pride, the voice of justice and force, “an announcer said.” From Baghdad, the graveyard of the criminal invaders, good morning.

For the most part, by contrasting this piece with the dazzling *G&M* front-page

⁵³*The Globe & Mail*, 02/28/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

layout, and the graphical effect of the photo of the triumphant Kuwaitis, along with the *G&M* forceful headline banner, the *G&M* reporter may have used the Radio Baghdad excerpt as a strategy to ridicule the credibility and authority of Radio Baghdad. This very negative and sarcastic juxtaposition is both socially and cognitively effective, since it is finely tuned to the social needs, norms, and interests embedded in the belief system of the *G&M* readers.

The cachet of American assertion of the Iraqi defeat is also well captured in the following *G&M* front-page headline:

- **U.S. exhibits military prowess**

Museum celebrating gulf victory opens before fighting ends

By JACQUIE McNISH

NEW YORK – As it routed Iraqi forces in the Persian Gulf, the United States wasted no time erecting monuments to its military prowess.⁵⁴

It is beyond doubt that the ubiquitous American display of military supremacy in the Gulf War was unprecedented. Its drive can only be understood within the context of historical engineering, when President Bush declared “By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all,” in what the *NYT* described as “a spontaneous burst of pride.”⁵⁵ This was yet another stark retribution against the “Vietnam Syndrome” and its ensuing inferiority complex that had plagued the American psyche for more than three decades.

Even before the war has ended, the *G&M* lead paragraph reported that the United States was so eager to display its omnipresent *collective psychotherapy* (emphasis added)

⁵⁴*The Globe & Mail*, 02/28/A1/C1/headline. lead 2.

⁵⁵Maureen Dowd, “War Introduces Nation to a Tougher Bush.” *The New York Times*, March 2, 1991, A1. Cited in James Winter, “Truth As The First Casualty: Mainstream Media Portrayal of The Gulf War”, 1992, p. 1.

by “erecting a monument to its military prowess.” The second paragraph offers more details about “the world’s first museum exhibit on the war, set on the *Intrepid*, a Second World War battleship converted into a military museum, ... to showcase a military victory even as the war continued.” And the Canadian reaction to this comes in the following paragraph: “Only in America could something like this happen.” commented the bewildered Yves Fortier, Canada’s ambassador to the United Nations, “raising his eyes heavenward. “The war isn’t even over yet.”⁵⁶

Finally, the third and last front-page report of the *G&M* on February 28, 1991, is appropriately dedicated to capturing the jubilant mood of the Kuwait people in their homecoming celebrations.

- **Euphoric Kuwaitis celebrate**

Exiled emir poised to return to terrorized capital

By JOHN KING

KUWAIT CITY – The Kuwaiti flag flew over the capital for the first time in nearly seven months yesterday as civilians carrying machine guns took control of the city and allied forces encircled it.⁵⁷

The *G&M* covers the last episode of the Gulf War drama with explicit reverence and integrity. The headline and lead describe the long-awaited homecoming of the Kuwaitis, and reports on the destruction of landmarks in Kuwait City within a subdued and plain text. In contrast, the *NYT* reports on the same event from a different perspective. It describes the relief as well as the plight of the freed Kuwaitis who had to endure torture and atrocities committed by Iraq.

The editorial stance of the *G&M* on this day “Tallying up the war’s winners and losers,” does exactly that. While certain of the success of ousting Saddam Hussein from

⁵⁶*The Globe & Mail*. 02/28/A1/C2/paragraph 3.

⁵⁷*The Globe & Mail*. 02/28/A1/C4/headline, lead 3.

Iraq, the *G&M* editorial position is unclear on the final details of Iraq's compliance with United Nations resolutions. The following paragraph distinguishes the war's biggest winners from its losers, with the United States emerging as the ultimate victor. The editorial assesses the list of countries that have played a role in the Gulf War, however, minimal and comments on Canada's role and gain:

- Britain, France and Canada emerge as the most loyal of the coalition's Western members. Prime Ministers John Major and Brian Mulroney, in particular, should experience increased popular support.⁵⁸

In terms of letters to the editor, there are three Gulf-War related letters. The first "The heights of gall" is a response letter to a previous complaint about Israel not having supplied the Palestinians with gas masks. The author claims that while Palestinians were urging Hussein to use chemical and biological weapons against Israeli civilians, Palestinians were cheering the Iraqi missiles that were raining down on Israel. Then, the author contends that they [the Palestinians] had the nerve to turn and demand that Israel supply them with gas masks!

Immediately under the above letter, there is an untitled letter that reads: "When it comes to asking for more, Israel puts Oliver Twist in the shade." Basically, the letter refers to the fact that in addition to the \$ 3-billion/year that Israel already receives from the U.S., Prime Minister Shamir has the "chutzpah" to expect another \$ 1 billion loan to build houses for Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel.

Finally the third letter, "Toward a new order," urges Western democracies to establish "an international criteria for acceptable forms of government and for interaction between governments." The United Nations, the author claims, should be able to

⁵⁸*The Globe & Mail*, 02/28/A20/C1/Op-Ed 1.

implement these proposed guidelines in order to prevent irrational, though historically sanctioned behavior among governments.

• ***The Globe & Mail, Monday, April 29, 1991.***

There is only one Gulf War related news report in this last analyzed issue of the *G&M*.

• **Allies expand refugee zone in Iraq**

In south, U.S. Army airlifts Iraqi Shiites to Saudi camp
Associated Press and Reuter

The “security zone” for Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq has been more than doubled and a site is being sought for a second settlement, U.S. officers said yesterday.⁵⁹

On this date, the *G&M* headline introduces the main event, which is “expand[ing] [the] refugee zone in Iraq.” The Agents are the (Allies), and the subjects are the (Kurds and Iraqi Shiites). While the lead summarizes the headline that the U.S. army is airlifting a number of Iraqi dissidents (mostly Shiites) to a Saudi camp, it adds details (reasons) for increasing the “security zone” and expanding the refugee camps, apparently to accommodate the growing number of Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq.

In subsequent paragraphs, the report provides information about the situation of the camps and calls attention to coalition forces who are collaborating with Kurdish rebels and Iraqi government representatives in order to arrange for the return of refugees to their villages. There was no mention, for instance, of the predicament of the Kurdish people, not in this report, nor of the brutal Iraqi attacks on Kurdish and Shiite villages, nor the effort to squash the Kurdish uprising in the north, nor the Shiite insurgency in the south.

⁵⁹*The Globe & Mail*, 04/29/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

- **Quantitative Findings**

Over the nine *G&M* sampled issues, twenty-two front-page items appeared on the Gulf War, an average of 2.44 stories per *G&M* front page. Compared to the *NYT*'s twenty-eight front-page reports, there was an average of 3.11 stories per issue. The degree of coverage can certainly be described as extensive in both newspapers. It was also substantial in terms of the numbers of headline banner: seven in the *G&M* compared to also seven in the *NYT*.

It is also noteworthy that the *G&M* news reports were derived predominantly from newswire sources, namely AP and Reuter. Table 3.1 shows twenty news items sourced from the *G&M* (few were from *G&M*'s Washington Bureau, Parliamentary Bureau, or USSR Bureau). But almost all were sourced in combination with other news agencies mainly, AP (ten), Reuter (seven), CP (two), AFP (one), and *NYT* (two). Timothy Appleby, the *G&M*'s correspondent in Baghdad filed only one news item on his own, on January 16, even though he datelined an earlier report from Baghdad, on January 15. But the latter was in conjunction with AP, AFP, Reuter, *NYT* and *G&M* Staff (probably prior to the expulsion of all foreign correspondents except for few allowed to remain in Baghdad).

This study reveals the *G&M*'s extensive use of news agency sources, which partly confirms earlier research findings of Canadian press coverage of international affairs and their intense dependence on news wires and on severe lack of foreign correspondents.

TABLE 3.2 *The Globe & Mail's* Front-Page Coverage Of The Gulf War

| DATE | # OF FRONT-PAGE NEWS REPORTS | # OF ILLUSTRATIONS | # OF HEADLINE BANNERS | # OF EDITORIALS | # OF OPINION COLUMNS | # OF LETTERS TO THE EDITOR | BYLINE/AGENCY TOTAL # 42 | | | | | |
|----------|------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|----|--------|-----|-----|-----|
| | | | | | | | G&M | AP | Reuter | CPA | AFP | NYT |
| 15-Jan. | 2 | 1 Photo * 2 Photos + | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | 1 |
| 16-Jan. | 4 | 1 Photo * | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | 4 | 1 | - | 1 | - | 1 |
| 23-Jan. | 4 | 1 Photo + | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| 29-Jan. | 2 | 1 Photo * | 1 | ? | ? | 13 | 2 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| 30-Jan. | 1 | 1 Photo + | 1 | ? | ? | ? | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| 13-Feb. | 2 | - | - | ? | ? | ? | 2 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| 25-Feb. | 3 | 1 Photo + 1 Map NYT | 1 | ? | ? | ? | 3 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| 28-Feb. | 3 | 1 Photo * | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | - | 1 | - | - |
| 29-April | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| Total | 22 | 10 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 21 | 20 | 10 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 2 |

* Photos by AP (Associated Press) = 4

+ Photos by Reuter = 5

? not available

Note: Canadian Byline/Agency refer to *G&M's* staff, *G&M* Washington Bureau, *G&M* Parliamentary Bureau, and *G&M* USSR Bureau. Almost all *G&M* news items were sourced in conjunction with other wire sources.

Interestingly, the *G&M* was able to compensate for this deficiency by having 90.91% of the news items re-written by its staff (see Table 3.1). This high percentage of news items emanating partly from the *G&M* staff, inclined *G&M* readers to see the Gulf War through Canadian eyes. This finding stands in sharp contrast to the findings of many earlier studies of Canadian press coverage of international affairs.

Of the nine *G&M* issues, six had front-page reports that dealt with peace initiatives. What this suggests is that unlike the *NYT*, the *G&M* did not participate in

building up Canadian public support for war against Iraq. The *NYT*, in contrast, had only one front-page report about a proposed Iraqi-Soviet peace initiative (on February 13, 1991). What is immediately striking is that the analysis of the *G&M* reveals that the newspaper was not part of what earlier research claimed about the “cheerleading role” played by the Canadian press (similar to their American counterparts). It rather confirms Hibbard and Keenleyside’s (1991) empirical findings that Canadian print media were not very favorable to the “use of force” resolution, nor to the option of a military offensive against Iraq.

In view of the fact that the *G&M* is a reputable newspaper, it made numerous attempts to provide a relatively balanced treatment in its straight news stories. Nonetheless, the analysis of the *G&M* coverage reveals a slant towards the peace initiatives. This inclination in the *G&M*’s coverage towards peace may have been influenced by the views of those Canadians who were opposed to any Canadian military participation in the Gulf War, and thereof were in favor of giving the economic sanctions sufficient time to force an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

In the end, this can be considered a significant finding pertaining to the *G&M*’s non-conformist role in refusing to create a consensus in support of an aggressive Canadian posture in the Gulf.

Evidently, one must account for the military censorship and pooling measures that put enormous restraints on the *G&M* Gulf War reportage. These constraints might well have prompted more emphasis given to views supportive of U.S. government sources, which the *G&M* would have been negligent in its duty not to report. Thus, even a balanced reporting of Gulf War developments might in reality entail an unintended bias

towards the American “official” point of view, impacting Canadian public opinion accordingly. Amid this inherent bias of military censorship, extensive reliance on news agencies, and the pull of American media, the *G&M* still managed to safeguard an independent stature away from a “pro-war” bias.

Focus will now turn to the *G&M*’s editorial and opinion columns to verify any association between the *G&M*’s front-page Gulf War reportage on one hand, and its contextual background and evaluative comments on the other. Table 3.2 indicates that of the sampled editorials, 40% were supportive, 40% were critical, and 20% were neutral. The opinion columns were 33.3 % supportive to the war effort, 33.3% critical, and 33.3% neutral. Thus, the diversity of editorial comment and opinion columns reflected the *G&M*’s hesitancy to fully endorse one opinion over the other.

TABLE 3.3 *The Globe & Mail*’s Attitude Towards Canadian Participation In The Gulf War

| DATE | ATTITUDE OF EDITORIALS TOTAL # 5 | | | ATTITUDE OF PINION COLUMNS TOTAL # 6 | | | ATTITUDE OF LETTERS TO THE EDITOR TOTAL # 21 | | |
|---------|-------------------------------------|----------|---------|--|----------|---------|--|----------|---------|
| | Supportive | Critical | Neutral | Supportive | Critical | Neutral | Supportive | Critical | Neutral |
| Jan. 15 | 1 | - | - | 1 | 2 | - | - | 1 | - |
| Jan. 16 | 1 | - | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Jan. 23 | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Jan. 29 | - | 1 | - | - | - | 1 | 5 | 8 | - |
| Jan. 30 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Feb.13 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Feb.25 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Feb.28 | - | - | 1 | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Apr. 29 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Total | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 12 | 2 |
| % | 40 % | 40 % | 20 % | 33.3 % | 33.3 % | 33.3 % | 33.3 % | 57.2 % | 9.5 % |

The letters to the editor section is extremely important since it reflects Canadian public opinion as it appeared in the *G&M*. In the nine issues, it appears that the *G&M* has regularly devoted a considerable space and attention to Canadians writing about their opinions about the Gulf War. Of the eighteen sampled letters, 57.2 % expressed anti-war attitudes, 33.3 % were in support of the war, and 9.5 % were neutral.

In sum, there was a great tendency to look at the Gulf War from a Canadian perspective in the letters to the editor section than in other parts of the *G&M*. The letters to the editor in the sample clearly reflected the diverse Canadian attitudes towards the Gulf War.

- **Conclusion**

This chapter sought to understand the *G&M*'s role in constructing the narratives of the Gulf War. As an elite Canadian national newspaper with a unique form and mission, the *G&M* provides a valuable context in which to consider its influence on Canadian elites' decision-making processes, and the degree of its conformity to the coverage provided by U.S. media. To understand this, three basic questions were posed. These questions examined the *G&M*'s front-page headlines and leads, which reflected the dominant discourse (Karim, 2000b) such as the dehumanizing and demonizing of the enemy (Iraq), and the depiction of the Gulf War in good vs. evil, and us vs. them dichotomies. However, there seemed to be an independence of thought that was distinctive to the *G&M*'s reporting style, which was more compatible with the unique Canadian political culture.

The textual analysis of the *G&M* also reaffirms previous research findings (Soderlund & Lee, 1999) regarding the increasing influence of the Canadian press on

Canadian foreign policy. An important point to be seen here is that during the Gulf War, the *G&M* did not deliver an instantaneous public support to the Canadian government. To the contrary, the *G&M*'s consistent broad and diverse reportage of alternative opinions and perspectives featured not only on the front pages, but also in editorials, opinion columns, and letters to the editor, lead some to believe that this approach was quite detrimental in limiting the scope of Canadian military involvement in the Gulf War.

Another aspect of this study is to fill a gap in the literature that points to the inherent American bias in Canadian newspapers' international reporting. This chapter suggests that the *G&M* did seem to have a specific niche in the reporting of the Gulf War. Its primary position was to focus on peace initiatives and a secondary position was on the role played by Canada in the Gulf War. The capacity of the *G&M* to relentlessly focus on peace initiatives was more in tune with Canada's peacekeeping mentality and with the shaping of public attitudes, which were distinctly different from those in the United States. The *G&M* analysis offers an interesting instance of how an elite newspaper presented the Gulf War and provides some insights of how it negotiated the constraints of war reporting. The *G&M* is seen to hold a definite independent character in the way it presented the news of the Gulf War.

In closing, the *G&M* appears to have served another function in the face of American sphere of influence. Despite the fact that the *NYT* and the *G&M* are part of very compatible pluralist/liberal communication systems, they are still very much characterized by distinct social realities and political ambitions (the *NYT*'s superpower state ideology and the *Globe & Mail*'s maverick peace philosophy). The *G&M* as an elite newspaper has to function in relation to the perception of Canadian national politics, and,

correspondingly, it must operate in another way, making its presentation and content increasingly consonant with the way the rest of the major information purveyors present the news while remaining true to its own quality. It has a role to play in purveying the Canadian international peacekeeping image to the world. Canada is also taking its place as a main peacekeeping power and that takes the *G&M* into a new realm.

Chapter 4

Analysis Of Ad Dustour's Coverage Of The Gulf War

- **Introduction**

This chapter presents an analysis of the Gulf War coverage by the Jordanian newspaper *Ad Dustour*. In order to offer a thorough in-depth study, it is critical to locate the analysis within the historical, political, economic, and social milieu of Jordan vis-à-vis its relation to the Arab world.

- **Jordan's Political & Economic Position During The Gulf War**

Jordan's geographic location with Syria to its north, Saudi Arabia to the southeast, Iraq to the east, and Israel to the west put her at a disadvantaged position during the Gulf War, which posed the most dreadful challenge in Jordan's history. Several political, economic and cultural factors have contributed to an escalating confrontation between Jordan and the Arab World on the one hand, and the West on the other.

As an integral part of the Arab economy, Jordan was the first to suffer from the decline of the Arab oil boom in 1986. The Jordanian economy was mainly dependent on Arab aid and remittances from Jordanians working in the rich Arab Gulf states. The decline was particularly sharp between 1988 and 1989, when, according to World Bank figures, aid fell about one-third, from \$536 million to \$377 million. In addition, remittances from Jordanian workers in the Gulf were considerably diminished by deflated oil prices. At the same time, rising expectations and increased consumer consumption

had caused a frenzy of imports that the government was reluctant to curtail, fueling a foreign trade gap that increased five-fold between 1976 and 1982.

Cutting ties with Iraq, and adhering to the UN-imposed sanctions, put Jordan in an extremely compromising position. Regardless of other political considerations, there were immense economic factors at work that dictated against Jordan's cutting ties with Iraq. *The Middle East Economic Survey (MEES, 33:47)* reported that during the first three quarters of 1989, Jordan relied on Iraq for 82.5 percent of its petroleum, importing a total of 2.1 million tons of Iraqi crude oil and other oil products. According to *The Washington Post* (Jan. 9, 1990), Jordanian farmers had a reported \$200 million (U.S.) in standing contracts with Iraq. Since Iraq was Jordan's number-one trading partner, implementing UN sanctions not only threatened future good-will relations with Iraq, but also meant the loss of a very important market for Jordan's exports.

Furthermore, the Jordanian economy depended also on Kuwait and Saudi financial aid and markets. During the first quarter of 1989, Jordan had imported 133,626 tons of Saudi Arabian crude, and 307,609 tons of Kuwaiti crude (*MEES, 33:47*). The most formidable repercussion of the Gulf crisis, regardless of what position Jordan took, was the loss of the Kuwaiti aid, market, and remittances from its large expatriate community in Kuwait.

In terms of financial support, and despite the decline in oil revenues of the 1980s, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait were the most likely potential Arab sources of aid and concessionary loans. During the Gulf War both states expressed their willingness to reward support for the anti-Iraqi coalition. For instance, Saudi Arabia decided to provide half of Jordan's crude oil demands in order to gain Jordan's support of the coalition. On

the other hand, when the policy of “encouragement” failed, on September 20 Saudi Arabia announced that it was stopping its oil shipments to Jordan; it sealed its borders to Jordanian traffic and expelled Jordanian diplomats (*MEES*, August 31, 1990).

Hence, it would appear from the above that the only realistic economic option that Jordan had was to side with the coalition; any attempt to explain why it did not remains at best a speculative assessment.

• History Of The Jordanian Press

The 1950's brought about some openness in the political milieu, and about 40 newspapers, and magazines appeared in Jordan, all with diversified orientations and alternative political discourses (Ayish, El-Sarayah, & Rifai 1994). The year 1956 marked a turning point in the politics and the press history of Jordan. There were some attempts at the time to convince Jordan to join the 1955 Baghdad Pact,¹ then being promoted by the United States and Britain. It is believed that the pressure from both Arab Nationalist and Islamic discourses through their newly established press along with some opposing regional forces (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria) brought down this proposal.

This was the first time that the Jordanian press played a divisive role in Jordanian politics rather than a conformist one. The country was divided among those pan-Arab nationalists (Nasser's sympathizers) who opposed Jordan's joining the Western pact and the pro-Western tendencies of the King who wanted to join in. Such an atmosphere resulted in furthering the division of the country along ideological lines reflecting the

¹A military alliance that was encouraged by U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles's "northern tier" foreign-policy, to bring countries bordering the Soviet Union into a military pact with the West. Hence, The Baghdad Pact was a treaty in 1955, between Iraq and Turkey in which Muslim countries such as Pakistan and Iran were included along with Britain. This pact angered Egypt's leader Nasser who refused to join, as well as other Arab countries that were in Nasser's sphere of influence.

dissociation of the Arab World from Jordan at the time. All these factors prompted the government to revoke the licenses of the opposition on the basis that these newspapers had conspicuous affiliations and that they had advocated foreign interests and ideologies (*Jordan Press*, 1980:30).

The year 1967 marked the defeat of Arab nationalism and unity. It was the disgraceful war of June 1967 with Israel that was referred to in Arabic as “the war of shame.” The defeat had serious ramifications on the unity and viability of the Kingdom of Jordan, and triggered a legitimization crisis throughout the entire Arab world. The Palestinian question was swiftly intimidating the Arab regimes and mobilizing the masses against their corrupt leaders.

The mass psychology of defeat was echoed again in the press in the form of intense accusations and ideological configurations that gave birth to new radical political camps. In light of the extremely explosive factions in Jordanian society, such as the radical Palestinian, the moderate East Banker, the communists, and radical Muslims, and the ideological divergence among them put unsustainable pressure on the fragile social and political arrangements of Jordan. This prompted the Jordanian government’s first attempts to place limits on the number of publications and on the margin of freedom accorded to them. Following newspaper criticisms of the Jordanian Army’s responses to Israeli border raids, an executive order was issued to reorganize the press, and shut down the opposition newspapers’ licenses (Ayish, El-Sarayrah & Rifai, 1994).

Another crucial period in Jordan’s history came in September 1970, when the government decided to overcome the Palestinian resistance movement in what was referred to in Arabic as “black September.” The army entered the Palestinian camps and

literally massacred the militia. Once again, the press played a significant role in the demise of the Palestinian camp by manipulating the population (Palestinian vs. East Banker) and mobilizing the entire Arab world through fiery discourses. Two newspapers *Ad Dustour* (The Constitution 1967), and *Al-Difa'a* (The Defense 1968) were among “the newspapers that almost immediately became directly involved in the confrontation between the government and the Palestinian commando in the 1970 movement” (Ayish, El-Sarayah, & Rifai, 1994:128). These resulted in massive shutdowns, the confiscation of opposing newspapers, and the imprisonment of opposing political and press affiliates and leaders.

According to Badran (1988), government-press relations in the 1980s are only understood by evaluating the kingdom's official information policy. In 1986, King Hussein confirmed at the government-appointed National Consultative Council that press freedom should not be considered separately from press responsibility. Nevertheless, successive Jordanian governments have used interpretations different from the King's perspective, adopting different approaches in dealing with the press (Badran, 1988). By the end of 1992, the Jordanian press consisted of four dailies: *Al-Rai* (The Opinion) (50,000 copies), *Ad Dustour* (The Constitution) (80,000 copies), *Sawt Al-Shaab* (The People's Voice) (30,000 copies), and the English-language *Jordan Times* (12,000).

- **The Social Responsibility Of The Jordanian Press**

In the 1920s, 1930's and 1940's the press had a major role in supporting the struggle for independence from British colonial rule. The Jordanian press is best understood within the realm of social responsibility. As first developed in the mid-1950s,

this model had two premises: Freedom carries concomitant obligations, and the press is obliged to be responsible to society for carrying out certain essential functions of mass communication (Sibert, Peterson & Schramm, 1963:74).

Under the Jordanian Press and Publication Law of 1953, the press was expected to treat the Royal family with respect and dignity and the Jordanian cultural values with outmost sensitivity. The role of the press was to educate people (in a political way), and to serve society by seeking a partnership with government, in order to support change for beneficial purposes, and to serve as an instrument for peace. In essence, the press was considered as a unifying rather than as a divisive agent. The press in this regard was considered an instrument of social justice and change (Severin & Tankard, 1988). A free press within this context meant freedom of conscience for journalists, where press freedom was less important than the viability of the nation, and a national press-policy was needed to provide legal safeguards for freedom.

In accordance with the social responsibility of the press, and since the launching of the first newspaper in the early 1920s, the Jordanian press supported and advanced the policies of the government in power and served the state. Newspapers evolved into a partnership with the country's development, echoing national concerns and ambitions. In its 70-year history, Jordan has espoused a mixed system of governance in which private enterprise worked along parallel lines with the public sector in an atmosphere of cooperation and reciprocity at times, and conflict and shutdowns at critical times. Although print media in Jordan was always a domain of the private sector, it always operated at an arms length from government control. Meanwhile, broadcasting remained within the public realm.

- ***Ad Dustour* (The Constitution)**

To determine whether or not *Ad Dustour* (The Constitution) should be considered as an “elite” newspaper or as a “journal of record” is not the objective here. However, if we want to make an educated guess based on what we have come to know about high journalistic standards, wide national and international readership (see Table 4.1 below) and influence etc., (again not to generalize), not many newspapers in the Arab world would qualify as elite ones.

Table 4.1 *Ad Dustour*’s Profile

| READERSHIP FIGURES | FOUNDED IN | CIRCULATION FIGURES | COMPANY | READERSHIP PROFILE | NATIONAL RANKING | INTL. RANKING |
|--------------------|------------|----------------------|--|--------------------|------------------|---------------|
| - | 1967 | 90,000 (m) (1995) | Jordan Press & Publishing Co. | - | - | - |

Source: <http://www.addustour.com>

In this regard, Jordan Press and Publishing Co. publish *Ad Dustour*, founded in 1967 with (60% private shares ownership) and (40% public shares). *Ad Dustour* is considered a politically independent newspaper (within the social responsibility context), and one of three main newspapers in Jordan. According to *Ad Dustour* sources, the newspaper’s circulation ranged between 75,000 and 80,000 copies in the year 1992 (El-Sarayrah, 1992). *Ad Dustour* was suspended several times by the government for different reasons, first for its direct opposition to the government’s position regarding the Palestinian commando movement in 1970, and later for calling for a general amnesty for all political prisoners in the country (Rugh, 1979). According to El-Sarayrah’s research, *Ad Dustour* devoted 58 percent of its foreign news coverage to the Middle East and relied

heavily on Western news agencies for foreign news. In 1992, this newspaper published 28 pages, devoted 32.9 percent of its space to advertisements, and gained 32.5 percent of overall advertisement space used by the three Arabic Jordanian dailies (El-Sarayrah, 1992).

Finally, it is worth mentioning that although the Jordanian press enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom in the 1950s, it was not until 1989 that Jordanian media were presented with genuine opportunities to participate in the free handling of public affairs in a democratized environment. The most dreadful challenge was the Gulf War during which “the media had demonstrated a high degree of responsibility and proved their maturity and concern over safeguarding a democratic Jordan” (Ayish, El-Sarayrah & Rifai, 1994:26-141).

- **Analysis Of *Ad Dustour*'s Coverage Of The Gulf War**

The texts of *Ad Dustour* were chosen primarily to provide the material for the textual analysis of this chapter, in view of its independent posture in Jordanian politics (Ayish, El Sarayrah & Rifai, 1994). Typically, the eight-column front pages of *Ad Dustour* present six to eight stories that are usually continued on the inside pages. The main events are always found on the top right (Arabic proceeds from right to left), where catchy bold large size-font headline banners signal their importance. Before we proceed with the analysis, it is necessary to comment on the English translation of the Arabic headlines and leads. The English upper case is used in the translations in order to relate to the reader as authentically as possible the meanings, the vivid effects of the graphic lay

out, and the enormous, multiple-deck Arabic headline banners that were used explicitly by *Ad Dustour* to underscore certain topics.

• ***Ad Dustour*, Tuesday, January 15, 1991:**

• **THE GULF CRISIS IN ITS DAY OF RECKON ...AMMAN IS CENTER FOR ARAB INITIATIVES**

On this date, the front page of *Ad Dustour* presents to its readers the above eight-column (compared to six in the *NYT* and *G&M*) banner headline, accompanied by four photos and ten Gulf-crisis related news items. The first three photos show King Hussain meeting with various delegations, whereas the fourth illustrates angry Jordanian demonstrators expressing solidarity with Iraq and protesting the “imperialist-Zionist aggression.” The headlines are all bold and catchy, summarizing subsequent news stories. The ambiguous sentence and words in the banner headline define the Gulf crisis on the last day of the UN-imposed deadline and introduces Amman as the main event - the center of intense Arab meetings.

- **AL HUSSAIN MET WITH ARAFAT, WALDHEIM AND AL-ATTAS**
- **HIS MAJESTY CONFIRMS: OUR EFFORTS WILL PERSIST TO THE END**
- **AUSTRIAN PRESIDENT CONTACTED AZIZ AND DISCUSSED THE SITUATION**

AMMAN - *AD-DUSTOUR* - Yesterday, Amman was the axis of Arab and international diplomatic talks to contain the explosive situation in the Gulf and to spare the region a destructive war. In this regard, diligent efforts continued to find a peaceful and final Arab resolution to the crisis.²

This three-deck headline and lead is placed immediately above the picture of angry demonstrators. The headline introduces the main topic, establishes the centrality of

²*Ad Dustour*, 01/15/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

Jordan, and offers King Hussain (the agent) the power to find a peaceful resolution, to meet with "Arafat," "Waldheim," and "Al-Attas," and to "confirm" that "efforts will persist to the end," thus signaling Jordan's preference for a "peaceful resolution to the conflict." The lead paragraph gives the full macrostructure of the main topic. It defines "Amman" the "axis," (the location), specifies the time (yesterday), the roles of political groups (Arafat, Waldheim, and Al-Attas), and explains the goal (a peaceful resolution to spare the region from imminent war).

On the cognitive level, the implicit meaning of this headline and lead signals the ideological position of *Ad Dustour*, namely, its emphasis on an inter-Arab solution to an Arab predicament. Despite Jordan's appearance of embracing any and all international peace initiatives (as reflected in the headline's mention of Austrian President Waldheim) *Ad Dustour* focuses the readers' attention on "Jordan" and the King's efforts to find a (preferably Arab) solution to the conflict in its lead reading: "diligent efforts continued to find a peaceful and final Arab resolution to the crisis." As the events were unfolding, it was clear to Jordanian officials that they stood to lose the most if the option of war were to prevail. Unlike the *NYT*, and more in line with the *G&M*, the discourse of this headline concentrates mostly on the peace efforts rather than on military preparedness.

- **WIDE INTERNATIONAL MOBILIZATION TO EVADE WAR IN THE GULF**
- **LIBYAN PROPOSAL, AND ANOTHER FROM YEMEN REJECTED BY THE UNITED STATES**
- **FRANCE'S BID TO CALL ON IRAQ AND DOUMA VISITS BAGHDAD**

CAPITALS – NEWS AGENCIES – The past twenty-four hours witnessed an intensive political mobilization regarding the crisis in the Gulf, especially in the few hours left between peace and war.³

This headline is positioned immediately under the two side-by-side photographs of Jordan's monarch meeting with various foreign delegations. Again, like the previous one, this headline/lead defines the ideological (van Dijk, 1991) position of Jordan vis-à-vis the Gulf conflict. It calls attention to the gravity and urgency of the situation, which requires a **"WIDE INTERNATIONAL MOBILIZATION TO EVADE WAR IN THE GULF."** The kickers on the other hand, identify the United States as the one who is rejecting Arab (Libya and Yemen) and international peace proposals as in the last kicker declaring **"FRANCE'S BID TO CALL ON IRAQ AND DOUMA VISITS BAGHDAD."** This headline points to the severity of the crisis in the region by signaling to *Ad Dustour's* readers the two emerging camps; one that is frantically rallying for peace (France, Libya, Yemen and Jordan), and the other, mainly led by the U.S., preparing for a military strike.

The lead paragraph elaborates on the headline, and refers to the source of information as "news agencies" and "capitals." The foreground treatment of the peace efforts in the headline and lead involves emphasizing the approaching decisive moment between war and peace. King Hussain's frantic attempts to avoid war and to steer a delicate middle course is intended to evade animosity with Iraq and with the rest of the rich Arab Gulf states (on whose assistance Jordan's economy is substantially dependent).

³*Ad Dustour*, 01/15/A1/C1/headline, lead 2.

Although this balancing strategy increased the king's domestic popularity, it left Jordan largely isolated in the international community, and deprived the Jordanian economy of much-needed Arab and Western aid.

- **A DAY OF ANGER IN JORDAN**
- **MASS DEMONSTRATIONS TO SUPPORT IRAQ**
- **AND TO DENOUNCE THE IMPERIALIST ZIONIST ATTACK**

AMMAN – *AD DUSTOUR* – A huge turnout for the Jordanian Arab people in Stadium Amman in response to the national unity call to condemn the American attack on the Arab region and on brethren Iraq.⁴

This report is placed under the photo of angry protestors. In this headline, kicker and lead, Jordan is the subject of the statement, the one who is “angry,” but united in “mass demonstrations” to express solidarity with Iraq, and to protest yet another “imperialist-Zionist” attack. The ideological imbedding of this sort of headline lies in the depiction of a united country, and in muting the domestic tensions in the delicate social arrangement of the Jordanian society, which is composed, among others, of the East Banker, the Palestinian and the emerging Muslim fundamentalist (Rugh, 1979). Despite the fact that all three groups are Muslims, there are significant differences in their Islamic thinking, and political ideologies. In other words, there are serious variations in the cultural forms and values that set the East Banker, the Palestinian, and the Muslim fundamentalist apart, and have created many instances of formidable challenge in the past to the unity and national identity of Jordan.

The demonstrators who are referred to in the lead as “the Jordanian Arab people” are mostly Palestinians marching through the Jordanian capital, burning flags and cheering for the prospects of war, and regarding it as an opportunity to achieve a

⁴*Ad Dustour*, 01/15/A1/C6/headline, lead 3.

Palestinian statehood. Palestinians in Jordan have vast interests in embracing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's linkage strategy, and in supporting his efforts to relate any Iraqi pull-out from Kuwait, with a comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, South of Lebanon and the Syrian Golan Heights.

The headline and lead blend the predominantly pro-Iraq Jordanian street scene with the more precarious official Jordan, and depicts a unified front vis-à-vis the Gulf crisis in terms of old frames of "imperialist" and "Zionist" attacks. The group-based and institutional embedding of negative attitudes and ideologies towards "imperialism" and "Zionism" are values incorporated in shared meanings used by *Ad Dustour* to invoke a "mental model" and to offer its readers a historical context in its most convenient way. The lexical choices of these two words originate in socio-political ideology, which reduces a long complicated history into simple negative nuances of subjugation, conquest, humiliation, disgrace and unfairness of the West and Israel towards the Arabs. To summon past dreadful and negative historical experiences in the mind of readers is to construct an ideological, obscured "other" of the West, parallel to Said's appropriation of the "other" East and Islam, in *Orientalism* and *Covering Islam*, and to what Karim incisively discussed in *Islamic Peril*.

- **AL HUSSAIN⁵ ATTENDS MILITARY BRIEFINGS**
- **JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES READY TO DEFEND JORDANIAN SOIL**
AMMAN – PETRA - His Majesty, King Hussain, Chief in Command of Armed Forces, visited yesterday the General Command and met with Chief of Staff Fathi Abu Taleb, and other high-ranking officers.⁶

This headline, kicker and lead are placed right on top of a photo of King Hussain conferring with his military leaders. In this news headline and lead, once again, the King is the agent, the one who attends (the setting) “military briefing,” and announces the readiness of the national armed forces (the subject) to “defend Jordanian soil” (the objective). This headline expresses readiness to defend the nation against any foreseeable threat, yet it is in total conformity with Jordan’s official wait-and-see policy, which so far, is avoiding the use of any confrontational discourse. While the non-provocative tone of this report echoes the unresolved stance of the Jordanian government, it asserts the steadfastness and patriotic readiness of a mobilized nation prepared to protect its soil if threatened.

- **CALL FOR RESERVES TO REGISTER IN THE PEOPLE’S MILITIA**
AMMAN – *AD DUSTOUR* – Sources close to *Ad Dustour* mentioned that a call has been made for army volunteers to register their names in designated offices due to the current developments in the Gulf conflict.⁷

This headline and lead is positioned under the previous report and carries the same mass mobilization theme. On the syntactic level, the “agentless” nature of the lead signals in van Dijk’s terms an interpretation of *Ad Dustour*’s implicit position on this issue. In a sense, the diffusion of this information through unspecified sources of “weak incumbency” (Potter & Halliday, 1990), allows *Ad Dustour* to construct the “call for

⁵Please note that Al Hussain, or Hussain is used here in reference to the Jordanian Monarch; whereas, Hussein is always used to refer to the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein.

⁶*Ad Dustour*, 01/15/A1/C1/headline, lead 4.

⁷*Ad Dustour*, 01/15/A1/C1/headline, lead 5.

reserves” as a government-interested position (perhaps for domestic view), and at the same time uses the category “sources close to,” to fend off charges (on the international scene) that this source may or may not be representative of the Jordanian government.

- **SADDAM OFFERS ADDITIONAL GUARANTEES TO KING FAHED IF HE PROMISES TO PULL OUT FOREIGN FORCES AND REPLACE THEM WITH ARAB ONES**
- **THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES ON THE ISLAND... IS A DECLARATION OF WAR ON IRAQ**

BAGHDAD - NEWS AGENCIES – In a televised broadcast, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein conveyed to King Fahed, the monarch of Saudi Arabia, a pledge not to attack Saudi Arabia if Riyadh agrees to withdraw American-led coalition forces from the Gulf, and replace them with Arab forces approved by Saudi Arabia.⁸

This headline assigns to Saddam Hussein the agency and the power to offer “guarantees,” to demand the withdrawal of “foreign forces,” and to promise, “not to attack.” In cognitive terms, the headline implicitly frames the presence of “foreign forces” on Saudi soil as an unacceptable condition, and, as such, represents it as an act of “declaration of war on Iraq.” The coherence assigned to this headline by language users (van Dijk, 1988) establishes in the readers’ mind the incongruity of the Saudi act of harboring “foreign” (especially American/Western *antagonist*) forces on Arab soil, and suggests a more “commonsensical” and “logical” (according to Iraq and Jordan) alternative to replace these (other) “foreign forces” with (us) “Arab ones.” Thus, the ideological imbedding of the “Us: Other” ratio in this headline is paramount to a) the insistence upon an inter-Arab *brotherly* solution to this inter-Arab predicament, and b) to the exclusion of the “other” *historically* distrustful American/Western factor.

⁸Ad Dustour, 01/15/A1/CS/headline, lead 6.

However, it is noteworthy that this news report of Iraqi concessions sourced from “unspecified news agencies” did not appear on the front pages of the *NYT*, nor in those of the *G&M*. Since there is no way to substantiate the authenticity of this news report, nor the validity of the Iraqi intentions, this information is treated here merely on its rhetorical merit.

- **LATEST NEWS**

NEW YORK - AFP: The American Ambassador to the United Nations declared yesterday the United States’ rejection of a six-point French peace proposal.⁹

This small-font, one-column headline introduces an unspecified topic of the “Latest News,” datelined in New York and sourced from *Agence France Press*. The lead explains that the United States has rejected the French peace proposal. Despite the strategy to downplay this report (by positioning it under an unspecified headline, with small font, in one column), the ideological implication of the report works in consort with *Ad Dustour*’s front page, which depicts the United States as the one who rejects not only Arab peace initiatives, but also the latest French peace proposal.

Evidently, the significance of this story points to the variation in journalistic standards across national boundaries. For instance, and from a merely journalistic perspective, this news event (the French peace proposal) merited enough significance and newsworthiness to be awarded a prominent front-page banner headline in the *G&M*, yet it was marginalized in *Ad Dustour*, and totally muted in the *NYT*.

⁹*Ad Dustour*, 01/15/A1/C4/headline, lead 7.

• **SIX U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS MOVE TO LOCATIONS NEAR IRAQ**

WASHINGTON – REUTER – Officials in the U.S. Defense department said yesterday that six aircraft carriers with more than 450 warplanes would arrive at their locations near Iraq on Tuesday in the final hours of the UN-imposed deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.¹⁰

The subject of this headline is the American aircraft carriers' "move to locations near Iraq." The lead paragraph performs its syntactic function (van Dijk, 1988), and elaborates on the headline by specifying a) the agent (the six American aircraft carriers, and the 450 warplanes), which will arrive b) the location (near Iraq), and c) the time (Tuesday, in the final hours), of the d) consequence (the UN imposed deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait).

The overall tone and "uninterested" wording of this report, which is datelined in Washington, and sourced by Reuter, appears to suggest a literal reproduction of the news agency dispatch by *Ad Dustour*. In his study of international news, van Dijk (1984b, 1987b), found that literal reproduction in foreign news production is fairly common. However, since we have no access to the original news dispatch we cannot determine that this is the case here, but we can only point to the fairly plain (as opposed to confrontational) wording of this report, which is distinctly different than that of *Ad Dustour*.

¹⁰*Ad Dustour*, 01/15/A1/C4/headline, lead 8.

- **CALLING FOR IRAQIS TO DIE FOR KUWAIT**
- **SADDAM: THE CAPITULATION ERA IS OVER**
- **THE NATIONAL COUNCIL AUTHORIZES HIS DECISION**

BAGHDAD - NEWS AGENCIES – The Iraqi president called upon Iraqis to fight until death to keep Kuwait and said that Washington has the keys for peace in the Gulf.¹¹

The confrontational tone of this headline datelined in Baghdad, and sourced from unspecified news agencies reflects the mood of its origin (Baghdad), and is in sharp contrast with the more subdued preceding one. In this three-deck headline, Saddam Hussein is the agent who has the power to call upon “Iraqis to die for Kuwait,” and the authority to stop the “capitulation era.” To a person who is not familiar with the shared meanings and traditions in question this headline probably will make no sense at all. However, understanding the opinions, attitudes and ideologies that are embedded in these statements require more than just common language interpretations; it requires a vast knowledge of the history of the region, and its relations with the United States and the West. Without this cultural dictionary and historical map, these propositions are little more than a mere irrational uttering.

The first deck in the headline features Saddam Hussein’s order “to die for Kuwait.” This script can be comprehended within the consensual historical knowledge of the Iraqis, to whom Kuwait is as an extension of the Iraqi nation that was snatched arbitrarily by the border drawings of the colonial masters in Europe. Only within this context can one justify defending Kuwait (one’s nation) with one’s precious life. The connotation of Saddam’s quote: “The capitulation era is over,” in the kicker line invokes the episodic memory (van Dijk, 1988), of pan-Arab ideology, which explains all the ills facing the Arab world from the perspective of colonial subjugation. Accordingly, the

¹¹*Ad Dustour*, 01/15/A1/C3/headline, lead 9.

defeat of Arabs in modern history is believed to be the result of this capitulation that has prevented the Arabs from recovering Palestine, and from restoring their ancient glory. To many Iraqis and indeed Arabs who espouse pan-Arab ideology, the resentment towards the United States is due to its unfair and unconditional support of the state of Israel, which is considered to be in contempt of international law and basic human rights of self- rule.

The lead also reiterates the headline and gives more information as to why Iraqis need to die, and the answer is “to keep Kuwait.” The interesting notion is that the lead ends by quoting the Iraqi president: “Washington has the keys for peace in the Gulf.” This last statement is quite significant since it can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, it can mean that Saddam Hussein is assigning to Washington the great responsibility for peace in the Gulf. This is a positive diplomatic hint that it is not too late to negotiate peace. Secondly, a pessimistic implication may signal that the fight, for which Saddam Hussein is calling upon Iraqis to die, is yet another episode of the United States’ resolve to use military force.

- **DE CUELLAR CONVEYS TO SECURITY COUNCIL THE OUTCOME OF HIS TALKS IN IRAQ’S CAPITAL**
- **DE CUELLAR: I FAILED IN BAGHDAD AND LOST HOPE. IT’S TOO LATE FOR DIPLOMACY**

CAPITALS - NEWS AGENCIES – In the early hours of Tuesday, Mr. Javier De Cuellar was expected to have summoned the UN Security Council in New York and said: “he had nothing to say, and that his visit to Baghdad had failed.”¹²

This headline and lead is positioned beneath the previous report and at the very bottom of *Ad Dustour’s* front page. The somber headline exposes the frustration of the

¹²*Ad Dustour*, 01/15/A1/C3/headline, lead 10.

UN Secretary General and the fact that he has “failed and lost hope,” and that “It’s too late for diplomacy.” The lead explains the circumstances of De Cuellar’s comment and spells out that his visit to Baghdad “had failed.” The dreadful realization of this headline and lead imply that war is imminent.

On a pure journalistic level, however, the significance of this headline is in *Ad Dustour*’s classic practice of using international news dispatches under the rubric of unidentified news agencies, and is reflective of the repetitious undetermined official Jordanian policy. The pre-determined dichotomies of “us” vs. “them” or in this case “for” and “against” the Gulf War, which was quite clear-cut in the *NYT* and to a certain extent vague and hesitant in the *G&M*, is completely blurred and fuzzy in *Ad Dustour*. Also, it seems that every time a news report tends to denote a strong stand (whether favorable or not) to the overall popular mood of the country, *Ad Dustour* distances itself by attributing it to unidentified news agencies.

Finally, there were ten front-page Gulf War-related reports in *Ad Dustour* on Tuesday, January 15, 1991. Five are devoted to various peace initiatives; four have a mobilization and battle preparedness theme, and one is about en masse war protests. Clearly the “will we fight, will the war begin?” enigma is carried in newspapers all over the world, and *Ad Dustour* is no exception. However, it is central to this study that we fully comprehend the real position of *Ad Dustour* by contrasting its front-page reportage to its editorial comment.

Despite the fact that the front page of *Ad Dustour* expresses diverse attitudes and opinions in anticipation of war in the Gulf, its reportage clearly tilts towards a diplomatic, and peaceful solution. In contrast, its editorial comment is more explicit in assigning the

blame to the United States rather than to defiant Iraq. In "If War Erupts" *Ad Dustour's* (unsigned) editorial reads: "If war erupts within the next few days and the whole Gulf region and the Middle East explodes, American President George Bush will be held responsible for the immense loss of life and substance incurred by a devastating war. History will regard him as the sole planner, who single-mindedly insisted on a destructive war in spite of the numerous peace calls and initiatives that are still hovering over the skies of the capitals and cities of Europe and America."

• ***Ad Dustour, Wednesday, January 16, 1991.***

IN A HISTORIC ADDRESS TO A UNIFIED JORDANIAN NATION

- **AL HUSSAIN: WE WILL ONLY BOW TO GOD**
- **THE GHOST OF WAR IS UPON THE ARAB, WE'RE ON HIGHEST ALERT**
- **YOUR ARAB ARMY IS IN THE FRONT BUNKERS, AND THE PEOPLE ARE BEHIND THEM**
- **OUR REGION IS ON THE VERGE OF CATASTROPHE**
- **WE KNOCKED ON ALL DOORS AND SPARED NO VENUES TO SOLVE THE CRISIS AMONG US, ARABS**
- **HOPEFUL THAT REASON WILL PREVAIL OVER INSANITY AND LOVE OVER HATRED AND PEACE WILL REIGN ON ARABS**
- **OUR DEMOCRACIES HAVE BEEN TESTED STRENUOUSLY AND IT IS ABOUT TIME WE DEFEND OUR NATION WITH OUR LIVES**
- **WE SHALL CONFRONT OUR DESTINY AS ONE INDIVISIBLE NATION**

AMMAN – PETRA – His Majesty, King Hussain said our region is on the edge of an abyss, and that the Gulf conflict is on the verge of catastrophe. Despite the horrible situation and pain that fills our hearts for what has become of us, our conscience is clear, and that we spared no effort to find a political resolution to the Gulf crisis. Since the early stages of this conflict, our deep convictions in our nation dictated our relentless attempts to foster unity and peace among our Arab people.¹³

This eight-deck headline surrounds King Hussain's photo, and looks and reads more like a proclamation of Jordanian rather than an ordinary news headline-banner. This type of headline typifies the semantic macro structure of a news report, with its full

¹³*Ad Dustour*, 01/16/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

hierarchy of propositions. The relevance of the local semantics of such a complex headline requires understanding and knowledge of the socially shared belief system of not only the speaker (King Hussain), but also the reader (van Dijk, 1988).

One of many ideological implications embedded in this headline is first, the encounter of danger: "The ghost of war is upon the Arab." Second, the relentless effort to resolve it: "We knocked on all doors and spared no venues," and: "It is about time we defend our nation with our lives." Third, admit failure (of diplomacy) and surrender to destiny: "We shall confront our destiny."

The enormous headline signals the prominence, gravity and seriousness of the situation. It projects a unified Jordan, facing a formidable challenge, and a monarch talking to his people explaining a grim reality, but assuring them that their pride will prevail and that humility will be only towards God.

Evidently, the headline empowers King Hussain (the agent), and gives him the authority to address the nation and define its state of affairs. The second proposition of the headline: "The ghost of war is upon the Arab; we are on highest alert," does not specify which Arab, and does not discriminate against the "Arab character." On the contrary, the discourse treats the "Arab persona" as a unified entity, which blends in not only various Jordanian elements (The East Banker, the Palestinian and the Muslim fundamentalist), but also brings together the Egyptian, the Syrian, the Saudi, the Kuwaiti, and even the Iraqi, as well as some 200 million people identified as Arabs. This crude generalization and total disregard of the socio-economic, geo-political and cultural diversity of millions of Arabs invokes in the mind of the reader a myth of Arab harmony, perhaps even spins a web of facticity (Tuchman, 1975) about the ideals of pan-Arab

ideology to forge a “united Arab nation,” joining forces to confront “the ghost of war” imposed “upon the Arab” by the forces of the “other.”

The third proposition expresses solidarity and readiness to take action in a sweeping and comprehensive illusion of a unified “Arab Army” marching to battle, with all Arab “people behind them.” This rhetorical unification of the “Arab character” mystifies the conflict-ridden realities of the Arab world. The discourse continues to treat the diverse entity of the Arab world by appropriating their complex realities, identities, cultural and political experiences into one simplified and generalized rhetorical vessel, a façade of indiscriminate Arabs: “knocking on doors, and sparing no venues to solve the crisis among us, Arabs” and “hoping that reason will prevail ...and peace will reign on Arabs,” and that “We shall confront our destiny as one indivisible nation.”

Finally, the headline ends with a universal value of defending one’s indivisible nation with “our lives,” which is quite a patriotic stance shared with all nations.

THE REGION ON THE VERGE OF VOLCANIC ERUPTION

- **LAST CALL FOR IRAQ TO WITHDRAW OR FACE WAR**
- **“I RECEIVED GUARANTEES TO DEAL WITH ALL ISSUES INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION”**

The whole world is now wondering ... is there going to be war in the Gulf, and what are the repercussions of the last few hours on the region?¹⁴

This headline, like the previous one, continues the rhetorical discourse and makes its persuasive arguments by using rhetoric properties such as parallels and metaphors. For example, the enormity and gravity of anticipating war is being compared to a “volcanic eruption.” This fatalistic resignation of human reason and will is a metaphoric interchange of the divine force of nature and the vulnerability of mankind. The symbolic

¹⁴Ad *Dustour*, 01/16/A1/C1/headline, lead 2.

exchange between war and volcano not only links the horror and perils of war to a volcanic eruption, but also compares the human incapacity to stop a volcano to the failure to alter the imminence of war. Like millions of other headlines in the world, this headline is confused on the question of the probability of war in the Gulf. Evidently, *Ad Dustour* makes the connection between the Gulf crises and the Palestinian-Israeli question by placing a conditional clause between the “last call for Iraq to withdraw or face war” and the phrase “to deal with all issues including the Palestinian question.”

- **WASHINGTON SETS ITS MILITARY FORCES**
- **AND BUSH MEETS ADVISORS TO DECIDE**

CAPITALS - NEWS AGENCIES – Radio Israel said that American officials informed Israel that Washington stepped up its military forces and completed final touches on the war strategies including the timing of the offensive assault.¹⁵

In this headline Washington and George Bush are the agents, the ones who “set military forces,” “meet advisors” and “decide.” The lead highlights the policy of American-Israeli collaboration by referring to the former’s discussion of the “timing of the offensive assault.” The politics of American-Israeli cooperation form the basis of the deep-rooted Arab animosity towards the United States. The U.S. double-standard policies of compromising international law and democratic convictions of self-rule and justice for all people in order to accommodate and safeguard the security, prosperity and interests of Israel, while sparing no costs in doing so, are the causes of historic Arab distrust and antagonism towards the United States.

¹⁵*Ad Dustour*, 01/16/A1/C7/headline, lead 3.

- **SADDAM: THE FLAG OF “GOD IS GREAT” WILL FLY HIGH IN THE BATTLE SKY**
- **THE “JIHAD” TO LIBERATE PALESTINE IS OUR FINAL OBJECTIVE**
- **BUSH: “NO HOPE” AND WAR MAY START TODAY RATHER THAN TOMORROW**

BAGHDAD – WASHINGTON - NEWS AGENCIES – President Saddam Hussein said that the flag of “God is Great” will fly high up in the battle sky and on Iraqi soldiers’ foreheads, and that God will decide on their fate in the manner of “Al Hassanain” (a Koranic verse) which is either victory or martyrdom in God’s way.¹⁶

This three-deck headline offers yet another fascinating instance of the interplay between media, politics, religion and culture, which are all manifested in a highly metaphoric and confrontational rhetorical discourse. The juxtaposition of Hussein and Bush’s quotes in one headline offers an intriguing interchange between Said’s “East” and “West” in *Orientalism*, and Geertz’s¹⁷ premises of “essentialism” and “epochalism.”¹⁸ Essentialism displayed in Saddam’s flag of “God is Great” is quite significant, considering that not long ago, the Iraqi Baa’th party,¹⁹ in essence, represented the epochalism of a secular regime of governance, as opposed to the more atavistic one that it replaced. This very secular regime, supported by the West and Arab Gulf States, waged a decade-long nationalistic war against Shiite Iran in order to shield the entire region from Islamic fanaticism and fundamentalism. But, in one historic moment, all the diligent epochalistic processes that took many years to implement in every minute detail of Iraqi life, will all be thrown away, and essentialism will prevail. In his last-ditch effort to mobilize Arab masses, Saddam, in a Machiavellian maneuver, discards his long espoused Western type realism and (epochalism) (such as in his Baa’th-party rhetoric of “we make

¹⁶*Ad Dustour*, 01/16/A1/C3/headline, lead 4.

¹⁷The term used by Geertz to explicate the external ideological, economic and cultural factors that alters the true nature of a culture. For details see Clifford Geertz, *The interpretation of Cultures*, 1973, p. 240.

¹⁸See Dov Shinar’s analogy of “Epochalism and Essentialism,” in *Palestinian Voices*, 1987, p. 18.

¹⁹Baa’th in Arabic means “rebirth.”

our destiny and the will power of the people determines their fate..." and restores his new-found faith in God and in Islam. This is clearly a religious preposition used intentionally to inflame and steer profound Islamic emotions and to mobilize masses all over the Muslim and Arab world.

After establishing his new Muslim rhetoric, Saddam emerges like a visionary who has come a full circle to invoke a significant axiom of Islam, namely, the call for "Jihad." The call for Jihad to liberate Palestine could be intended to draw historical parallels of past images of Arabs who defended against the march of crusaders to conquer Jerusalem, and to subdue their Arab will. Back then God (*as will be now*) was on the side of the Muslim believers who emerged victorious from the battle that had restored the honor and glory of Jerusalem.

The third deck of the headline contrasts Saddam Hussein's "final position," which is "the Jihad to liberate Palestine," with President Bush's resolve that "war may start today rather than tomorrow." The lead reiterates the first two decks of the headline, and adds further information about the Iraqis who are asked by Saddam Hussein to let "God decide their faith, by either one of "Al Hassanain," "... victory or martyrdom in God's way." By citing this Koranic verse, Saddam Hussein presents a win-win scenario, which in either case (triumph or defeat) promises the Iraqi warrior to be rewarded in God's glory. But the lead does not elaborate on President Bush's statement, referred to in the fifth paragraph, which points to the installment characteristic of news reports and to the hierarchical nature of news actors.

In a sense, *Ad Dustour* bestows a higher status to Saddam Hussein than it does to President Bush by sequencing Saddam's statement first in the lead paragraph, and by

placing President Bush's statement in the fifth paragraph. By this secondary treatment of President Bush, *Ad Dustour* leads its readers to also consider his statement less significant than that of Saddam Hussein.

Finally, the editorial comment of *Ad Dustour* on this day entitled: "Nation of pride and Glory," supports and restates King Hussain's address to the nation and clarifies that "Jordan's Monarch candidly professed to his fellow citizens that the doors were slammed in the face of reason and peace," and that "since the beginning, Jordan relentlessly worked to defuse the crisis by focusing on an inter-Arab solution to deter war."

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Ad Dustour</i>, Wednesday, January 23, 1991. |
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- **IRAQ PREPARES SUICIDE MISSIONS AGAINST ALLIED FORCES**
- **IRAQI MISSILE ATTACK DESTROYS A NEIGHBORHOOD IN TEL-AVIV, AND KILLING AND INJURING 94 ISRAELIS**
- **MISSILE ATTACKS ON DHAHRAN AND RIYADH, DOWNING AND DESTROYING 23 AIR TARGETS, AND CAPTURING A NUMBER OF AMERICANS**
- **SIRENS IN TURKEY, GROUND MISSILE LAUNCH PADS INTACT**
 - Shelling continues and preparations underway for ground battle
 - World anger and Arab rage against the Crusade Offensive
 - Calls to halt the slaughter, and to declare sacred Jihad

Iraq prepares for suicide attacks against the invading crusade alliance to punish the criminals and murderers who had been bombing the Iraqi people barbarically since the beginning of the Atlantic-Zionist attack on our brothers in Iraq.²⁰

On this date, *Ad Dustour's* emphasis on Jordan's solidarity with Iraq is patent. Eight Gulf-War related stories and issues crowd the entire front page of *Ad Dustour* and express camaraderie with Iraq, leading the reader to believe that there is consensus among Jordanians regarding the Gulf War. The above multi-deck-headline-banner

²⁰*Ad Dustour*, 01/23/A1/C6/headline, lead 1.

introduces numerous aspects of an intense day in the battlefield. In all four decks, attention is centered on Iraq and its achievements. Iraq is the subject of the statements, the one that “prepares for suicide attacks against allied forces,” “destroys a neighborhood in Tel-Aviv,” and “kills and injures 94 Israelis.” Moreover, Iraqi missiles attack “Dhahran and Riyadh,” destroy “23 air targets, and capture Americans,” and cause “sirens” to go off in “Turkey.”

The first kicker line describes the ongoing shelling and the preparation for the forthcoming ground battle. The second kicker line summons world and Arab anger against the “crusade offensive,” and the third “calls to halt the slaughter, and to declare Jihad.”

These hyperbolic, stylistic characters of exaggeration, steadfastness, readiness to take action, and invocation of religion make this headline extremely difficult to analyze. However, tackling the ideological embeddings of such a headline without slipping into stereotypical generalization and escaping charges of determinism and reductionism is the ultimate challenge. The banner headline consists of many value-ridden signifying systems of words to contend with such as: “suicide missions,” “crusade offensive,” “sacred jihad,” “criminals and murderers,” “barbaric bombing,” and finally the “Atlantic-Zionist attack.” In order to offer a relevant and thorough analysis for each proposition, one must account for the vast ideological, religious, historical, political and cultural belief systems, and worldly knowledge, which in turn, would require volumes of interpretations and study.

However, in the interest of time and limitation of this endeavor, the author cautions that the ensuing interpretation especially pertaining to Muslim thought or

doctrine is not that of a theologian or expert on Muslim studies or religion. It is rather based on the socially shared meanings, interpretations and worldly experience of people of Muslim faith, with which the author is familiar.

Firstly, the religious connotations of such concepts as “suicide missions,” “martyrdom,” and “sacred jihad,” are far beyond the scope of this study. However, in the course of analyzing the negative images of the “other” (in this case the United States and the West) available in the specific fields of meanings used in constructing the discourse of this headline, a cognitive model is needed in order to interpret the set of propositions that invoke the relevant knowledge i.e. socially shared scripts that are assumed to be known to the speaker (*Ad Dustour*) as well as to the listener (Muslims and Arabs). In his insightful analysis of Canadian newspaper coverage of conflicts between Muslims and Christians in the South Caucasus and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Karim (2000a) has shown how the global media create a dominant discourse to explain conflicts between Muslims and Christians according to a “jihad model of journalism,” and a “religious conflict script” (p. 180). Interestingly, it is the same religious script that *Ad Dustour* calls upon in this headline in order to invoke in its readers’ episodic memory parallel images of modern-age “crusaders,” “slaughtering,” and capitulating Arabs and Muslims.

Secondly, Karim (2000b) considers jihad an “‘effort,’” “‘exertion,’” or “‘struggle.’” He lists two forms of jihad: first “‘Jihad in the way of God,’” which includes “‘jihad of the heart,’” and “‘jihad of the tongue,’” a Sufi-type spiritual cleansing to achieve highest levels of self-purity. And second: “‘jihad of the sword,’” which basically means battling the infidels for the sake of Islam. (pp. 42-43). Indeed *Ad*

Dustour's call for "sacred jihad" against the "crusade offensive" qualifies as a call for "jihad of the sword" in its broadest sense.

It is worth mentioning that the unattributed lead continues these propagandist themes that capitalize on traditional Western images of "the invading crusade alliance," which is "bombing the Iraqi people barbarically." The lead then introduces the logical sequences of events and gives Iraq (the agent) the power to "prepare for suicide missions," in order "to punish the criminals and murderers" (the objective). The lead concludes with the use of the "Atlantic-Zionist attack" in reference to the Gulf War. This is clearly a discursive strategy used by *Ad Dustour* to discredit the legitimacy of the participating Arabs and Muslims in the coalition forces and to construct the Gulf War as an Atlantic-Zionist attack, rather than an internationally accredited war to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

- **THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND ARMY WILL FIGHT TO THE END**
- **THE AMERICANS RAID CIVILIAN TARGETS IN BAGHDAD IN UTTER CONTEMPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RESOLUTIONS**

AMMAN – *AD DUSTOUR* – Diplomatic sources stated on the condition of remaining anonymous that they received a telegram from Baghdad confirming the high morale among the Iraqi people and army. Despite the severe air raids carried out by American aircraft, the Iraqi people and army are determined to fight to the end and defeat the evil forces to rid the Arab psyche of fears, and confront the crusading alliance, which intends to re-colonize the Arab world by abandoning Iraq.²¹

The juxtaposition of the "Us: Other" ratio (Lester-Massman, 1991) is evident in this headline. Karim (2000b) referred to the cognitive dominant scripts used by Western media "integration propagandists" which consistently depict a "violent, irrational Muslim Other" (p. 25). However, it is fascinating to find the same dominant but inverted discourse used in *Ad Dustour* to depict the battle between good "Us" (Iraq), and the evil

²¹*Ad Dustour*, 01/23/A1/C1/headline, lead 2.

“Other” (the United States). The headline and lead affirm Iraq’s legitimacy and validate its moral and just cause “to fight to the end,” to combat the evil forces of a nefarious enemy that “raids civilian targets in Baghdad” in an “utter contempt of international law.”

The lead continues to validate Iraq’s righteousness to “defeat the evil forces” and explains the main topic in a highly combative tone to confirm the “high morale among Iraqi people and army,” in their unwavering fight to “defeat the evil forces,” and “rid the Arab psyche,” and empower the “Arab psyche” after a prolonged victimization of “fears to confront the crusade alliance,” which intends to subdue and “re-colonize the Arab world by abandoning Iraq.” In this sort of rhetoric, which is interchanged using historical frames of decadent enemies of crusaders, and colonizers, *Ad Dustour* qualifies the Iraqi peoples’ resistance as good vs. evil.

• **THE MOROCCAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM SAUDI ARABIA**
RIYADH – AFP – The leader of the Moroccan parliamentary opposition Independence Party, Mohammed Khalifa, asked his government to withdraw its military troops that were sent to Saudi Arabia.²²

The comradeship in this headline points out to Jordanians that they are not isolated, and that other Arabs (namely the Moroccan Independence party) also share their conviction of the unjust war against Iraq, and are taking actions to stop the aggressors by calling on all foreign troops to pull out of Saudi Arabia. The lead legitimizes Jordan’s position against Arab participation echoed in the “Moroccan parliamentary opposition’s leader’s request to withdraw Moroccan troops from the coalition against Iraq.”

²²*Ad Dustour*. 01/23/A1/C5/headline, lead 3.

- **IRAQ:**
- **WE WILL ABIDE BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF POWS ONLY IF THE PALESTINIANS ARE TREATED THE SAME**
NICOSIA – CYPRUS – Yesterday Iraq linked the treatment of the POWs of the coalition forces against it with the treatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories.²³

The conditional relationship between the two clauses of this headline presents a narrative style that is coherent and comprehensible only within the world knowledge of the Arab reader. In other words, the causal relationship of Iraq's treatment of Western POWs is dependent on the Israeli treatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories. Once again, the discourse in the headline and lead invoke in the mind of the reader references of shared antagonism towards Israel and the United States. This is a discursive strategy of parallelism to connect to the Gulf War with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The headline offers *Ad Dustour's* readers a context to interpret the Gulf War within the broader issues of the Middle East. In a sense, the linkage strategy used by *Ad Dustour* empowers the victimized image of Palestinians in the occupied territories in control of their Israeli oppressors, and creates a mental model, a frame of reference in which a reversed subjugation of (POWs), empowers (Iraq) to demand that the aggressor (the United States) take notice and review its position in the Middle East.

- **A PROLONGED GULF WAR WORRIES ARAB STATES
ALIGNED WITH AMERICA**

AMMAN – *The Financial Times* mentioned yesterday that the potential of a long war causes great concerns to large Arab countries, which are part of the international coalition against Iraq, in light of increased opposition in these countries against the alliances of their governments.²⁴

Alternative media reported mass demonstrations in support of Iraq all over the world, especially in Arab countries. Thus, a prolonged war does concern Arab countries,

²³*Ad Dustour*, 01/23/A1/C4/headline, lead 4.

²⁴*Ad Dustour*, 01/23/A1/C3/headline, lead 5.

as the previous analysis revealed. The highly rhetorical exchange of antagonistic, nationalist, combative and religious hyperbole, such as the calls for sacred Jihad, martyrdom etc. is an effort to mobilize Arab masses against their governments' participation in the coalition forces of the Gulf War. Indeed these Arab governments are in a precarious situation, and quite apprehensive about the prospects of a prolonged war, regarding their regimes' ability to suppress domestic opposition, as well as their peoples' enormous emotions and boiling tempers.

• **GORBACHEV: THE MILITARY ESCALATION IN THE GULF IS DANGEROUS AND EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF WAR**

MOSCOW – REUTER – Soviet President Mikhael Gorbachev said yesterday that international efforts should be intensified to prevent further war escalations in the Gulf.²⁵

In this headline the authority is given to the former Soviet Union's leader to define the situation as "dangerous," and to call for every effort to "prevent the spread of war." The lead simply reiterates the main topic of the headline. Reminiscent of the *G&M*, there has been a systematic effort in *Ad Dustour* to report every hint at peace and to devote significant attention and front-page treatment to resolve the conflict and stop the devastating war. Evidently, this is in accordance with Jordan's policy in the Gulf War, calling for an immediate halt to the air raids and a political resolution to the crisis.

²⁵*Ad Dustour*, 01/23/A1/C6/headline, lead 6.

- **To Stop The War and Give Political Solutions a Chance**
- **THE ARAB MAGHREB STATES REQUESTED AN OFFICIAL EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL**

CAPITALS – NEWS AGENCIES – Members of the Arab Maghreb countries of Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya decided yesterday in Tripoli to officially request an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council to stop the war and give a chance to political resolutions.²⁶

This headline, like the previous one, is markedly one in a series of headlines used to de-emphasize Jordan's isolation. The comradeship with the Arab Maghreb states, and their diligent efforts to find a peaceful and Arab resolution to the crises is well received. Jordan feels very isolated in its stance against the big powers and welcomes any peace initiative because Jordanian officials know too well that the longer the war lasts, the more devastating the consequences will be for Jordan. In this regard, *Ad Dustour* treated peace initiatives and calls for ceasefire with the same diligence as did the *G&M*. This stood in contrast to the deliberate attempts of the *NYT* to either discredit any bona fide peace prospects, or to just mute them.

- **AMERICAN MILITARY LEADERS DISCOURAGED SINCE THE AIR RAIDS HAVE FAILED AND PICTURES OF POWS INCREASE THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT**

- From SAID NASSER – *Ad Dustour* Correspondent in Washington – American Military Officers are challenged by the difficulty of evaluating the damage incurred on the ground by their intensive air raids, and by the increasing number of their lost warplanes.²⁷

The headline in essence uses unsubstantiated information to build its story about the difficulty of evaluating the extent of damage, exaggerating and contradicting it to the point where American military leaders are “discouraged,” and draws the conclusion that the raids had failed. The factuality of this headline and lead is attributed to information from unspecified “American Military Officers,” since there is no way to determine its

²⁶ *Ad Dustour*, 01/23/A1/C7/headline, lead 7.

²⁷ *Ad Dustour*, 01/23/A1/C3/headline, lead 8.

validity if it is taken at face value. On the other hand, the second part of the headline "Pictures of POWs increase their disappointment," is more likely factual, since parading POWs captured by one's enemy would likely be distressing to any country.

The editorial comment of *AD Dustour* on this day entitled: "U.S. Crimes Against Iraqi Civilians," is in total agreement with the overall position of the newspaper. The editorial contends that "the allied crusaders have failed to defeat the Iraqi army, and their intense barbaric aerial bombing will not deter the Iraqi people from overcoming the invading forces of evil."

• ***Ad Dustour*, Tuesday, January 29, 1991.**

- **IRAQI MISSILES RAIN DOWN ON ISRAEL AND AMERICAN BASES IN SAUDI ARABIA**
- **PATRIOT AIR-DEFENSE MISSILES FAIL TO EVADE IRAQI SCUD MISSILE ATTACKS AND ISRAEL IS TIGHT-LIPPED REGARDING NUMBER OF MISSILES AND EXTENT OF DAMAGES**
- **THE OIL SPILL EXTENDS GRADUALLY AND REACHES THE SAUDI BEACHES TODAY THREATENING THE WESTERN COALITION SHIPS**
 - **Baghdad announces hitting 4 enemy targets and the continuous bombing of cities**
 - **Iraq has chemical missile warheads and enormous chemical arsenal**
 - **International condemnation of offensive against Iraq persists and Israel renews its threats.**

Last night, Iraq aimed its "Al Hussein" missiles towards Israel and American military targets in Riyadh.²⁸

By now, the U.S.-led coalition air attack is well underway, and so is the Jordanian official policy towards the war. This banner headline of January 29 reflects the resolution of the Jordanian official dilemma of "who to support and what position to

²⁸ *Ad Dustour*, 01/29A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

take,” and is quite patent in *Ad Dustour*’s militant style, and confrontational reporting on the Gulf War.

Several topics crowd this three-deck, eight-column headline banner, and its three-kicker, five-column subheadlines (Garst & Bernstein, 1982), positioned atop of two photographs. The first picture is a smoke-engulfed shrine with two tall towers, which reads: “the holy columns in Al Najjaf after a crusade aerial attack.” The second is a photo of massive black flames of torched oil fields, and reads: “enormous black smoke column from Al-Ahmady field.”

Initially, the first two decks of the headline juxtapose the success of the Iraqi missile with the failure of the Patriot (American) one. The ideological implication of this contrasting stylistics (a discursive strategy) is used in *Ad Dustour* to induce trust and reliability in Iraq’s (the good Us) military capability, and cast a shadow of doubt on the enemy’s (the Other evil) competence to intercept the superior Iraqi missiles.

The third deck depicts the oil spill as “threatening the Western coalition ships,” in a rather fatalistic implication of a supreme power (inferred especially by positioning the photo of the insulted holy site next to the blazing oil field) forcing the oil spill in the direction of the enemy to imperil its (evil forces). This harmonious juxtaposition fits *Ad Dustour*’s overall romantic quest theme of the certainty of “good triumphing over evil.” Consequently, the two-kicker subheadlines reaffirm the first two-decks’ boosting up of the Iraqi success, its precision of “hitting 4 enemy targets,” and capacity of carrying “chemical missile warheads.” Finally, to balance it all, *Ad Dustour* reminds its readers in the last kicker of the ongoing “international condemnation of offensive against Iraq,” and contrasts it with the “renewed Israeli threats.”

The lead signifies the semantic power of language, and points out the discursive strategy of *Ad Dustour* in naming the Scud missile “Al Hussein” in reference to Saddam Hussein’s “Arab visionary role.” The overall hyperbolic accent of this complex headline together with the (one sentence) lead depicts the destruction and terror being inflicted on the once impervious Israel and the invincible United States. It appears that the headline and lead are representing *Ad Dustour*’s perception of the “Arab psyche” in a sort of Aristotelian collective catharsis²⁹ similar to the American catharsis of the Vietnam syndrome.

In effect, *Ad Dustour* displays its unchallenged, and euphoric dominant discourse to portray the emotions experienced by Arabs on Saddam’s side in a manner echoing Memmi’s suppressed people, and Fanon’s “Wretched of the earth.” It is quite delightful and overwhelming to witness *the* day where the *oppressed* Arabs fatefully rise up and face their oppressors in a symbolic interchange between *Ad Dustour*’s righteous “Al Hussein” missile, and the rest of the world’s decadent Iraqi Scud. Also, the metaphor of a “rain” of (Scud) missiles pouring down on Israel and American bases in Saudi Arabia shatters the formidable myth of the U.S. and Israel.

²⁹The alleviation of fears, problems, and complexes by bringing them to consciousness or giving them expression. Applied originally by Aristotle to the purging of pity and terror by viewing a tragedy.

- **'BY GOD I HOPE WE WON'T BE FORCED TO USE NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS**
- **WE ARE CONFIDENT OF OUR VICTORY AND OUR MISSILES' ABILITY TO CARRY NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WARHEADS**
- **THE OIL WEAPON IS PERMISSIBLE AND WE'RE IN AGREEMENT WITH IRAN THAT THE BATTLE IS BETWEEN THE FAITHFUL AND FAITHLESS'**

NICOSIA – REUTER – Iraqi president Saddam Hussein expressed his confidence in defeating the Western alliance and in freeing the Arab will and territory. In a CNN cable news report early Tuesday morning, Saddam Hussein confirmed the capability of Iraqi missiles to carry nuclear, chemical and biological warheads.³⁰

For added drama and relevance, this three-deck, five-column headline is positioned right beneath the two aforementioned five-column photos. The superheadline opens with a threat, in Saddam's faithful quote, and Muslim discourse of "By God," in a sort of "jihad of the heart" (Karim, 2000b) manner, asking the Divine authority to spare him the use of "non-conventional weapons" in his battle against the infidels. The distortion continues by feeding the ubiquitous "Arab psyche" with exaggerated images of the forthright defeat of the West and the overstated confidence in Iraq's ability to liberate all Arab territories. By affording prominence and visibility to Saddam's quote, and the justification to use "nuclear, chemical and oil weapons" against the "faithless," *Ad Dustour* tacitly treats Saddam Hussein as an Arab visionary by depicting him as a modern-day prophet, who is about to deliver his "faithful" people. The confrontational propaganda, complete with expressions of readiness to use non-conventional weapons and the portrayal of the Iraqi military supremacy, has deceived even the Iraqis themselves, and prompted them to overestimate their military might by projecting their missiles' capability to carry nuclear and biological warheads, a lie in which they [the Iraqis, and the Palestinians] were entrapped.

³⁰ *Ad Dustour*, 01/29/A1/C4/headline, lead 2.

- **A LETTER FROM MITTERAND TO HUSSAIN
REGARDING FRANCE'S POSITION IN THE GULF WAR**

AMMAN – PETRA – Last night, his Majesty, King Hussain received in Al-Nadwa Palace, Mr. François Chire, Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and special envoy of French President François Mitterand, to deliver a letter in regards to the French position in the Gulf War.³¹

Atop this headline is a photo of King Hussain's meeting with the French delegation. The rational, civilized theme of the picture, along with the headline and lead is a fresh breeze amidst the emotional, distorted and screaming headlines of *Ad Dustour*, which presumably, are more reflective of the Jordanian mood on the streets rather than the Palace. On the other hand, this headline and lead are perhaps more insightful of Jordan's traditional moderate policies, and in line with the official position of Jordan, represented by King Hussain's unrelenting, quiet diplomatic efforts in searching for ways to stop the Gulf War. This is a quite marked difference from the intense confrontational discourse that has been carried out by *Ad Dustour* so far.

- **THE RETURN OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER FROM TEHRAN**
- **AGREEMENT TO DEVELOP MUTUAL JORDAN- IRAN COOPERATION**
- **AND CALL TO HALT THE DEVASTATING WAR AGAINST BRETHREN
IRAQ**

AMMAN – PETRA – Mr. Taher Al-Masri Minister of Foreign Affairs, returned to Amman last night after a two-day visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran, where he delivered a written letter from his Majesty King Hussain to the Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani and met with a number of Iranian high officials.³²

In its consistent effort to underscore even a miniscule hope for peace, *Ad Dustour's* reportage in this headline along with the previous one attempts to frame the Jordan - Iran rapprochement in the perspective of cooperation in order to breakdown Jordan's isolation in the international community. It is no secret that the Iraq-Iran

³¹ *Ad Dustour*, 01/29/A1/C1/headline, lead 3.

³² *Ad Dustour*, 01/29/A1/C1/headline, lead 4.

rapprochement during the Gulf War surprised even the most skeptical. At this point the Jordanian government did not publicly endorse Saddam's view that the "battle is between the faithful and the faithless." But the positioning of this report directly underneath the previous headline may have been used by *Ad Dustour* to hint at a possible Jordanian official conformity with Saddam's quote: "'We're in agreement with Iran that the battle is between the faithful and the faithless.'" ³³

- **CITIZENS DEFY CURFEW**

- **500 ARRESTED IN GAZA STRIP**

AMMAN – PETRA – OCCUPIED JERUSALEM – NEWS AGENCIES –

Palestinian citizens defied a curfew order forced by the occupying Zionist authorities on all cities, towns and camps in occupied Palestine, and for, the twelfth day, threw rocks and empty bottles at enemy soldiers and their military patrols. ³⁴

This headline and lead emphasize the solidarity and support of "Palestinians defying the occupying Zionist authorities' curfew orders." The story is highlighted in *Ad Dustour* for its significance to what has been termed as the Palestinian factor in Jordan's decision to side with Iraq against Kuwait. Was the King's divergence from his traditional moderate policy (which was always considered an ally of the West), to accommodate internal Jordanian complexities? How decisive were the primordial connections of the Jordanian Palestinian and the East Banker to the question of Palestine, and how much of an influence did this factor have on the tilting of the political Jordanian pendulum to the opposite end?

³³*Ad Dustour*, 01/29/A1/C1/headline, lead 2.

³⁴*Ad Dustour*, 01/29/A1/C4/headline, lead 5.

- **NEW AMERICAN PIRACY IN THE “RED”**
- **SHIP PREVENTED FROM GOING TO AQABA SEAPORT**

AMMAN – *AD DUSTOUR* Jordanian sources said the American Navy in the Red Sea intercepted the “Sea Energy” cargo ship at the Traits of Tiran, and prevented it from entering the seaport of Aqaba. The same sources have asserted that the cargo ship was carrying imported commodities for Jordanian merchants to meet local market demands.³⁵

In this headline, *Ad Dustour* exposes the unlawful American actions of intercepting the cargo ship and accuses her of “new piracy,” as opposed to “old piracy.” It is worth mentioning that this is one of the many consequences that Jordan had to endure as a result of its siding with Iraq against the U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf War. This could very well be an intimidating event to pressure the Jordanian people for their rival attitudes, which are firmly believed to have twisted the King’s hand into taking a counter position from that of the U.S.- led coalition.

From an economic perspective, the *Middle East Economic Digest* (*MEED*, 1991) claimed that the Gulf War had literally disintegrated Jordan’s economy. Almost all activities in Aqaba (a major seaport in Jordan) were brought to a halt, tourism earnings disappeared, remittances were drastically reduced, oil from Saudi Arabia was cut off, and Jordanian products were denied excess to the Gulf States (*The New York Times*, Oct. 21, 1990). Also, the phosphate market was depressed, phosphates being Jordan’s main physical export. Unemployment, lingering at 15 percent before 1990, reached nearly 40 percent by spring 1991 (*MEED*, Nov. 2, 1991:15). Most importantly, Iraq was incapable of paying the \$835 million that it owed Jordan in autumn 1989 (Stork, 1991:360).

³⁵*Ad Dustour*, 01/29/A1/C1/headline, lead 6.

- **AMERICAN MILITARY SPOKESPERSON DENIES NEWS**
- **JORDAN DISPUTES SAUDI CLAIMS OF MOVING MISSILES FROM JORDAN TO IRAQ**

AMMAN – PETRA – The official spokesperson denied news reported in the Saudi newspaper *The Middle East* published in London about the alleged transport of Scud missiles in refrigerated trucks during nighttime.³⁶

In accord with the previous headline and lead, this headline also fits *Ad Dustour's* accountability theme that hints at dubious attempts to further alienate and isolate Jordan by fabricating events such as the ones that were mentioned above to portray Jordan as an active participant in the war, contrary to its claims of neutrality.

Hence, *Ad Dustour* discredits the alleged “Saudi claims” as a heinous campaign carried out by the U.S. and the Arab Gulf States to further harm Jordan’s reputation and to isolate and punish the Jordanian people. Since there is no way to validate the claims made in this report, it is best to treat the information at face value.

- **LATEST AMERICAN REPORTS CONFIRM FAILURE OF AIR RAIDS, AIRPORTS STILL WORK, PLANES AND MISSILES UNTOUCHED**
- **IRAQ OWNS SOPHISTICATED COMMUNICATION NETWORK AND MISSILE LAUNCH PADS UNHARMED**

From SAID NASSER – *Ad Dustour* Correspondent in Washington:

Top U.S. officials continue probing information offered by the American defense department to assess the Iraqi damage incurred by intense air raids for the past ten days.³⁷

Analyzing this sort of headline is like engaging in a study of a typical propaganda model. This headline is more of a speculation than a news report. It is driven in a desperate propagandist attempt to keep up high morale amidst a devastating air attack, which exceeded in number and tonnage those of the Second World War. The reactionary tone of the headline and lead contradicts the reality of total destruction and conveys un-attributed information about a steadfast and powerful Iraq.

³⁶*Ad Dustour*, 01/29/A1/C6/headline, lead 7.

³⁷*Ad Dustour*, 01/29/A1/C6/headline, lead 8.

**IRAQ HAS DEADLY MISSILES COLLECTION THAT
WILL HAVE DECISIVE MILITARY IMPACT ON WAR**

LONDON – REUTER – The British *Soviet Intelligence Review*, specialized in defense matters, reported yesterday that Iraq owns a number of deadly surface-to-surface missiles other than Scuds that may play a decisive role in a ground battle should coalition forces attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait.³⁸

In retrospect, this headline and lead, sourced from Reuter, can only be termed as an exaggeration of the Iraqi military capability. Like the previous one, this un-attributed headline presents information that cannot be validated and can easily be considered distorted.

On this day, the *Ad Dustour* editorial: “Why Conspire Against Jordan?” is about fending off charges published in the Saudi paper *Al Sharq Al Awsat*, and about the alleged Jordanian role in the Iraqi missile attack on Israel.

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Ad Dustour</i>, Wednesday, January 30, 1991. |
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- **IRAQI ARMORED BATTALIONS RAID SAUDI TERRITORIES**
- **HUGE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES AMONG COALITION FORCES AND THE CAPTURE OF UNDAMAGED WEAPONS**
- **EMERGENCY SIRENS IN DHAHRAN... HITTING 6 AIR TARGETS AND KILLING AN ENEMY PILOT**
 - **IRAQ PREPARES NEW MILITARY SURPRISES FOR AGGRESSORS**
 - **2,600 NEW AIR RAIDS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS**

Iraqi armored battalions raided coalition positions inside Saudi territories and engaged in a skirmish that resulted in heavy coalition casualties. The unit returned safely to its bases after capturing intact weapons.³⁹

On this date, the *Ad Dustour* front-page presents eight different Gulf War stories/issues to its readers under the above three-deck, eight-column headline banner, and two four-column kicker subheadlines. On the right of the headline banner is a four-

³⁸*Ad Dustour*, 01/29/A1/C6/headline, lead 9.

³⁹*Ad Dustour*, 01/30/A1/C5/headline, lead 1.

column photo of King Hussain presiding at a civilian meeting. On the left side of the banner, there is a three-column photo of King Hussain (the Commander-in-Chief of the Jordanian Forces) in military uniform, shaking hands with soldiers. The headline banner together with the two pictures convey a sense of confidence in a poised King, a leader who is not only competent politically (in the civilian picture), but also an expert in military affairs (in the military photo).

The first deck of the headline introduces the main event, which is the Iraqi attack inside Saudi territories. The next one announces the success of the Iraqi operation that not only caused enormous human casualties, but also got hold of valuable armaments. The third deck continues to detail the Iraqi offensive on Dhahran and confirms its success by “hitting six enemy targets, and killing one pilot.” The first kicker subheadline initiates a new topic, a promise/threat about “new Iraqi military surprises.” Finally, the last deck presents factual information about intense “2,600 air raids on Iraqi civilian targets,” and also, a context for the reader to interpret the former headlines (the Iraqi assault on Dhahran) within a justified Iraqi self-defense frame, in light of the intense and the enormous attack on Iraq by the U.S.- led coalition.

The challenge of this multi-deck complex headline is two-fold. First, no source is accredited for its information; therefore, there is no way to verify its validity and factuality. Second, the exaggeration of casualties and the bragging confrontational tone warrants a skeptical and cautious treatment. But the account of the intense 2,600 air raids⁴⁰ is confirmed in the *NYT*, but is used in different contexts, perhaps to point out the

⁴⁰The term “sorties” was referred to in U.S. military briefings and consequently picked up by the media as a semantic choice to lessen the destructive connotation of the term “air raid,” and to blur the devastating bombing campaign with French sophistication.

superiority, efficiency, and precision of the coalition's weaponry, with no mention of hitting any civilian targets. In contrast, *Ad Dustour* uses the same information from an opposite angle, i.e. to signal the air raids' absolute terror and total destructive power. Evidently, the term "air raids" in *Ad Dustour*, and "sorties" as used in U.S. military briefings, present us with a fascinating interplay between ideology, semantics and discursive strategies. It should be mentioned that the *NYT* used the term once in a small font "10,000 Sorties" front-page kicker headline on January 23rd, but on this day the *NYT* referred to it in "Allies Fly 2,600 missions." Remarkably, the *G&M* did not use the term at all in any of its front-page headlines. In a way, *Ad Dustour* uses the phrase "air raids" in its most commonsensical and conventional sense to denote a universal meaning if you will, of something (an air raid,) which indeed is destructive, painful and deadly. Conversely, the use of "sorties" adds some intriguing French classiness to conceal the enormous tonnage of explosive dropped indiscriminately on Iraq.

- THE PRESENT PHASE THAT WE'RE IN IS THE MOST PERILOUS**
- **AL HUSSAIN: OUR NATION IS SUBJUGATED TO PARTITION AND APPROPRIATION**
 - **"IT'S OUR PATRIOTIC DUTY TO FIGURE OUT A PEACE PROCESS TO TACKLE ALL ISSUES"**

AMMAN – PETRA – Last night his Majesty visited the Prime Minister Madar Badran in his office, prior to chairing the cabinet meeting to discuss the latest developments in the Gulf War (including the destruction of various civilian infrastructures caused by the air bombing against our brethren Iraq.⁴¹

This four-column headline is positioned on top of the photo of King Hussain presiding over his cabinet meeting. The eyebrow superheadline (Garst & Bernstein, 1982) precedes the main headline to characterize its context as "the most perilous." Once the readers' attention is set in this precarious disposition, *Ad Dustour* introduces the

⁴¹*Ad Dustour*, 01/30/A1/C1/headline, lead 2.

King's quote in a double-deck headline. The first headline deck gives the King the power to define the state of the nation and the authority to notify his people that their "nation is subjugated for partition and appropriation." As a logical consequence of the former proposition, the second deck underscores the King's action plan as a "patriotic duty to figure out a peace process." Notice the King's rational, well-thought words and phrases signaling Jordan's earlier stance of insisting on a peaceful resolution to the Gulf War as a part of a more comprehensive regional peace process that "tackles all issues" (hints at the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East).

Besides accrediting the information to the Jordanian news agency, Petra, and providing details of the circumstances (cabinet meeting) of the King's quote, the lead does not add anything new.

It is the worldly knowledge, the socially shared meanings, the history, and the political experiences that tie *Ad Dustour's* reader to the King, and in turn, the King to his people, and through this kind of rapport, the headline realizes its ideological implication. The headline also entails power and coercion, in "subjugating our nation [the Arab] to partition and appropriation," a recurring cliché of the threat to Arab unity (the threat presumes the actual existence of one solid Arab nation out there) which is the cornerstone of Jordan's long established pan-Arab policy.

The unrelenting effort of Jordan to find an urgent Arab solution to the Gulf War is compelling. That Arabs could be in coalition with foreign armies to destroy a brethren Arab country is very difficult (from a pan-Arab perspective) to comprehend or to accept. It is ironic that Arabs killing Arabs is yet another chapter of a long and shameful history in the making, and Jordan wants no part of it. The question is then why would Jordan

(that is considered a moderate Arab country) focus on finding a peaceful resolution to the Gulf War and why wouldn't Egypt do so, or perhaps radical Syria? The answer may very well be that Egypt and Syria both stood to benefit most from the rewards of complying with the West. Why would they oppose rich Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the rest of the rich Gulf sheikdoms to save a distasteful Saddam Hussein? The acrimony between Saddam's Iraq and former Hafez Assad's Syria dates way back, and the relations are full of distrust, hatred and suspicion.

Yet, many believe that despite Jordan's traditional moderate pro-Western policies, and King Hussain's close relationship with Britain and the United States, Jordan's opposition to the Gulf War can be explained neither on moral grounds nor due to her commitment to Pan-Arabism. In this regard, Mowlana (1991) questioned Jordan's motives in supporting Arab Iraq, but not safeguarding the plight of Arab Kuwait, considering that the majority of Jordanians were expatriates working in the rich Gulf region earning and transferring the much-needed foreign exchange into the Jordanian economy.

- **CHEVENEMENT'S RESIGNATION ... BACKLASHES ON MITTERAND'S POLICIES**

- **"THE LOGIC OF WAR GOES BEYOND THE UN OBJECTIVES"**

PARIS – NEWS AGENCIES – "The allied objectives in the Persian Gulf War exceeded the guidelines established by the United Nations. This was the introduction to a rather short (45 words) resignation letter presented yesterday by Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the Defense Minister of France, to President François Mitterand. Observers considered it a political setback to President Mitterand's foreign policy especially regarding the West's war against Iraq."⁴²

This double-deck headline is immediately beneath the previous King Hussain headline, and is accompanied by a one-column photo of the French Defense Minister.

⁴²*Ad Dustour*, 01/30/A1/C1/headline, lead 3.

The first deck introduces the resignation as the main topic, while the second deck rationalizes the “going beyond the UN objectives,” as being behind it. The lead attributes the information datelined in Paris to unspecified news agencies and provides details such as the short “45 word” resignation letter. The lead characterizes the resignation as “a political setback to President Mitterand’s foreign policy especially regarding the *West’s* (emphasis added) war against Iraq.” Evidently, while the minister is disappointed with the way the Gulf War is unfolding, he would certainly not consider the coalition’s Gulf War as the “West’s” war, regardless of how sympathetic his views might be. Perhaps, through a discursive strategy and under the influence of (unspecified) observers, *Ad Dustour* might have slipped in its own interpretation by implanting it in the lead paragraph for added credibility.

Clearly, the significance of this resignation is a crucial development that was carried in the dispatches of unspecified news agencies. However, from a sheer journalistic perspective, this event should be considered groundbreaking, and perhaps merit enough significance to be considered as a front-page newsworthy event in both the *NYT* and the *G&M*. Consider this for a moment. The French Defense Minister resigns in protest against the United States’ warfare in the Gulf and accuses the coalition of having gone far beyond the UN objectives. Yet, there is no trace of this story anywhere on the front pages of either the *G&M* or the *NYT*.

What gives this event special significance to the Arab world requires some historical context. Although France was once a colonizer, it has managed to establish a friendly relationship with the Arab world, especially with countries that were formerly under its mandate, in a manner comparable to Britain in its sphere of dominance. The

self-serving postcolonial policies of France have left a positive impression on the Arab world and France was considered the “Arabs’ Friend.” Take Lebanon for instance. Some of the Lebanese regard France as their “caring mother,” which is a little too naïve in the world of realpolitik to think of a former colonizer as a loving mother, unless it is used to conceal a dependency policy. Be that as it may, France was not the only country with divided opinion; there were many other countries that opposed being dragged into the Gulf War by the United States and some were literally forced or coerced to consent to Iraq’s total destruction; we simply did not know about them because they were only reported on in alternative media.

- **PALESTINIANS ENTER WAR IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ**
 - **TENS OF ROCKETS ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND THE ENEMY SHELLS AL RASHIDIYA CAMP**
- BEIRUT – TUNIS – NEWS AGENCIES –

In the early hours of yesterday morning tens of Katyusha rockets hailed down on Israeli settlements in the northern occupied territories of Palestine in what is believed to be the most intensive rocket attack in recent years.⁴³

This headline and lead introduce the Palestinian factor in the Gulf War equation. (The *G&M* also reported these events on page A11) This report belongs to the linkage strategy applied by *Ad Dustour* and echoes the official as well as the Jordanian street attitudes. The unremitting Jordanian and Palestinian efforts to connect what is happening in the Gulf War to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict serve a number of purposes. First, they offer a comprehensive view of the conflict in the Arab world, which in turn calls for immediate international attention to deal with the whole situation, instead of offering compartmentalized policies that treat the consequences of the Arab-Israeli predicament rather than examining its cause. This strategy, however, totally contradicts U.S. and

⁴³*Ad Dustour*, 01/30/A1/C6/headline, lead 4.

Israeli foreign policy in the Arab world and is strongly opposed for fear that it might compromise Israeli interests.

Another reason for the linkage strategy is Saddam's tactic to champion the Palestinian cause. By mobilizing attacks from Lebanon against northern parts of Israel, Saddam hopes to instigate an Israeli military reaction, which many believed, if successful, (provoking Israel to engage in a side-by-side battle with the Arabs against Iraq) would have the power to generate enough dissent and topple many Arab regimes, thereby ruining the frail Arab-US. Alliance

- **MOSCOW DECIDES ON EXTRAORDINARY MISSIONS TO STOP THE GULF OFFENSIVE**

MOSCOW – AFP – Vitelli Anyatneko, the spokesperson of the Soviet President, confirmed yesterday the Soviet Union's commitment to take extremely critical decisions concerning the Gulf crisis and that the Soviet Union is preparing for peace initiatives and proposals.⁴⁴

In this headline, Moscow has the authority to "decide on extraordinary missions," with the objective "to stop the Gulf offensive." The lead paragraph, datelined in Moscow, summarizes the topic, while adding some credibility to the information such as the confirmation of the former Soviet President's spokesperson, and the former Soviet Union's determination to find an acceptable peace initiative. In almost every issue, *Ad Dustour* systematically reports about the continuous efforts, proposals and initiatives of the Soviet Union to halt the war. While the *G&M* emphasizes this news event in its front-page, it is being mostly downplayed in the *NYT*.

⁴⁴*Ad Dustour*, 01/30/A1/C1/headline, lead 5.

- **EGYPTIAN JOURNALISTS PROTEST THE CONTINUING ASSAULT ON IRAQ**

CAIRO – AFP – The Egyptian journalists' syndicate organized a sit-in yesterday in their headquarters in downtown Cairo to protest the American-led Atlantic assault on Iraq.⁴⁵

This headline introduces the topic of the Egyptian journalists' disapproval of the war against Iraq. The lead summarizes the report, and adds more details to the headline by specifying the sort of protest (sit-in), and the place (downtown Cairo,) where it is organized (syndicate), and ideologically opposed to "the American-led Atlantic assault on Iraq" i.e. the Gulf War.

Evidently, *Ad Dustour* makes a consistent effort to overcome Jordan's isolation and re-establish comradeship with the Egyptian people. This report is one of many about the increased apprehension among the Egyptian intelligentsia about their government's active participation in the Gulf War. But the extent of this opposition and its impact on the Egyptian Gulf War policies remain to be seen (the next Chapter).

- **1,500 JORDANIANS ENTERED "RUWEISHID" FROM IRAQ**
- **ENEMY WARPLANES RAID CIVILIAN CARS ON AMMAN-BAGHDAD HIGHWAY AND AT "TURAIBEL"**

From TALAAT SHENAA: An eyewitness account by Ahmed Ali Al-Nadi, a Jordanian citizen who lived to tell about his miraculous escape from death and destruction caused by the bombing of American Atlantic warplanes, which targeted civilian passenger cars returning from Kuwait and Iraq near the Iraqi Jordanian borders.⁴⁶

The significance of this news event is that it made it to the front pages of the *NYT*. This presents us with the first and unique opportunity to compare the way this story was reported in *Ad Dustour* and the *NYT* (the *G&M* reported it on page A12). Hence, consider the two headlines:

⁴⁵*Ad Dustour*, 01/30/A1/C4/headline, lead 6.

⁴⁶*Ad Dustour*, 01/30/A1/C6/headline, lead 7.

The New York Times:

• **War Refugees Flood Jordan, Telling of Raids and Extortion**

By ALAN COWELL

RUWEISHID, Jordan, Jan. 29 – Refugees fleeing Iraq and Kuwait streamed into Jordan today, telling of bridges and highways bombed in lands where food and hope are scarce and foreigners fear the perils of flight as much as they dread allied bombardment.⁴⁷

First let us start with the sources; it appears that the two newspapers' respective correspondents in the border town of Ruweishid, Jordan filed the two reports based on eyewitness accounts. The *NYT* headline and lead spoke of refugees fleeing Kuwait. While referring to their plight, they called attention to stories about "Telling of Raids and Extortion." On the other hand, *Ad Dustour's* headline focused on the human suffering caused by the "1,500 Jordanians" who were fleeing Iraq, and were telling of "enemy warplanes" targeting "civilian cars on the Amman-Baghdad highway." Both leads used eyewitness accounts as the source of their details. The *NYT* lead described the bombed bridges and highways and the scarcity of food and hope. Later in the report, the paper took advantage of the dire refugee circumstances to point out Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait (rather than calling world attention to aid the flock of refugees). *Ad Dustour's* lead reiterated an eyewitness account of how he escaped death and lived to tell about "enemy" warplanes bombing civilian-passenger cars returning from Kuwait and Iraq.

This overwhelming tragic situation of thousands of refugees representing different nationalities arriving penniless at the Jordanian borders every day overwhelmed Jordan's resources and emptied its markets. As a result of the occasional coalition's interception of Jordanian commodity ships entering its only seaport, the markets were out of basic necessities, and Jordan was isolated in dealing with this enormous and strenuous task single-handedly. However, in all fairness to the *G&M*, we must account for a report on

⁴⁷*The New York Times*, 01/30/A1/C5/headline, lead 3.

page A11, "External Affairs walks tightrope, Canada tries to balance initiatives while helping victims of gulf war,"⁴⁸ which acknowledges the dire situation both in Palestinian camps and the Jordanian border. The report mentions that diplomats from the Department of External Affairs are carefully handling the donation of 10,000 gas masks to Palestinians, as well as an offer to help Jordan deal with the influx of refugees from Iraq.

THE INTIFADA LEADERS WARN AGAINST MASSIVE DEPORTATIONS
• **OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES USE THOUSANDS OF DETAINEES AND PRISONERS AS "HUMAN SHIELDS" TO PROTECT DEMONA REACTOR**
OCCUPIED JERUSALEM – NEWS AGENCIES – The Israeli occupying authorities are gathering thousands of Palestinian detainees and prisoners to use them as "human shields" to protect the Demona nuclear reactor located in the Palestinian Najjab Desert from Iraqi missile attacks.⁴⁹

This headline together with its eyebrow superheadline introduce the topic of the Israeli actions of "Massive deportations" and refers to Israel as the "occupying authority." The lead exposes the Israeli intentions to put thousands of Palestinian detainees and prisoners in harm's way, with its plan to use them as "human Shields." The lead, as usual, explains the headline and enhances its coherence by providing pertinent details such as stating the objective: "to protect the Demona nuclear reactor from Iraqi missile attacks," and the location "in the Palestinian Najjab Desert." Notice the ideological implication of referring to the *Palestinian Najjab Desert* (emphasis added). This report runs parallel to Saddam's use of POWs as human shields, which resulted in the killing of a prisoner-of-war during one of the coalition's air raids on Iraqi governmental buildings.

⁴⁸ *The Globe & Mail*, 01/30/A11/C5.

⁴⁹ *Ad Dustour*, 01/30/A1/C3/headline, lead 8.

The Editorial comment of *Ad Dustour* on this date is entitled: "An Honest French Politician" and reflects on the resignation of the French Defense minister, Jean-Pierre Chevenement. This is considered to be a serious blow in the face of the policies of the Crusade-Zionist alliance, as well as the policies of the French President François Mitterand.

• ***Ad Dustour*, Wednesday, February 13, 1991.**

• **AMERICA DENIES CLAIMS THAT JORDAN WAS TRANSPORTING MISSILES IN OIL TANKS**

RIYADH – PETRA – *AD DUSTOUR* – An American military official held a press conference yesterday in the Saudi capital to deny rumors circulating in Western media about American allegations accusing Jordanians of transporting Scud missiles in oil tanks.⁵⁰

On this date, the front page of *Ad Dustour* presents its readers with six Gulf War related issues under unusual two headline banners, one of which is the first to appear in a relatively smaller font than the regular font-size headline banner of *Ad Dustour*. Obviously, the format of this eight-column banner is used to emphasize its significance. The subject of the headline sounds almost like an apology for the United States; it dismisses earlier allegations of Jordan's military cooperation with Iraq. The lead specifies the circumstances of the denunciation in terms of the five Ws. The source (who): "American military official," the time (when): "yesterday," the format: (how) "in a press conference," the location (where) "in the Saudi capital," and purpose: (why) to deny "American allegations about transporting Scud missiles in oil tanks,"

⁵⁰*Ad Dustour*, 02/13/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

- **HAMADI: POSTPONING GROUND BATTLE ... A PLOY**
- **AMERICAN HEAVY SHELLING ON IRAQI MINEFIELDS AND BOMBING OF HOSPITALS AND WATER PLANTS**
- **“NON ALIGNED” COUNTRIES CALL FOR PEACE AND PREMAKOV IN BAGHDAD**

Iraqi Deputy-Prime Minister Saadoun Hamadi charges that the latest statement of American President George Bush regarding the unlikelihood of the ground war is a ploy.⁵¹

This is the main regular font-size, three-deck headline banner. Underneath the right side of this banner is a photo of a smiling, preppy-looking King Hussain. Conversely, across, and on the left side is a caricature (illustration) of a well built, (Rambo like) Saddam with a “God is Great” bandana around his head, and an “Al Hussein” missile in his mouth confronting a feeble and collapsing Bush who has a Viking helmet, and a twisted (broken) “Patriot” missile in the mouth.

The first two decks of the headline work in concert with the picture of a rational King Hussain. The empowering graphics of the caricature depict the devious intentions of the United States (related to the postponement of “the ground battle,”) discrediting the maneuver by calling it “a ploy.” The second deck exposes the barbaric nature of the American “heavy shelling,” which is targeting Iraqi civilian structures indiscriminately.

The third deck introduces the “call for peace” within the peace initiatives of the “non-aligned” nations along with the unremitting peace missions of the former Soviet Union.

It is worth pointing out that few of the events mentioned here are authenticated in the *NYT*’s lengthy description of this day described as the “Heaviest shelling by the Allies yet.” A divergence, however, occurs when the *NYT* uses a totally different angle to

⁵¹*Ad Dustour*, 02/13/A1/C1/headline, lead 2.

discredit the Iraqi allegations about targeting civilian facilities shifting its focus away from the human suffering. Instead, the paper surveys destroyed bridges and government edifices. Finally, as part of the consistent effort noted earlier, the *NYT* downplays the Soviet-Iraqi peace talks and discredits the Iraqi intentions by using a U.S. official's quote: "So the bottom line is that it doesn't look like anything new."

• **CLARK: THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTING WAR CRIMES AND IS IN CONTEMPT OF THE GENEVA AND LAHAI CONVENTIONS**
NEW YORK – NEWS AGENCIES – upon his return from a one-week visit to Iraq, former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark said in a press conference yesterday that the U.S. has committed war crimes in Iraq by inflicting enormous civilian casualties and destruction.⁵²

This double-deck headline is quite extraordinary. The headline introduces the topic in the form of a quote taken from the press conference of the former U.S. Attorney General. Mr. Clark's statement exposes the atrocities committed by the United States and charges that such acts are in total disregard to the rule of law. The lead attributes the New York-dated information to unspecified news agencies and provides the details of Mr. Clark's disturbing findings after his fact-finding mission to Iraq.

Remarkably, a report of this caliber did not merit enough significance or newsworthiness to be reported on by either the *NYT* or the *G&M*. However, a month later, the report surfaced in one of the alternative media, when *The Nation* published it under the headline: "A War Crime," on March 11, 1991 (*The Nation*, 252 (9), p. 309).

⁵²*Ad Dustour*, 02/13/A1/C4/headline, lead 3.

- **ARENS REFUSES TO PROMISE NOT TO ATTACK IRAQ**
- **AMERICAN OFFICIAL ASKS THE GULF STATES, GERMANY, AND JAPAN TO PAY FOR ISRAELI AID**

WASHINGTON – From SAID NASSER – *AD DUSTOUR* CORRESPONDENT: A high-level American official spoke on the condition of anonymity that rich Gulf states, Germany and Japan should subsidize the additional costs of the aid requested by Israel as part of the coalition's war budget.⁵³

This double-deck headline introduces the two unlikely related topics in a cause-consequence relation embedded within the proposition (van Dijk, 1988) to give the reader the impression that the events of the first topic (in the first deck) caused the events of the second topic, in the second deck (consequence). This discursive strategy by *Ad Dustour* is used here to suggest power and coercion on Israel's part.

At first, a careful reader may be skeptical of the information detailed in the lead, for it may sound too far-fetched, and may raise a propagandist flag. It is not quite unusual though to expect this sort of discourse to be used by *Ad Dustour* in order to inflame Arab reactions against the United States and Israel. However, under closer scrutiny, the story is not only corroborated, but its information is validated in a previous report published in the *G&M* on January 23, 1991 on page A9, under the headline:

The Globe & Mail:

- **\$ 3-billion requested by Israel**
- **U.S. asked to cover costs of Gulf War.**

By JOHN GRAY

JERUSALEM – After establishing its credentials as a loyal friend and ally, Israel is asking the United States to cover its \$ 3-billion costs from the war in the Persian Gulf.⁵⁴

The *G&M*'s report goes beyond the above mentioned \$ 3-billion, and confirms that Israel "wants an additional \$ 10-billion in grants, loans and investment guarantees.

⁵³*Ad Dustour*, 02/13/A1/C3/headline, lead 4.

⁵⁴*The Globe & Mail*, 01/23/A9/C6.

The \$ 3-billion bill covers everything from Israel's direct military costs to lost tourism revenue and higher insurance costs."⁵⁵

To put things in perspective, consider the massive U.S. pledge of financial and economic concessions of \$ 13- billion, in addition to the extra \$ 10-billion, which is described as half the cost for settling one million Soviet Jews who were expected to arrive in Israel.⁵⁶ It is quite a generous dividend for Israel to refrain from interfering in the Gulf War, especially when it is offered U.S. protection by the swift airlift of sophisticated Patriot missiles that were deployed immediately along with their U.S. crew members to guard against future Iraqi attacks.

Furthermore, and in view of Israel's substantial financial requests, it is very plausible that the U.S. may request that the rich Gulf States, as well as Germany and Japan, subsidize the additional costs of the aid requested by Israel, perhaps as part of the coalition's war budget. How realistic is it to even speculate for one moment that the United States would come up with all these massive funds and immense concessions from its own treasury that was running a gigantic \$ 300 billion dollars deficit?

• **SADDAM TO PRIMAKOV: WE'RE READY TO COOPERATE WITH MOSCOW TO END WAR**

NICOSIA – REUTER – Radio Baghdad mentioned yesterday that President Saddam Hussein is willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union to end the Persian Gulf War.⁵⁷

The above headline introduces a topic that is covered in all three newspapers, *Ad Dustour*, the *NYT*, and the *G&M*. This presents us with the opportunity to study and compare the ways in which Saddam Hussein's peace efforts were portrayed in each of the

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷*Ad Dustour*, 02/13/A1/C7/headline, lead 5.

newspapers. *Ad Dustour*'s report will be analyzed first, and then, will be contrasted with those of the *G&M* and the *NYT*, respectively.

Ad Dustour's headline introduces the topic of "Iraq's intentions to end war" in a quoted phrase from Saddam Hussein to the Russian envoy. The lead datelined in Nicosia attributes the information to Reuter and reiterates the statement of Radio Baghdad.

The Globe & Mail:

• **Hussein hints at move to peace**

Meets Soviet envoy, Baghdad radio reports

By COLIN MacKENZIE

And MATHEW FISHER

With Reuter and Associated Press

Iraqi president Saddam Hussein is willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union in seeking an end to the war in the Persian Gulf, Baghdad radio said last night.

The state-run radio said he made the statement during a meeting in Baghdad with Soviet envoy Yevgeny Primakov.⁵⁸

In comparison, the *G&M* partly attributes its sources to Reuter and datelines the report from Washington. The wording of the Iraqi statement in the *G&M* is pretty much parallel to that of *Ad Dustour*, except for the mention of "the state-run radio," which could be interpreted in two ways. A positive interpretation may consider the *state-run radio* (emphasis added) as an indication of credibility, a guarantee if you will, since the view of a government-controlled radio may be regarded as an extension of the Iraqi government, and therefore, a reliable tool to conduct Iraq's foreign policy. A negative interpretation, on the other hand, may denote distrust in the credibility of the statement, and may cast a shadow of doubt on the peaceful intentions of Iraq.

⁵⁸*The Globe & Mail*, 02/13/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

The New York Times:

• **Hussein Meets With Soviet Envoy and Talks of Effort to End War**

By PATRICK E. TYLER.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12 – President Saddam Hussein of Iraq said tonight that he was willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union to end the Persian Gulf War, but he also said that Iraq was determined to keep fighting “until aggression and the aggressors are beaten back.”⁵⁹

In contrast, the *NYT* datelines its report in Washington and attributes its sources to its own correspondent. The headline reflects the information stated in the previous two reports (*Ad Dustour* and the *G&M*). The lead, however, displays two discrepancies. First, it does not trace the information back to Radio Baghdad (a minor one). Second, it attributes motive: “that Iraq was determined to keep fighting” and then takes Saddam Hussein’s quote out of context: “until aggression and the aggressors are beaten back” to discredit the positive intentions mentioned in the headline and in the first part of the lead. This discursive strategy, according to van Dijk (1988), is usually utilized to embed implications and presupposition in a subtle and indirect way. For further illustration, let us examine the following *NYT* lead:

President Saddam Hussein of Iraq said tonight that he was willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union to end the Persian Gulf War, **but he also said that Iraq was determined to keep fighting “until aggression and the aggressors are beaten back”** (emphasis added).

The first clause presents the Iraqi intentions in a neutral tone, the way *Ad Dustour* and the *G&M* did. However, the *NYT* uses the connective “**but**” to suggest a consequential relation between the former (neutral clause), and the following negative, and offensive clause. What this means discursively is that the *NYT* is relying on the readers’ cognitive reference (highly distorted), and their world knowledge of “Saddam Hussein” (extremely unreliable), to realize the intended meaning that conforms with the

⁵⁹*The New York Times*, 02/13/A1/C4/headline, lead 2.

NYT's ideological position, which considers both Saddam Hussain and the proposed peace efforts to be highly untrustworthy.

- **RAMADAN ASKS ARABS & MUSLIMS TO STOP DEMONSTRATING & PROTESTING & START HITTING COALITION COUNTRIES' INTERESTS**
BAGHDAD, REUTER – Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Taha Yassin Ramadan called upon Arab and Muslim sympathizers with Iraq to go beyond the protests and demonstrations and start targeting coalition countries' interests.⁶⁰

This double-deck headline features the confrontational, combative, and call-for-action discourse of the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister. And by giving it front-page prominence and coverage, *Ad Dustour* may very well be in agreement with it. The lead, on the other hand, attributes the Baghdad-dated information to Reuter, thus establishing its distance. This call for action is reiterated and detailed in the lead, which gives the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister (agent), the authority to call upon Arabs and Muslims alike (subjects), "to go beyond the protests and demonstrations and start targeting coalition countries' interests (a call for action). Although this reportage was mentioned on the front pages of neither the *NYT* nor the *G&M*, the current events were hinted at by referring to the intense security measures taken by Western embassies and by other interests throughout the world as a precaution against possible terrorist attacks.

On this day, *Ad Dustour*'s editorial "The Wrong Entry to Discuss the Conflict" argues that all the current negotiations and efforts to find a way out of the Gulf conflict decimated by Washington are still in a vicious circle.

⁶⁰ *Ad Dustour*, 02/13/A1/C3/headline, lead 6.

• ***Ad Dustour*, Monday, February 25, 1991.**

- **JORDAN ANNOUNCES ITS ANGER AND CONDEMNS THE GROUND BATTLE**
- **IRAQ DEFENDS AGAINST MASSIVE AGGRESSORS**
- **SADDAM: YOUR NATION AWAITS YOUR VICTORY... AND PEOPLE OF THE EARTH LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR PERFORMANCE**
 - **DESTROYING HUNDREDS OF ARMORED VEHICLES AND KILLING AND CAPTURING LARGE NUMBERS OF COALITION FORCES**
 - **EXTERMINATING AN ENTIRE AIR BORNE UNIT ... AND MISSILE ATTACKS ON RIYADH & DHAHRAN**
 - **CONFLICTING REPORTS FROM RIVAL ALLIED MEMBERS AND TOTAL SECRECY REGARDING CASUALTIES**

CAPITALS – NEWS AGENCIES – “God is great... victory is sweet God willing...” were the cries of Iraqi soldiers, in (the Mother of all Battles), defending against the largest ground, air and naval assault since WWII.⁶¹

On this date, *Ad Dustour* presents the readers with seven Gulf War related reports on its front page. The main headline banner is composed of three decks and three eight-column kicker subheadline banners. Underneath this multiple headline banner (on the right) is a two-column photograph of King Hussain (with fatigue uniform) conferring with his military leaders. In the center of the page is a caricature of multiples of Rambo-like Saddam Hussein[s], with his lower body (chest down) buried in the soil and his upper body springing out with open defiant arms, a “God is Great” bandana around his forehead and a missile in his hand with a comment that reads: “The new desert plants!!”

Clearly, analyzing this kind of headline requires a propaganda approach, for it exhibits several propagandistic strategies of presenting symbols of highly emotional and cognitive content and using distortion and exaggeration to shape perceptions and manipulate cognitions to achieve a certain goal (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2000). The intense factual deception and falsification in certain parts of the headline manipulate the readers’

⁶¹*Ad Dustour*, 02/25/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

perceptions and lead them to believe in a reality that does not exist; that is propaganda at its best. However, for those who have access to other media, the accounts of *Ad Dustour's* ground battle read like a fiction story with events that take you to a different planet.

The first deck of the headline introduces Jordan's "anger and condemnation of the ground offensive" and calls attention to a factual event (i.e. Jordan's political stance). In contrast, the second deck with its larger-than-life font announces the Iraqi resistance, while the third deck presents Saddam Hussein's call for action. The highly emotional quote of Hussein: "Your nation awaits your victory," and "the people of the earth look forward to your performance," is underscored by *Ad Dustour* to achieve the propagandist's (Hussein's) interests and to forge a strong and resolved image of Iraqi soldiers. In the meantime, the global media are parading the pictures of the defeated and the en masse surrender of thousands of Iraqi prisoners.

Ad Dustour's propagandistic endeavor does not stop at the motivational logic represented in Saddam Hussein's quote, but continues throughout the following three kicker-headlines in which *Ad Dustour* engages in its own propaganda. The completely fraudulent facts implanted in the three kicker headlines, like "destroying hundreds of armored vehicles, and killing and capturing large numbers of coalition forces," firstly, exaggerates enemy losses in order to demoralize the enemy and to boost confidence in Iraq's capability. Secondly, the use of "[exterminating] an entire airborne unit..." is to dehumanize the enemy (a reverse strategy). Thirdly, the distorted facts of a *confused enemy* (emphasis added) continues in *Ad Dustour's* "conflicting reports from rival allied members and total secrecy regarding casualties," which aims at depicting an organized

alliance, now in disarray due to high casualties inflicted upon them by Iraq. Evidently, all three-kicker headlines sharply contradict Western media reports of the overwhelming Iraqi defeat and the devastating crush of the formidable Iraqi army.

The lead maintains this highly sizzling and emotional tone and uses inverted discursive images of defeated Iraqis to transform them metaphorically into some mythical reality. In fact, Muslim phrases of “‘God is great... victory is sweet God willing...” may very well be the final cries “and the surrendering to God’s utterances” of thousands of falling Iraqi soldiers in “the Mother of all Battles.”

Finally, this multiple headline and lead create an apocalyptic zone in which reality and fantasy intertwine, blurring the collective awareness of a nation about a war gone too wrong.

• **THE OUTCOME OF GROUND BATTLE DECIDES BUSH’S FUTURE**

WASHINGTON – From Jane Jones – REUTER: American President George Bush’s orders for an extensive ground war against Iraqi forces in Kuwait could be a political gamble if it does not end the five weeks-long Gulf War in a swift and decisive victory.⁶²

Once again, the same twisted logic of *Ad Dustour* prevails in this headline. It is worth mentioning that this headline and lead are located to the left of the aforementioned “Rambo-like Hussein” caricature. The headline connects the outcome of the ground battle to the political future of the American president. This “hypothetical” swift victory suggested in the headline is believed to “decide” the political future of President Bush. Although the lead attributes its sources to Reuter’s, and to *Ad Dustour*’s correspondent in Washington, it deliberately manipulates and misleads its readers into believing an opposite version of the events. By casting a shadow of doubt on the coalition’s capacity

⁶²*Ad Dustour*, 02/25/A1/C7/headline, lead 2.

to achieve certain victory, the lead speculates on and draws scenarios of the political viability of the American President. In fact, however, it is Saddam Hussein who is facing a dismal fate and the risk of being ousted.

ALLIES FEAR CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- **AL HASHIMI: IT IS IRAQ'S RIGHT TO USE ANY WEAPONS IT POSSESSES**

CAPITALS – NEWS AGENCIES – The Iraqi ambassador to Paris, Mr. Abdul Razaq Al Hashimi, said that it is his country's right to use any weapon it owns to defend itself. On the other hand, the Egyptian retired expert Major Ahmed Abdul Halim considered Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's televised address tacit orders to his forces to use chemical weapons.⁶³

This double-deck headline also implements a feature of war propaganda, namely fear and threat. While the eyebrow superheadline introduces the coalition's fear of an Iraqi chemical attack, the main headline delivers a justified threat (in the words of the Iraqi ambassador) of a future Iraqi chemical attack. The lead expands the headline's theme and invokes the natural right to defend oneself as a validation for Iraq's intention to use its entire defensive means, including non-conventional weapons. Finally, the last sentence of the lead confirms the Iraqi chemical threat in the words of the Egyptian expert.

- **IRAQ IS OUTSTANDING IN NUMBERS AND RANGE ARTILLERY ARE THE KING OF BATTLES**

WASHINGTON – From JIM WOLF – REUTER – So far the artillery proved yet again to be the deadliest of all battles conducted in the 20th century. Prior to the war, Iraq had deployed around 3,100 artillery pieces in Kuwait or close to its borders, which are three times the numbers of artillery deployed by the coalition forces.⁶⁴

This is yet another headline exaggerating the Iraqi military artillery and is positioned immediately below the “Rambo-like-Hussein” caricature. Since the

⁶³*Ad Dustour*, 02/25/A1/C1/headline, lead 3.

⁶⁴*Ad Dustour*, 02/25/A1/C6/headline, lead 4.

information is datelined in Washington and dispatched by the Reuter's correspondent, it is unclear who is doing the distortion here, *Ad Dustour*, or Reuter. However, it could be that the report was diffused by the American military as a tactic to confuse the enemy. At any rate, there is no way of verifying the purpose of this information. *Ad Dustour's* emphasis can be viewed as a self-serving strategy to boost the fading confidence in Iraq's military viability.

Consequently, and with the benefit of hindsight, we must also account for the premises of the American military campaign of exaggerating Iraq's war power, the menace of the Scud missile, the potential of the elite Republican Guards, the sheer size of the Iraqi army (which ranked fourth in the world), and the non-conventional weapons of mass destruction, all of which turned out to be a rather hollow threats. Only within this context, can one comprehend the meaning of this headline and lead, which amplifies Iraq's artillery might.

MASS DEMONSTRATIONS TO CONDEMN THE AGGRESSION

- **POLITICAL AND UNION ACTIVISTS ANNOUNCE FORMING AN ARAB-MUSLIM REGIMENT TO FIGHT THE WAR WITH IRAQ**

AMMAN- *AD DUSTOUR* – Yesterday, various political, union, and popular activists met at the center of the various unions of the Jordanian workforce to discuss the latest developments in the Arab land, in view of the latest American-Zionist aggression on the Iraqi Arab nation.⁶⁵

This headline is another attestation of the propagandist role played by *Ad Dustour*. Notice how the narratives of the headline and lead use rich references such as “Forming an Arab-Muslim regiment to fight the war with Iraq” using highly value-ridden concepts of Arab nationalism, as well as exploiting the sacred feelings associated with being a faithful Muslim. The propagandist objective is magnified when these revered

⁶⁵*Ad Dustour*, 02/25/A1/C6/headline, lead 5.

religious ethos are juxtaposed against the negative and antagonist feeling of alienation and suppression associated with the “latest American-Zionist aggression on the Iraqi Arab nation.”

The narratives of the headline and lead are based on what Nohrstedt & Ottosen (2001) termed as a “motivating logic” that invokes lessons from the past (American-Zionist aggressions) to instigate reasons for acting now (fighting with Iraq), and states the gains to be achieved (saving the Arab nation) and losses to be avoided (subjugation of Islam (p. 21). In cognitive terms, the headline and lead call for action and stir feelings of alienation, belonging and solidarity with Iraq. By invoking common history, and faith the headline urges the Arabs to join forces and defend the honor of the Arab-Muslim nation represented in Iraq, as it is being singled out in an unjustly assault by the American-Zionist aggression.

• **WAR COST COULD AMOUNT TO \$ 90 BILLION**

PARIS – PETRA – Western reports estimated the cost of the Gulf War by the end of next month to be between sixty and ninety billion dollars.⁶⁶

This headline introduces the topic of the cost to conduct the Gulf War. The lead however, datelines the information in Paris and identifies the source as the Jordanian news wire Petra. It is no secret by now that the war expenditure exceeded its original estimate, reaching \$90 billion dollars. The price-tag increase projected in the above report is believed by many to be the operating cost of recruiting conformity to the coalition’s war.

⁶⁶*Ad Dustour*, 02/25/A1/C4/headline, lead 6.

- **BODIES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS CARRIED BY SHIPS TO SEAPORTS IN SPAIN**

MADRID – Special – A Spanish commercial ship, The Teresa De La Mer, arrived at the seaport of Valencia in Spain on the 21st of this month, carrying 15 refrigerated containers filled with bodies of American soldiers killed in the Gulf War.⁶⁷

This headline fits the overall dominant discourse of *Ad Dustour* on this day, which is totally dedicated to forging an Iraqi victory and to depicting the incredible loss of enemy life. The information about “bodies of American soldiers” is used here as a validation and evidence of the previously mentioned slant in *Ad Dustour* towards Iraq. However, the vague term “Special” used by *Ad Dustour* to attribute the source of information datelined in Madrid does not validate the references made in the lead with respect to the Spanish ship that is believed to be carrying the bodies of American soldiers. Therefore, since there is no way of verifying the authenticity of this report, caution must be exercised here in treating the factuality of its information, given *Ad Dustour*’s tendency to distort facts and to manipulate information to advance its own propagandistic interests.

“The Fifth Arab-Israeli War” is the title of *Ad Dustour*’s editorial on this day. It contends that:

“It does not take much for any Arab citizen who has been puzzled, and taken by the sinister American eagerness to conduct this war, and it does not even require any tangible evidence to discern the motives behind it. Only Israel can benefit from all of this bloodletting, wasted resources, and the manipulation of hatred and acrimony. This war can only serve Israeli interests, and whatever is happening can only provide for its well-being. Since the beginning of war, Israel has managed to block every peace proposal that may have ended Arab and American bleeding.”

⁶⁷*Ad Dustour*, 02/25/A1/C4/headline, lead 7.

- ***Ad Dustour*, Thursday, February 28, 1991.**

- **KING HUSSEIN VISITS THE HIGH COMMAND CENTER**

AMMAN- PETRA- King Hussain, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, visited the general military command center yesterday, and met with his high-ranking military officers.⁶⁸

On this date, the front page of *Ad Dustour* is crowded with many headlines and leads that point to the imminence of the end of the Gulf War. This headline occupies four columns and is located at the top right side of the front-page, accompanied by a photograph of King Hussein, sitting at his desk in fatigue uniform, and meeting with his military officers. The headline and lead portray a King who is very much in charge and in control of his destiny, busy fulfilling his duties to safeguard the Jordanian nation against the dangers of war.

CONTINUING THE FIGHT GOES BEYOND THE UN MANDATE

- **AL HASSAN: THERE IS THE POTENTIAL OF USING NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN THE GULF WAR**

AMMAN- PETRA- His highness crown prince, Al Hassan, said that the continuing fighting in southern Iraq is a violation that goes far beyond the UN mandate. In a televised interview with the American network NBC, he also expressed his hope to end the war.⁶⁹

The above four column, double-deck headline is right across from the previous headline and on the top left side of the front page. First, the eyebrow superheadline frames the continuing fight as an infringement of UN directives and then introduces the crown prince's quote that warns against the use of non-conventional weapons. The lead, in turn, lists the context and details the information that led to these statements.

⁶⁸ *Ad Dustour*, 02/28/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

⁶⁹ *Ad Dustour*, 02/28/A1/C5/headline, lead 2.

“THE IRAQI PULL-OUT FROM KUWAIT WAS COMPLETED LONG BEFORE IT WAS ANNOUNCED”

- **BADRAN: THE IRAQI SOIL WILL BE THE GRAVEYARD OF THE INVADERS AND AGGRESSORS**
- **THE NEW WORLD ORDER IS TO DOMINATE AND RULE**
- **WE COLLABORATE AND WORK TOGETHER SHOULDER TO SHOULDER AND THERE IS NO PLACE AMONG US FOR A TRAITOR OR A CONSPIRATOR**

AMMAN – PETRA – Jordanian Prime Minister, Mr. Madar Badran, stated that the Iraqi leadership decided to withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait long before it was publicly declared.⁷⁰

This is the main headline banner of *Ad Dustour*. However due to the severity of the situation, *Ad Dustour* altered its graphical design on this day to accommodate the headlines that it needed to underscore. Thus, this eight-column headline banner appeared just below the two former headlines and picture. To the right, and just below the eyebrow superheadline and main headline, is a one-column photo of the Iraqi Prime Minister. To the left, and across it there is a four-column caricature of a U.N. coffin and two kneeling mourners. To the right of the coffin is a graveyard with a tombstone that reads: “Here in peace rests the League of Nations.” To the left of the U.N. coffin is a tombstone that reads: “Here will the United Nations rest in peace,” and Mr. Bush, who is wearing a Viking helmet is deep down digging the fresh grave. Following this dramatic scene is the eyebrow superheadline that ushers in a new unknown fact (the Iraqi withdrawal) as a quote from the Iraqi prime minister’s statement. The main headline then delivers the main topic, which is a very rhetorical statement/threat made by the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mr. Badran.

Once more, and according to Nohrstedt’s & Ottosen’s (2000) propaganda approach, the Iraqi Prime Minister uses intense symbolic language to deliver his threat,

⁷⁰*Ad Dustour*, 02/28/A1/C1/headline, lead 3.

(as conveyed in the first deck: "The Iraqi soil will be the graveyard"). The powerful and polarized positive and negative distinctions portray the sacred cause of "ours" (Iraqi) against the profane "Other" depicted in the adjectival groupings of "invaders," and "aggressors." The second deck exploits deep emotional values of survival, freedom, and justice and declares that the new world order is "unfair and domineering." To hold out against this evil, the Iraqi people must maintain camaraderie and resolve (a logical consequence); by virtue of their moral righteousness they will defeat the "traitors and conspirators."

Finally, the confrontational hyperbole is used to conceal the Iraqi defeat. The readiness to take action and turn the Iraqi soil into a "graveyard" is a reverse psychology of twisting facts with fiction. The lead, however, sums up and resonates with the overwhelming Jordanian resentment that: "The West achieved all its strategic aims on or even before Aug. 2, 1990, when this present crisis ostensibly began. By then, the oil was already secure in Western hands, Saudi Arabia was protected, and an Iraqi commitment to withdraw from Kuwait was attained" (Abu Jaber, 1991).

THE ALLIES REJECT IRAQ'S ACCEPTANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS AND CONTINUE THE ASSAULT

- **BAGHDAD: MASSES OF SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE BRAVELY DEFEND AGAINST AGGRESSORS**
- **MOSCOW "REJECTS" WHAT'S HAPPENING AND CALLS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION**

UNITED NATIONS – BAGHDAD – AGENCIES: The past twenty-four hours witnessed urgent developments in the offensive war led by the United States and its allies against our brethren Iraq. Yesterday, Iraq announced its unequivocal commitment to fulfill all UN Security Council resolutions and demanded that the Security Council declare a ceasefire to end the war against Iraq.⁷¹

The headline declares Iraq's unequivocal acceptance to abide by the UN resolutions, only to intercept it by a clause referring to the negative act (the U.S. refusal of the Iraqi gesture). The second deck expresses the steadfastness and bravery of the Iraqi soldiers and people and conveys the rhetoric of pride. The third deck introduces the Soviet disapproval of the way the war is progressing and underscores the need to halt the offensive and focus on a political settlement. The lead reiterates the headline and adds some details pertaining to the overall context of events.

- **PLANS TO OCCUPY PARTS OF SOUTHERN IRAQ**

WASHINGTON – NEWS AGENCIES – The American press revealed yesterday American conniving plots that include occupying parts of the south of Iraq. The American *Los Angeles Times* reported that the United States is quietly planning a strategy to induce a coup to remove President Saddam from power by tightening the economic sanctions against Iraq and preventing him from selling oil to get the resources needed to rebuild his country.⁷²

The headline uncovers a plan to occupy parts of Iraq. The lead presents the information datelined in Washington as an unspecified news agencies' contribution. In turn, news agencies trace the source of the information back to "*The Los Angeles Times*." *Ad Dustour* however, uses this information to expose the Americans' heinous intent.

⁷¹*Ad Dustour*, 02/28/A1/C1/headline, lead 4.

⁷²*Ad Dustour*, 02/28/A1/C7/headline, lead 5.

which clearly deviates from the UN's objectives that were set for the Gulf War. There was no questioning, for instance, in the mainstream media of the coalition forces' objectives of hunting down and slaughtering the worn-out and fatigued Iraqi soldiers, who were being chased deep into the southern parts of Iraq.

- **“EVEN PARENTHESES AND EXCLAMATION MARKS ARE DANGEROUS TO NATIONAL SECURITY!”**

OCCUPIED JERUSALEM – Wrote MAGDA AL BATSH – AFP:

Editors of Palestinian newspapers published in the occupied territories confirmed that military censorship has tightened since the start of the Gulf War last January 17. Sources say that the military censor-observer edits their newspapers, and even interferes in the way their headlines are placed and objects to the length of some news reports, as well as the formats of certain news pages.⁷³

The headline and lead aim to expose Israeli claims of Western-style democracy, and discredits what Israel worked so hard to maintain, namely, its image of a society upholding the freedom of speech. However, it is not at all surprising to exercise strict censorship in times of war; after all, it is quite a common practice in dictatorships and in democratic states alike.

On this date, *Ad Dustour's* editorial “Critical Responsibilities in light of the Unremitting Assaults,” reads: “There is no need for us today to speculate about American and Atlantic intentions. Their short and long objectives were revealed especially after these invading forces crossed Iraqi international borders, and occupied some locations in the south, and are in for a long stay.” In short, the editorial calls upon Arabs, Muslims, the Soviet Union, and the whole world, to stand up against the atrocities committed by the American government, and its attempts to dominate the entire world, and enforce its laws on humanity.

⁷³*Ad Dustour*, 02/28/A1/C3/headline, lead 6.

- ***Ad Dustour*, Monday, April 29, 1991.**

- **“WE HOPE IRAQ WILL RECOVER ITS STRENGTH & WELL BEING”**
- **AL HUSSAIN CONGRATULATES SADDAM ON HIS BIRTHDAY**

AMMAN – PETRA – His Majesty King Hussain sent yesterday a well wishing 54th happy birthday telegram, to Mr. Saddam Hussein, President of the Iraqi Republic.⁷⁴

On this date, *Ad Dustour*'s front-page presents two stories about Iraq. The first headline introduces the above double-deck headline of King Hussain's word to Iraq. The second deck specifies the occasion (Saddam's birthday) and the lead gives some detail about the occasion and the King's happy-birthday message.

It is quite significant how much attention Saddam Hussein's 54th birthday attracted. Each of the three newspapers used this occasion to vent their attitudes and remarks of the post Gulf War period. *Ad Dustour*, for instance, seized the moment to underscore the brotherly sentiments throughout, and used this occasion to congratulate the persistence of the Iraqi president who seems very much in control, contrary to reports that predicted his ill fate.

Similarly, the *G&M* spared no effort in exposing a jubilant Iraqi president attending lavish birthday parties and appearing quite in charge. In contrast, the *NYT* described the birthday of the Iraqi president as a solemn occasion and totally downplayed his stay in power by reporting his absence as a sign of his uncertain future, interpreting his absence to his not being in the mood to celebrate.

⁷⁴*Ad Dustour*, 04/29/A1/C6/headline, lead I.

- **IRAQ DENIES RECEIVING WEAPON SHIPMENTS**

BAGHDAD – REUTER – Iraq denied yesterday information mentioned in the British “*Observer*” that Iraq had resumed building its arsenal by receiving shipments in defiance of UN-imposed economic sanctions on Iraq.⁷⁵

This last headline presents Iraq’s denial. The lead elaborates on the information datelined in Baghdad and sourced from Reuter, summarizing the main event in a neutral tone. This is quite a departure from *Ad Dustour*’s usual ideological attempt, for instance, to point out the post-war Iraqi predicament of abject humiliation.

The editorial comment of this day, “The Moment of Truth is Here,” declares the failure of American diplomacy in the Middle East and blames it on the unrelenting position of Israel.

- **Quantitative Findings**

The nine sampled issues from *Ad Dustour* yielded a total of sixty Gulf-War front-page stories, an average of 6.67 stories and twenty-two illustrations per issue. Compared to the *NYT*’s twenty-eight front-page reports, there was an average of 3.11 stories per issue. The *G&M* had twenty-two front-page reports, with an average of 2.44 stories per issue (see Table 4.1 below). The degree of coverage in *Ad Dustour* (sixty) is more than double the totals of the *NYT* and the *G&M* combined (fifty). The nine headline banners in *Ad Dustour* also exceeded both those in the *NYT* (seven), and the *G&M* (seven).

It is also notable that *Ad Dustour*’s news reports were derived predominantly from newswire sources namely the Jordanian Petra, unspecified News Agencies, *Ad Dustour*, Reuter, AFP, and unaccredited reports. Table 4.1 shows thirteen news items sourced

⁷⁵*Ad Dustour*, 04/29/A1/C4/headline, lead 2.

from Petra, fifteen from unspecified News Agencies, eleven news items sourced from *Ad Dustour*, eight unaccredited reports, eight from Reuter, and six from AFP.

TABLE 4. 2 *Ad Dustour's* Front-Page Coverage Of The Gulf War

| DATE | # OF FRONT- PAGE NEWS REPORTS | # OF ILLUSTRATIONS | # OF HEADLINE BANNERS | # OF EDITORIALS | BYLINE/AGENCY TOTAL # 52 | | | | | |
|--------------|---|-----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|-------|------------------|--------|-----|-------------------|
| | | | | | <i>Ad Dustour</i> | Petra | News Agencies | Reuter | AFP | Un- Accredited |
| 15- Jan. | 10 | 4 Photos | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | - |
| 16- Jan. | 4 | 2 Photos | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | 2 | - | 1 | 1 |
| 23- Jan. | 8 | 3 Photos | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 29- Jan. | 9 | 3 Photos | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | - | 2 | - | 1 |
| 30- Jan. | 8 | 3 Photos | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | - | 2 | 1 |
| 13- Feb. | 6 | 2 Photos | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | 1 |
| 25- Feb. | 7 | 2 Photos | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | - | 1 |
| 28- Feb. | 6 | 3 Photos | 1 | 1 | - | 3 | 2 | - | 1 | - |
| 29- April | 2 | - | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| Total | 60 | 22 | 9 | 9 | 11 | 13 | 15 | 8 | 6 | 8 |

Note: News Agencies refer to unspecified agencies.

This study reveals *Ad Dustour's* extensive use of news-agency sources and confirms earlier research findings of *Ad Dustour's* heavy reliance on news agencies in its Middle East coverage (El-Sarayrah, 1991) and its nearly total lack of foreign correspondents (except for one in Washington, and one in Baghdad). This heavy dependence of *Ad Dustour* on news agencies is compatible with the *G&M's* 100% reliance on news-wire dispatches and in sharp contrast with the *NYT* total (100%) dependence on its own correspondents' sources.

However, some inconsistencies in *Ad Dustour's* sources should be accounted for. Firstly, despite *Ad Dustour's* relatively low reliance (23.33%) on Western news agencies (which amounts to fourteen out of sixty reports, distributed as follows: Reuter (eight), and AFP (six)). This is quite significant when contrasted with the twenty-four domestically sourced reports such as the Jordanian news wire Petra (thirteen), or *Ad Dustour* (eleven). Further yet, there are still twenty-three reports with unaccounted for sources; as they were either attributed to an unspecified category of Capitals - News Agencies (fifteen), or unaccredited all together (eight).

In other words, out of the sixty reports, twenty-three are unaccounted for in terms of their sources. If we were to add the number of reports sourced from unspecified news agencies to the number of Western wired reports, the total would be twenty-nine out of sixty, and the percentage 48.33%. By the same token, if we were to assume that the unaccredited reports were probably sourced partly from information obtained from Western news agencies, this would then bring the total of *Ad Dustour's* reliance on non-domestic news sources to thirty-seven out of sixty, or to 61.67%. This 13.34 percentage point increase, while statistically significant, is unreliable given: a) *Ad Dustour's* extensive war reportage, b) the tight military Gulf War censorship measures, and c) the lack of foreign correspondents.

Therefore, it is safe to suggest that perhaps *Ad Dustour* heavily edited the wired-news dispatches and manipulated its sources to conceal its overwhelming dependency on Western news agencies. But since there is no way of verifying the sources, this conclusion remains speculative.

- **The Editorial Discourse Of *Ad Dustour***

The sample yielded nine editorials, all of which were bluntly pro-Iraq, and regarded the Gulf War as yet another “Atlantic-Zionist” attack on the “Arab nation.” The editorials blamed the Gulf War on the hegemonic maneuvers of the United States and its domineering power to establish itself as the only superpower in the emerging new world order. In conforming to the Jordanian government’s position, the editorials also called for a comprehensive strategy to deal with the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict as the only way to end the instability and political turmoil in the region. The unanimity of opinion in *Ad Dustour*’s editorial comment reflects its full endorsement of the Palestinian cause and its support for Iraq’s efforts to defend (in *Ad Dustour*’s view) against a war imposed unjustly on Iraq and the Arabs.

In effect, the analysis of *Ad Dustour*’s editorials was consistent with Mowlana’s (1992) sampling of various Jordanian editorials in the *Triumph of the Image* and was in line with *Ad Dustour*’s Islamic and pan-Arab discourses. According to Mowlana, the Jordanian editorialists described the war as a scenario manipulated for Western ends. In light of Jordan’s geopolitical position in the Persian Gulf, the Jordanian press focused on the Palestine question and on the need to avoid war. Given a position between the crossfire of Iraq, Israel, and the U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia, the Jordanian press highlighted the regional need to avoid bloodshed and a *Jordan Times* editorial posed several questions for the “Western conscience,” such as:

“Why is it when Saddam occupies Kuwait he is called Hitler and when President Bush and his colleagues occupy oilfields in the Gulf they are liberators? When Saddam sends 38 Scud missiles into Israel he is a terrorist, when the American coalition makes over 90,000 sorties in one month and dumps more than 100 thousand tones of explosives, mostly

over Iraqi and Kuwaiti civilian targets, they are champions of justice?" And "Why for the past 40 years, and in spite of all the injustice, torture and humiliation endured by the Palestinians under Israeli rule, has there never been an American human-rights committee to investigate their plight, while barely two months after the Iraqi invasion, a Senate human-rights committee convenes to listen to Kuwaiti testimony against Iraq and the hearings are aired on all the national networks?" (*Jordan Times*, February 26, 1991, cited in Mowlana et al., 1992: 171).

During the Gulf War, *Ad Dustour* along with the rest of the Jordanian press, supported the government's decision and did not question, for instance, the logic of Jordan's monarch's sense of Arabism, which was always quite powerful. One must then accept Mowlana's rationale, and question King Hussain's sense of Arabism during his crackdown and eventual crushing of the Palestinian activism in Jordan in September 1970. By the same token, Mowlana once again calls attention to King Hussain's Arabism that led him to support Arab Iraq and not Arab Kuwait. There were no such conflicting or parallel arguments either in *Ad Dustour* or in the other Jordanian press. Although one assumes that given the significant number of Jordanian expatriates working in the Gulf States and in Kuwait (the enormous monetary contributions of which were vital to the Jordanian economy and interests), one would have expected such dialogue to appear in the press (Mowlana et al., 1992:166-172).

However, it was noticeable from the analysis of *Ad Dustour* that while the Jordanian people were clearly and certainly pro-Iraqi in their demonstrations and discourses, the official line was not so until well after the air offensive in mid-January, 1991. *Ad Dustour's* accounts uncovered the Jordanian government's hesitant standpoint, which did not accept Iraq's appropriation of Kuwait as its nineteenth province and continued to view the Sabah monarchy as the legitimate government of Kuwait.

- **Conclusion**

The objective of this chapter was to grasp the way *Ad Dustour* constructed the narratives of the Gulf War. As a politically independent newspaper, operating within the context of the social-responsibility of the press, the analysis of *Ad Dustour* provides insights that could inform research about the globalization role of the media, the role of national media systems to depict the same events, and the ways in which these events are appropriated into images and interpretations relevant to their unique cultural, linguistic, and ideological predispositions. To understand this, three basic questions were considered. These questions examined the discursive nature of *Ad Dustour*'s front-page headlines and leads, which appeared to be at odds with Western dominant discourse such as the dehumanizing and demonizing of the enemy (in this case the United States and Israel) and the depicting of the Gulf War in religious good vs. evil, and nationalist us vs. them dichotomies.

The textual analysis of *Ad Dustour* also reaffirms previous research findings regarding war-propaganda narratives. For instance, *Ad Dustour* manipulated its entire front pages to advance one dominant narrative by embedding them in various news items. It used a range of referential levels in its graphic design, illustrations, headlines, rich narratives, descriptions and argumentations to support each and every report that appeared on the front page. Therefore, despite the appearance of diverse news items and topics, the context and reasons for war, along with their mythical references and metaphors, worked all together in concert to affirm the ideological position of *Ad Dustour*.

Of the sixty *Ad Dustour* Gulf-War analyzed stories, ten were front-page reports of Gulf-War related peace initiatives. In line with the *G&M*, *Ad Dustour* also kept a regular and diligent coverage of each and every peace initiative or proposed political resolution to the crisis. This was unlike the *NYT*, which deliberately concealed the United States' refusal of reconciliation, totally downplaying all peace and negotiation initiatives in various European and American capitals and cities. In this regard, it is safe to suggest that during the sampled period, *Ad Dustour* did support its government's stand, which was categorically opposed to the "use of force" or the option of a military offensive against Iraq. However, as the war escalated, *Ad Dustour* played a "cheerleading role" to the Iraqi government in order to counterbalance the American media.

In essence, *Ad Dustour's* early attempts to provide a relatively balanced treatment of the conflict were swiftly abandoned once the aerial assault was launched, in favor of hyperbole and of polarized references of revered, or antagonist norms, and values to depict the conflict in us vs. them dichotomy. While heavily engaged in domesticating the Gulf War coverage, *Ad Dustour* used dominant narratives to invoke sacred religious values such as "God Is Great," "Martyrdom," and "Jihad in God's way," as well as the nationalistic discourse of Arab unity and cultural ethos of "pride," and "decency" to create a consensus and mobilize its readers in support of Iraq.

For the most part, *Ad Dustour* played a role in conformity with the Jordanian government. At times, though, it went astray in its exaggerated confrontational discourse that was probably not a true reflection of the official view nor was in the interest of the Jordanian government. Thus, it furthered Jordan's external isolation and at the same time

forged a united domestic front. In its total bias towards Iraq, *Ad Dustour*'s reportage was a reflection of the Jordanian people's (mostly Palestinian) sentiments.

Additionally, amid the intrinsic bias linked to military censorship, and to the extensive reliance on news agencies, *Ad Dustour* was able to recontextualize the pro-Western news it received, appropriating these items to fit the Jordanian setting. *Ad Dustour* was able to maintain its own perspective in its Gulf War reportage mainly through propaganda, heavy editing, revising, and, at times, exaggerating and even distorting the facts.

Another significant finding in this work is to fill a gap in the literature of transnational processes in news journalism. The study of *Ad Dustour* offers a unique and interesting picture of how an independent Jordanian newspaper presented the Gulf War, and gave some indications about how counter propaganda is used to maneuver against the inherent Western dominance of Gulf War reporting. It is plausible to suggest that in the case of *Ad Dustour*, the globalization processes that characterized the Gulf War as a global event were minimal. The power of the global media to hold one global narrative of the Gulf War is challenged here on the basis that the conflict was interpreted differently in *Ad Dustour*. Certainly, the finding of this chapter vividly illustrates how *Ad Dustour* used diverse discursive strategies to resist a) the influence of the global media, b) the bias of the U.S.-based information, and c) the news agenda that was set in Washington. While pointing to uneven globalization effects between center and periphery, this chapter disputes claims about the domineering power of global media (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001).

In closing, *Ad Dustour* appears to have served another function. As an independent newspaper (operating within the theory of social responsibility of the press), *Ad Dustour* has a duty in Jordanian national politics and a regional responsibility to preserve pan-Arab ideology, and to promote the Palestinian character, in addition to its role in the Middle East in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the unity of the Arab world. Hence, at the early stages of the conflict, *Ad Dustour's* Gulf War reportage characterized the Gulf conflict as an inter-Arab matter requiring an inter-Arab resolution. But when this strategy failed, *Ad Dustour* initiated a linkage strategy, making its presentation and content increasingly consonant with the Palestinian question in order to reflect the relevance of the Gulf War to the Arab-Israeli conflict, insisting on the promotion of the view of a comprehensive solution to the Gulf War that would include the Palestinian nationhood.

Chapter 5

Analysis Of Al Ahram's Coverage Of The Gulf War

- **Introduction**

Chapter four presented a textual analysis of *Ad Dustour's* coverage of the Gulf War within the geopolitical context of Jordan. The focus of this chapter will be to position the analysis of *Al Ahram's* coverage within the unique and historical role of Egypt in the Arab world. To fully comprehend the Egyptian experience vis-à-vis the Gulf War, an exploration of its historical, economic, political and social dynamics must be presented first.

- **Egypt - A Historical Overview**

Egypt is an Arab country that forms a strategic bridge joining Africa and Asia. The Mediterranean Sea is to the north, Sudan to the south, the Red Sea to the east, and Libya to the west. Egypt is the most densely populated country of the Middle East; its population has rapidly increased from 16 million in 1933; to 38 million in 1976; to 52 million in 1987; to 56 million in 1990, and to 69 million in 2001. The majority of the population is rural, Islam is the religion of the state, and Arabic is its official language (CIA, World Fact- Egypt, 2001).

The most prominent historical event in contemporary Egypt was the Free Officers' Revolution of 1952, carried out by Gamal Abdul Nasser. Nasser was a strong militant and charismatic leader who institutionalized the role of the military, created an authoritarian one-party state, and implemented agrarian reform and nationalization based on the ideals

of Arab socialism and unity. Among the major accomplishments of the Nasser regime were a) the construction of the Aswan High Dam with Soviet aid; b) the take-over of the Suez Canal in 1956, which led to the 1956 War and the British-French-Israeli Trilateral Invasion of the Sinai Peninsula (also known as Sinai); c) the short-lived Egyptian-Syrian union known as the United Arab Republic (1958-61); d) the “War of Shame”, that is, to the Egyptian participation in the June 1967 war with Israel that resulted in Egypt's loss of the Gaza Strip and Sinai, and e) the so-called War of Attrition along the Suez Canal in 1969-70. Nasser was not just the leader of Egypt; he was the champion of Pan-Arabism and the symbol of Arab unity and nationalism. His death in 1970 was mourned by millions of Arabs around the world (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998).

Anwar al Sadat, the vice-president and one of the first included in the “Free Officers’ Revolution” of 1952, was Nasser’s successor. Sadat established a patriarchal and traditional method of government that relied on clienteles. Among his major achievements were a) early successes in the October 1973 War with Israel that made him a popular hero and boosted the morale of Egyptians; b) the demilitarization of Egypt in favor of the bourgeoisie; c) the 1974 “infitah” or open-door policy after years of alienation and distrust of capitalism and the West; d) his famous visit to Jerusalem in November 1977; e) signing the Camp David Peace Accords in September 1978; and f) the Egyptian- Israeli peace treaty in March 1979.

The peace with Israel brought about massive internal as well as external Arab opposition to the government and resulted in Sadat’s increasing repression of domestic opposition, which in turn led to the cutting-off of Egypt from the rest of the Arab world

and eventually to Sadat's assassination by the Muslim extremist Al Jihad (Holy War) group in October 1981. Upon Sadat's death, Hosni Mubarak, the vice president, took office. Unlike his predecessor, Mubarak followed a policy of gradualism, which meant preserving the positive elements of the former regime while introducing new policies. Mubarak attempted to establish a partnership between the private and public sectors by allowing for more freedom and constitutional reforms, better relations with the West (especially the United States) and was successful in restoring Egypt's position as a leader of the Arab World (*The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, 1998).

On the domestic front, Mubarak was quite tough in his confrontation with the growing number of Muslim extremists, sometimes referred to as fundamentalists. A formidable challenge was posed not only by the political survival of the regime but also by the economic life of the country that relied heavily on tourism and foreign aid.

- **Egypt's Economic Position During The Gulf War**

Egypt has a mixed-system economy where free enterprise operates under government supervision next to the public sector. Two dreadful challenges have faced the Egyptian economy, particularly between 1980-1990. First, was the colossal population growth (estimated at 2.6% year) that put tremendous strain on natural resources. Second, was the huge foreign debt that had threatened to cripple Egypt's economy. The latter was later cancelled, forgiven, or restructured as a result of Egypt's participation and support of the multinational forces in the 1991 Gulf War.¹

¹Egypt's foreign exchange and economy is greatly dependent on tourism income, tolls from Suez Canal, oil revenues and remittances from Egyptians working abroad (2.5 million workers). Also capital grants and loans from Arab states, the United States and the Paris Club (a consortium of 18 Western affluent nations) enable Egypt to implement various developmental and importation projects.

In the late 1980's and early 1990's, Egypt faced a grim economic outlook. The country had an unmanageable foreign debt of US\$18 billion and the population growth was draining the country's resources. While negotiating the rescheduling of its debt-payments, the government was forced to lift or reduce its historical support and subsidies of basic commodities such as fuel oil, gasoline, electricity, flour, and rice. Egypt's Central Bank was required to raise interest rates and reform the foreign investment law as well (Egypt, *A CIA World Fact Report*, 1992).

It is quite obvious from estimating the Egyptian economic situation alone prior to the Gulf War that it was almost unthinkable to conceive of any different political alternative other than that of supporting the United States. The Egyptian Government was approaching a certain economic "if not political demise" had it not been rewarded with immense financial assistance. It is most likely that the Egyptian political decision to support the rich Arab Gulf states against Iraq was largely inspired by its extremely desperate economic state of affairs rather than by any other ideological or political conviction. In retrospect, it made a choice that proved to be rather lucrative and fortunate, unlike its Jordanian counterparts who probably lived to regret an otherwise ill-conceived decision.

- **The Egyptian Press**

For the past 116 years, the Egyptian press has mirrored the modern history of Egypt. It was molded and shaped by every major political and ideological trend of the day. During the struggle for independence, the press was the champion for mobilizing the masses, demanding freedom from the colonial rulers, and spreading awareness about

Western philosophies and democracy. On the eve of the Gulf War, Egypt was the center of Middle Eastern communication with strong journalistic traditions and a relatively free press. Indeed, Egypt had the region's most important film, television and recording industries, as well as the largest publishing industry in the Arab world. All newspapers and periodicals are still under governmental supervision and partial governmental ownership, as are all publishing houses (Dabbous, 1994:60-74).

Unlike broadcast media, print media are slightly more autonomous: through government-appointed editors, "self-censorship" was expected and any deviation from that rule was not tolerated. Sadat used the policy of removing and appointing newspaper editors as a way of controlling dissidence in the press. Although Sadat demonstrated a desire for democracy more than his predecessor regarding a limited press freedom, he did not hesitate at all to pursue strict control when various political parties opposed his policies. At one point, Sadat was particularly fierce against Mohammed Hassanain Haikal, the once-celebrated editor of *Al Ahram* who had opposed the Camp David peace talks with Israel and was creating a fierce opposition to Sadat's policies, especially to those pertaining to peace with Israel.

Sadat reinstated two anti-Nasser outcast journalists (Ali and Mustafa Amin) and authorized Ibrahim Saada, the editor of *Al-Akhbar*, to use the paper for anti-Soviet and Arab propaganda in accordance with Sadat's expulsion of Soviet military experts and the rapprochement policy towards the United States. Sadat used the press efficiently to pave the way towards peace talks sponsored by the US and as a prelude to peace accords with Israel. In order to look good in the eyes of the West in terms of tolerance and democracy, Sadat allowed the founding of a limited opposition press. He also tolerated some

political deviance that voiced its opinion in its own newspapers. For example, he permitted *Al-Ahali* (The Folk) representing the left, *Al-Ahrar* (The Liberals) the political right, *Ad Dawah* (The Call), and later *Al-Ihtisan* (The Adherence) the Muslim Brotherhood, and *Ash-Shaab* (The People) the center-left Labor Party. To keep up with the trend, the government also published its own newspaper *Al-Mayu* (May). At times, these opposition papers, along with official papers, carried investigative reporting that unveiled corruption humiliating to the government. Then again, when the government was threatened, there was no hesitation in shutting down the left-wing *Al Ahli* for disputing Sadat's foreign open-door policies (Dabbous, 1994).

Upon Sadat's assassination by the Muslim Brotherhood, Hosni Mubarak, the vice-president, took over and relaxed his grip on the secular press, but tightened the rope around the neck of the Muslim Brotherhood and its newspaper, *Ad-Dawah* (The Call). Mubarak permitted the New Wafd Party to print *Al-Wafd* (The Mission) and allowed the once-banned Nasserites to put out *Sawt-al-Arab* (Voice of the Arabs). In order to conciliate the rising Islamic awareness and sentiments in Egypt and to channel them in accordance with law and order, the government initiated its own Islamic discourse and set out to publish various Islamic periodicals such as *Al-Liwa-al-Islami* (The Islamic Standard), and *An-Nur* (The Light) by the liberal party.

It is a limited free press, nonetheless, the kind that comes with the controlled mechanism of allowing the opposition press to periodically vent and mobilize its views prior to locking them up again. For instance, the press had a major role in the protection of individual rights and the exposing of police brutality during the 1987 trial of police officers charged with cruelty and the torture of Islamic activists. On the other hand, the

finite influence of the non-official press is due to limited circulation figures. For example, government dailies have a circulation of around one million each in comparison with the opposition press, except for *Al-Wafd*; the rest are all weeklies with limited distribution and significance.

Egypt prior to the Gulf conflict was striving to achieve a significant free and responsible press including that of the opposition. At the time of the Gulf War, it was perhaps at its highest level of freedom since the fall of the monarchy in 1952 (*IPI Report*, July 1983). It is Mubarak who set out to restore limited liberalization suspended by Sadat in 1981 and allowed the opposition press to publish. Currently, five major political parties are allowed in Egypt, each publishing its own newspaper with a circulation of 100,000 or more: *Al-Ahrar* (*Al-Ahrar*, The Liberals, weekly), *Al-Wafd* (*Al-Wafd*, The delegate daily), *Al-Tagamo'a* (*Al-Ahali*, "The Independent," weekly), *Al-Watani* (*Mayo*, "May," weekly), and the Socialist Labor Party (*Al-Sha'ab*, "The People," weekly). Because of a more efficient distribution network, the official newspapers - *Al-Akhabar* "The News," *Akhabar al-Yom* "Today's News," and *Al Ahram* "The Pyramid"- sell many more, between 400,000 and 1 million copies a day and circulate widely outside the nation's borders. There has been a substantial improvement in the circulation of the opposition press, but it is still a limited one compared to the Western World (Dabbous, 1994).

- ***Al Ahram***

The first issue of *Al Ahram* appeared on August 5, 1876. Thus, it is one of the oldest newspapers in the Arab world. Presently, *Al Ahram* owns a sophisticated printing

press that not only prints *Al-Ahram* on a daily basis, as well as all other *Al-Ahram* publications and a number of client newspapers. Among *Al Ahram* publications are: *Al Ahram* International, *Al-Ahram* Hebdo, Advertisements, Pyramid Advertising Agency, Computer Center, Distribution, Subscriptions, Export and Import, Engineering and Projects, Personnel, Accounting, Legal, Medical, Security, Mail, Communications. *Al-Ahram* claims that since its inception, the newspaper has “covered events from an Arab national perspective. *Al-Ahram* has always been a forum for expressing the views and ideas of leading Arab intellectuals and opinion-makers, and through which they could convey the concerns and aspirations of the great Arab nation” (*Al Ahram* Website).

Table 5.1 *Al Ahram*’s Profile

| READERSHIP FIGURES | FOUNDED IN | CIRCULATION FIGURES | COMPANY | READERSHIP PROFILE | NATIONAL RANKING | INTL. RANKING |
|-----------------------|---------------|------------------------|--------------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| - | 1876 | 900,000 (m) | Al Ahram Co. | - | 3 rd | 53 rd |

Sources: Editor and Publisher’s Yearbook, 1998.
<http://www.alahram.com>

- **Analysis Of *Al Ahram*’s Coverage Of The Gulf War**

At the time of the Gulf War, *Al Ahram*, “The Pyramids” was considered to be one of the three largest official newspapers in Egypt with an estimated circulation of almost one million (Dabbous, 1994). It is considered to be semi-official and the most influential and prestigious newspaper in Egypt, one of the few of its kind in the Arab world (Merrill, 1983). In general, *Al Ahram*’s graphical layout fluctuates between six to eight columns, and often the last two columns are reserved for *Al Ahram*’s editorial comment. The

headlines of major events usually appear in the top right columns. In the right and left bottom portions of *Al Ahram*'s front page, one or two advertisements are quite common.

• ***Al Ahram*, Tuesday, January 15, 1991.**

- **COLLAPSE OF PEACE EFFORTS... AMID ESCALATING RISKS OF WAR IN THE GULF**
- **SADDAM MEETS WITH HIS MILITARY LEADERS AND DECLARES: NO GOING BACK AND IRAQ IS READY FOR WAR**
- **IRAQI NATIONAL COUNCIL CONFIRMS ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT**
- **DE CUELLAR: PEACE PROSPECTS ARE VERY SLENDER**

In less than 24 hours, at 9:00 am tomorrow morning, Cairo time, the UN deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait will expire. The risk of war is increasing in the Gulf following the unsuccessful mission of UN Secretary General, De Cuellar, to Iraq, and his announcement that no progress has been made and that there is not much hope for diplomacy either.²

On this date, the front page of *Al Ahram* presents to its readers a total of eleven Gulf-War related stories. First is the above seven-column, multi-deck headline banner, then the three medium-sized (two column) headlines, along with eight-tiny-font, one-column, one-paragraph Gulf War-related headlines scattered around the front page in no particular order and continued in the inside pages of *Al Ahram*.

The main headline (above) announces the failure of all diplomatic efforts and foregrounds Iraq's confrontational and defiant rhetoric. Accompanied by this headline is a three-column Reuter's photo of British soldiers clearing minefields in the Saudi deserts, and getting ready for combat. Like the *NYT*, *Al Ahram* is readying the Egyptians for the prospects of the soon-to-begin Gulf War, almost by appointment at 9:00 a.m., Cairo time. In contrast, the *G&M* and *Al Dustour* were still covering peace initiatives and giving last-minute diplomacy a chance to evade war. Parallel to *Ad Dustour*, however, is *Al Ahram*'s

²*Al Ahram*, 01/15/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

front-page format, which uses headlines covering the front page from side to side, with big, bold, fiery words that jump out at you and grab your attention; to feed you what *Al Ahram* thinks you should know about the events of the day. With no evidential aspects of source, mode, and degree of reliability, this headline and lead present unqualified information that allows *Al Ahram* to be the sole *definer, interpreter and summarizer* of the conflict. The lead also reaffirms the headline and builds upon the mental model of the readers by presenting an insolent and antagonistic Iraq determined to refute the UN, retain a foothold in occupied Kuwait, and even wage war.

Al Ahram's implicit interpretation of a precarious situation is in a seemingly distant, disinterested mode. However, this ostensibly objective stance of *Al Ahram* falls under the *ideological definition* to which van Dijk referred, is only a prelude that falls short of the “us” vs. “them” dichotomy. Nevertheless, it paves the way for a deliberately defined and well thought-out role should the war option win.

- **EMERGENCY MEETINGS IN THE WHITE HOUSE**

WASHINGTON – from HAMDY FOUAD - President George Bush held an emergency meeting with General Colin L. Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff... and another one with National Security officials and advisors.³

This headline is presented in a rather low-key, one-column, small-font-size, and is located to the left of the photograph of British soldiers. The headline introduces the main topic in a flash-like quick reference to the American role in this conflict. In this headline, the White house is the subject of the statement, the one holding “emergency meetings.” The lead paragraph elaborates on the topic, specifies President Bush as the agent, and provides details about the American build-up. It is clear that *Al Ahram* is downplaying

³*Al Ahram*, 01/15/Al/C3/headline, lead 2.

the leadership role of the US in this countdown to a Gulf War that mesmerized the whole world. No reference is made here to the famous and provocative rhetorical exchange between US President George Bush and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

- **IRAQI WITHDRAWAL IS THE ONLY SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE WORLD**

Egypt's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, Dr. Ismat Abdul Majid, announced that Egypt has been seeking a peaceful settlement since the beginning of the Gulf crisis to avoid war in the region. Egypt is still attempting to find a way out to spare the region the perils of war, to stop the aggression, and to prompt an Iraqi withdrawal.⁴

This is another one-column headline and lead that clearly define Egypt's primary role and her continuous efforts to defuse the explosive situation that has been building up since the onset of the Gulf crisis. The headline affirms the "Iraqi withdrawal" as the only solution to the crisis. The lead paragraph reiterates the Egyptian government's numerous attempts to find a way out of this predicament and avoid war by negotiating a peaceful Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The lead depicts Egypt's historical "big brotherly" image as one of tending persistently to its Arab siblings, even to the ones with irredeemable flaws like aggressive Iraq.

- **EUROPEAN NATIONS CANCEL SENDING A PEACE ENVOY TO BAGHDAD**

BRUSSELS – NEWS AGENCIES – The European Community overwhelmingly decided at an emergency meeting with its member governments' External Affairs Ministers not to send any delegation as a last-minute initiative aimed at persuading Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.⁵

This is one of the three medium-sized headlines with a narrative linkage to the UN theme regarding the fading prospects of any diplomatic resolution to the conflict. In this headline and lead, it is the European nations who have decided against any peace

⁴*Al Ahram*, 01/15/A1/C1/headline, lead 3.

⁵*Al Ahram*, 01/15/A1/C1/headline, lead 4.

initiative in the face of the unyielding Iraqi regime. This tacit thematic linkage is a strategy used by *Al Ahram* to depict the entire world as mobilizing on the peace side with a defiant Iraq on the war side. After setting this scenario prominently in its headline banner, *Al Ahram* elaborates this theme in various news reports throughout the front page to validate its postulate that points in one direction; the civilized and peace-loving United Nations is now joined by the European Community who also decided to relinquish its diplomatic efforts due to the unreasonable and unaccommodating position of Iraq.

• **DE CUELLAR IN NEW YORK: SADDAM IS NOT READY TO DISCUSS ANY DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT**

NEW YORK - NEWS AGENCIES – Upon his arrival in New York yesterday, UN Secretary General Javier De Cuellar confirmed in a press conference held at New York airport that he does not believe that Saddam is ready to discuss any diplomatic resolution to the Gulf crisis or withdrawal from Kuwait and that his visit to Baghdad had failed.”⁶

The same linkage narrative continues in this headline which reiterates the information provided in the main headline banner. This recurring theme is used by *Al Ahram* to affirm the script of the *mental model* invoked by the previous headlines. The lead details the disappointed tone in the UN Secretary-General’s intricate remarks upon his return to New York. It evidently frames the story in terms of an overwhelming majority that supports peace and the stubborn Iraq (agent) that insists on making the entire peaceful world yield to its illegitimate capture of Kuwait. No background story or context is offered to the readers to help them understand why Iraq is being so stubborn and uncooperative to all political resolutions to withdraw from Kuwait.

⁶*Al Ahram*, 01/15/A1/C2/headline, lead 5.

- **EGYPTIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: FOREIGN NEWS AGENCIES MISSED THE TEXT OF 'RETURN OF KUWAITI LEGITIMACY' IN THE YEMENI PEACE INITIATIVE**

Sources close to the Ministry of External Affairs mentioned that the official joint statements of President Mubarak and Yemen's External Affairs Minister during his visit to Cairo last Saturday were missing some important segments pertaining to the "return of Kuwaiti legitimacy" from the texts that were carried by news agencies from the Yemeni side.⁷

This unaccredited headline and lead introduce a new topic, which is at the same time a correction to the Yemeni-Egyptian joint statement. The subject of this headline is the Egyptian Department of External Affairs, which claims that the phrase of the "Kuwaiti legitimacy" was missing from the text of the Yemeni statement. *Al Ahram* is eager to call to the readers' attention that the Yemeni delegation has deliberately tempered the joint statement and dropped the "return of Kuwaiti legitimacy" phrase in order to stir confusion regarding Egypt's official stand. Thus, the lead asserts Egypt's crystal-clear position regarding the return of Kuwait to her legitimate rulers. Any perplexity of this sort would compromise Egypt's very intricate role in the Gulf conflict.

- **SIX AMERICAN CARRIERS MOVE TOWARDS IRAQ**

WASHINGTON – NEWS AGENCIES – American Defense officials announced that six American carriers with 450 warplanes will arrive in the region on Tuesday, just hours before Iraq's deadline to withdraw from Kuwait.⁸

This headline introduces the topic and assigns the power to the American carriers. The unspecified news source presents the Washington-dated information in the lead paragraph, which in turn assigns the agency to the American Defense officials to announce that (450 warplanes aboard the American carriers), and define the location and time (in the Gulf region on Tuesday). The lead hints though at their objective by a

⁷*Al Ahram*, 01/15/A1/C4/headline, lead 6.

⁸*Al Ahram*, 01/15/A1/C5/headline, lead 7.

sequential clause (“just hours before...”). To signal its early prediction of the inevitability of war, *Al Ahram* uses this tacit display of force and commitment in the headline and lead. Like the *NYT*, *Al Ahram* is constructing the argument against Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait as an obstruction of international law and order that calls for disciplinary actions. The six American carriers with 450 warplanes are approaching Iraq, just in time for the showdown.

• **NEWS OF LAST MINUTE ALGERIAN INITIATIVE**

PARIS – NEWS AGENCIES – Diplomatic sources in Paris mentioned yesterday that Algerian President, Al Shazily Bin Jidid, is about to leave Algiers for a peace mission to the Gulf.⁹

This is also a tiny one-column headline that introduces the “last minute Algerian peace initiative.” *Al Ahram* downplays this initiative by affording it miniscule front-page exposure. While the lead attributes the intentions of the Algerian president (the peace mission to the Gulf) to unspecified diplomatic sources, the Paris-dated information does not name the news agency either. Therefore, the unspecified news agency together with the unidentified diplomatic sources do not give the report enough credibility to raise any prospects of evading war.

• **SADDAM HOLDS KING FAHED LIABLE FOR ANY IRAQI DEATHS!!**

BAGHDAD – R – In a radio broadcast yesterday, Iraqi president sent a message to the Saudi Monarch, King Fahed Abdul Aziz, holding him accountable for any Iraqi deaths because of lack of medicine and threatened to kill hundreds of Saudis if the war erupts.¹⁰

This is another small, one-column headline that gives the authority to Saddam Hussein to hold the Saudi monarch responsible for “Iraqi deaths.” The lead expands on the topic of the headline and delivers the Iraqi threat in a cause-and-effect sequence (the

⁹*Al Ahram*, 01/15/A1/C6/headline, lead 8.

¹⁰*Al Ahram*, 01/15/A1/C5/headline, lead 9.

Iraqi death will result in Saudi deaths). Remarkably, *Ad Dustour* referred to the same broadcast to frame Saddam Hussein's conciliatory gesture to Saudi Arabia. In contrast, *Al Ahram* uses the event to underscore the vindictiveness of Saddam Hussein. Let's contrast the two headlines and leads:

Ad Dustour:

- **SADDAM OFFERS ADDITIONAL GUARANTEES TO KING FAHED IF HE PROMISES TO PULL OUT FOREIGN FORCES AND REPLACE THEM WITH ARABS**

BAGHDAD - NEWS AGENCIES – in a televised broadcast, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein conveyed to King Fahed, the monarch of Saudi Arabia, a pledge not to attack Saudi Arabia if Riyadh agrees to withdraw American- led coalition forces from the Gulf, and replace them with Arab troops approved by Saudi Arabia.¹¹

The two reports are datelined in Baghdad: one refers to a televised report the other to a radio broadcast. The source is referred to as an ambiguous “R” in *Al Ahram*, and “News Agencies” in *Ad Dustour*; neither, however, specifies which agency.

Al Ahram uses highly evaluative terms such as “liable” in its headline and “accountable” in its lead to call upon the readers' frame of reference based on the concepts of responsibility and accountability. Like the big brother that Egypt is, *Al Ahram* points out Hussein's hypocrisy of making others (Saudi Arabia) liable for his persistent conduct, which will bring hardship and suffering to his people. The story blends in very well with *Al Ahram*'s framing of the conflict in terms of the outlawed Iraq and the disciplinary actions of the UN-community that is left with no choice but to wage war in order to hold Saddam accountable, to reverse the occupation of Kuwait, and to deter others from contemplating the same acts.

¹¹*Ad Dustour*, 01/15/A1/C5/headline, lead 5.

Conversely, the antithetical headline of *Ad Dustour* does not concur with the ominous and intimidating rhetoric of Saddam towards Saudi Arabia conveyed by *Al Ahram*. Rather, *Ad Dustour* portrays Saddam's conciliatory gesture towards Saudi Arabia as a step forward in the peace-making context. In essence, the analysis of *Ad Dustour* revealed a consistent coverage of every slight prospect of peace throughout. Finally, it is worth mentioning that this headline did not make it to the front pages of either the *NYT* or the *G&M*.

- **FRANCE IN A LAST EFFORT PRESENTS A PEACE PROPOSAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A LAST MINUTE DITCH TO AVOID WAR IN THE GULF**

UNITED NATIONS – from *AL AHRAM* correspondent - France unveiled a last-minute six-point peace plan at the United Nations yesterday as a final effort to avoid war in the Gulf. The Iraqi ambassador to United Nations announced that French Foreign Affairs Minister Roland Doumian would visit Baghdad in a last bid to avoid war.¹²

This medium-sized headline about the French peace proposal is located at the bottom front page of *Al Ahram*. The *G&M* also covered the same topic on its front page headline of January 15, 1991: **"France makes late bid for peace, proposal calls for Iraqi withdrawal in exchange for conference on Palestinian issue."**¹³ This one, however, makes no linkage to the Palestinian question. Incidentally, the *NYT* gives the same subject a background treatment, presenting it on page A 12 under the headline: **"France and 3 Arab States Issue an Appeal to Hussein."**¹⁴ Conversely, *Ad Dustour* reports it in its front-page's second headline: **"FRANCE'S BID TO CALL ON IRAQ AND DOUMIAN VISITS BAGHDAD."**¹⁵ The significance of this news report is that

¹² *Al Ahram*, 01/15/A1/C5/headline, lead 10.

¹³ *The Globe & Mail*, 01/15/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

¹⁴ *The New York Times*, 01/15.A12/C1/headline, lead 8.

¹⁵ *Ad Dustour*, 01/15/A1/C1/headline, lead 2.

it offers us a unique insight into how each of the four newspapers domesticated the same event to fit its particular perspective on the issue. On the one hand, both the *G&M* and *Ad Dustour* underscore the French initiative and their coverage gives the impression that peace can still be attainable. In contrast, the *NYT* downplays the proposal in order to emphasize the imminence of war. While *Al Ahram* affords the event decent prominence, it surrounds it with negative reports about the resolve of Saddam Hussein to fight in order to cast shadows of doubts on the effectiveness of the French proposal.

• **FRIGHTENED & HORRIFIED IRAQI FAMILIES FLEE TO REMOTE AREAS**

The latest reports out of Baghdad indicate a mood of horror, anxiety and uncertainty among the Iraqi people and a somber atmosphere of war covers the entire country, which has driven a number of Iraqi families to abandon the capital and cities and seek refuge in remote areas, while others are building cement fortifications in front of their homes to shelter them in case of war.¹⁶

Al Ahram uses unspecified and unverified information mainly to show the Egyptian people that it is Iraqi President Saddam Hussein who is responsible for frightening and terrifying the Iraqi people, who are either fleeing or fortifying their homes with cement. The concept of fortification does not belong to the safety of one's home; neither does the concept of fleeing one's neighborhood and city. These battlefield terms are used by *Al Ahram* to point out Saddam Hussein's recklessness and refusal to abide by the rule of international law. Hence this analogy makes him accountable for safeguarding the interests of his own people, and pressures him to pull out of Kuwait. Or it could simply mean that Iraqis fear an "enemy" who may not spare civilians.

Finally, on this day, the editorial comment of *Al Ahram* entitled "The Day of the Bloody Suicide" blames the escalating Gulf crisis on Saddam Hussein and calls his

¹⁶*Al Ahram*, 01/15/A1/C2/headline, lead 11.

defiant policies “suicidal.” The editor argues that while people have the right to commit suicide, no one leader has the right to drag his whole country and his entire people into a suicide mission, making them victims of his personal ill-fated demise.

• ***Al Ahram*, Wednesday, January 16, 1991.**

- **MUBARAK MAKES LAST CALL TO SADDAM HUSSEIN IN THE REMAINING FEW HOURS BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR**
- **THE DANGERS FACING OUR ARAB NATION AND PEOPLE ARE FAR MORE SERIOUS TODAY THAN THE DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY THE DEMONIC WAR MACHINE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR**
- **IT IS NO SECRET THAT WE SPARED NO EFFORT TO RESCUE PEACE AND WE ARE STILL CONTINUING WITH ALL THE POWERS OF THE NORTH, SOUTH, EAST AND WEST**
- **WE HAVE NO BITTERNESS AGAINST THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND WE WILL NOT HAVE ANY PERSONAL ANIMOSITY AGAINST THE IRAQI PRESIDENT**
- **ONLY THE IRAQI PRESIDENT CAN DECIDE TO SPARE THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND ALL ARABS THE CATASTROPHES OF WAR**
- **I CALL UPON HIM IN THE NAME OF EVERY MARTYR'S FAMILY GRIEVING FOR THEIR LOSS IN THE IRAN WAR**
- **TO PROTECT THE CHILDREN OF IRAQ FROM THE HORRORS OF DEATH AND IMAGES OF DESTRUCTION**
- **I CALL UPON HIM IN THE NAME OF EVERY FATHER AND MOTHER AND CHILD IN EGYPT AND IN THE NAME OF ALL PEOPLE NOT TO DENY THEIR CONSCIENCE AND AWARENESS OF PEACE**

In the final defining hours between peace and war, and in fulfillment of his Arab and international historic duties, President Hosni Mubarak made the last call for Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to put his personal issues aside and rescue peace and his people and the children of Iraq and the families of the martyrs from the horror of war and destruction.¹⁷

On this date, *Al Ahram* presents to its readers five Gulf War-related stories and a photograph of President Mubarak accompanied by a comment that reads: “President Mubarak in his last night’s final appeal to Saddam Hussein to save peace.” First, this colossal (seven-column) headline runs from one end of *Al Ahram*’s front page to the other, along with the photograph, conveying a resolved leader, and giving President

¹⁷*Al Ahram*, 01/16/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

Mubarak the authority to address his nation and to define for them the formidable situation. Second, the headline appears and sounds more like Egypt's act of declaration for the expected Gulf War (identical to *Ad Dustour* on this day), rather than a newspaper headline. Only by situating this headline within Egypt's precarious context can one begin to appreciate the connotation and significance of a peculiar headline like this. Third, only by dismantling the delicate *hierarchical* structure of this *pyramid* (appropriate for Egypt) of topics and themes can one reveal the ideological implications imbedded in it (van Dijk, 1991).

Let's start, therefore, with the first proposition: Egypt's President Mubarak makes a last call to Saddam, a metaphor parallel to the repercussions of life or death, in this case "peace" or "war." Like an emergency doctor who desperately attempts to revive a patient from the brink of death, Mubarak similarly declares to the world that he has exhausted all means and symbolically washes his hands of the Iraqi leader. President Mubarak's conscience is clear and now it is up to a divine authority to grant peace or war, a rather fatalistic approach that strikes a chord in the collective religious awareness of Egyptians and Arabs alike.

Once the guilt factor is eliminated, the next step is to summon into the communal memory the Second World War with all its images of absolute horror and destruction, one that pales in comparison to the apocalyptic devastation expected from the Gulf War. Mubarak reaffirms the perilous situation that calls for Arabs to join forces against the dismal fate that awaits them at the hands of Saddam, complete with unsurpassed suffering, destruction and horror far exceeding the outdated "demonic" war machine of

WWII. Notice the interplay of history, religion, technology and politics in this *mental model*.

In the third proposition, President Mubarak makes a clever distinction between Saddam the politician and Saddam the person, unlike the U.S. official campaign of demonizing Saddam Hussein. President Mubarak uses a disclaimer to the effect “**....WE WILL NOT HAVE ANY PERSONAL ANIMOSITY AGAINST THE IRAQI PRESIDENT**”... [But] equivalent to what van Dijk referred to in the phrase “I don’t mean to sound prejudiced but ...”¹⁸ This statement stands in sharp contrast to the antipathy and the personal/political levels of acrimony that have surfaced between President Bush and President Hussein during their famous rhetorical media exchange.

President Mubarak then holds the Iraqi president personally responsible for what is yet to come in a quite chauvinistic metaphor very common in Arab culture. A male figure in general, and in this case the Iraqi leader, is considered to be the patriarch and the protector of Iraqi society. Thus, he is expected to carry the burden of the fate of his people on his conscience. President Mubarak then proceeds to use a rich emotional discourse that had been common in Egypt since the 1950s and 1960s, when Jamal Abdul Nasser used to deliver hours of poignant speeches to entice the senses and mobilize the emotions of millions of Arabs.¹⁹ Correspondingly, in his rhetoric, President Mubarak claims himself to be a sort of patriarchal protector of the weak and voiceless children, widows and orphans of Iraq and pleads with President Hussein to have mercy and not to

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Nasser had a reputation for talking to his people for hours at a time in lengthy and vociferous speeches that were known to mobilize audiences across the Egyptian borders to the entire Arab World. His charismatic personality was loved by millions of Arabs to whom he spoke in an emotional language that aroused in them pan-Arab pride and pan-Arab sentiments.

take advantage of their misery; that has a very dishonorable connotation in Arab culture and Islam. President Mubarak is inducing in the minds of people the disgraceful abandonment by Iraq's president not just of his people but also, in particular, the widows and orphans of the martyrs' families that he was entrusted to protect.

Then Mubarak asserts himself to voice the cries of the mothers and fathers and children of Egypt, a symbolic interchange of unity between a leader and his people in a message intended for domestic consumption to preempt any notion of dissidence and opposition and to prevent any violent acts of rivalry that would have crippled the Egyptian society, shattered its strong political façade, and compromised Egypt's efforts to regain its Arab leadership role if and when the war against Iraq begins.

- **'POINT OF DECISION' THE DEADLINE PASSED AND PEACE EFFORTS COLLAPSED...WAR WILL START AT ANY MOMENT**
- **FAILURE OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING... DE CUELLAR APPEALS TO SADDAM TO TURN AWAY FROM CATASTROPHE**
- **COALITION FORCES IN COMBAT POSITIONS**

WASHINGTON from HAMDY FOUAD – At 7am Cairo time today, the UN deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait has passed. Six US carriers with 450 warplanes aboard are now taking positions in the waters of the Gulf close to the Iraqi borders. And all international forces are on alert and poised ready to go after the failure of all diplomatic efforts to convince Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait.²⁰

The first deck of the headline introduces the countdown to war “at any moment.” The second deck declares the failure of the Security Council and juxtaposes it with De Cuellar's appeal. The third deck introduces the combat positions of coalition forces as a logical consequence of the first two propositions. The lead paragraph reiterates the previous day's military readiness of the “six US carriers, and the 450 warplanes” and De Cuellar's appeal to reaffirm in the readers' mind Hussein's responsibility for the dreadful

²⁰Al Ahram, 01/16/A1/C3/headline, lead 2.

consequences of war. This headline and lead provide the thematic build-up in support of the lengthy plea of President Mubarak.

In its efforts to conform to official Egyptian policy and to be socially aware of the sensitivities of the Egyptian populace in relation to the deep-rooted hostility and distrust towards the West in general and towards the US in particular, *Al Ahram* spares no effort in legitimizing the use of force against Iraq and frames it as a last resort to deal with Iraq's unwillingness to negotiate a reasonable settlement. In order to circumvent domestic dissent and widespread hostile reactions, *Al Ahram* downplays the American military task and cautiously presents the necessary military measures as part of a collective international response to right the unjust actions of Iraq and to force the aggressor (Iraq) to release its grip on the victim (Kuwait). Basically, these preemptive measures are designed to mute and to curtail Egyptian rival political dissent in a commonly practiced policy of containment against domestic opposition.

- **MISSILES WILL RAIN DOWN ANNOUNCING THE BEGINNING OF WAR**
- **STEALTH FIGHTERS WILL DESTROY RADAR AND MISSILE LOCATIONS**

WASHINGTON – AP – Based on a series of intense interviews with US Defense officials and military analysts for the past five months, the Associated Press sketches the scenario of the first few hours of war against Iraq. It predicts that it will be horrible, but admits that no one could know the outcome.²¹

In total contrast to the previous report that downplays the American role, this headline and lead datelined in Washington, and sourced from AP, offer a preview of what to expect in the wee hours of the war against Iraq. The headline offers an open-ended script of how the war will begin, invoking a mental model in the readers' minds of raining missiles and fighter jets destroying radar installations and missile launchers. In

²¹*Al Ahram*, 01/16/A1/C3/headline, lead 3.

turn, the lead explains the topic, and traces the source of information to “US Defense officials,” and “military analysts.” While it describes with certainty the “horrible” beginning of the war, it leaves its outcome open to personal speculation.

• **JORDANIAN OFFICIAL: SYRIA DEPLOYED FORCES NEAR GOLAN HEIGHTS**

AMMAN – R – A Security official in Amman said that Syria has deployed its military forces and artillery near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and that Syrian forces are on high alert to counter any Israeli participation in the Gulf War.²²

This story is datelined in Amman, and filed by “R,”²³ but oddly enough was not reported in the front pages of *Ad Dustour*. It is a significant piece that has a number of implications. First, by this time, the war has not yet begun and positions of Arab countries such as that of Syria were not officially publicized, so this came at a time when enormous efforts were being made to persuade Israel to stay out of this conflict. It is no secret that there has always been a high degree of distrust, suspicion and hostility among various Arab countries, namely between Syria and Jordan. Syria and Iraq, Syria and Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Egypt ... etc. The significance of the news event is to send Israel a strong message that any interference in the Gulf crisis will not be tolerated and will have grave repercussions, which is in line with Syria’s historical antagonistic policies against the imperialist “West and the Zionist United States.” But what is quite surprising is the fact that Syria ended up siding with the US-led coalition against Iraq. Jordan, which was always the moderate pro-Western regime, ended up in a rival camp. Perhaps Syria

²²*Al Ahram*, 01/16/A1/C5/headline, lead 4.

²³I’m not sure if it stands for Reuters.

preferred to join hands with the imperialist West rather than to support its distasteful neighbor, Saddam's Iraq.²⁴

- **SADDAM IN ISOLATION AND MOVES AMONG 54 HIDEAWAYS: IRAQI MORALE HITS ROCK BOTTOM**

Reports coming out of Baghdad confirmed that the morale of the Iraqi people hit rock bottom after the expiration of the UN deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and the Iraqi National Council's decision to support Saddam's annexation of Kuwait and the option of war.²⁵

In this headline, Saddam is the subject; the one who is in hiding and the low Iraqi morale is the object. In the headline, *Al Ahram* frames Saddam as the criminal outlaw wanted by all the good forces of the world; the script continues to depict him hiding in 54 different places, a mental model that reminds the *Al Ahram* readers of criminal pursuits and escape from justice and contrasts this image with the somber mood of the Iraqi people. The lead, on the one hand, reinforces the causal relationship of the Iraqi mood that hit rock bottom and the expiration of the UN deadline, with the Iraqi National Council's decision to support Saddam's annexation of Kuwait, on the other.

Again, the lead attributes its information to unspecified reports that cannot be validated, so the information here can only be treated speculatively.

Lastly, there is no editorial in *Al Ahram* on this day.

²⁴Not to mention the lucrative rewards to be collected for good behavior and obedience.

²⁵*Al Ahram*, 01/16/A1/C2/headline, lead 5.

• *Al Ahram*, Wednesday, January 23, 1991.

- **MUBARAK: IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT IS A MUST FOR CEASEFIRE TO CONVINCE THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO STOP THE WAR**
- **EGYPT IS A LEADING COUNTRY IN THE REGION AND CANNOT BE BUT FIRM IN OPPOSING THE UNLAWFUL CAPTURE OF KUWAIT**
- **THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN SUDAN ARE STAGED AND ANY ASSAULT ON US FROM SUDAN WILL COST THEM DEARLY**
- **The president in a press conference yesterday:**
- **IF WE AGREE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF OCCUPYING LAND BY FORCE HOW COULD WE THEN PERSUADE ISRAEL TO ABANDON ITS OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES?!**
- **THE IRAQI MISSILE ATTACK ON ISRAEL IS ONLY FIREWORKS AND IS AIMED AT DRAGGING EGYPT, SYRIA AND THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD**

After his meetings, and in a press conference yesterday, President Hosni Mubarak announced that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait, since without a withdrawal we will never be able to persuade the international community to stop the war. The President said how could we propose a ceasefire today, and who will listen and who will trust it? He added that a ceasefire prior to Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait would be against Security Council resolutions.²⁶

On this date, *Al Ahram*'s front page presents six different Gulf War issues to its readers, all under the above three-deck, seven-column, headline banner, and two three-column kicker subheadlines. In the middle of the headline banner is a three-column-photo of President Hussein that reads: "President Mubarak in a press conference about the latest developments." A few paragraphs down is an AP picture of "a rescued Israeli elderly man from the debris of his home in Tel Aviv after last night's Iraqi missile attack on Israel."

The first deck of the headline banner reads again like a lengthy declaration of the Egyptian government's policy vis-à-vis the Gulf War. It introduces the topic of President Mubarak's statement that only an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait can bring about a ceasefire and can convince the world community to halt the war.

²⁶*Al Ahram*, 01/23/A1/C1/headline. lead 1.

The second deck should be viewed within the context of Egypt's relentless efforts to regain its leading role in the Arab world, a role that was lost after Sadat signed the Camp David Peace accords. The framing of Egypt's role in the Gulf War as the beholder of international law and order is the result of a deep conviction that Egypt was the champion negotiator on behalf of the Palestinians and that it went to great lengths to regain the latter's occupied territories from Israel. This is a counter campaign to contain the linkage strategy of the Gulf War and the Palestinian question that was constantly made by the rival camp of Iraq, the Palestinians, and, to a certain extent, Jordan.

The third deck delivers a threat to neighboring Sudan and warns that any meddling with Egypt shall not be tolerated. The first kicker subheadline underscores the previous day's statement given to journalists by President Mubarak. The second kicker introduces President Mubarak's legitimizing logic that argues against the contradictory nature of the Iraqi occupation and judges it against the Israeli one. The last deck exposes the Iraqi attempts to provoke Israel and drag it to war, which would probably pull the entire Arab nation with it.

Mubarak's last statement hints at the historical role of Egypt to safeguard the well-being of the entire Arab world. For Egypt, the ideology of Arab nationalism is intertwined with the memory of Nasser who called for the unification of the Arabs through revolutionary nationalism and socialism and mobilized the masses throughout the Arab world against Western imperialism and Zionism. Sadat, however, "de-Nasserized" Egypt in the 70's and diminished the entire ideology, setting out on an opposite course of full-blown capitalism and peace with Israel. Mubarak, on the other hand, preserved the accomplishments of Sadat in terms of Westernization, peace with Israel and the famous

open-door policy, but revived certain aspects of Nasserism pertaining to Egypt's leading role in Arab politics especially during the Gulf War.

- **A THIRD IRAQI ATTACK ON ISRAEL KILLS 5 AND INJURES 70**
- **PATRIOT MISSILES INTERCEPT IRAQI MISSILES OVER SAUDI ARABIA**

TEL AVIV/RIYADH – NEWS AGENCIES – For the third time, Iraq launches a Scud B missile against Israeli. The Iraqi Scud missile was able to evade two American Patriot air-defense systems and slammed into a Tel Aviv suburb.²⁷

The headline together with the photograph of an injured Israeli man introduces the topic of the Iraqi attack on Israel in a particularly disinterested, cause-and-effect tone, only to contrast it in the second deck with the success of the Patriot missiles over Saudi Arabia. The lead credits the Tel-Aviv-and Riyadh-dated information to unspecified news agencies and offers details pertaining to the circumstances of the Israeli assault. Contrary to the euphoric reporting of the same event in *Ad Dustour*, *Al Ahram* downplays the incident and mutes its repercussions to avoid stirring and rallying Egyptian popular emotions. This was particularly challenging to the Egyptian government since it was desperately working to present to the world with a unified and strong Egypt, and to prove that the Egyptian house was in order, capable of resuming a trustworthy leading role in the Arab world.

- **IRAQ DESTROYS OIL REFINERIES IN KUWAIT**

RIYADH - NEWS AGENCIES – An American military spokesperson announced that there is a clear indication that Iraq is destroying Kuwaiti oil refineries and affirmed that satellite pictures show that Iraq is torching two Kuwaiti oil refineries, as well as the Al Wafra oilfield near Kuwait's border with Saudi Arabia, 30 kilometers away from the Saudi Al Khafji region.²⁸

In this headline, Iraq is the one that is destroying the oil refineries in Kuwait. The

²⁷*Al Ahram*, 01/23/A1/C1/headline, lead 2.

²⁸*Al Ahram*, 01/23/A1/C4/headline, lead 3.

lead attributes the information to unspecified news agencies and traces the information to an American military spokesperson. The reader of this news report is inclined to believe the story was validated on the basis of satellite pictures. In this headline and lead, *Al Ahram* is accusing Iraq of “eco-terrorism,” which is another frame widely adopted in the Western media and is being transferred here into Egypt’s *Al Ahram* by unspecified news agencies.

- **CHENEY PREPARES AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION FOR THE GROUND BATTLE IN THE GULF**

WASHINGTON – WBA – Defense Secretary, Richard Cheney embarks on a daily public-opinion TV campaign, during the same time that he manages the war in the gulf.²⁹

This headline gives the US Defense Secretary the power and the authority to prepare the “American public” for the “ground battle.” The lead evidently gives Secretary Cheney the agency to accomplish two objectives of the same importance. First, he embarks on a TV campaign, and second, he manages the Gulf War. The lead in a peculiar way suggests that managing public opinion during the war is equally important to conducting the battle itself.

- **SYRIA APPEALS TO SADDAM TO WITHDRAW OR RESIGN TO SPARE IRAQ’S DESTRUCTION**

DAMASCUS – R – Syria appealed to President Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait because he is driving his country off the cliff. The official Baa’th newspapers asked President Saddam Hussein to be brave and to take the decision to withdraw to save whatever can be saved of Iraqi soil.³⁰

In this headline and lead the subject is Syria, which is “appealing” to the “protagonist” Saddam and urging him to either “withdraw” or “resign” for the sake of the collective good of Iraq. The headline touches on the legitimacy and primordial politics

²⁹ *Al Ahram*, 01/23/A1/C3/headline, lead 4.

³⁰ *Al Ahram*, 01/23/A1/C3/headline, lead 5.

that are still common in the Arab world. The lack of legitimacy plagues all the rulers of the Arab world and their primordial politics guards them against being held accountable by the people they rule. This blurring is so intense and intertwined in the Arab world that, for instance, Mubarak becomes Egypt and Egypt becomes Mubarak, and Syria's Assad becomes Syria, and the same is true for the rest of the Arab leaders.

Therefore, it is within the context of the cultural reservoir of Arab duty and honor to protect the voiceless and to free the oppressed [Iraqi people] that this appeal from Syria urges Saddam Hussein to be brave. In a sense, for an Arab leader to be brave requires an enormous amount of courage and selflessness in order to abandon his egocentric policies and to put the well-being and interests of the people first.

• **PARTIAL LOAN WAIVER FOR EGYPT AND POLAND**

PARIS – A SH A- The big Seven Industrial countries have agreed to waive part of Egypt's and Poland's loans due to the special circumstances that these two countries are going through. The terms to reschedule their loans will be discussed at the Paris Club that includes members of major public-loan donor-countries. France has proposed to forgive 40% of the total loan amount, whereas other countries wanted 33%.³¹

The subject of this headline is the partial forgiving of Egypt's and Poland's debts. The lead gives the Big Seven industrial countries the power to waive part of Egypt's and Poland's loans. It cites special circumstances as the reason behind this act, but does not elaborate as to what exactly triggered this display of generosity. It is unclear, however, if *Al Ahram* is tacitly linking this economic reward to Egypt's political strategy in the Gulf War.

There is substantial evidence suggesting that perhaps Egypt's economic position was the decisive factor in siding with the coalition. For only in September 1990, did

³¹*Al Ahram*, 01/23/A1/C4/headline, lead 6.

President George Bush propose that the United States could forgive Egypt's approximately US\$7 billion military debt if Egypt supported the US during the Gulf War (which was later endorsed by Congress). This was quite a generous (but self-serving) gesture that relieved Egypt of yearly repayments amounting to more than US\$700 million. In October 1990, the World Bank had estimated that Egypt would lose US\$2.4 billion in remittances from workers in Iraq and Kuwait, US\$500 million from the loss of exports to Iraq and Kuwait, US\$500 million from tourism, and US\$200 million from the loss of Suez Canal tolls. Furthermore, the Egyptian minister of international cooperation assessed that Egypt would need an additional US\$900 million to support the needs of Egyptians relocated from Iraq and Kuwait.

Consequently, Canada, several EEC member states, and the Persian Gulf countries along with Saudi Arabia followed suit with the United States and also forgave Egypt's debt obligations. By early November 1990, the total debt cancellation stood at about US\$14 billion. Additional assistance was to come Egypt's way. In an attempt to compensate and jump-start the Egyptian economy, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (together with several European Economic Community [EEC] member nations) promised in December, 1990 a sum of US\$1.5 billion, together with several European Economic Community (EEC) member nations to help ease the pressure on the economy, but funds were slow in arriving (*The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, 1998).

In line with *Al Ahram's* front-page reportage, the editorial entitled "Today and not tomorrow," holds Saddam Hussein responsible for the Gulf War. The editor builds his case by stating that whenever problems are not resolved immediately they snowball into a more complicated dilemma. The editor refers to the Gulf War as a case-in-point and he

asserts that the trouble was mainly to figure a way to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. But now we are facing an equally urgent and dangerous situation and that is how to protect the Iraqi and Kuwaiti people from the devastation of a war that had begun due to Saddam Hussein's total disregard to the law and order of the world community.

• ***Al Ahram*, Tuesday, January 29, 1991.**

On this date, the front page of *Al Ahram* presents three Gulf-war related issues, one photograph, and no headline banner.

- **100 OF IRAQ'S PLANES NOW IN IRAN; SPECULATION OVER THE INCREASE IN THEIR NUMBER**
- **MORE IRAQI PLANES ARE EXPECTED AND IRAN CONFIRMS ITS NEUTRALITY**
- **ALLIED WARPLANES CONTINUE PRECISION SHELLING AROUND BASRA AND KUWAIT**

LONDON – NEWS AGENCIES – British military sources confirmed the flight of 100 Iraqi military cargo planes to Iran in the past three days.³²

To the right side of the third deck of this headline, there is an AP photo of “American tanks and troops getting ready for the ground battle to liberate Kuwait.” It is worth noting that the subject of this headline and lead was also the focus of the *NYT* and the *G&M*, but had no reference in *Ad Dustour*. The first two decks of this multiple headline present the subject of the defecting Iraqi planes to Iran. The third deck introduces a new topic, which is the precision bombing of the allied warplanes. So far, *Al Ahram* is avoiding the display of any blatant US supremacy and presents the meticulous shelling as a collective effort of the “allied” forces to suit local sensitivities and tailor them for local consumption.

³²*Al Ahram*. 01/29/A1/C1/headline. lead 1.

- **NEW IRAQI MISSILE ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA AND ISRAEL**

RIYADH – NEWS AGENCIES – Iraq launched its Scud missiles again on the Saudi capital Riyadh and Israel. Military sources in Riyadh said the missile was intercepted in the southern part of Riyadh and the number of Scud missiles that fell on Saudi Arabia has reached 26.³³

The subject of this headline is the renewed Iraqi missile attack on Saudi Arabia and Israel. The lead offers details pertaining to the interception of this missile and confirms that 26 Scud missiles had fallen so far in Saudi Arabia.

Contrary to the patriotic and euphoric tone of each and every Scud missile attack reported in *Ad Dustour*, *Al Ahram* reports on these assaults in a seemingly low-key, neutral tone, as part of intricate act of balancing the delicate and complex domestic scene that *Al Ahram* is so conscientiously trying not to provoke.

- **SUCCESS OF MILITARY OPERATION TO SLOW OIL SPILL INTO THE GULF WATERS**

DHAHRAN – NEWS AGENCIES – Industrial sources in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, have mentioned that Allied forces' military operations have succeeded in slowing the oil spilling into the Gulf waters, but did not stop it, and added that the oil is now flowing intermittently.³⁴

The same containment strategy that was implied by *Al Ahram* in the previous report continues here too. *Al Ahram* diligently downplays any news event having the potential to mobilize Egyptian dissidence. Also, *Al Ahram* totally refrains from publishing any report that might in any way reflect negatively on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or any other Gulf State, not to mention the US-led coalition forces. It is evident that the objective of the above headline is to illustrate that a) not much damage has been done to the Gulf waters, and b) due to the quick intervention of the military, any further oil spill

³³*Al Ahram*, 01/29/A1/C3/headline, lead 2.

³⁴*Al Ahram*, 01/29/A1/C3/headline, lead 3.

was prevented. Notice the unspecified “allied forces’ military operations” is used here deliberately to put the leading US role in the background.

Al Ahram’s editorial comment on this day is about neighboring Sudan and echoes President Mubarak’s earlier sharp criticism of that country’s leadership. The editor disapproves of the Sudanese leader and condemns his policies in the Gulf War, especially his support for Saddam Hussein.

• *Al Ahram*, Wednesday, January 30, 1991.

- **ALLIES FLY 2,600 AIR RAIDS OVER REPUBLICAN GUARDS’ UMM-QASSR NAVAL BASE, KARKOUK AIRPORT, AND TV STATION**
- **A GROUND OPERATION DESTROYS A LONG IRAQI MILITARY CONVOY OF IRAQI ARTILLERY, TANKS AND FRONT BUNKERS IN KUWAIT**
- **ALLIES RESTRUCTURE THEIR POSITIONS TO GET READY FOR GROUND WAR**

Allied aerial forces destroyed Iraqi Silk Worm missile battery launch pads and bombed the naval base in the town of Umm Qassr, Karkouk airport, and TV station. The allied forces also destroyed a military convoy of 24 Iraqi tanks and transport armors, and continued its intense air raids on the Republican Guards and other targets in the Iraqi city of Basra in 2,600 sorties within the past 24 hours.³⁵

On this date, the front page of *Al Ahram* presents six different Gulf War stories to its readers under the above three-deck headline banner. The first deck of the headline introduces the intense day of 2,600 air raids. The second recounts the destruction of Iraqi military targets and the third describes the readying for the ground battle.

Despite the challenges of treating an unaccredited report such as this one, few aspects of the headline can be verified by simply comparing it to the other three newspapers. Evidently, the *G&M*’s front-page headline did not report on the air raids,

³⁵*Al Ahram*, 01/30/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

but on “US offers Iraq ceasefire.” In contrast, *Ad Dustour* and the *NYT* reported the 2,600 air raids in parts of their front-page headlines. However, the 2,600 missions reported on in the *NYT* did not mention the striking of any specific military targets as was revealed in *Al Ahram*’s first deck. But the reports of the hitting of the Iraqi military convoy in *Al Ahram*’s second deck were verified in the subsequent paragraphs of the *NYT* news report. While *Ad Dustour*’s headline confirmed the 2,600 air raids, the discrepancy between *Ad Dustour* and *Al Ahram* reports was the concealing of the “hitting of civilian targets”³⁶ as opposed to the military targets identified here (in *Al Ahram*) and verified in the *NYT*. As for the interpretative framework, *Al Ahram* uses this information in a unique way to emphasize the international character of the military task. While consistently muting the leading role of the United States in the Gulf War in order to curtail domestic opposition and dissent, *Al Ahram* underscores Egypt’s participation in this UN-sanctioned warfare, and plays down its alliance with the US in order to avoid stirring up domestic sensitivities.

• **DOWNING OF IRAQI MIG 23 WARPLANE AND DESTROYING BATTERY MISSILE LAUNCHERS**

RIYADH – PARIS – NEWS AGENCIES – American military spokesman in Saudi Arabia last night announced that coalition forces had hit a new Iraqi Mig 23 airplane, as well as two Silk Worm naval-missile battery-launch pads and had attacked the Iraqi base in Umm Qassr.³⁷

This headline is positioned on top of a two-column Reuter photo of a tank that reads: “American artillery fires towards Iraqi positions in occupied Kuwait.” By setting this headline together with the picture, *Al Ahram* reports the downing of the Mig as a symbol of the collapsing Iraqi might. The lead attributes the sources to unspecified news

³⁶*Ad Dustour*, 01/30/A1/C5/headline, lead 1.

³⁷*Al Ahram*, 01/30/A1/C2/headline, lead 2.

agencies, which datelined the information in Riyadh and Paris respectively, to perhaps appear more credible. The downing of a Mig 23 warplane has a special significance to the pan-Arab collective memory. The Soviet-made Mig warplanes represent the first-ever Arab victory (albeit short-lived) achieved by the supremacy of the Egyptian and Syrian Mig warplanes in the early battles of the 1973 war against Israel. Hence, the downing of the Mig characterizes the fall of what was once perceived as the Arab unity and might, which is being shattered by the Gulf War.

- **ALLIED FORCES CLOSELY MONITOR MOVEMENT OF IRAQI PLANES IN IRAN AND PLEDGE TO ATTACK ANY RETURNING JETS TO PARTICIPATE IN WARFARE**

WASHINGTON – NEWS AGENCIES - American officials said coalition forces are closely monitoring the Iraqi warplanes fleeing to Iran and they find the Iraq – Iran cooperation over the planes truly puzzling.³⁸

This report also received a foreground treatment in the *NYT*. Interestingly, in *Al Ahram*'s version of the story (and in the third column), the report states that the Iranian council to the UN, Mr. Kamal Kharazi, has declared Iran's neutrality and has confirmed that after questioning detained Iraqi pilots it was clear to them that they were fleeing to save their lives and their planes. But he did not comment on reports that this might be a prearranged move. This is, for instance, the selective context given in *Al Ahram* to the story of the fleeing Iraqi planes to Iran with, however, no reference to the great puzzlement that it reportedly caused (in the *NYT*). The US apparently had difficulty comprehending the rapprochement policies of Iraq and Iran (two enemies that had fought a decade-long war not long before), which had become allies in the name of Islam in

³⁸ *Al Ahram*, 01/30/A1/C3/headline, lead 3.

order to defeat the (crusade) invasion against Iraq. In contrast, the *NYT* offered an explanation for this bewilderment in its “continued on page A8” segment:

[When] asked about the planes in an interview Monday night by Peter Arnett of CNN, Mr. Hussein replied: “Iraq and Iran are neighboring Muslim countries, and regardless of the circumstances of the past”- a reference to the eight-year war fought by the two countries ending in 1988- “they both see the confrontation here as a battle between faith and the infidel.”³⁹

Radical Islam has always been a decisive factor in the internal politics of Egypt, especially during the Gulf War where religious sentiments were running high within the domestic opposition to Egypt’s active military participation in the Allied coalition. Therefore, *Al Ahram* is overly vigilant to censor any coverage of such an explosive issue, which has the potential of bringing Islam to the heart of the Gulf War. So in total conformity with the official line of the government, *Al Ahram* thoroughly attempts to keep Islam out of any Gulf War discussion in order to neutralize efforts made by Muslim extremists to mobilize against the government, and to avoid the risk of having to discuss it publicly on the front-pages of *Al Ahram*.

• **BUSH COMMANDS THE LEADERSHIP OF MUBARAK
AND EGYPT’S CHIEF ROLE IN THE REGION**

WASHINGTON – from HAMDI FOUAD – US President George Bush received a letter yesterday from President Hosni Mubarak regarding the Gulf situation and the developments in the Middle East.⁴⁰

In this headline, President Bush has the authority to “command Mubarak’s leadership,” and the power to acknowledge the value of “Egypt’s role in the region.” The lead gives more information regarding the continuous American-Egyptian cooperation policies. This can be interpreted by *Al Ahram*’s readers as Egypt’s reward for playing by

³⁹*The New York Times*, 01/30/A8/C3.

⁴⁰*Al Ahram*, 01/30/A1/C4/headline, lead 4.

the rules of the great powers, a patting on the shoulder that signals approval and content. On the political home front, it can be viewed as a major step in boosting international confidence in Egypt's credentials (in the eyes of moderate Arabs), a testimony that Egypt has prevailed, and is worthy of regaining its leadership role in the Arab world.

- **THE OIL SPILL IN THE GULF HAS STOPPED AND THE FIRES ARE LESS INTENSE**

American Defense Department – The Pentagon said the crude-oil spill in the Gulf has slowed down and General Tom Kelly, one of the top officials of American Defense, announced that the flow of oil stopped after a military operation targeted to cut off oil-pumping pipelines at Al Ahmadi Seaport in Kuwait.⁴¹

The headline introduces the topic of the oil spill and announces that the “spill has stopped” and that the fires were put out. The lead attributes the sources to the American Defense Department and reiterates the information, while adding pertinent details (who, what, why, where) in such a way as to acknowledge the smart American operation that was able to cut off the flow in the oil pipeline. This narrative strategy is used frequently by *Al Ahram* to bring out the positive attributes of the American role in the Gulf War. Notice, for example, the connotation that *Al Ahram* induces in its reader's minds: that the Americans are helping clean up the giant oil spill that was caused by Saddam, in the same way that they are helping the Arabs to rid Kuwait from Saddam's tyranny and menace. On the other hand, there is no mention in *Al Ahram* (front page) of the thousands of refugees flocking to the borders of Jordan that are reported in *Ad Dustour* on this day, nor for that matter, any talk about the mistreatment of Egyptian refugees stranded in the desert on a no-man's land by Iraqi authorities who are reportedly avenging the Egyptian

⁴¹*Al Ahram*, 01/30/A1/C3/headline, lead 5.

rival participation in the Gulf, according to eyewitness accounts reported in both the *NYT* and the *G&M*.

- **A COMPREHENSIVE BRITISH PEACE PLAN TO SOLVE MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS**

LONDON – from MOHAMMED AL HENAWI – Sources confirmed the news in London that the British government started preparing for a comprehensive peace plan that would deal with all issues in the Middle East as soon as the war to liberate Kuwait ends.⁴²

This headline introduces the post-Gulf War prospects of a British comprehensive framework to deal with conflicts in the Middle East. The lead attributes the London-dated information to unspecified sources, without indicating exactly which problems the British have in mind. It is believed that this is a British attempt to calm down rising concerns about post Gulf War-Middle Eastern predicaments, and most likely, *Al Ahram* is reporting it to counterbalance the rival Gulf War-Palestinian linkage strategy. By offering the British commitment in the Middle East as an alternative to the rival camp's linkage policy, *Al Ahram* is able to curtail domestic concerns and to offer a viable Middle Eastern solution (without naming the Palestinian question) only after the liberation of Kuwait. Interestingly, this report was missing in the front pages of the other three newspapers.

There is no editorial comment in *Al Ahram* on this day.

⁴²*Al Ahram*, 01/30/A1/C4/headline, lead 6.

• ***AL Ahram*, Wednesday, February 13, 1991:**

- **MUBARAK DISCUSSES WITH GENSCHER THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KUWAIT LIBERATION WAR AND THE EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE DEBT BURDEN AS WELL AS THE COLLATERAL RELATIONS**
- **Upon ending an official meeting held yesterday, the German foreign Affairs Minister said:**
- **WE ARE READY TO RESOLVE EGYPT'S ECONOMIC TROUBLES**
- **GERMANY WILL RALLY THE PARIS CLUB TO REDUCE EGYPT'S DEBT**
- **A COLLATERAL COOPERATION COMMITTEE WILL CONVENE IN BONN WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS**
- **EGYPT ASSUMES A LEADING ROLE IN THE REGION**

President Hosni Mubarak received yesterday Mr. Hanz Dietrich Genscher, Germany's Foreign Minister, and exchanged with him reports about the latest developments in the Kuwait liberation war, the efforts to reduce Egypt's loan burden, and the means to support all aspects of the collateral cooperation between the two countries.⁴³

On this date, *Al Ahram* dedicates its headline banner to the German-Egyptian mutual talks. This multiple headline has one main deck, an eyebrow superheadline, and four kicker subheadlines. Beneath the headline banner, and to the left side of the kicker subheadlines, is a three-column photo of President Mubarak's meeting with the German Foreign Minister.

Obviously this is another *pyramid* sort of headline that *Al Ahram* uses to project the government's official directives on the Gulf War. Notice the headline starts by outlining the benefits of the astute policy of the Egyptian government in the Gulf War, and promises more to come. It lists President Mubarak's accomplishments in tangible and meaningful ways to improve the Egyptian peoples' quality of life.

Before we start to tackle the topics of this complex headline, which are arranged according to their degree of significance and relevance, notice the introduction of a new frame in the headline: "**THE KUWAIT LIBERATION WAR**" in reference to the

⁴³*Al Ahram*, 02/13/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

ground war. It is fascinating to see the end product of news from various news agencies being custom-tailored for the much-needed feel of the crevices of a certain culture and society. In the same way *Ad Dustour* referred to the “Scud” missile as “Al Hussein,” here *Al Ahram* creates its own frame of reference to reflect the special complexities of the Egyptian experience.

Initially, three propositions crowd the topic (the first deck) of the headline banner. First, it situates the context of the German-Egyptian talks within the perspective of the Gulf War (establish linkage). Second, it announces the German and Egyptian collaboration to reduce Egypt’s debts (economic benefits), and third, it declares future German-Egyptian collateral economic cooperation (pledge for more rewards). The eyebrow superheadline ushers in the details of the German statements featured in the following four kicker subheadlines. The first three kickers list the German economic revival plan in the words of its visiting Foreign Affairs Minister (for added credibility), and uses direct quotes to verify the seriousness of the German commitment.

Finally, the last kicker completes *Al Ahram*’s narrative linkage and discursively ties the economic rewards to the shrewd policies of President Mubarak, which induces in the readers’ minds that Egypt’s leadership (in the Gulf War) and its international stature (respect for international law and order), has finally paid off. Then, in the most logical and “commonsensical” order of things, *Al Ahram* depicts the Egyptian President as determined to solve one of Egypt’s major economic predicaments, namely, its enormous foreign debt. The headline particularly points out Egypt’s international stature of worthiness and respect that led Germany to rally the affluent and powerful Paris Club on Egypt’s behalf. As a logical consequence of the stunning Egyptian success in lobbying

the international community and striving to prove its high credentials and deserving merits, *Al Ahram* concludes its headline by affirming Egypt's earned status as the Arab World's leader.

- **QADHAFI ARRIVES IN CAIRO TODAY TO CONSULT WITH MUBARAK**
Libyan President, Moammar Al Qadhafi, Leader of the Libyan revolution, arrived in Cairo this morning for a two-day visit with President Hosni Mubarak. During his visit, the two leaders will discuss the latest development in the Kuwait liberation war and the relation between the two countries.⁴⁴

The significance of this headline and lead is in its reference to Arab unity, symbolized by the Libyan leader's visit to Cairo. It is a show of support, comradeship, and respect for the leadership of Egypt that was able to tame one of the most notorious members of what was once known as the "Arab Rejection Front," formed in the 1970's to face up to "Western imperialist" and Zionist attacks on the Arab world. Again, it may very well be that the official line of this visit is intended to restrain domestic opposition in Egypt, and to hammer yet another nail in the coffin of the Egyptian dissent ideology by a strong counterargument and show of support from an Arab bastion like Moammar al Qadhafi.

- **MUBARAK DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN THE GULF AND THE RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IMF AT A LENGTHY MEETING YESTERDAY**

President Hosni Mubarak presided over a lengthy meeting yesterday with Prime Minister, Dr. Atef Sidqi, and other ministers to discuss a number of political and economic issues related to the current situation in the Gulf.⁴⁵

This headline introduces the topic and assigns the authority to "discuss the situation," to President Mubarak. The overwhelming show of action in tackling the

⁴⁴*Al Ahram*, 02/13/A1/C4/headline, lead 2.

⁴⁵*Al Ahram*, 02/13/A1/C1/headline, lead 3.

disabled Egyptian economy is always good and welcoming news to report in *Al Ahram*, since it helps strengthen Mubarak's regime and fortifies his accomplishments in a meaningful way to mobilize public support and curb dissatisfaction. The lead paragraph offers the full macrostructure of the topic. It identifies: the agent (President Mubarak), and other political actors (the Prime Minister and other ministers), the circumstances (in a lengthy meeting), the time (yesterday), the immediate objective (to discuss political and economic issues), and sets a further goal (the current situation in the Gulf) (van Dijk, 1988).

It is noted that in almost every reference *Al Ahram* makes to the situation in the Gulf, it ends it with a positive note, and a comment about the economic rewards that Egypt is gathering as a result of its policy in the Gulf War. This constant linkage between Gulf War policy and economic prosperity must be used in *Al Ahram* to downplay the enormous popular dissent, mass demonstrations and government crack-downs that were not reported in *Al Ahram*, and were muted in the Western media.

To grasp the Egyptian government's emphasis on the economic factor, one must comprehend the structure of a society that is divided on the basis of economic and social strata. The disparities between the extremely rich and the very poor are quite significant. Prior to and during the Gulf War, there are, for example, people who dwell in graveyards due to lack of affordable housing. Also, the urban cities of Cairo and Alexandria are flooded with rural migration and lack of opportunities for social mobility and growth. For the most part, the social structure consists of a prosperous business class, and land-owners (elite) who benefit from pro-Western and free-market policies and who continue to accumulate tremendous wealth and power. On the other end of the spectrum you have

the peasantry that consists of the majority of the population with no discrimination between educated and non-educated, with millions of unemployed university graduates living below the poverty line (Hopwood, 1993).

• **IN TWO DAYS, NINE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL MEET IN CAIRO TO DISCUSS THE NEW ARAB SECURITY PACT**

In two days, nine Arab foreign ministers will meet in Cairo to discuss regional developmental issues. They will also discuss ways of implementing the Gulf Cooperation Council's resolutions pertaining to the \$ 15 billion dollars fund, which was created during the Council's last meeting in Doha.⁴⁶

This headline, like the previous one, also deals with economic issues. In addition to its economic relevance, the headline confirms Egypt's leadership in the Arab world, and its place at the hub of all Arab decisions. Choosing Cairo, the Egyptian capital, for its conference, symbolizes the Gulf Cooperation Council's endorsement of Egypt's centrality in Arab politics. It is not clear, however, if *Al Ahram*'s over-emphasis on the economic prospects of Egypt is somehow related to the degree of mounting popular opposition, as seen in Egypt's betrayal of its Arab unity, and in its participation in the ground Gulf War. The unspoken words of *Al Ahram* indicate its absolute neglect of the stories that were crowding the front pages of *Ad Dustour*. In contrast, comes yet another story like this one focusing on the economic benefits that would be granted to Egypt by the grateful and rich Gulf States and their pledge of \$ 15 billion as a token of their commitment and dedication to Egypt's well being.

In retrospect, one can only appreciate the total commitment of Egypt to the West in the Gulf War in terms of the generous economic rewards that the West has promised Egypt. Consider this: Egypt's economic development was revived in May 1991, when it

⁴⁶*Al Ahram*, 02/13/A1/C6/headline, lead 4.

signed a contract with the African Development Bank for a US \$350 million loan to finance part of the Kuraymar power station. This amount was complemented by grants of US \$100 million from the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development, US \$100 million from the World Bank, and US \$10 million from the Islamic Bank for Development. On July 10, the Egypt Consultative Group, composed of thirty organizations and countries, promised US \$8 billion in aid to Egypt over the next two years, more than double the minimum that Egypt had hoped for, and hinted at. The World Bank, which organized the group, confirmed that the donors had settled on a “massive support” for Egypt’s economic-reform program, which it characterized as “daring,” and “exhaustive.” It assessed that the Gulf War had cost Egypt about US \$20 billion (*The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, 1998).

• **TEN IRAQI SOLDIERS SURRENDER TO EGYPTIAN FORCES**

RIYADH – NEWS AGENCIES – Ten Iraqi soldiers surrendered themselves yesterday to Egyptian forces positioned in the northern parts of Saudi Arabia. The escaping soldiers ignored their security guards’ orders to stop and return to their posts. However, the security guard did not open fire on the escaping soldiers and defied Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s orders to open fire at any escaping soldiers.⁴⁷

This headline certainly underscores the role of the Egyptian soldiers and the lead explains that the surrendering Iraqi soldiers simply ran away from their military positions, defied a direct order to return back, and risked being shot. The discourse of the headline and lead reveal the level of desperation and the disillusionment of the Iraqi soldiers, while at the same time discrediting the Iraqi military and political leaders, flattering the brotherly role of the Egyptian forces.

⁴⁷*Al Ahram*, 02/13/A1/C5/headline, lead 5.

- **HEAVIEST LAND, SEA AND AIR SHELLING BY THE ALLIES ON IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT SINCE THE START OF WAR**

RIYADH – NEWS AGENCIES - Allied shells fired for three hours, from land, sea and air rained down on a large concentration of Iraqi infantry, armor and artillery in south-eastern Kuwait today in what military spokesmen called the largest combined operation since the start of the Kuwait liberation war. In the meantime, American naval infantry is taking front positions to start the ground battle.⁴⁸

This headline finally brings *Al Ahram* readers' attention back in line with the realities of the Gulf War, which on this day were described by the *NYT* as the "Heaviest shelling by the allies yet, rips south Kuwait." The headline flows in the same direction as the previous one in a subtle discursive strategy and a graphical positioning that point to the clever ideological maneuvering of *Al Ahram*. It is not a mere coincidence that such a delicate headline announcing the dismal Iraqi defeat is preceded by all the good news about the Egyptian economy and the numerous pledges of reviving Egypt's prosperity, in addition to a story about Egypt's thriving political leadership in the Arab world.

- **A LETTER FROM GORBACHEV TO SADDAM**
- **PRIMAKOV: I DID NOT MEET WITH ANYONE AND I HAVE NOTHING TO SAY!**

MOSCOW – NEWS AGENCIES – Soviet President's special personal envoy Yevgeny Primakov arrived in Baghdad to deliver a letter from President Gorbachev to the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The official spokesmen of the Soviet foreign minister announced that the objective of the visit is to discuss with the Iraqi President an end to the devastating war especially in light of the latest prospects of a ground battle that will result in a great number of casualties on both sides.⁴⁹

The first deck of the headline introduces the topic of the letter from Gorbachev. *Al Ahram* follows it with a cynical quote from the Soviet envoy to discredit the seriousness of the Soviet initiative.

⁴⁸*Al Ahram*, 02/13/A1/C1/headline, lead 6.

⁴⁹*Al Ahram*, 02/13/A1/C3/headline, lead 7.

The pessimistic quote in the headline preempts the lead's optimistic potential to end the war and leaves an open-ended reading to the outcome of the Soviet initiative. The analysis of *Al Ahram* has so far detected a pattern of muting or de-emphasizing each and every call for ceasefire, or peace initiative, typical to the *NYT*, and contrary to the *G&M* and *Ad Dustour*.

To appreciate the degree of *Al Ahram*'s divergence, let us juxtapose its reportage with that of the three others.

Ad Dustour:

- **SADDAM TO PRIMAKOV: WE'RE READY TO COOPERATE WITH MOSCOW TO END WAR**

NICOSIA – REUTER – Radio Baghdad mentioned yesterday that President Saddam Hussein is willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union to end the Persian Gulf War.⁵⁰

The NYT:

- **Hussein Meets With Soviet Envoy and Talks of Effort to End War**

By PATRICK E. TYLER.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12 – President Saddam Hussein of Iraq said tonight that he was willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union to end the Persian Gulf War, but he also said that Iraq was determined to keep fighting “until aggression and the aggressors are beaten back.”⁵¹

The G&M:

- **Hussein hints at move to peace**

Meets Soviet envoy, Baghdad radio reports

By COLIN MacKENZIE

and MATHEW FISHER

With Reuter and Associated Press

Iraqi president Saddam Hussein is willing to co-operate with the Soviet Union in seeking an end to the war in the Persian Gulf, Baghdad radio said last night.⁵²

Upon comparing the four headlines and leads, the major deviations to be found were: firstly, all three newspapers except for the *NYT* received the information from news wires (albeit unspecified in *Al Ahram*). Secondly, the *G&M* gave the event foreground

⁵⁰ *Ad Dustour*, 02/13/A1/C7/headline, lead 5.

⁵¹ *The New York Times*, 02/13/A1/C4/headline, lead 2.

⁵² *The Globe & Mail*, 02/13/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

treatment in its main front-page headline. It was the second headline in the *NYT*, the fifth in *Ad Dustour*, and the seventh in *Al Ahram*. Thirdly, in its headline, *Al Ahram* used a cynical quote to disregard any potential for peace, followed by the *NYT*'s discrediting quote in its lead, which reads: "but he also said that Iraq was determined to keep fighting "until aggression and the aggressors are beaten back."

Finally, the editorial comment of *Al Ahram* on this day is entitled "The Palestinian Question, the Future and the Destiny." The editor argues that recent efforts to link the Gulf crisis with the Palestinian question were just attempts to make the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait final. The fact is that there is a worldwide realization that the stability of the region must be achieved within a comprehensive perspective that would deal primarily with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Al Ahram</i>, Monday, February 25, 1991. |
|--|

- **ALLIED FORCES ADVANCE TOWARDS KUWAIT AND REPORT LITTLE OR NO IRAQI RESISTANCE**
 - **5,500 CAPTURED IRAQI PRISONERS... AND THOUSANDS MORE SURRENDER TO ALLIED FORCES**
 - **DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS ON THE KUWAITI SHORES**
 - **IN TEN HOURS ALLIED FORCES COMPLETE FIRST DAY'S OBJECTIVE**
- In less than ten hours since the start of the Kuwait liberation war, US General H. Norman Schwarzkopf announced from Saudi Arabia that allied forces drove deep into Kuwait, and met no resistance, capturing 5,500 Iraqi prisoners. Thousands of others surrendered. He refused to give any further details about the ground war due to military censorship.⁵³

In a six-column, two-deck banner headline, and two kicker-subheadlines, *Al Ahram* marked this day as the beginning of allied victory and Iraqi defeat. Beneath the headline and to the right side of the front page is a photo of President Mubarak meeting

⁵³ *Al Ahram*, 02/25/A1/C1/headline, lead 1.

with his military leaders. To the left is an AP picture of triumphant allied soldiers waiving their rifles.

The first deck of the headline introduces the overwhelming victory of the allied forces amid reports of “little Iraqi resistance,” and as a logical consequence, the second deck brings in the story of the Iraqi surrender en masse. The first kicker subheadline offers military details about the ground battle and the next one boasts about the allied forces completing their one-day objectives in just ten hours.

Evidently, the lead paragraph offers the full macrostructure of the topic. It specifies the agent (General H. Norman Schwarzkopf), the place (Saudi Arabia), the objective (Kuwait liberation war), the patient (5,500 Iraqi prisoners, and thousands who surrendered), and the accomplishment (swift advances, in just ten hours).

Upon comparing all four reports of the same event, it was clear that *Al Ahram* gave attention to certain aspects of the situation that were important to Egypt, while leaving out information about the huge number of Iraqi casualties and the awesome destruction that resulted from the military operation. Unlike *Ad Dustour*’s distorted reportage that appeared to be in total denial on this day, *Al Ahram* filters the news, permitting only the constructive aspects such as the quickness of liberating Kuwait, while excluding anything else that points to the devastation, or degradation, such as the famous AP picture of the marching of hundreds of Iraqi prisoners that was published in both the *NYT* and the *G&M*. In essence, *Al Ahram*’s reportage depicts the ground battle as a swift, clean, and precise operation, with almost no resistance and no casualties, as part of the paper’s deliberate effort to contain the mobilizing factor of a horrifying and humiliating Iraqi defeat and its potential to stir dissent among the Egyptian public.

- **MUBARAK: OUR MISSION IS TO LIBERATE KUWAIT AND WE WILL NOT CROSS INTO IRAQ**

President Hosni Mubarak met yesterday with a number of his military advisors and repeatedly confirmed that our objective is to liberate Kuwait and that our forces will not enter Iraq. He also warned that any rumors contrary to the above are mere speculations and are intended to stir trouble and confusion.⁵⁴

This headline is on top of President Mubarak's photo (the meeting with his military leaders). Amid the astounding reports of coalition forces marching to Baghdad comes this headline of Mubarak's assertion that Egypt will not cross into Iraq. What would be the political ramifications of Egyptian forces advancing into Iraq? The answer lies in the semantic choices of "crossing" or "entering" used here to escape the cognitive connotations of "invading" or "occupying." The implications associated with the act of invading or occupying Iraq will most certainly create unforeseen upheavals for the Egyptian regime. Therefore, it is crucial that *Al Ahram* keep its reportage about the Egyptian participation in the warfare within the interpretive framework of "liberating Kuwait." It is not surprising that President Mubarak (like other Arab leaders) is aware of the limits to the tolerance of Arab public opinion and is certain that any report about foreign armies invading Iraq with Egyptian participation will have serious ramifications on his political home front. In effect, *Al Ahram* makes the distinction on behalf of the Administration and downplays the ground-war operations in general (especially the ones inside Iraqi territories) in order to protect President Mubarak's aspirations and Egypt's "big brotherly" image to preserve her prospects of Arab leadership, should Egyptian armed forces risk being caught marching deep into sovereign Iraq.

⁵⁴*Al Ahram*. 02/25/A1/C1/headline, lead 2.

- **EGYPTIAN TROOPS ENTER KUWAITI TERRITORIES AND COMPLETE THEIR OBJECTIVE WITH MINIMUM RESISTANCE**

A military official stated that Egyptian forces have crossed the Saudi – Kuwait border yesterday during the Kuwait liberation war and they have successfully advanced (few kilometers) into Kuwaiti territories with almost no resistance. The large surrendering numbers of Iraqi captains and soldiers question the objectives of their political and military leaders.⁵⁵

Obviously, this headline is thematically linked with the previous one. Both the headline and lead underscore the mission of the Egyptian forces inside Kuwaiti territories and validate President Mubarak's position as stated in the former headline. In a deliberate and calculated strategy, *Al Ahram* arranges the graphical layout of its front page in such a way as to present its headlines and leads in a hierarchical order to support the *raison d'être* of the Egyptian administration and to fulfill its journalistic mandate (social responsibility). Notice that the headline reports the Egyptian success in entering Kuwait and the lead explains that the liberating Egyptian forces were engaged in a nominal battle with Iraqi troops and concludes by referring to the stunning numbers of surrendering soldiers and their cynicism in the Iraqi leadership.

- **ALLIED TROOPS INTEND TO SURROUND IRAQ'S REPUBLICAN GUARDS**

Allied troops drove deep into Iraqi-occupied Kuwait on Sunday reaching the outskirts of Kuwait City before nightfall, according to senior officers. To the west, powerful armored columns and a huge fleet of helicopters stormed into Iraq, heading northeast towards Basra in an effort to isolate Iraq's Republican Guards.⁵⁶

It is patent from this headline and lead that *Al Ahram* maintains the same interpretive framework in its delicate reporting on the liberation of Kuwait City. Firstly, notice how the news about the advancing allied troops towards "Iraqi-occupied Kuwait" precede the accounts of the storming helicopters' attack on Basra, Iraq. Second, the lead

⁵⁵ *Al Ahram*, 02/25/A1/C3/headline, lead 3.

⁵⁶ *Al Ahram*, 02/25/A1/C3/headline, lead 4.

concludes the attack on Basra with an immediate justifying clause that reads: “to isolate Iraq’s Republican Guards.” Clearly, *Al Ahram*’s careful reporting of the stunning allied military successes comes amid reports about the increasing disapproval of other coalition European members, as well as Canada, which by now are seriously questioning the US military rationale in advancing towards Iraq (and if this was a violation of UN objectives set for sanctioning the Gulf War). A case in point is *G&M* reporter Colin MacKenzie’s front-page outstanding précis that was discussed in chapter three and is summed up in its headline:

- **HUMILIATION/Grind-it-in-your-face triumph is what US wants in**
- **When victory is not enough⁵⁷**

Oddly enough, there is no editorial comment in *Al Ahram* on this day.

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Al Ahram</i>, Thursday, February 28, 1991. |
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- **EGYPTIAN FORCES ACCOMPLISH MOST OF THEIR MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF LIBERATING KUWAIT**
- **LEGIONS OF EGYPTIAN ARMORED AND MECHANICAL INFANTRY FREE AL JAHRAA CITY AND AL SALEM AIRPORT AFTER OVERCOMING IRAQI RESISTANCE**
- **OUR FORCES RAISE THE EGYPTIAN FLAG ON OUR EMBASSY AND ARE IN CONTROL OF THE KUWAITI CAPITAL IN COOPERATION WITH SAUDI AND KUWAITI FORCES**
- **EGYPTIAN FORCES WILL NOT CROSS IRAQI BORDERS AND ITS OPERATIONS WILL BE LIMITED TO KUWAIT**
- **BRITISH AND FRENCH NEWSPAPERS: EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS CRUSHED THE SOVIET THEORY OF FORTIFICATIONS**

Egyptian forces have successfully completed most of the military objectives of liberating Kuwait. After overcoming Iraqi resistance our forces regained complete control over Al Salem Airport, and freed Al Jahraa city. *Al Ahram* military reporter learned that legions of Egyptian armored and mechanical infantry advanced into Kuwait city on two fronts: the western front going east on Jamal Abdul Nasser highway across the Kuwaiti

⁵⁷*The Globe & Mail*, 02/25/A1/C3/headline, lead 2.

shoreline. The forces of this front actually pushed its way to downtown Kuwait City and are now in control of their assigned tasks.⁵⁸

This is the last day of the Gulf War and *Al Ahram* marks this historic moment in its headline banner along with four news reports and two photographs. The complex multi-deck headline banner is entirely dedicated to underscore the Egyptian military accomplishments and to announce the liberation of Kuwait. *Al Ahram*'s reportage is captured in one photograph of an Egyptian soldier guarding Iraqi prisoners who have surrendered to Egyptian forces. This speaks volumes about how *Al Ahram* wants the Egyptians to see themselves upon reading the remarkable euphoric victory-reports, which mainly focus on the Egyptian role in the liberation of Kuwait. The entire headline glorifies the capabilities of the Egyptian forces; revels in the superior conduct of the Egyptian troops and ends with the patriotic raising of the flag over the Egyptian Embassy as the final closing act on the dignified Egyptian military stage. At the same time, no effort is spared in the headlines to reaffirm Egypt's policy not to cross Iraqi borders and ends on a flattering note from the French and British press as a final testimonial to the impressive Egyptian military credentials.

- **RAISING THE KUWAITI FLAG IN THE LIBERATED CAPITAL AFTER 210 DAYS OF OCCUPATION**
 - **THE CROWN PRINCE OF KUWAIT STARTS HIS DUTIES IN THE CITY WITHIN FEW HOURS AND COMBING OPERATIONS CONTINUE**
- KUWAIT – NEWS AGENCIES – The Kuwait flag was raised in downtown Kuwait at 9 am, local time yesterday to mark the liberation of Kuwait city from Iraqi occupation that lasted 210 days.⁵⁹

This report appeared in the *NYT* and the *G&M*, but not in *Ad Dustour*. To the left of this double-deck headline is a Reuter's photo of legions of American tanks on their

⁵⁸*Al Ahram*, 02/28/A1/C1/headline. lead 1.

⁵⁹*Al Ahram*, 02/28/A1/C1/headline. lead 2.

way to Kuwait, the capital. In this headline and lead, *Al Ahram* joins in the joyous reporting of the liberation of Kuwait City and its return to its legitimate rulers, in a show of support and celebration. In essence, the first deck declares the liberation of Kuwait; and the second affirms the legitimacy of the Crown Prince, and thereby the Kuwaiti royal family. In turn, the lead asserts the topic of the headline and adds a few details about the exact time (at 9:00 am), location (downtown Kuwait), and the duration of the Iraqi occupation (210 days).

- **ALLIES CUT OFF RETREATING IRAQI TROOPS NEAR BASRA**
- **US AND FRENCH BATTALIONS PENETRATE INTO MID IRAQ**

WASHINGTON – from HAMDY FOUAD – and NEWS AGENCIES – While American and French armored forces reached deep inside the mid provinces of Iraq near Baghdad, they set out their military bases to restore the airports in the region. Sources at the US Defense Department announced that allied armored units have trapped Iraq's vaunted Republican Guard in southern Iraq, especially near Basra to prevent them from retrieving their weapons after losing 26 battalions out of a total of 42.⁶⁰

In this headline, *Al Ahram* turns its focus to the battlefields of Iraq and continues to report on the military progress of the allied forces without exposing the overbearing American character of the assault. In this double-deck headline, which is conveniently located beneath the picture of the legions of US tanks rolling towards Kuwait City, *Al Ahram* provides its readers with the context they need to interpret the allied penetration into Iraq within the framework of liberating Kuwait.

Certainly, the lead summarizes the topic and offers an explanation to the wondering mind of the average *Al Ahram* reader that this operation is necessary "to prevent them [the Republican Guards] from retrieving their weapons after losing 26 battalions out of a total of 42."

⁶⁰*Al Ahram*, 02/28/A1/C3/headline, lead 3.

- **IRAQ OFFERS MORE CONCESSIONS**
- **BUT THE BIG COUNTRIES REFUSE TO OFFER A CEASEFIRE**

NEW YORK – NEWS AGENCIES – In an attempt to reach a ceasefire agreement and additional concessions, Iraq announced yesterday its acceptance of all UN resolutions pertaining to payments, abandoning the idea of Kuwait as part of Iraq, and freeing all prisoners of war as soon as a ceasefire agreement is reached.⁶¹

The display of this headline was prominently underscored in *Ad Dustour*, but was relatively downplayed here and totally absent from the front pages of the *NYT*, and the *G&M*.

It is discernable how this highly critical news report received a nominal two-column treatment in the bottom of *Al Ahram*'s front-page located beneath all the triumphant stories and euphoric headlines. Initially, the first deck introduces Iraq's additional concessions and the second declares, "The big countries refuse to offer a ceasefire." The lead explains the topic and adds pertinent details to sum up the event. However, it is only in the second paragraph that the American identity is revealed, in the form of a US State Department spokesperson who announced that the five UN Security Council members rejected the Iraqi proposal on the grounds that it did not meet all necessary conditions to merit a ceasefire.

To truly appreciate the magnitude of this minimization, it is crucial to pay attention to the semantic choices, undertones, and the strategic positioning of this report. Who "the big countries" were that rejected the ceasefire was kept a mystery until towards the end of the second paragraph. For example, there was no immediate elaboration in the lead as to who exactly these powerful countries are. Of course not, because the answer might be problematic to Egyptian policy, which *Al Ahram* so faithfully safeguarded throughout the course of its Gulf War reportage.

⁶¹*Al Ahram*, 02/28/A1/C3/headline, lead 4.

On this date, there is no editorial comment in *Al Ahram*.

• ***Al Ahram*, Monday, April 29, 1991.**

- **MUBARAK: COOPERATION BETWEEN ARAB AND MUSLIM COUNTRIES SHOULD BE MUTUAL AND NOT FORCED**
- **EGYPT WILL NOT BE AN OPPORTUNIST COUNTRY AND SHOULD CONFLICT ARISE AMONG ARABS OUR GOAL WILL BE TO DIMINISH THE RIFT AND FOSTER ARAB UNITY**

President Mubarak met with delegations of the fourth conference of the Higher Council of Islamic Issues and with the president of the Kuwaiti delegation who said: the Gulf crisis was about values and Kuwait will always be indebted to Egypt and the region's countries.⁶²

This is the last sampled issue of *Al Ahram* and on this day Egypt was hosting the fourth convention of the Higher Council on Islamic affairs, which convened in Cairo. Upon meeting with various delegations, President Mubarak made the above statement to explain Egypt's post-Gulf War policies.

The gist of his remarks can be viewed within the context of Egypt's post-Gulf War concerns and aspirations. Egypt is finally ready to reap the rewards of her exceptional political and military maneuvers during the Gulf War and to consolidate all its political gains into a rewarding leading role in the Arab and Muslim world. As such, *Al Ahram* faithfully relates this in its headline banner to promote Egypt's deserving status in the Arab and Muslim world. Why would then Mubarak hint "**Egypt Will Not Be An Opportunist Country.**" Perhaps President Mubarak is brushing off the self-conscious "opportunist" label to justify the enormous economic rewards that were granted to Egypt as a result of Egypt's Gulf-War policies. The reverse psychology tactics in Mubarak's remarks of a self-conscious Egypt is intended to enhance his credibility and to bring

⁶²*Al Ahram*, 04/29/A1/C3/headline, lead 1.

across a truly sincere and well-meaning Egypt, trustworthy in the eyes of the Muslim and Arab world and worthy of their consent to her leadership.

In comparison with the other three newspapers, *Al Ahram* did not have any front-page coverage of the Iraqi refugee zone (that was reported on in both the *NYT* and the *G&M*), nor any reference to Saddam Hussein's 54th birthday (as was the case in *Ad Dustour* on this date).

There is no editorial comment on this day.

- **Quantitative Findings**

In the nine *Al Ahram* sampled issues, there were forty-seven front-page Gulf-War related reports, an average of 5.22 stories per *Al Ahram* issue. There were ten illustrations, and eight headline banners (see Table 4.1 below). This can be compared to the *NYT*'s twenty-eight front-page reports, the *G&M*'s twenty-two front-page reports, and *Ad Dustour*'s sixty front-page reports.

As with *Ad Dustour* and the *G&M*, the majority of *Al Ahram* news reports are from news wires. Table 4.1 traces sixteen news items, or 34.04% of *Al Ahram* news reports to unspecified "News Agencies," nineteen, or 40.43% are unaccredited, six are sourced by *Al Ahram*, one from Reuter, three from R (perhaps Reuter), one from WBA (local), and one from ASHA (local). The study strongly suggests *Al Ahram*'s heavy dependence on news-wire sources and the minimum usage of foreign correspondents (only one in Washington). Considering that all but six (attributed to *Al Ahram*'s correspondent) of the total forty-seven reports were some sort of news wire write-ups, *Al Ahram* (similar to *Ad Dustour*) credited only sixteen to unspecified news agencies, and

nineteen were simply unsigned. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that forty-one news reports amounting to 87.23% of the total number of news reports were entirely, or at least partially, sourced from news agencies despite *Al Ahram*'s reluctance to acknowledge this.

TABLE 5. 1 *Al Ahram*'s Front Page Coverage Of The Gulf War

| DATE | # OF FRONT- PAGE NEWS REPORTS | # OF ILLUSTRATIONS | # OF HEADLINE BANNERS | # OF EDITORIALS | BYLINE/AGENCY TOTAL #41 | | | | | | |
|--------------|---|-----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|-----|------------------|-----|-------------------|------|---|
| | | | | | Al Ahram | WBA | News Agencies | RAP | Un- Accredited | ASHA | |
| 15- Jan. | 11 | 1 Photo + | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | 4 | 1 | - | 4 | - |
| 16- Jan. | 5 | 1 Photo | 1 | - | 1 | - | - | 1 | 1 | 2 | - |
| 23- Jan. | 6 | 1 Photo * | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | 2 | 1 | - | 1 | 1 |
| 29- Jan. | 3 | 1 Photo * | - | 1 | - | - | 3 | - | - | - | - |
| 30- Jan. | 6 | 1 Photo + | 1 | - | 2 | - | 2 | - | - | 2 | - |
| 13- Feb. | 7 | 1 Photo | 1 | 1 | - | - | 3 | - | - | 4 | - |
| 25- Feb. | 4 | 1 Photo* 1 Photo | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4 | - |
| 28- Feb. | 4 | 1 Photo * 1 Photo | 1 | - | 1 | - | 2 | - | - | 1 | - |
| 29- April | 1 | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | - |
| Total | 47 | 10 | 8 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 16 | 3 | 1 | 19 | 1 |

* Photos by AP (Associated Press) = 4

+ Photos by Reuter = 2

Note: News Agencies refer to unspecified agencies.

On the other hand, and as expected, *Al Ahram*'s editorial line was in total compliance with its front-page reportage (so was that of *Ad Dustour*). Of the nine issues studied, only four had editorial comments. Nonetheless, they were all geared towards creating a consensus among *Al Ahram* readers and centered on holding Saddam Hussein responsible for the Gulf War. The dominant narrative of *Al Ahram*'s front-page was in

tune with its editorial stance, which consistently cited Saddam Hussein's contempt of international law and order and his defiance of the world community as the reason that instigated the massive international response to right his wrong.

- **The Editorial Discourse Of *Al Ahram***

The analysis of *Al Ahram* editorials is at odds with Mowlana's discussion of various Egyptian editorials during the Gulf War. In fact, this discrepancy prompted this author to closely scrutinize the editorials of *Al Ahram*, finding them to be also antithetical to Mowlana's findings on the oppositional stance of the Egyptian editorials, reflected in their questioning of the validity of the Egyptian government's policy and participation in the Gulf War.

While the sampled *Al Ahram* editorials did not substantiate Mowlana's analysis *per se*, they did not necessarily refute the existence of dissidence in Egypt. Quite to the contrary, this study validates the ideological postulate that the media in general, and in this case *Al Ahram* in particular, was successful in totally eradicating the voice of any opposition in its Gulf War reportage. This unique situation in Egypt was the result of a split between government policy that supported the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq and the ideologies of both radical Islam and Arab-Nasserite dissidents who opposed the U.S. intervention in the Gulf War.

According to Mowlana (1992), some Egyptian editorialists fiercely opposed whoever backed Iraq and others supported Saddam Hussein, not because of his invasion of Kuwait, but rather, for daring to stand up against Western powers. Despite the lack of dissent from *Al Ahram*'s Gulf-War reportage and editorials (at least in the sampled

issues), opposing views and attitude were widespread in Egypt and were well documented in Mowlana's (1992) reference to a group of Egyptian intelligentsia who opposed Egypt's participation in the Gulf War. According to Mowlana, the arguments of these Egyptians against the use of U.S. military force were:

It should be starkly obvious, that this kind of military logic constitutes a clear violation of the Geneva Conventions on the rights of civilian populations during war and that it is no different from the logic that lay behind that most shameful episode in human history: the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (*Mideast Mirror*, February 22, 1991, in Mowlana et al., 1992:172).

These were the kind of editorials and opinions that were not voiced in *Al Ahram*. One editorial observed, "By Pitting the rich Gulf States against Iraq, the West was turning Arab wealth against Arab might with the aim of destroying both together"(Mowlana et al., 1992:172).

Also absent from *Al Ahram* was the discourse of radical Islam. The 1991 Gulf War presented radical Muslims with a dilemma. Would they side with their Muslim brothers in Iraq or Kuwait? Ideologically, they opposed the Iraqi regime for being secular and the Kuwaiti Monarchy for not being sufficiently Muslim, and strived to overthrow both.

- **Conclusion**

The Gulf War presented Egypt with its first historical opportunity to resume its role as leader of the Arab world in the wake of peace with Israel and its alienation from the Arab world. As the Arab big brother, Egypt used its official media to portray to the world that it can shift alliances and contribute to the political future of the Arab world.

Evidently, the textual analysis of *Al Ahram* revealed few divergences from the three other newspapers and some convergences with a few of them. Firstly, *Al Ahram*, like the *NYT*, downplayed or omitted most calls for ceasefires and peace initiatives in total conformity with their respective governments' policies. The *G&M*, however, with *Ad Dustour*, were incidentally in agreement with the policy of their respective governments, which emphasized all efforts made for peace proposals and underscored all ceasefire calls.

Secondly, the analysis of *Al Ahram* has slanted towards favoring news about a forceful resolution to the conflict. In line with the *NYT*'s (one) minimal reporting on peace initiatives, *Al Ahram* had only three reports (of the total forty-seven Gulf War headlines and leads) about various peace initiatives, compared to six in the *G&M*, and ten in *Ad Dustour*. Thirdly, there was also a heavy and unique emphasis in *Al Ahram* to link the Gulf War with domestic economic benefits. Consider for example, *Al Ahram*'s January 29 headline banner about domestic economic issues, contrasted with the *NYT* headline banner about the defection of "100 Iraqi planes to Iran." Incidentally, the same Iraqi planes were the topic of the *G&M* headline banner, whereas "raining Iraqi missiles on Saudi Arabia," was the topic of *Ad Dustour* headline banner. A second headline banner in *Al Ahram* underscored the economic dimension of the Gulf War. While the *NYT* underlined the "Heaviest shelling by allies yet" in its front-page headline, *Al Ahram* dedicated its front-page headline banner of February 13 to the German-Egyptian economic relief efforts. The *G&M* in contrast, reported on "Hussein hints at move to peace," and *Ad Dustour* announced: "America denies claims that Jordan was transporting missile in oil tanks."

Finally, the single most dominant Gulf-War narrative of *Al Ahram* was within the UN perspective. In fact, *Al Ahram* interpreted the events of the Gulf War as a necessary military endeavor to uphold international law and order and to enforce the wishes of the world community and the United Nations' directives.

At first, the government tried to follow an inter-Arab solution and mediated directly between Kuwait and Iraq. When that failed, the official discourse focused on condemning Iraq and siding with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United States. Egypt, however, still expected that international pressure along with sanctions would deflect the crisis and even called upon the United States to extend the sanctions three more months prior to taking any military action against Iraq. On January 24, 1991, and in the People's Assembly, Mubarak confirmed that he had made twenty-six unsuccessful appeals to Saddam Hussein. Inevitably, he claims he had to send 35,000 Egyptians to Saudi Arabia in compliance with the provisions of the Arab Mutual Defense Pact signed in 1950 (which called on assisting another Arab country against aggression). Also in January, Mubarak stated that he made it clear to Washington that if Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, Egypt considered Saddam Hussein's staying in power permissible.

Probably we will never know if the decision to side with oil-rich Arab states was taken much earlier than was publicly announced as a result of the immense economic reasons enlisted earlier, and the historic juncture that presented Egypt with a unique opportunity to proclaim its leading role in Arab decision-making and politics. At any rate, and due to its deep-rooted Pan-Arab ideology, *Al Ahram* had to be delicate and credible in arguing for Kuwait against Iraq. Despite a widespread Egyptian antipathy toward Saddam and his socialist regime that had badly treated around one million

Egyptian expatriates working in Iraq, *Al Ahram* still had a duty to justify Egypt's decision to a multi-faceted society that represented diverse political groups and discourses.

In its discourse through *Al Ahram*, the Egyptian government had to vindicate its decision of participating with the coalition forces not only to its Egyptian constituency, but also to the Arab masses. It is believed that Mubarak's objection to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait was initially popular in Egypt; as the crisis developed into war, though, popular support declined. Divisions occurred between and within radical Muslim groups with some supporting Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and others backing Iraq. The leftist parties also experienced confusion, with some members of Tagammu supporting each side in the Gulf War; but none of this was reported or even hinted at in *Al Ahram*.

Chapter 6

Discussion And Conclusion

Introduction

The Gulf War, according to Jean Baudrillard (1991), never happened. A decade later, Nohrstedt & Ottosen (2001), claim that the Gulf War, never ended. In between these two postulates lays the truth that was crushed by the chilling tremors of the September 11th suicide attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. These terrifying attacks have indeed shattered the myth of the former, and have unraveled the unsettling certainty of the latter.

The calls for a better understanding of the Gulf conflict and the aftermath of the Gulf War are warranted now more than ever. Despite the paradoxical appearance of the above two views, at a closer look, they are quite alike. It is premature to evaluate the performance of media organizations and journalists in this new war on terrorism or to verify whether the lessons learned from the Gulf War have changed the ways journalists report on this first war of the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, media coverage of these latest developments already exhibit both convergence with, and divergence from, the media coverage of the Gulf War, though this is not the place to deal with this issue.

How then was the Gulf War constructed in the news discourses of the four newspapers from four different countries? The previous chapters provide some important insights that can serve as the premises of the ensuing interpretations. In this final chapter, I will sum up the various conclusions and will integrate them within the theoretical framework outlined in the introduction.

TABLE 6.1 Comparative Coverage Of The Gulf War

| | # OF FRONT- PAGE REPORTS | # OF ILLUSTRATIONS | # OF HEADLINE BANNERS | # OF EDITORIALS | # OF OPINION COLUMNS | # OF LETTERS TO THE EDITOR | # OF AGENCY BYLINES |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>The New York Times</i> | 28 | 15 | 7 | 8 | 21 | 6 | 0 |
| <i>The Globe & Mail</i> | 22 | 10 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 21 | 22 |
| <i>Ad Dustour</i> | 60 | 22 | 9 | 9 | - | - | 52 |
| <i>Al Ahram</i> | 47 | 10 | 8 | 4 | - | - | 41 |
| Total | 157 | 57 | 31 | 26 | 27 | 27 | 115 |

- **The Global Character Of The Gulf War**

The Gulf War is considered to be the first global, real-time, televised media war. The global nature of this war manifests itself in many respects, such as: the hierarchy of the international system, the role of the UN, the international economic structure, the transnational flow of news, the global historical context, global media technology, global journalism practices and professional ideologies, and of course global war propaganda.

The instantaneous media coverage of the Gulf War created a global media audience, which in turn, necessitated that governments draw strategies to influence public opinion (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001: 242), and produce additional measures to control and censor war news (Hachten, 1996:156). With the assistance of the media, the United States was able to develop a global strategy of “public diplomacy” to strengthen its leadership in the coalition.

Another globalization result was the re-evaluation of past notions about the international system and the national position of one’s own country in that system. This

is described in terms of a) the international hierarchy of states (Karim, 2000b), and b) the relativization of the nation-states' positions and their national identities in relation partly to the "world system of societies," and partly to "humankind" (Robertson, 1992:27). The hierarchy of states on the international level is similar to the social hierarchy on the national level. In the international hierarchy, elite states are distinguished from non-elite nation states, and thus, the actions, and policies of the elite states are treated credibly and presented prominently in the transnational media. On the other hand, domestication processes of the Gulf War have also occurred on the international as well as on the national levels. On both levels, actors appeared in public with proposals for how the conflict should be conceived, what the opposite positions were, and why their own policy was right. The conflict discourse in this respect – internationally as well as nationally – assumed the definition of this new reality within the context of the actors' own identities.

Accordingly, for the United States, the Gulf War was about the new world order, and its own leadership in the process. For Canada, the conflict discourse was about reconsidering its own traditional security and foreign policies in relation to the U.S.'s leadership role in the war against Iraq.

For Jordan, it was a delicate balance between advocating a peaceful inter-Arab resolution to the conflict, in line with Jordan's traditional pro-Western policies on the one hand, and dealing with its radical domestic constituency on the other. Eventually, this dilemma forced Jordan to take a radical stand vis-à-vis the Gulf War and its rhetoric appealed for Arab unity, radical Islam, and the Palestinian question to legitimize its political denunciation of the Gulf War.

For Egypt it was about regaining its leadership role in the Arab world. Thus, the Egyptian government was quite forceful in its Gulf War policies and appeared determined to reverse the Iraqi invasion. But at the same time it made it very clear that the Egyptian forces would not step on Iraqi soil, thus preserving the prospects of a leading position for Egypt in the Arab and Muslim world.

- **Transnational News Flow**

The propaganda factor of the Gulf War further intensified the friction between the center- periphery, and the North-South (Karim 2000b) international system of nation-states. The increased state involvement in the Gulf War translated into increased engagement in propagandist efforts to win public support both on the national and transnational levels. There is no argument in this regard that the U.S. was instrumental in delivering the most efficient, focused and superior propaganda of all. But as the textual analysis has revealed, other parties also used their media to attain their objectives and to disorient and win the domestic and international opinion over their cause (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001: 242). In this respect, the U.S. military information policy is considered the most comprehensive, for it was tailored to fit the heterogeneous character of the coalition and it employed sensitive cultural strategies in order to target not only American but international audiences as well.

Table 6.2 shows the remarkably high percentage of news agency sources used extensively in the news accounts of the *G&M*, *Ad Dustour*, and *Al Ahram*, respectively. It offers details about how these newspapers negotiated with the constraints of war reporting (censorship and propaganda). Furthermore, this table illustrates the avenues

through which these newspapers “recontextualized” (Fairclough, 1995:41) and, if you will, “domesticated” (Cohen et al., 1996:152-153) the global media’s narratives of the Gulf War to fit their very particular national, cultural, and political conditions.

TABLE 6.2 Source Comparisons Of Gulf War Reportage

| | <i>THE NEW YORK TIMES</i> BYLINE/AGENCY SOURCES TOTAL # 28 | | <i>THE GLOBE & MAIL</i> BYLINE/AGENCY SOURCES TOTAL # 42 | | <i>AD DUSTOUR</i> BYLINE/ AGENCY SOURCES TOTAL # 50 | | <i>AL AHRAM</i> BYLINE/AGENCY SOURCES TOTAL # 41 | |
|----------------|---|------------|---|------------|--|------------|---|------------|
| | Total # | Percentage | Total # | Percentage | Total # | Percentage | Total # | Percentage |
| <i>NYT</i> | 28 | 100 % | 2 | 4.8 % | - | - | - | - |
| <i>G&M</i> | - | - | 20 | 47.6 % | - | - | - | - |
| CP | - | - | 2 | 4.8 % | - | - | - | - |
| AP | - | - | 10 | 23.8 % | - | - | 1 | 2.4 % |
| Reuter | - | - | 7 | 16.7 % | 8 | 16 % | - | - |
| AFP | - | - | 1 | 2.3 % | 6 | 12 % | - | - |
| Petra | - | - | - | - | 13 | 26 % | - | - |
| News Agencies | - | - | - | - | 15 | 30 % | 16 | 39.1 % |
| Unaccredited | - | - | - | - | 8 | 16 % | 19 | 46.4 % |
| WBA | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 2.4 % |
| R | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3 | 7.3 % |
| ASHA | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 2.4 % |
| Total | 28 | 100 % | 42 | 100% | 50 | 100% | 41 | 100% |

As pointed out in Table 6.2, the *G&M* eased the constraints of its total reliance on news agencies by rewriting 47.6 % of all its news items. However, *Ad Dustour* and *Al Ahram* maneuvered their restraints by simply not attributing some of their news reports, or just by crediting them to unspecified news agencies. Hence, Table 6.2 indicates that *Ad Dustour* attributed 30% of its sources to unspecified news agencies and 16 % to unaccredited (unsigned) sources. Similarly, *Al Ahram* attributed 39.1 % of its news reports to “News Agencies” and 46.4 % to unaccredited sources.

In theoretical terms, although this study confirms the North-South direction of transnational news flow (West - East), it disputes the findings of earlier research about globalization theory (Robertson, 1992) and the thesis of an immediate causal relation between global media content and global opinion-formation. For example, P. Sainath (1992) noted the discrepancy between the pro-war news columns and the anti-war editorials in Indian newspapers. He discerned that the pro-war news coverage in the newspapers was the result of the total Western control of international news flow, while the editorials accurately reflected the anti-war mood of the public. Conversely, this textual analysis seems to offer a relevant perspective about the notion that the Gulf War global media narrative did not necessarily generate a unified interpretation or an identical mental script with similar effects, while being transmitted from the transnational to the national level (Cohen et. al., 1996; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001; Thompson, 1995).

- ***Cross-National Comparisons***

The impact and meaning of the Gulf War in a global and historical context is conceived of as the discursive cultural and political re-orientation processes initiated by the conflict, and the new international situation (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001: 242). News in this regard is not characterized as a picture of reality, which may be correct or biased, but as a frame through which the social world is routinely constructed (van Dijk, 1988:8). The symbolic meaning production of the Gulf War took place not only locally but also in places far removed from the events in question. Thus, how did the national journalistic discourses of these four diverse newspapers handle a globally disseminated supply of information about a major international conflict such as the Gulf War?

TABLE 6.3 Front Page News Theme Comparisons Of The Gulf War Coverage

| | TOTAL # OF NEWS REPORTS | NEWS REPORTS JUSTIFYING THE GULF WAR | | NEWS REPORTS ON THE UN ROLE | | NEWS REPORTS ON CEASEFIRES, OR PEACE INITIATIVES | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|--|--------|--------------------------------|-------|---|--------|
| | | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| <i>The New York Times</i> | 28 | 6 | 21.4 % | 1 | 3.6 % | 2 | 7.1 % |
| <i>The Globe & Mail</i> | 22 | 2 | 9.1 % | 2 | 9.1 % | 4 | 18.2 % |
| <i>Ad Dustour</i> | 60 | 0 | - | 4 | 6.7 % | 10 | 16.7 % |
| <i>Al Ahram</i> | 47 | 10 | 21.3 % | 4 | 8.5 % | 4 | 8.5 % |
| Total | 157 | 18 | 11.5 % | 11 | 7 % | 20 | 12.7 % |

Despite the fact that the media coverage of the Gulf War was heavily influenced by propaganda, censorship and various strategies of media control, the cross-national comparison of style between the sampled four newspapers disclosed the behavior in which these newspapers contextualized and domesticated the global Gulf War narrative according to their particular historical, political and cultural traditions. In what follows, I will review the ideological and cultural interpretative framework underlying each of the four newspapers' presentation of the Gulf War. Table 6.3 consists of the common themes that were shared among the four newspapers and that have surfaced during the textual analysis. Thus, the significance of this assessment is not so much so in its magnitude, but rather in its consistency and its capacity to provide a general comparative basis for our interpretations.

- **Justifying The War**

Table 6.3 demonstrates that throughout the period under study, the Gulf War justification (liberation of Kuwait) was covered by almost equal percentages by the *NYT* 21.4% and *Al Ahram* 21.3%, to a lesser extent by the *G&M* (9.1%.) and none in *Ad Dustour*. The oil interest of the West, Kuwait's refusal to negotiate with Iraq, or Iraq's historical claims all disappeared once the military offensive started. Only *Ad Dustour* kept probing and explaining the conflict in terms of the new world order and the hegemonic interests of the United States.

The situation of the *G&M* was quite different from that of the *NYT*. While warfare would seem legitimate to the *NYT*, this is not so much the case in the *G&M*, where especially at the beginning of the war there was support for a peace movement highly reflective of the peacekeeping orientation of Canada. But the geographic and political proximity of Canada to the U.S. necessitates compatible foreign policies especially in terms of mutual defense alliances, shared interests in actual conflicts, etc. This in part explains the relative impact of U.S. propaganda on the news content of the Canadian media (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001:252).

Notwithstanding the political, economic, cultural and ideological proximity factors, the *G&M*'s front page reportage of the Gulf War was much more varied and critical than that of the *NYT*, especially in relation to the greater need to justify the use of force to the Canadian public. While the *G&M* reportage mostly subscribed to the U.S. version by virtue of the bias inherent in U.S. sources and political actors, the *G&M* was still able to maintain a relatively independent stance in its war reporting and deviated from the *NYT* by underscoring all peace talks and initiatives.

- ***The UN Role In The Gulf War***

Once the air war began, the UN role was considerably overshadowed by war coverage in the *NYT*. The paper did not give much significance to the United Nations, nor to the different means to settle the conflict. This observation is supported by the mere 3.6% (Table 6.3) front-page coverage by the *NYT* of the UN role in the Gulf War. A plausible explanation for this minimal coverage could be inherent in the military logic of the U.S. government and its reluctance to discuss other solutions for settling the conflict.

In contrast, the *G&M* meticulously conveyed the discourse of disenchantment of most Canadians with the manner Americans had twisted the UN directives towards the end of the Gulf War. That 9.1% of the *G&M*'s Gulf-War reports were dedicated to the UN is a clear indication of the *G&M*'s interest in the UN and to the paper's primary role a) to point out the self-serving measures of the United states in brushing off Iraq's final attempt for peace and honorable ceasefire, and b) to question the rationale behind inflicting devastation of epic proportions on the estimated 540,000 Iraqi troops dug down in bunkers. The dehumanizing of the Iraqi suffering was also characterized in the responses of U.S. officials to inquiries about the numbers of Iraqi casualties killed in napalm-torched bunkers such as: "We'll never know, and it really doesn't matter."¹

Another example of American contempt of human life was the depiction of a U.S. pilot referring to the carnage of Iraqi tanks along the Saudi border with Kuwait: "It's almost like you flipped on the light in the kitchen late at night and the cockroaches started scurrying and we're killing them" (Winter, 1992: 8).

¹*The Globe & Mail*. 03/19/A1/1991.

Evidently, the divergence in coverage between the *NYT* and the *G&M* occurred unmistakably during the course of the ground battle, where the tacit disagreement between the U.S. and Canadian governments was reflected in their respective newspapers' reportage of the Gulf War. Thus, the policy disagreement between Canada and the United States was echoed in the *G&M*, which had struck a chord in the Canadian collective conscience. In Ottawa, Liberal spokesman Lloyd Axworthy pointed to the dented UN credibility, making this melancholy remark: "Canadians have lost their innocence in this battle. We've had to learn that we aren't the international boy scouts we thought we were."²

In its explanation of the conflict, *Al Ahram* tended to follow the general pattern: "Saddam Hussein was to blame." In order to make a plausible pro-war argument to its Egyptian readers, *Al Ahram* designated 8.5% of its total front-page coverage to the UN's role in the Gulf War conflict. In effect, to legitimize Egypt's involvement in the coalition forces, *Al Ahram* presented the Gulf War as a battle sanctioned by the UN in order to implement the wishes of the world community.

In sum, considerable emphasis to the UN role was given in the *G&M* 9.1%, followed by *Al Ahram* 8.5%, then by *Ad Dustour* 6.7%, and lastly by the *NYT* 3.6% (See Table 6.3).

- **Reporting On Ceasefires And Peace Initiatives**

As Table 6.3 reveals, the *NYT* dedicated only 7.1% of its Gulf War coverage to report on ceasefires and peace proposals. In fact, the textual analysis suggests a strong tendency of the *NYT* to favor the military solution of the U.S. government. To explain

²*The Globe & Mail*, 02/28/A2/C6/paragraph 20.

this slant in the *NYT*, we might surmise that by virtue of war-reporting conventions, the war frame could have been passed on largely by the *NYT*'s sources. But as a journal of record, the *NYT* attempted to balance this inherent bias (censorship, and propaganda) in its hard news by providing a great range of diverse views in its op-ed sections. For instance, the *NYT* had the highest percentage of critical opinions (66.7%), critical editorial comments (62.5%), and published the most critical letters to the editor (83.3%) of all four newspapers (see Table 6.3 for comparisons).

Thus we may conclude that the four newspapers' coverage of alternative ways to settle the conflict reflected the official perspective and the political milieu of each newspaper. In the cases of the *NYT* and *Al Ahram*, the discussion of peace initiatives was essentially used against any criticism of the war. Particularly in the *NYT*, the minimal attention paid to the Soviet or UN peace initiatives may have very well be determined by the strategic interests of the United States. Tveiten affirms the *NYT*'s deliberate role in keeping a strong war frame in order not to challenge the U.S. presidency. This, in part, explains why the *NYT* refrained from supporting either the Soviet peace talks, or the UN initiatives (Tveiten, 2001: 232).

Conversely, 18.2% of the *G&M*'s coverage was dedicated to the topic of negotiations, ceasefires or peace discussions compared to the 7.1% coverage of the *NYT*. In keeping with the peacekeeping orientation of the Canadian government, the *G&M* was vigilant in assigning space and prominence to all peace initiatives and ceasefire requests, evident in to the its more sympathetic coverage of the Kurdish and Shiite Iraqis and the *G&M*'s bold criticism (opinion column) of their abandonment by the American government.

Table 6.3 indicates that coverage by both the Canadian and Jordanian newspapers was heavily involved in presenting alternative ways to settle the Gulf conflict, especially at the beginning. Although *Ad Dustour* was opposed to the military logic all along, it consistently promoted a peaceful alternative. Thus, 16.7% of its coverage stressed the need for a comprehensive perspective that would allow discussing all political/territorial disputes in the Middle East (emphasizing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict), including the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

Unlike the Canadian *G&M* (18.2%), and the Jordanian *Ad Dustour* (16.7%), which thus far displayed a significant tendency towards peace journalism, the American *NYT* (7.1%) and the Egyptian *Al Ahram* (8.5%) followed their governments' strategic cues by downplaying the allies' refusal to negotiate and muted the reports about the Iraqi intentions to negotiate for a peaceful settlement.

- **Propaganda: Images and Perceptions**

After studying American media coverage of foreign countries, many scholars have discerned that the American media interpret foreign events in familiar and popular narratives and frames (Chomsky, 1992/1993; Daniel, 1995; Gerbner, 1992; Hackett, 1991; Haque, 1995; Hashem, 1995; Karim, 2000a, 2000b; Kellner, 1995; Malek. & Wiegand, 1995; Mowlana, 1995; Nohrstedt & Ottosen [Eds.] 2001; Palmer, 1995; Roach, 1995; Said, 1981; Schiller, 1992). Among the most popular framing of Gulf War events were those of 'Hollywood'-type villains (Iraqis & Saddam) and heroes (Americans & Bush/Westerners) rushing to rid the world of evil and proclaiming their superiority.

Evidently, the analysis of the *NYT* did not reveal any blatant display of the “dehumanizing” or the “demonizing” frames that were widely used by the American mainstream media. Nor did it reveal that the *NYT* saw Saddam Hussein as a “terrorist” threat at the head of an exaggerated “Iraqi war machine.” The analysis did, however, disclose the *NYT*’s constant downplaying of Iraqi peoples’ suffering by either muting the news in its headlines and leads or by disclaiming the authenticity of the eyewitness accounts, not to mention by simply placing the reports in less prominent spaces. Indeed, in a few of its op-ed pieces the *NYT* did “demonize” Saddam Hussein and discredited all his “irrational” actions or decisions by simply portraying him as the ultimate villain that the world needed to get rid of. The effect of such a “demonizing” frame, along with the exaggeration of the Iraqi threat has insinuated to the *NYT*’s readers that more from Saddam Hussein would be expected, perhaps even an apocalyptic nuclear, biological or non-conventional attack. Better yet, the *NYT* justified to the American public the extreme measures taken by its government to curb this enormous evil. Finally, the sudden unsurpassed might of the Iraqi war machine and army, referred to as the “fourth largest in the world,” was appropriated by the *NYT* to fit the gigantic egocentric image of the “demon Saddam Hussein” frame.

Be that as it may, in addition to censorship, there was no doubt that Western journalists were obstructed by their own cultural biases. In a sense, it was easy for American Information policy to fall back on stereotypes instead of dealing with the conflict within an historic/structural framework (Ottosen, 1992:137-143) and to follow an oversimplified romantic quest narrative depicting the Gulf War realities through frames of “dehumanized Iraqis,” a “demonized Saddam,” an exaggerated “terrorist threat,” and

an inflated “Iraqi war machine.” The problem is that mainstream media depend on the centers of power and on what U.S. information officials decide on what makes the news. This dependency, many believe, may have resulted in homogenized opinion within the press and a U.S. public who wanted to believe that the government was telling the truth.

A “fast and vigorous” war was needed and thoughts of censorship could be postponed until after the battle. To this end, the *NYT* front-page coverage delivered the much-needed one-dimensional scope of momentary patriotic joy that swept through the country, limiting the range of public discourse. But the story was different in the *NYT* op-ed segments. Table 6.4 shows that 62.5% of the *NYT* editorials’ attitudes were critical, and only 37.5% were supportive of U.S. participation in the Gulf War.

TABLE 6.4 Comparisons Of Attitude Towards Participation In The Gulf War

| | ATTITUDE OF EDITORIALS | | | ATTITUDE OF OPINION COLUMNS | | | ATTITUDE OF LETTERS TO THE EDITOR | | |
|--------------------|------------------------|----------|---------|-----------------------------|----------|---------|-----------------------------------|----------|---------|
| | Supportive | Critical | Neutral | Supportive | Critical | Neutral | Supportive | Critical | Neutral |
| The New York Times | 37.5 % | 62.5 % | - | 19 % | 66.7 % | 14.3 % | - | 83.3 % | 16.7 % |
| The Globe & Mail | 40 % | 40 % | 20 % | 33.3 % | 33.3 % | 33.3 % | 33.3 % | 57.2 % | 9.5 % |
| Ad Dustour | - | 100 % | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Al Ahram | 100 % | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

Similarly, 66.7% of the *NYT*’s opinion columns were critical of the U.S. participation in the war, and only 19% were supportive. The same holds for the *NYT*’s letters-to-the-editor category, of which 57.2% were critical letters. This provides a true indication of the *NYT* diversity and its leadership in opinion formation. Therefore, it is quite likely that the *NYT* has provided a reasonable range of debate and discussion about

the Gulf War. In the overall scheme of things, the *NYT* appears to have presented a coalition of Gulf-War perspectives, rather than a monolithic and carefully orchestrated Gulf-war reportage.

On the other hand, the textual analysis of *Ad Dustour* uncovered the most propagandistic polarized coverage of all four analyzed newspapers. The Gulf War was depicted in black and white. At the early stages of the Gulf War, *Ad Dustour* called for an inter-Arab solution for the conflict and framed the Arab resistance in terms of nationalist pan-Arab ideology. As the conflict escalated, the coverage of *Ad Dustour* gradually slipped into an intense confrontational tone, which sometimes was at odds with the official Jordanian position. Contrary to the Western image, *Ad Dustour* portrayed Iraq as the real victim, the one who was fighting for the rights of all Arabs, daring to challenge the United States and its imperialist and aggressive policies in the Middle East. To make its arguments credible, *Ad Dustour* relied heavily on metaphors, parallels, and past historical experiences (such as the colonial past or the Israeli occupation) to mobilize feelings of injustice and revenge.

As the war intensified, so did the rhetoric of *Ad Dustour*. It steadily employed religious idioms to mobilize opinions and to create consensus around Saddam Hussein. By paraphrasing, and at times quoting, Saddam Hussein, *Ad Dustour* framed the war in religious terms as a showdown between the faithful “us” against the infidel “them” crusaders and repeated Saddam Hussein’s calls for Jihad. *Ad Dustour* diligently exposed the hegemonic and double-standard policy of the United States and its emblem Israel in the Middle East. By using linkage policy (the Gulf War and the Palestinian question), *Ad*

Dustour constantly reminded its readers that Israel was the real beneficiary of the Gulf War.

Finally, no space was allocated in *Ad Dustour* for alternative or critical opinions. For instance there were no attempts to report on the Egyptian, the Saudi, or other Arab perspectives. It was only *Ad Dustour's* frame and *Ad Dustour's* reality of the Gulf War that appeared; oddly enough, the newspaper contradicted the official view of the Jordanian government on numerous occasions.

In contrast, the Gulf-War coverage of *Al Ahram* was more in line with the Egyptian government than was *Ad Dustour* with the Jordanian government. *Al Ahram* emphasized the critical role played by the UN, particularly in lending credence to the international character of the coalition forces; it thus claimed that the use of force was in the name of the world community. It essentially provided an effective tool for governing, controlling and mobilizing the Egyptian population. *Al Ahram* also served as the platform for the Egyptian President from which he explained his policies and legitimized Egypt's position to his domestic constituency. Throughout the sampled period of the Gulf War, the discourse of *Al Ahram* claimed responsibility for the fate of "Arabs." In the Arab sphere, Egypt was depicted as the Arab's big brother.

The analysis of *Al-Ahram* in this study reveals the paper's vociferous support of the Egyptian government's Gulf-War policies and its defining the nation's role within the framework of Egypt's "big brother" Arab leadership. The coverage by *Al Ahram* was based on eliminating all news that would have jeopardized Egypt's credibility and firm stand in the Gulf War. Instead, the reportage projected a solid Egypt, unified and determined to implement the United Nations' mandate of international law and order.

Thus, *Al Ahram* deliberately emphasized the international aspect of the conflict, and considerably muted and downplayed the leading role played by the United States, especially during the ground battle that was referred to as “the Kuwait liberation war.” To silence domestic criticism, curtail popular dissent, and justify the Egyptian government’s policy, *Al Ahram* resorted to yet another coercive tactic. It repeatedly linked Egypt’s economically grim situation to the better prospects that awaited Egyptians, if only they would consent to their government’s role in the Gulf War. *Al Ahram*’s editorials praised Mubarak’s accomplishments, commended his assiduous attempts to mend the severe economic predicaments facing Egypt, and admired his aptitude to reassert Egypt’s leadership in the Arab World. As the prospective leader of the Arab world, *Al Ahram* was quite attentive in its portrayal of Egypt’s participation with the Western powers to free Kuwait and totally refrained from addressing Iraq in a vindictive manner. Rather, in its long brotherly counsel/headlines it emphasized a “big brother” approach for reasoning with a defiant Iraq.

In sum, the analysis of *Al Ahram*’s chauvinistic coverage revealed its total commitment to defending the Egyptian government and to condemning the Iraqi occupation of a neighboring Arab country. It held Saddam Hussein responsible for all the destruction, warned him of the consequences of his policies, and even asked him to abandon his irrational ambitions.

- **The Cognitive Role Of Language & Style**

The overall coherence of a news text is largely dependent on its macrostructures. In addition to generalization, deletion and construction, macrostructures have cognitive

functions. Consider for a moment all the events that were taking place in the battlefields of the Gulf War. Neither reporters nor readers had direct access to the facts out there. The comprehension of the world and knowledge of events was interpreted through frames and scripts known to language users. These frames and scripts were the mental models of the reporter and the reader alike through which they understood the mere happenings of the war. Conversely, the subjectivity of these frames or scripts differed from one person's interpretation to another (and from one newspaper to another or from one country to another), and definitely fluctuated through the use of different languages, especially in the case of English and Arabic (van Dijk, 1988:32-33).

Obviously, the analysis of these *frames* and scripts reflected each newspaper's unique perspective on the war. The frames of the English newspapers; namely the *NYT* and the *G&M* were compared with each other first and then were contrasted with their Arab counterparts. Comparing the headlines and leads between the *NYT* and the *G&M* yielded a few themes portraying the Gulf War in classic narratives and old stereotypical scripts of "good" vs. "evil;" others depicted the conflict in Said's "us" vs. "them" terms.

In regards to style and language, there were significant differences between the newspapers of various countries. Although formal language was used in all four newspapers, the lexical style differed enormously, in line with Tuchman's (1978) contention that a society's definition of news is dependent upon its social structure. The study also confirmed van Dijk's (1988) assertions that in news discourse, the actual expressions and choices of words used to more or less refer to the same meaning were often deployed to conceal their ideological connotations.

Accordingly, this study subscribed to the idea that language use and style will have a definite bearing on the context signaling the unique national interests and perspectives of the four newspapers. Also, the analysis aimed at uncovering the underlying ideological framework of each newspaper, as it was woven delicately into the narrative structure of the *NYT*, subtly in the *G&M's*, or quite bluntly in *Ad Dustour* as in its referral to "Al Hussein" (Scud) and in *Al Ahram's* reference to the "Kuwait liberation war" (otherwise commonly known as the "ground war"). Thus, it is safe to suggest that the ideological connotations of the texts in both *Ad Dustour* and *Al Ahram* conform to the findings of previous research concerning the two Arabic newspapers' heavy engagement in consensus formation.

The extensive textual analysis of *Ad Dustour* and *Al Ahram* revealed different narrative strategies and *frames* in order to interpret the events of the Gulf War to their respective constituencies in Jordan and Egypt. These, I might add, were very different then were the cases between the *NYT* and the *G&M*. This study asserts that the fundamental divergence between *Ad Dustour* and *Al Ahram* are not attributed to discrepancies in journalistic standards and practices, but rather, to variations in policies and interests of Jordan and Egypt in the Gulf War. To explicate this assumption further, the analysis confirms that *Ad Dustour* and *Al Ahram* relied heavily on common Arab frames of reference (such as the historic grievances towards the West and Israel, or Arab morals and sense of duty). For instance, in its depiction of the West, *Ad Dustour* extensively used negative cultural terms such as invaders, crusaders, infidels etc. But most importantly, both newspapers called upon Arab cultural values and Muslim ethics to

mobilize the masses behind the policies of their respective governments' positions in the conflict.

- **Comparison Of Graphical Layout**

The comparison of the Gulf War coverage presented in Table 6.1 indicates the intensity of coverage in all four newspapers in terms of the sheer numbers of 157 front-page reports, fifty-seven illustrations, thirty-one headline banners, twenty-six editorials, twenty seven opinion columns, twenty-seven letters to the editor, and 144 agency sources (Table 6.1). Despite this intensive Gulf War coverage, the overall characteristics of front-page graphical design of the *NYT*, *G&M*, *Ad Dustour*, *Al Ahram* disclosed a number of variations and similarities.

In terms of the layout and levels of descriptions, van Dijk (1988: 25-29) asserts that the theories of graphical realization are crucial in describing the layouts of news discourse. As such, the graphical layouts of all four newspapers were consistent with the elementary rules of the news-discourse category of headline and lead and were marked off by a special printing type. However, the Arabic newspapers compensated for the lack of lower-and-upper case characters in Arabic language by using bold type-print and multi-level eight-column front-page headlines.³

Conversely, there were major discrepancies and blurring between the English and Arab newspapers in terms of the functions of headlines, leads, editorials and opinion columns. In both the *NYT* and the *Globe & Mail*, the headlines preceded their leads and summarized both the headline and the news report by expressing the major topics of the

³van Dijk discussed this type of headline that consist of several parts of decks or banks, such as a main headline, a super-headline, a kicker, snapper, or eyebrow and a sub-headline, in *News As Discourse*. 1988. p. 53.

text i.e. initial summary, and defining the special sequence of the news text in which variable global contents were inserted.

Contrary to the *NYT* and the *G&M*, *Al Ahram* and *Ad Dustour* appeared to have a similar front-page graphic design, accentuating the positions of the headlines and leads on top and across the entire eight (fluctuating in *Al Ahram*) front-page columns. This large and bold type layout was designed to distinguish between different news categories, but occasionally, was slightly ambiguous in *Al Ahram*. At times, the lead in *Al Ahram* was serving as a summary for its headline, while most of the time it was just reiterating the headline.⁴ This practice, for instance, was not consistent with the Western format of the *NYT* or the *G&M*.

Evidently, only the *NYT* and *Ad Dustour* kept one steady front-page format throughout all nine issues. The *G&M* modified its layout (changed its lower-case headline character into upper case) on one occasion to accentuate the Scud missile attack on Tel-Aviv.⁵ In contrast, *Al Ahram* frequently changed its front-page format to accommodate two kinds of leads that van Dijk had referred to: firstly, leads that articulated and reiterate the themes of their headlines in separate and bold prints, secondly, leads that accentuated the theme of the news report's first paragraph. *Al Ahram* used both types of leads interchangeably as a strategy to call attention to some news by using the bold printed headlines and leads, while downplayed others by using the second style of leads as part of the first sentence of the thematic text.

⁴A rhetoric strategy that will be discussed later.

⁵The reference is to *The Globe & Mail*, 01/23/A1/C1/headline, and lead 1.

- **Comparison Of Functions Of Headlines, Leads & Editorials**

Variations in graphic design between the *NYT* and the *G&M* on the one hand and *Ad Dustour* and *Al Ahram* on the other can be attributed to the differing roles and functions of headlines, leads, and editorials between English and Arabic newspapers. Van Dijk defines the headline and lead category essentially as: “an empty form in which newspapers insert in it different meanings” (van Dijk, 1988: 27). This was not the case at all in the Arab newspapers. For instance, the thunderous, large and long headlines were distinctive features of both *Al Ahram* and *Ad Dustour*, along with the large number of articles found in each, some of which were few lines long.

Table 6.4 offers a comparison of the four newspapers’ attitudes towards participating in the Gulf War. Based on this comparison, the mobilizing roles of the Arab newspapers became most evident in the total absence of any critical or diverse views and in the 100% total compliance with their governments’ respective positions. In effect, the Gulf War reportage of *Al Ahram*, and *Ad Dustour* had a totally different purpose: the function of their coverage was political rather than informational. Thus, the headlines, leads and editorials all looked and sounded more like government declarations. Western conventions of differentiating between facts and commentary were blurred, and unmarked, and the characteristically distinct categories of front page factual, hard news, and the op-ed sections were all mixed up. This is mainly due to variation in the philosophical approaches, and to the role of media in Western and Arab societies. As mentioned earlier, the Arab press is premised on promoting government policies and national interests. In a sense, the Arabic headlines and leads were instrumental in mobilizing their masses and rallying them against any possible domestic dissidence.

- **Concluding Remarks**

The repercussions of the 1991 Gulf War were indeed far more decisive and critical to the unity of the Arab world (depending on one's point of view) than any Arab-Israeli war, where Arabs were united (albeit in appearance rather than substance) against the façade of one enemy, namely Israel, and one cause, Palestine. The Gulf War crushed the legend of Arab unity and integrity and symbolized the epic of Arab disarray and animosity, i.e. Arabs fighting Arabs (again according to one's perspective). It is only through these cultural codes that one can decipher the discourse of the Gulf War in *Al Ahram* and *Ad Dustour*. And only then, can one begin to develop a sense of the intertwined nature of media, culture, and religion in these societies. But there were other communities of interpretations such as the discourses of Muslim fundamentalists and Arab Nasserites that were not present in the accounts of either *Al Ahram* or *Ad Dustour*.

For the Western media, the coverage of the Gulf War redefined the relationship between the media and the military forces since the Falklands War, as well as the invasions of Grenada and Panama.⁶ But its full impact was not fully revealed until well after the end of the Gulf War in studies that indicate the ways in which the U.S. military managed and controlled the interpretations of the Gulf War.

In a sense, the Gulf War coverage was the testament that destroyed the utopia of the "new world information order" and disintegrated the counter-hegemonic efforts of the regional nonaligned movements of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Most media coverage of the Middle East fell short of responding to the diversity of cultures and the

⁶ The British media policy in relation to the Falklands War is believed to have inspired the U.S. military measures in the Gulf War.

intricacies of its media and societies. Certainly, quantifying per capita incomes, the numbers of TV and radio sets, and the circulation figures of newspapers has resulted in crude categorization. Moreover, the simplistic clichés of favorable/unfavorable studies and the deterministic generalizations have all missed the whole point of communication as a way to comprehend and accept the history of the existing and very different “other.”

A decade later, nothing has changed in this surrealist picture. The dominance of the Western flow of information continues unabated, Saddam Hussein is still in power, and the low-intensity warfare and military operations have been carried out in sporadic campaigns throughout the past decade.⁷ A familiar American cast of characters is back in Washington with a vengeance. Indeed, the new Bush administration wasted no time in marking its presence through the air strikes of February 16, 2001. It delivered a very *loud and destructive* message to Saddam Hussein; the second Bush regime was in the process of pondering its options of how to dispense with the man whose survival has haunted Washington for ten years.

Shortly after the dawn of the 21st century, a frightening apocalyptic nihilism struck in the heart of America; it was a thunderous attestation indeed to Nohrstedt & Ottosen’s (2001) prophetic testimony that the Gulf War has never ended. As they join forces with many other scholars’ warnings against prematurely harvesting the success story of the Gulf War, we are presently witnessing the spiral of violence, as well as the conflict that is widening the gap between North and South, occident and orient. But, it is

⁷The bombing campaigns on Iraq never really ceased. In fact Baghdad was attacked in January and June 1993, and in September 1996. In 1997-98 an imminent attack due to the disagreement over the mission of UN inspectors and sanctions was barely avoided. In December 1999 operation Desert Fox was underway, and another military attack occurred in February 2001.

too early to establish any concrete connection between the Gulf War and the current war on terrorism and it is best left for another endeavor.

Yet, the lessons that can be drawn for communication research are far more compelling today in relation to questions about a) dominant global media narratives b) the impact of media technology on content and quality of transnational news flow, and c) the integrity and independence of media during war time. An interesting challenge to the transnational news flow is emerging during the present war on terrorism. The Qatari-based Arabic broadcaster, Al Jazeera is in a unique position to challenge the global (Western) media narrative of war on terrorism and to create a historic precedence of using global (Western) satellites to force a two-way-flow of information by providing access to Osama Bin Laden to tell his side of the story.

Despite Peter Arnett's reporting for CNN from behind enemy lines during the Gulf War, CNN was and (still is) an American-based and-owned network. In contrast, Al Jazeera presents a unique instance of the interplay between media culture and politics in the history of transnational communication, in that the government of the United States has no direct control over it. The lack of American leverage over Al Jazeera's coverage of Bin Laden's statements or tapes has prompted the U.S. government to urge the American television networks and newspapers to "exercise judgment" and not to publish or broadcast "enemy propaganda." This novel occurrence presented by Al Jazeera is a particularly fascinating venue for media research to explore.

Lastly, if there is any doubt as to how far the media will be allowed to go this time in the coverage of the current war on terrorism, Marvin Kalb offers a pretty clear

picture in his October 17, 2001 *New York Times* op-ed piece entitled "How to Cover a War:"

In many ways, this war is different from previous wars. In one way, however, it is disturbingly familiar to journalists: they know many of the players from the Gulf War. Vice President Dick Cheney was secretary of defense in that era, and Secretary of State Colin Powell was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They briefed and pooled reporters with rigid discipline. They wanted – and got – a very clean, efficient war, replete with smart bombs that played as well on television as the latest Nintendo game. Not until months later did we learn that the bombs' I.Q. was deficient and that they often missed their targets.

Clearly, during the gulf war they did not trust a press they could not control. And they still don't. When the war in Afghanistan shifts from air to ground operations, the administration, already freaked out by leaks, is likely to reduce the number of briefings, sharply restrict access to the battlefield and wave the flag still higher.

.... The Bush administration is rallying a wounded country to fight an uncommon war. It must recognize that in this fight the press is not the enemy- it is a valuable and necessary ally, if treated with the trust that its role in a free society warrants.

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